JUDGMENT
P.B. Sawant, J.
1. The short question that is involved in the present petition is whether the petitioner-employee is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts on record show that the petitioner was first employed on July 16, 1970 as an Analytical Chemist in the salary grade of Rs. 650/- to Rs. 1,000/. He resigned the said job on April 30, 1974. On Oct. 16, 1974 he re-joined as a Chief Analytical Chemist in the salary grade of Rs. 750/- to Rs. 1,500/- consolidated. His appointment was for a minimum period of three years. His services thereafter came to be terminated with effect from October 19, 1977 on account of the efflux of the tenure. He challenged the said termination before the Labour Court and the Labour Court by its impugned order rejected the reference holding that he was not a workman within the meaning of the Act. Hence the petition.
2. The Labour Court has recorded its impugned finding on the ground that one J. K. Mehta was working as an Analytical Chemist with the petitioner and the petitioner also supervised the work of Rabbit House Boy. The Labour Court has for the said finding also relied upon the contents of clause (5) of the appointment letter which states that the petitioner would be in complete charge and responsible for the analytical section, including the care of experimental animals and their well-being in general, and clause (8) thereof which specifies that it is his duty to train apprentices in his department so that they can be sent for approval as Analytical Chemist by the Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration or any other authority. The Labour Court from these facts drew the inference that the petitioner was exercising supervisory authority over the apprentices in the analytical chemist section. Hence he was not workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act.
3. We are afraid that the Labour Court has completely misdirected itself. It is true that the post of the petitioner was that of a Chief Analytical Chemist. However, it is not the designation but the nature of the duties performed by or allocated to the post which have to be examined to find out whether the work is that of a supervisory character. To come to the conclusion that the petitioner was working in supervisory capacity it was necessary to prove that there were atleast some persons working under him whose work he was required to supervise. Admittedly there is no evidence led by the respondent-employer to prove it. The only evidence that is brought on record is that he was incharge of the entire analytical section. The analytical section admittedly had only one Rabbit House Boy who was no more than a peon or a cleaner, and one apprentice-trainee J. K. Mehta. It was not urged before, and indeed could not have been urged, that merely because the Rabbit House Boy was working under him the petitioner could be said to be performing supervisory duties. If that argument is accepted, then even a clerk who is given the assistance of a peon can be said to be working in a supervisory capacity. As regards the apprentice-trainee, admittedly the only duty of the petitioner was to train him so that he could be sent for approval as an analytical chemist. The training of the apprentice was a part of his work and that work by itself could not be called supervisory work. Further, the mere fact that the petitioner was in charge of the analytical section would not make him a supervisor, because there was nobody else in the section whose work was to be supervised. As a person in charge of the section and being the only person in the section he was required to do every thing himself. The mere fact of being in charge of the section therefore did not make him a supervisor. There was no other fact on record on the basis of which the Labour Court could have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was working in a supervisory capacity of was exercising supervisor powers. The Labour Court, therefore, according to us, travelled beyond is jurisdiction and authority and has also improperly exercised the jurisdiction vested in it to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was a supervisor.
4. Hence we have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned order of the Labour Court and remanding the matter for trial on merits. Rule made absolute accordingly with costs.
