JUDGMENT
Syed Saadathulla Hussaini, J.
1. This contempt case has been filed by the petitioner alleging that the respondents have violated the orders of this Court passed in W.A.No. 32 of 1991 dated 2-11-1992 and to punish them and to direct the respondent No. 1 to dispose of the appeal preferred by the petitioner on merits.
2. At the outset, two preliminary objections have been raised by the respondents viz.,
(i) that the contempt case is barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
(ii) that no proceedings have been initiated within a period of one year from the date of contempt alleged, as such, the contempt case is not maintainable.
3. We have heard at length the arguments of both the counsel and we must say fairly that the learned Government Pleader has not pressed the first objection after conclusion of the arguments by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. With regard to the second objection, it is submitted, that the date of alleged contempt is 10-3-1994 and the contempt case has been filed on 10-3-1995. When the said case came up for admission on 10-3-1995, the court directed that notice before admission be issued to the respondents. After service of notice, the case has now come up for hearing.
5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short “the Act”) commences only when the proceedings are initiated by the Court under Section 17 of the Act. Section 17 of the Act reads as under so far as it is relevant :
“Section 17 : Procedure after cognizance
(1) Notice of every proceeding under Section 15 shall be served personally on the person charged, unless the Court for reasons to be recorded directs otherwise.
(2) The notice shall be accompanied,
(a) in the case of proceedings commenced on a motion, by a copy of the motion as also copies of the affidavits, if any, on which such motion is founded; and
(b) in the case of proceedings commenced on a reference by a subordinate court, by a copy of the reference.
He has also invited our attention to Section 20 of the Act, which is to the following effect :
“Section 20 : Limitation for action for contempt. No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”
6. This case has not been admitted as yet. The limitation period for action for contempt is one year. The contempt alleged is dated 10-3-1994. Obviously, this is barred by limitation. The other question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is only proceedings have to be initiated within a period of one year. As this court, at the time of admission on 10-3-1994, (1995) had issued “notice before admission” to the respondents, he submits that the proceedings have been initiated on the issue of notice to the respondents, as such, the case is not barred by limitation. A plain reading of Section 20 of the Act leaves us in no doubt that an action has to be initiated for violating any order of the court, it is to be initiated within a period of one year from the date of alleged violation. The question of ordering of notice before admission to the respondents could be taken as initiation within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act.
7. Further, the learned counsel has very strenuously argued that if, the court passes any order within a period of one year from the date of the alleged contempt, it would be considered as initiation of the proceedings and would not be barred by limitation. He has further submitted that this court when ordered notice before admission to the respondents, has applied its mind and issued notice before admission, as the court was satisfied that prima facie the orders of this court have been violated by the respondents. The important aspect to be dealt with is what is the effect of issuing notice before admission to the respondents and what is the notice, contemplated to be, issued to the respondents in such a case as per Section 17 of the Act. Notice has to be issued in consonance with rule 18 of the Contempt Court Rules, 1980 framed under the Act, which is to the following effect :
“18. Notice of every contempt case, if ordered by Court for service on the contemner, shall be in Form I and shall be accompanied by one set of all papers filed in the case and the said notice with all enclosures shall be served personally on the alleged contemner, unless the court otherwise directs for reasons to be recorded, requiring him to appear in person, unless otherwise ordered, on a day fixed, which shall be not less than four weeks from the date of the order or as fixed by the Court, for hearing of the proceedings and to show cause why he may not be suitably punished under the contempt of courts Act, 1971 and he shall continue to remain present during the hearing till the proceeding is finally disposed of by order of the Court, unless otherwise directed.
Provided that the Court, on an application made by, the contemner, before the date fixed for his appearance in the notice, to dispense with his personal appearance in Court, may, for sufficient cause, dispense with his personal appearance and permit him to appear by his pleader.”
A reading of Section 17 of the Act together with Rule 18 made under the Act, makes it clear that the notice contemplates that the respondent should be put on show cause notice as to why he should not be suitably punished under the Act. Notice before admission issued by this Court on 10-3-1995 is to the following effect :
“Whereas the said petition coming on for orders as to admission on this day this Court directed issuance of notice before admission returnable by three weeks, to the respondents herein to show cause why in the circumstances stated in Memorandum of petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof, the said case should not be admitted by you namely,
1. The Director of School Education, Govt. of A.P., Hyderabad.
2. The Regional Joint Director, Educational Department, Kakinada, be and hereby are directed to show cause on 31-3-1995 to which date the case stands posted either appearing in person or through Advocate duly instructed for the hearing of the same, failing which the said case will be heard and determined ex-parte.”
In the said show cause notice, it is clear that the respondents were only asked to show cause why the contempt case should not be admitted against them. This, in our opinion, is not the notice as contemplated under Section 17 of the Act.
