ORDER
J.B. Goel, J.
1. Application (I.A. 12820/95) under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC read with Section 151 CPC has been filed by one Iqbal Singh for being imp leaded as a party in a suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff against the defendant on the basis of an agreement of sale dated 31.3.1992 whereby the defendant had agreed to sell her 1/135th (8 Biswas) undivided share in agricultural land comprised in various khasras as mentioned in the plaint situated in village Bijwasan for a consideration of Rs. 90,000/- out of which a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid as advance. The balance of Rs. 80,000/- was payable at the time of execution of sale deed. The sale deed has not been executed by the defendant in spite of legal notice dated 12.5.1995. The suit was filed on 9.10.1995. On an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 by an Order ex parte temporary injunction passed on 17.10.1995 defendant was restrained from transferring, alienating, parting with possession or creating third party interest in the suit property. Intimation to this effect was sent to defendant on 18.10.1995 as provided under Order 39 Rule 3 CPC. Another interim order was passed on 27.12.1995 restraining the defendant from raising any construction. Contempt petition was filed and appearance was put in Court on behalf of the defendant as well as by the applicant on 20.12.1995. The defendant filed written statement and reply to applications on 23.2.1996. Sale consideration agreed and part payment were not specifically denied nor the receipt of notice dated 12.5.1995 was denied. She, however, has pleaded that on 24.4.1995, a Memorandum of understanding (for short “MOU”) was entered into by her to transfer the said land to Shri Iqbal Singh for Rs. 1,16,000/ and had received an advance of Rs.6,000/- and on 28.4.1995, she had also executed an agreement of sale in his favour and received Rs. 31,000/- as advance and possession of the land was handed over to him and thereafter, a sale deed was executed in his favour on 25.11.1995 through her general attorney and balance amount or Rs. 79,000/- was also paid to her that the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance. She has denied that the order of ex parte interim injunction was served on her or she had knowledge of it.
2. Applicant Shri Iqbal Singh in his application under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC has also taken similar pleas.
3. Copies of MOU dated 24.4.1995, agreement to sell dated 28.4.1995 and sale deed dated 20.11.1995 have been placed on record. Plaintiff has disputed and is contesting the right and entitlement of the applicant to be imp leaded as a party.
4. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has contended that there is no agreement to sell entered into between applicant Iqbal Singh and the defendant. The agreement relied is between defendant and Shamsher Singh and as such applicant is not entitled to the benefit of the MOU and agreement in question and that the sale deed in favour of the applicant was executed on 20.11.1995, i.e., after the institution of the suit and after the order of temporary injunction restraining the transfer of the property was passed against the defendant and as such the transfer in favour of the applicant is void being hit by the doctrine of lies pendens as contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (for short “the TPA”) and also being in breach of order of injunction and he is not entitled to be imp leaded as a party. Whereas learned counsel for the applicant whom the counsel for the defendant has supported has contended that agreement to sell was entered into by the defendant prior to institution of the suit the applicant is a bona fide purchaser for consideration and without notice of the agreement of sale with plaintiff, he had no notice or knowledge of the suit or of the injunction order. In the circumstances, the doctrine of lis pendens is not attracted. He has also contended that possession was delivered by the defendant on 28.4.1995 against consideration and by virtue of Section 43 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 it amounts to sale and the sale deed executed and registered later on relates back to 28.4.1995 under Section 47 of the Registration Act. The applicant is vitally concerned with the subject matter of the suit, any adverse order will affect his rights, he is entitled to guard his interest and is a necessary or in any case a proper party entitled to be imp leaded under Order 1 Rule 10 and/or Order 22 Rule 10 CPC, moreso, as he is also being proceeded in contempt.
5. First, I take the question whether the transaction amounts to a transfer within the meaning of Section 43 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 read with Section 47 of the Registration Act as on 24.4.1995, or 28.4.1995.
6. Section 43 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 reads as under:- “43. Transfer with possession by a Bhumidhar to be deemed a sale. Any transfer of any holding or part thereof made by a Bhumidhar by which possession is transferred to the transferee for the purpose of securing any payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability, shall notwithstanding anything contained in the document of transfer or any law for the time being in force, be deemed at all times and for all purposes to be a sale to the transferee and to every such sale the provisions of Section 33 and 42 shall apply.”
