PETITIONER: RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF DHENKENAL Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/01/1964 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. DAS, S.K. SHAH, J.C. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA CITATION: 1964 AIR 1195 1964 SCR (6) 301 ACT: Constitution of India, 1950, Arts, 14 and 366(22)--Orissa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act (13 of 1958), ss. 5 and 6--Validity--"Ruler", meaning of. HEADNOTE: The petitioners in these three writ petitions challenged the operative provisions of the Orissa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act, 1958 and the, Rules framed thereunder. These petitioners possess 302 private lands in the State of Orissa, which before the impugned Act were not subjected to the payment of rent, but which were assessed by the Revenue Officers in conformity with the Rules framed under the Act. The petitioners claims a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the said orders of assessment. The Act was passed by the Orissa Legislature because it was thought expedient to provide for assessment of rent with respert to the private lands of Rulers in the State of Orissa. The main object of the Act is to authorise the levy of rent in respect of the private lands of persons included in the definition of the word "Ruler" prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act. Section 2(h) defines a "Ruler" as meaning the Ruler of a merged territory in the State of Orissa and includes his relatives and dependants. The petitioners attacked the pro- visions of the Act mainly on the ground that they contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution. Held:(i) that s. 6 of the Act does not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution for the reason that fair and equitable tests have been laid down under s. 6 of the Act for determining the rent which should be assessed in respect of the private lands of the Rulers. In the present case the legislature had prescribed the method of determining the rent payable on the private lands; and the relevant factors specified by s. 6 appear to be just and substantially similar to the considerations which are generally taken into account at the time of survey settlement for determining the proper revenue assessment on ryotwari lands. The problem posed by the requirement to levy assessment on these private lands had to be dealt with by the legislature on an ad hoc basis. The settlement of rent and assessment introduced by the Act had been made applicable to these lands for the first time, and so, these lands could not be treated as comparable in every respect with the lands which were governed by the rates prescribed under the previous settlement. (ii)In considering the validity of a statute under Art. 14 the wellestablished principle is that the legislature can make class legislation, provided the classification on which it purports to be based is rational and has a reasonable nexus with the object intended to be achieved by it. If the party fails to show that the said classification is irrational, or has no nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the impugned Act, the initial presumption of constitutionality would help the State to urge that the failure of the party challenging the validity to rebut the initial presumption goes against his claim that the Act is invalid. In all cases where the material adduced before the court in matters relating to Art. 14 is unsatisfactory, the court may have to allow the State to lean on the initial presumption of constitutionality. (iii)There is no substance in the contention that the impugned Act is void because the definition of the word "Ruler" is inconsistent with Art, 366(22) of the Constitution. There is no doubt that the definition of the word "Ruler" prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act is wider than that prescribed by Art. 366(22) of the Constitution. 303 The definitions prescribed by Art. 366 are intended for the purpose of interpreting the articles in the Constitution itself, unless the context otherwise requires. The whole object of defining the word "Ruler" in the Act is to specify and describe the lands in respect of which the operative provisions of the Act would come into play. It is in that connection that the word "Ruler" has been broadly defined in an inclusive manner. (iv) The impugned Act is entirely outside the purview of Art. 31 of the Constitution as it has not purported either to deprive the Rulers of their property, or to acquire or requisition the said property. It is a simple measure authorising the levy of a tax in respect of agricultural lands. Pratap Kesari Deo v. The State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1961 Orissa 131, relied on. JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 79 and 80 of 1963
and 140 of 1962.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
S. N. Andley, Rameshawar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the
petitioner (in Petition Nos. 79 and 80 of 1963).
Sarjoo Prasad, Ajoy Kumar Gajdhar Mahapatra and
A. D. Mathur for the petitioner (in Petition No.
140/1962).
S. V. Gupte Additional Solicitor-General, S. B. Misra,
R.Ganapathi lyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in
all the petitions).
M. C. Setalvad, J. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and O. C.
Mathur, for the interveners (in Petition No. 140/ 1962).