8. Next, the learned counsel for the petitioner has stretched his point that any order, which court passes in the contempt case within a period of one year shall be considered or should be taken as initiation of proceedings under the Act. He has relied on a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Dineshbhai v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad, . In the said decision, the division bench considered under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as to what exactly is its intent and “initiation of proceedings”, what it constitutes under Section 20 of the Act. Their lordships have considered various judgments of other High Courts, including the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Purshotam Dass v. B. S. Dhillon, and concluded that “No contempt proceedings can be initiated by a court after the expiry of a period of one year from the date of the alleged commission of contempt. Action under Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 can be taken if the court has applied its mind and initiated proceedings by passing some order within a period of one year from the date of the alleged act of contempt. If an application for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is filed within a period of one year from the date of alleged commission of contempt, but the court has passed no order thereon before the expiry of one year from the said date, such application automatically fails and the jurisdiction of the court is barred because the court did not apply its mind to the complaint or information within a period of one year. It is this application of mind by the Court which amounts to initiation of proceedings within the meaning of Section 20.”
9. He has next relied on a judgment of a single judge of the Lucknow bench of Allahabad High Court in Ram Prakash & Bros v. Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow, 1983 Cri LJ 753 (All). This judgment is also to the same effect. Para 13 of this judgment reads as under :
“No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. According to the learned counsel the alleged contempt was committed on 2-2-1975 but till today even though a period of more than seven years has passed no action has been taken by this court in terms of the rules contained in Chapter (2) of the Rules of Court, 1952 framed under S.23, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The present petition was filed on 14-2-1975 i.e., only a few days after the commission of the alleged contempt. By order of the same date the petition was ordered to be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice. On 24-2-1975, Hon’ble Chief Justice passed this order – “Before Hon’ble K. N. Singh”. On 26-2-1975 K. N. Singh, J. passed the order thus :- “Issue notice”. According to the learned counsel the order issue notice does not amount to initiation of proceedings within the meaning of S. 20. This brings us to the question as to what is the full import of the term “Issue notice”. The notice of a motion is not issued to the opposite party as a matter of course. It is issued only when the court comes to the conclusion after application of mind that a prima facie case has been made out against the opposite party. By issuing notice the court calls upon the notice to show cause why relief claimed against him in the petition may not be granted and this is all that is required for initiation of proceedings.” Placing reliance on the above said decision, the learned counsel submitted that the order of this court “notice before admission” on 10-3-1995 tantamounts initiation of proceedings as contemplated under the Act.
10. Next the learned counsel has relied on a division bench judgment of the A. P. High Court in Kishan Singh v. Hon. Mr. I. Anjaiah, 1985 Cri LJ 1428 (AP). Here their lordships were considering the nature of proceedings to be initiated under Section 20 of the Act and what exactly initiate proceedings for contempt on notice. While interpreting the judgment of the Supreme Court in Purshotam Dass v. B. S. Dhillor, their lordships have held thus :
“Initiation of the contempt proceeding is the time when the Court applies its mind to the allegation in the petition and decides to direct, under S. 17 the alleged contemner to show cause why he should not be punished.”
Considering the effect of the notice under Section 17 of the Act, their lordships have further held that “the contempt petition was presented on 13-7-1981. It was dismissed on 12-8-1981 against respondents 1 and 2 by a Division Bench and the petitioner was directed to file a better affidavit for the purpose of taking up the cause for admission against respondents 3 and 4. It is, therefore, clear that the court had not within one year of the period limited by S. 20 applied its mind nor decided to issue show cause notice to respondents 3 and 4. The petition is in August, 1984, yet to be admitted against respondents 3 and 4. There is thus no initiation of action under S. 17 of the Act within one year of the violation.”
We do not see any substance in the submission of Mr. K. V. Satyanarayana, the learned counsel for the petitioner. This decision will not support his contention.
11. Yet another decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of A. P. in C.V.L. Subrahmanyam v. K. Venkateshwarlu, was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which also does not support his case.
12. The learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Maharashtra High Court in Golchha Advt. v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 Mah LJ 216. In the said decision their lordships have considered the limitation for initiation of proceedings under Section 20 of the Act and held that :
“that the fact that notice before admission was issued within the period of 12 months did not stop the running of time of one year contemplated by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The sole object of issuance of such notice is to ascertain what the basic fact are in order to make up mind to initiate proceedings or not. In no case that will be tantamount to initiation of proceedings within the meaning of Section 20. There are only two points of time that are material. One is the day of commission of alleged contempt and the other of actual initiation of proceedings of contempt. No intervening event or order stops the running of time of one year referred to in Section 20. Time started running in the present case on 4th August, 1987 and since the period of one year expired therefrom long before, the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter had ceased to exist. Consequently, no proceedings for contempt could be initiated.”
We are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judges with regard to the initiation of proceedings as contemplated under Sections 17 and 20 of the Act for the purpose of limitation.
13. Mr. K. V. Satyanarayana, the learned counsel for the petitioner also tried to distinguish a notice to be issued under Section 17 of the Act as notice under criminal contempt and civil contempt, but could not show us as to what exactly a notice should contain. In our view, whether it is a civil contempt or a criminal contempt, notice as contemplated under the Act has to be issued for initiation of proceedings and punishment. In the present case, the notice issued by the court is a show cause notice as to why the contempt case should not be admitted. This will not satisfy the requirement as contemplated under Section 17 of the Act.
14. In our considered opinion, we hold that notice before admission issued in this case on 10-3-1995 by this court, does not come within the connotation of initiation of proceedings by the court. As such, we hold that this case is barred by limitation. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Order accordingly.