7. An agreement to sell is not a ‘transfer’ contemplated under Section 43 of the said Act. The transfer contemplated in this Section, underlined portion, is substantial reproduction of Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act according to which such “transfer” is a “mortgage”. The transfer contemplated under Section 43 is for the purpose of (1) securing the payment of any money or loan (2) existing or to be advanced in future or (3) to secure the performance of any engagement which may give rise to pecuniary liability. This clearly contemplates a transfer by way of mortgage to secure payment of an existing debt or loan to be advanced in future or to secure the performance of an engagement in future which may otherwise give rise to pecuniary liability arising out of agreement/engagement entered into and in pursuance of which such transfer takes place.
8. Under the scheme of the Act, two classes of tenures are created under Section 4 of the Act; (1) one tenureholder, i.e., ‘Bhumidar’ and (2) the other subtenure holder called ‘Asami’. Sections 5 and 6 confer certain rights and impose certain liability on both such tenure holder, under Section 31, interest of a Bhumidar is transferable subject to certain conditions, whereas interest of Asami is nontransferable under Section 32 of the Act.
9. Transfer by way of sale by Bhumidar is provided under Section 33 Section 34 permits only simple mortgage without transfer of possession and Section 36 permits lease to lessee called Asami under certain circumstances. Transfer in contravention of Section 33 results in vesting of Land in Gaon sabha. And under Section 43 any transfer with possession by the Bhumidar would be transfer by way of mortgage with possession which is prohibited under Section 34 of the Act. Section 43 does not contemplate or prohibits transfer of possession under an agreement of sale.
10. Concepts of ‘debt’ and ‘damages’ are not the same. A debt gives rise to an existing liability and is an actionable claim which is assignable whereas breach of contract gives right to file a suit for recovering damages and it does not give rise to an existing debt or obligation on the part of the person who commits the breach and is not assignable. {See Iron & Hardware (India) Co. Vs. Firm Shamlal & Bros., and S. Milkha Singh & Ors. Vs. M/s. N.K. Gopalakrishna Mudaliar & Ors. AIR 1960 Punjab 174 (DB)].
11. Thus in case of an agreement to sell, Section 43 is not applicable and for that reason the agreement to sell does not result into transfer/sale on 28.4.1995. For that matter, Section 47 of the Registration Act has no application.
12. Doctrine of lies pendens is contained in Section 52 of the TPA which reads as under:-
“52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.- During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.
13. The background and scope of this provision was considered by the Supreme Court in Jayaram Mudaliar Vs. Ayyaswami & Others, . There, the following definition of lis pendens from Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. LIV page 570) was referred to with approval :
"Lis pendens literally means a pending suit: and the doctrine of lis pendens has been defined as the jurisdiction, power, or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment therein." It was also observed there : "Expositions of the doctrine indicate that the need for it arises from the very nature of the jurisdiction of courts and their control over the subject matter of litigation so that parties litigating before it may not remove any part of the subject matter outside the power of the Court to deal with it and thus make the proceedings infructuous." 14. In Rajendar Singh & Ors. Vs. Santa Singh & Ors. also, this definition was referred to with approval. And the scope of Section 52 was explained as under :- "15. The doctrine of lis pendens was intended to strike at at tempts by parties to a litigation to circumvent the jurisdiction of a court, in which a dispute on rights or interests in immovable property is pending, by private dealings which may remove the subject matter of litigation from the ambit of the court's power to decide a pending dispute or frustrate its decree. Alienees acquiring any immovable property during a litigation over it are held to be bound by an application of the doctrine, by the decree passed in the suit even though they may not have been imp leaded in it. The whole object of the doctrine of lis pendens is to subject parties to the litigation as well as others, who seek to acquire rights in immovable property, which are the subject matter of a litigation, to the power and jurisdiction of the Court so as prevent the object of a pending action from being defeated."
15. This rule is not based on the doctrine of notice but on expediency. But for this rule it would be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination, if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail as the plaintiff would be liable in every case to be defeated by the defendant’s alienating before the judgment or decree, and driving him to commence proceedings de novo and without any end thereto. This principle necessarily is based on great public policy. It is immaterial whether the alienee pendente lite had or had no notice of the pending proceedings ( Rappal Vs. Gopal AIR 1970 Kerala 180). Question of good faith or bona fides also does not arise for its application (Mohd. Ali Abdul Vs. Bisahmi AIR 1973 Mysore 133, Shanu Ram Vs. Bashesher Nath & Ors., (1966) 68 PLR (D) 44, Balwinder Kaur Vs. Financial Commissioner (Appeals) Punjab & Anr. ). This rule applies to suits for specific performance. In Joginder Singh Bedi Vs. Sardar Singh Narang & Ors. , it was held that Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act also does not protect a transferee pending litigation. It is immaterial whether the alienee pendente lite had or had not notice of the pending proceedings. Nor it is necessary that the alienee must be imp leaded as a party to the suit. Such transferee has no prior equity nor any preexisting right. This is also the law laid down by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Munnilal & Anr. Vs. Bhaiyselal & Ors. and a Full Bench of Mysore High Court in Khajath Vs. Mohammad Hussain (1964) Mys LJ 236 (FB) and later followed in Mohd. Ali Vs. Abdulla AIR 1973 Mys 137 (DB).