January 23, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-The petitioners in these three petitions
have moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution and
claimed a declaration that the operative provisions of the
Orissa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act,,
1958 (hereinafter called `the Act’) and the Rules framed
thereunder are unconstitutional and ultra vires. The
private lands in the possession and enjoyment of the three
respective petitioners have been assessed by the Revenue
Officers in conformity with the Rules framed under the Act.
The petitioners claim a writ or direction, or order
304
in the nature of certiorari quashing the said orders of
assessment.
The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 140/1962 is the Patrani
Saheba of Keonjhar and is in possession and enjoyment of
eight villages, viz., Mangalpur; Barigan; Nua Rampas;
Nilung; Ghutru; Mohadijore; Patang and Anara in the district
of Keonjhar. These villages were granted to her for
maintenance a long time ago and as such, they have been
recorded in the village papers as Khoraki Posaki
(Maintenance Grant) Lands since the last settlement of 1918.
She has held these lands without paying assessment; and her
case is that the relevant provisions of the Act which
authorise the levy of assessment in respect of her lands are
unconstitutional and invalid. In her petition, she has
referred to the fact that from time to time, the Government
of the day had refrained from levying any assessment in
respect of her lands and thereby recognised her right to
hold the said villages on assessment-free basis. The
Revenue Officer of Keonjhar levied an assessment in respect
of the said villages purporting to act under the Rules
framed under the provisions of the Act. The petitioner then
preferred appeals to the Board of Revenue against the said
assessment orders but these appeals were dismissed. The
assessment levied against the petitioner in respect of these
lands is of the order of Rs. 9,000 and odd and it has to be
paid by her from 1958 retrospectively.
The petitioner in W.P. No. 79/1963 is Smt. Rani Ratna Prova
Devi who is the wife of Raja Sankar Pratap Singh Deo
Mahindra Bahadur, ex-Ruler of Dhenkanal State in Orissa. At
the time when the State of Dhenkanal. merged with India, the
petitioner was in possession and enjoyment of lands in five
villages as a Proprietor. In respect of these lands,
assessment had never been levied; but purporting to give
effect to the relevant provisions of the Act, the Revenue
Officer Dhenkanal assessed rent in respect of all the lands
which are in possession and enjoyment of the petitioner.
The appeals preferred by the petitioner against the said
order of assessment failed; and so, the petitioner filed the
present writ petition challenging the validity of the Act as
well as the validity of the assessment order.
305
The petitioner in W.P. No. 80 of 1963 is the ex-Ruler of
Dhenkanal. On the date of merger he held and was in
possession of 89 acres 18 dec. and 5 kadis of land in Niz-
garh Town as his private lands. These lands were never
subjected to the payment of rent and yet the Revenue Offi-
cers assessed rents in respect of these lands under the
provisions of the Act. The petitioner failed in persuading
the Appellate Authority to set aside the -order of assess-
ment, and so, has filed the present writ petition
challenging the validity of the Act and the order of
assessment. Thus, the facts on which the three petitions
claim relief are substantially similar and they have raised
common points of law for our decision. That is why the
three petitions have been heard together and would be
disposed of by a common judgment.
The Act which is challenged in the present proceedings was
passed by the Orissa Legislature because “it was thought
expedient to provide for assessment of rent with respect to
the private lands of Rulers in the State of Orissa”. It
received the assent of the Governor on the 21st May. 1958
and was published in the State Gazette on the 6th June,
1958. It consists of 15 sections and the main object of the
Act is to authorise the levy of rent in respect of the
private lands of persons included in the definition of the
word “Ruler” prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act. Section 2(e)
defines ‘Private land’ as meaning any land held on the date
of merger by a Ruler free from payment of rent, while s. 2
(h) defines a “Ruler” as meaning the Ruler of a merged
territory in the State of Orissa and includes his relatives
and defendants. Thus, the definition of the word “Ruler” is
an inclusive definition and takes within its sweep the re-
latives of the Ruler and his dependents, with the result
that private lands held by such relatives or dependents by
virtue of the grants made by the ruling Prince or otherwise
come within the mischief of the operative provisions of the
Act. Section 2(i) provides that all other expressions used
and not defined in the Act shall have the same meaning as
are respectively assigned to them under the tenancy laws in
force in the concerned areas. Section 3 contains the main
operative provision and it lays down that notwith-
134-159 S.C.–20
306
standing anything contained in any other law, custom, con-
tract or agreement to the contrary, the private lands field
by a Ruler shall, with effect from the date of commencement
of this Act, be liable to assessment and levy of rent as
provided in the Act. Thus, the effect of this provision is
that private lands held by Rulers which till then were not
liable to pay rent or assessment, were made liable to pay
the same. In other words the exemption from the payment of
assessment or rent which the private lands of Rulers enjoyed
till then ceased to be operative, and the said lands were
treated like other lands in the State liable to pay
assessment and rent.
Section 4 provides for the appointment of Revenue Officers,
and sections 5 and 6 deal with the classification of lands
and prescribe the maximum rates of rent, and the procedure
in determining the rent respectively. Under s. 5, the lands
have to be classified as irrigated-wet land, rainfed-wet
land, and dry land; this section provides that subject to
the provisions of s. 6, the rates at which the fair and
equitable rent shall be assessed with respect to the said
three categories of land shall not exceed the amount as may
be prescribed from time to time by the State Government.
The proviso to s. 5 deals with the special category of cases
where the tenants of the Ruler have already acquired rights
of occupancy, and lays down that the rent payable by the
Ruler in respect of such lands shall be such proportion of
the rent received by him from the tenants as may be
prescribed. Under s. 6, the considerations which have to be
borne in mind in determining the rates of fair and equitable
rent are specified by clauses (a) to (e), viz., the nature
of the soil and general productivity of such land; the class
under which the land is assessable; market value of the
land; the prevailing rates of rent obtaining for similar
lands in the neighbourhood; and such other matters relating
thereto as may be prescribed. It is thus clear that whereas
s. 5 requires the classification of the Ruler’s private
lands to be made and provides for the prescription of the
maximum of the rent which may be levied in respect of them,
s. 6 indicates the factors which have to be borne in mind in
determining the rates of fair and equitable rent. Clause
(e)
307
shows that in addition to the factors mentioned in clauses
(a) to (d), other matters may also be specified by the
Rules. The rest of the sections deal with matters relating
to the levy and recovery of assessment with which we are not
concerned in the present petitions.
The first contention which has been raised before us by the
petitioners is that the provisions contained in sections 5
and 6 are invalid inasmuch as they contravene Art. 14 of the
Constitution. It is convenient to refer to some facts set
out in W.P. No. 79/1963 in support of this argument. We
have already noticed that under s. 6 certain considerations
which the Act considers to be relevant have been prescribed,
and so, the Revenue Officer has to bear those considerations
in mind in determining the fair and equitable rent in
respect of a given land. W.P. No. 79/1963 points out that
as a result of the consideration of the relevant factors
mentioned in s. 6, the rates fixed by the preliminary pattas
in respect of the petitioner’s lands are in every case
higher than the rates of rent which are in operation in res-
pect of the Revisional Settlement Khatian. Basing them-
selves on the fact that in the calculation of the rent made
by the Revenue Officers in respect of the private lands of
Rulers they have arrived at a figure of rent which is gene-
rally higher than the rent which would be determined in case
the rates current under the Settlement prevailing in respect
of the other lands were applied, the petitioners contend
that in their operation the relevant provisions of the Act
have introduced an illegal discrimination as between their
lands and the other lands liable to assessment of rent in
the State of Orissa. It is also urged in support of this
argument that it would not be a valid consideration for
levying higher assessment in respect of the private lands of
Ruler that they were not required to pay assessment until
the Act was passed. The legislature may in its authority
make the private lands of Rulers liable to assessment of
rent, but when these lands are brought within the class of
assessable lands, they should be treated in the same way as
the other assessable lands are treated in Orissa. That,
briefly stated, is the contention on which the validity of
the Act is challenged under Art. 14. Prima facie, there is
308
some force in this contention. But, on the whole we are not
satisfied that the plea thus raised by the petitioners can
be said to displace and rebut the initial presumption of
constitutionality in favour of the impugned statute.