16. The broad purpose of Section 52 is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation pending its determination [ Gauri Dutt Maharaj Vs. Sukur Mohammad AIR 1948 PC 149 and Joginder Singh Bedi (supra)]. Section 52 places a complete embargo on the transfer of immovable property right which is directly and specifically in question in a pending litigation and applies irrespective of the strength or weakness of the case on one side or other (Kedar Nath Vs. Sheonarain ).
17. Documents placed on record show that an MOU was entered into on 24.4.1995 by the defendant with Shamsher Singh agreeing to sell the property in question to him for a consideration of Rs. 1,16,000/ when Rs.10,000/ was paid as advance, followed by agreement to sell dated 28.4.1995 confirming the MOU and Shamsher Singh further paying Rs. 31,000/- and the defendant having delivered possession to him. The sale deed purports to have been executed on 20.11.1995 in favour of the applicant and his brother Shamsher Singh which has been registered on 22.11.1995 at Mumbai. As mentioned in this sale deed, the total sale consideration agreed and paid is Rs. 82,500/- out of which Rs. 7,500/- was paid in cash and Rs. 75,000/- through cheque dated 13.11.1995. The number of the cheque and the bank on which the cheque may have been drawn are not mentioned. There is a variance between the sale consideration agreed in the MOU and the Agreement to Sell and the part payments made as mentioned therein on the one hand and that in the sale deed, inasmuch as in the first two documents, the sale consideration is Rs.1,16,000/- out of which Rs.10,000/- were paid on 24.4.1995 and Rs. 31,000/- on 28.4.1995 whereas the sale consideration in the sale deed is Rs. 82,500/- out of which Rs.7,500/- were paid in cash and Rs. 75,000/- in cash, both apparently on or about 20.11.1995 when it was executed or on 22.11.1995 when it was presented for registration. There is no mention in the sale deed if any MOU or agreement to sell was at all entered into before the sale deed was executed nor that advances of Rs.10,000/- and Rs. 31,000/- were paid on 24.4.1995 and 28.4.1995. Obviously either the MOU and agreement to sell were not entered into and have been falsely fabricated later to create false evidence or the same were abandoned/discharged and were not subsisting when this sale deed was executed. MOU is not drawn on any stamp paper and the copy of the agreement to sell does not show when the stamp paper may have been purchased, by whom and for what purpose as that portion has been withheld and its original has not been produced. It is admitted by the defendant that she had received a notice dated 12.5.1995 from the plaintiff requiring her to complete the sale. She had not given a reply that she had entered into MOU or agreement to sell with the applicant or his brother Shamsher Singh.
18. In these circumstances, it is very doubtful if any agreement to sell was at all entered into before the institution of the suit. The circumstances in which the sale deed has been registered are also very suspicious and intriguing. The land is situated in Delhi, vendor, vendees, the general attorney who executed the sale deed as well as the two attesting witnesses are all residents of Delhi but the sale deed was registered at Mumbai. There is no apparent reason why the sale deed was not got registered in Delhi and it was taken to Mumbai for its registration. It was registered on 22.11.1995, i.e., within two days of its execution. Apparently, it was a surreptitious sale hurriedly finalised after the suit was filed by the plaintiff. Possibly, the sale deed could not have been registered in Delhi without prior permission/NOC from the competent authority under the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972. Section 8 of that Act prohibits the Registering Officer from registering such document and Section 9 makes its violation a punishable offence and the sale in violation of Section 4 illegal and void. This fact seems to have been concealed from the Registrar. Apparently the sale deed is intended to defeat the claim of the plaintiff for specific performance.
19. Notwithstanding these circumstances, the case is being examined on the wider issue, that is, what is the effect of transfer pendente lite and for that purpose whether the applicant should be imp leaded as a party.
20. Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC provides as under:- “10. Court may strike out or add parties- (2) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the applica tion of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.”
21. This provision enables the Court to add any person as party at any stage of the proceedings if the person whose presence before the Court is necessary or in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceedings.