In dealing with the question raised before us, it is neces-
sary to bear in mind the fact that in regard to other
assessable lands, a survey settlement which had already been
made was in operation and was expected to continue in opera-
tion for a certain specified period; usually, when a settle-
ment has been made and assessment levied in pursuance of it,
it cannot be revised merely by an executive order during the
stipulated period, though, of course, the legislature can,
if it so desires, make a law prescribing for a fresh assess-
ment even during the said specified period. But, in the
present case, the legislature appears to have taken the view
that it was not necessary or expedient to introduce a fresh
settlement in regard to all the other assessable lands, and
so, it has passed the present statute only in regard to the
private lands of Rulers. That is one relevant and
historical fact which cannot be ignored.
Proceeding to deal with the private lands of Rulers on this
basis, the legislature had to prescribe the method of
determining the rent payable by the said lands; and the re-
levant factors specified by s. 6 appear to be just and
substantially similar to the considerations which are
generally taken into account at the time of survey
settlement for determining the proper revenue assessment on
ryotwari lands. There has been some argument at the Bar
before us as to whether the market value of the land which
has been prescribed as a relevant consideration by s. 6 was
also treated as relevant on the occasion of the earlier
settlement. No material has, however, been placed before us
in that behalf, and so, it is not possible to decide whether
this consideration was taken into account on the earlier
occasion or not, and if it was not, what the effect of the
said circumstance would be on the validity of the impugned
statute. Having regard to the relevant factors prescribed
by s. 6, it would, however, not be unreasonable to take the
view that fair and equitable tests have been laid down for
determin-
309
ing the rent which should be assessed in respect of the pri-
vate lands of the Rulers, and in the absence of any proof
that there has been a material departure in that behalf, we
find it difficult to uphold the plea that s. 6 can be
attacked on the ground that it has contravened Art. 14 of
the Constitution.
The problem posed by the requirement to levy assessment on
these private lands had to be dealt with by the legislature
on an ad hoc basis. The settlement of rent and assessment
introduced by the Act had been made applicable to these
lands for the first time, and so, strictly speaking, these
lands cannot be treated as comparable in every respect with
the lands which were governed by the rates prescribed under
the previous settlement and that may help to meet the
argument that the impugned Act contravenes Art. 14. If the
two categories of lands do not constitute similar lands in
all particulars, no valid complaint can. be made on the
ground that there has been discrimination as between them.
That is another aspect which may be relevant.
There is yet another factor which may be mentioned in this
connection. It appears that in 1959, the Orissa Legislature
has passed an Act, No. 3 of 1959 with a view to consolidate
and amend the laws relating to survey, record of rights and
settlement operations in the State of Orissa, and so, it
appears that after the settlement operations are duly
conducted and completed under the relevant provisions of
this latter Act, assessment in regard to all the assessable
lands, including the private lands with which we are con-
cerned in the present proceedings would be made on the basis
prescribed by it. The operation of sections 3, 5 and 6 of
the impugned Act is, therefore, limited to the period
between June, 1958 when the Act came into force and the date
when the assessment determined under the provisions of the
subsequent Act actually come into operation in respect of
all the lands. That is another factor which has to be
considered in dealing with the question about the validity
of the impugned Act.
The allegations made by the petitioners, in challenging the
validity of the Act are somewhat vague and the mate-
31O
rials placed by them in support of their challenge are in-
sufficient, inadequate and unsatisfactory. The reply made
by the State is also not very helpful or satisfactory. It
is precisely where a challenge to the validity of a statute
is made by a party under Article 14 and he fails to adduce
satisfactory evidence in support of his challenge that the
task of the Court to decide the issue becomes very
difficult. In considering the validity of a statute under
Art. 14, we cannot ignore the well-established principle
that the legislature can make class legislation, provided
the classification on which it purports to be based is
rational and has a reasonable nexus with the object intended
to be achieved by it, and so, on the failure of the party to
show that the said classification is irrational, or has no
nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the
impugned Act, the initial presumption of constitutionality
would help the State to urge that the failure of the party
challenging the validity to rebut the initial presumption
goes against his claim that the Act is invalid. In all
cases where the material adduced before the Court in matters
relating to Art. 14 is unsatisfactory, the Court may have to
allow the State to lean on the doctrine of initial
presumption of constitutionality and that is precisely what
has happened in these cases. On the whole therefore we must
hold that the petitioners have failed to show that the
impugned Act contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution.