22. English law as laid down in Moser Vs. Marsden (1892) 1 Ch 487 : 66 LT 570, (per Lindly L.J.) and which is also the Indian Law as held by the Supreme Court in Razia Begum Vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum , a party who is not directly interested in the issues between the plaintiff and the defendant but is only indirectly or commercially affected cannot be added as a defendant because the court has no jurisdiction under the relevant rule to bring him on record even as a proper party.
23. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay , the scope of Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC has been considered where it has been observed :- “The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1 Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceedings. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”
24. In para 8, construing the meaning of the words “whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit”, it has been observed that :-
“The Court is empowered to join a person whose presence is neces- sary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the rule direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. If the intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject matter of the existing action, the Court has power to join the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the Order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions.”
And in para 14, it has been observed that :-
“It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party………. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e. he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action.”
25. Thus, where the claim by the intervener is based on a different cause of action, the consolidation of two separate causes of action in the same suit is neither contemplated nor permissible as it might cause unnecessary prejudice to the plaintiff [New Red bank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kumkum Mittal & Ors. .].
26. Learned counsel for the applicant has relied on Savitri Devi Vs. District Judge, Gorakhpur & Ors. . In that case, appellant had filed a suit against her four sons for a decree for maintenance and for creation of a charge over ancestral property. A vakalat was filed on behalf of defendants. Defendant No. 4 also filed an affidavit on behalf of the defendants and with the consent of counsel for the parties defendants were restrained from alienating properties. Defendant No.1 sold his 1/4th share each in three properties to respondents No. 3 to 5 by means of separate sale deeds. The respondents No.3 to 5 applied for being imp leaded. The trial court after taking into consideration the facts of the case and also other developments which took place during proceedings allowed them to be imp leaded. Revision was dismissed by the District Judge and the writ petition by the High Court. Supreme Court also dismissed the appeal holding that on the facts of this case, the impleadment of respondents No. 3 to 5 as parties to the suit was warranted. Surjit Singh & Ors. Vs. Harbans Singh & Ors., was referred to but distinguished.
27. This case is based on its own facts and circumstances.
28. In Surjit Singh’s case, transferees lis pendens and having notice of the injunction order passed in the suit were not allowed to be imp leaded under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC.
29. In Ramesh Chand Shankar Choudhari (supra), the transferee had not sought impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC during the pendency of the suit for partition. The transfer pendente lite was also not in dispute. The transferee after the suit for partition of parts of an estate assessed to land revenue to the Government had been decreed had approached the Collector under Section 54 CPC for an equitable partition of the land. The land purchased by the transferees was allotted to another without giving any consideration to their claims for an equitable partition. Their appeal before the Commissioner as well as the State Government and also writ petition challenging the validity of the partition proceedings were dismissed on the ground that they had no locus standi to ask for an equitable partition under Section 54 of the CPC as their names were not mentioned in the partition suit. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that: “…….. in the case of transferees pendente lite also, if there is no dispute, the Collector may proceed to make allotment of properties in an equitable manner instead of rejecting their claim for such equitable partition on the ground that they have not locus standi. A transferee from a party of a property which is the subject matter of partition can exercise all the rights of the transferor. There is no dispute that a party can ask for an equitable partition. A transferee from this, therefore, can also do so”.
30. The transferee had not applied for being imp leaded as a party during the pendency of partition suit before the Civil Court either under Order 22 Rule 10 or Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC and the doctrine of lis pendens was not invoked. The transfers were not in dispute.
31. In Mahinder Kaur Vs. Sudarshan Krishna 1992 Rajdhani Law Reporter (DB) 274, during the pendency of a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell land, the transferee of defendant had sought impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 and Order 22 Rule 10 and Section 151 CPC which was disallowed by the single Judge. In appeal it was held that under Order 22 Rule 10, petitioner was a proper party to be added “to safeguard her interest not only against the plaintiffs but also against Panna Lal (owner) defendant who may enter into another contract as he has already entered into two contracts or to defeat Panna Lal from entering into compromise with the plaintiff behind her back”. In this case, mainly reliance has been placed on Bai Dosabai Vs. Mathuradas .