it is then argued that the Act is invalid because the
definition of the expression “Ruler” is inconsistent with
the definition of the said word prescribed by Art. 366(22)
of the Constitution. Art. 366(22) defines a “Ruler” in
relation to an Indian State as meaning the Prince, Chief, or
other person by whom any such covenant or agreement as is
referred to in clause (1) of Art. 291 was entered into and
who for the time being is recognised by the President as the
Ruler of the State, and includes any person who for the time
being is recognised by the President as the successor of
such Ruler. There is no doubt that the definition of the
word ” Ruler” prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act is wider than
that prescribed by Art. 366(22). The dependents of the
Ruler and his relatives are not included in the latter
defini-
311
tion, though they are expressly included in the former. But
it must be remembered that the definitions prescribed by
Art. 366 are intended for the purpose of interpreting the
articles in the Constitution itself, unless the context
otherwise requires, and so, the argument that the definition
of the word “Ruler” prescribed by the Act is inconsistent
with the definition prescribed by Art. 366(22), has really
no substance or meaning. Besides, it is fallacious to
assume that the Act has made any provision in respect of
Rulers as such; what the Act has purported to do is to
authorise the levy of assessment and rent in respect of
lands situated in Orissa; these lands are the private lands
of the Rulers as defined by s. 2 (h), and so, there is no
doubt that the whole object of defining the word “Ruler” is
to specify and describe the lands in respect of which the
operative provisions of the Act would come into play. The
subject-matter of the levy consists of the private lands and
the compendious way adopted by the legislature in describing
the said lands is that they are the private lands of the
Rulers. It is in that connection that the word “Ruler” has
been broadly defined in an inclusive manner. If the
legislature had said that the private lands of the Rulers as
well as the private lands of the dependents and relatives of
Rulers were liable to the levy permitted under s. 3, the
petitioners would not have been able to raise any objection
because, then, it would have been unnecessary to define the
word “Ruler” in a comprehensive. way. Once it is conceded,
as it must be, that the Orissa Legislature was competent to
pass the Act under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule, it is idle to suggest that the method adopted by
the Act in describing the lands which are made liable to pay
assessment, introduces any infirmity in the Art itself.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the contention that the
definition of the word “Ruler” is inconsistent with Art.
366(22) and that makes the whole Act void, is without any
substance.
The third argument which was faintly urged before us is that
the Act contravenes the provisions of Art. 31 of the
Constitution. This argument is wholly misconceived. Art.
31(1) deals with the deprivation of property save by autho-
rity of law, and cannot obviously be invoked against any
312
of the provisions of the Act; and Art. 31(2) deals with
compulsory acquisition or requisition which also is entirely
inapplicable to the present Act. What the Act has purported
to do is to authorise the levy of assessment in respect of
lands which till then had been exempted from the said levy,
and as Art. 31(5)(b)(i) provides nothing contained in clause
(2) shall affect the provisions of any law which the State
may make for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax or
penalty. If the Orissa Legislature has imposed a tax in the
form of the assessment of the private lands of Rulers,
clearly it has not purported either to deprive the Rulers of
their property, or to acquire or requisition the said
property; it is a simple measure authorising the levy of a
tax in respect of agricultural lands and as such, it is
entirely outside the purview of Art. 31. It appears that in
Pratap Kessari Deo v. The State of Orissa & Ors.(1) the
validity of the Act was challenged before the Orissa High
Court and the said High Court has repelled the challenge and
upheld the validity of the Act. In our opinion, the view
taken by the Orissa High Court is right.
The result is. the petitions fail and are dismissed with
costs. One set of hearing fees.
Petition dismissed.