32. In Bai Dosabai’s case (supra), the lessor had filed a suit for arrears of rent and possession. Suit was decreed and in execution possession was taken. Lessee having right to purchase the land then filed a suit for specific performance which was dismissed by the Trial Court but the High Court decreed the same on certain terms holding that the deed executed between the parties had created an equitable interest in the land in favour of the plaintiff. Negativing this last mentioned principle, it was held :- “The concept and creation of duality of ownership, legal and equitable, on the execution of an agreement to convey immovable property, as understood in England is alien to Indian Law which recognises one owner i.e. the legal owner : vide Rambaran Prasad Vs. Ram Mohit Hazra and Narandas Karsondas Vs. S.A. Kamtam . The ultimate paragraph of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, expressly enunciates that a contract for the sale of immovable property does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such Property. But the ultimate and penultimate paragraphs of Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act make it clear that such a contract creates an obligation annexed to the ownership of immovable property, not amounting to an interest in the property, but which obligation may be enforced against a transferee. with notice of the contract or a gratuitous transferee of the property. Thus, the Equitable ownership in property recognised by Equity in England is translated into Indian Law as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, not amounting to an interest in the property, but an obligation which may be enforced against a transferee with notice or a gratuitous transferee.”
33. This authority is of no help for deciding the question of right of transferee pendente lite being imp leaded as party during pendency of the suit.
34. The earlier Division Bench of this Court in Joginder Singh Bedi (supra) has also not been noticed and considered. As held therein, transfer during pendency of a suit for specific performance is hit by doctrine of lis pendens and such transferee cannot claim the benefit as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. This case thus is of no help as a precedent.
35. Under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC, a party is not entitled to be imp leaded/substituted as a matter of right. He may be imp leaded with the leave of the Court and that of course will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A power under one provision would not be exercised in derogation of other enactment.
36. In Pirthi @ Sansi etc. Vs. Jati Ram & Ors., , it was held that third party who came in possession of suit land after institution of the suit for specific performance will not be an impediment in the right of plaintiff for specific performance.
37. The scope, ambit, necessity and justification for the rule of lis pendens as contained in Section 52 of the TPA and its effect on pending proceedings has been considered by a Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Lakshmanan Vs. Kamal where it has been held that
“14. “……..The effect of this Section is to render void as against the decree holder in a suit in which any right to immovable property was in dispute and entitle him to ignore all transfers or other dealing with it by the judgment debtor from the time of the institution of the suit till the complete satisfaction or discharge of the decree which would affect the decree holder’s rights under the decree or any order made in the suit. xxx xxx xxx
15. If a transfer…….pendente lite is void as against the decree holder and he is entitled to ignore it and it cannot affect his rights under the decree, no purpose will be served by bringing on record, after the transfer, the transferee……and to insist that a transferee………should be brought on record in such cases would only be to hold out a premium to persons who desire to escape from their legal obligations and unnecessarily protract legal proceedings, and would defeat the very purpose for which Section 52 of the TPA has been enacted.”
38. In these circumstances, the applicant is a transferee pendente lite. The transfer in his favour is hit by Section 52 of the TPA and is voidable as against the plaintiff. His impleadment is unnecessary and which would cause embarrassment and delay in the trial of the suit. Plaintiff as dominus lit us does not want him to be imp leaded as a party. This is not unjustified. The applicant is thus not entitled to be imp leaded as a party in the suit.
39. Learned counsel for the applicant has also contended that the applicant transferee is a representative of the defendant and would be entitled to raise objections against decree of possession under Section 47 CPC and also at the time of taking possession under Order 21 Rule 98 CPC.
40. No doubt, a transferee is a representative of his transferor but as a representative he has no independent right. It is well settled that “the purchaser pendente lite under this doctrine is bound by the result of the litigation on the principle that since the result must bind the party to it so must it bind the person deriving his right, title and interest from or through him (Samarendra Nath Sinha & Anr. Vs. Krishna Kumar Nag ).
This application is accordingly dismissed.
I.A. 8362/99
41. This application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC has been filed by Shamsher Singh and Ashok Kumar, claiming as transferees of the land in question.
Learned counsel for the applicants has contended that the applicants have become transferees under Section 43 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 on 28.4.1995 when possession of land was handed over to them in part performance and for consideration and they are not transferees lis pendens; secondly that they are being proceeded in contempt for alleged violation of temporary injunction order passed on October 17, 1995. They are thus entitled to be imp leaded to safeguard their interest. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has disputed their entitlement to be imp leaded for the reasons already discussed above.
42. The contentions based on Section 43 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act and on the question of applicability of doctrine of lis pendens have already been discussed above. There is neither any agreement to sell nor a sale deed in favour of Ashok Kumar in respect of the land in question. He thus has got no right or interest in the subject matter of the suit and as such is not entitled to be imp leaded as a party.
43. It is not necessary that they should be imp leaded as party simply for deciding the proceedings for contempt against them. Those proceedings can be decided as effectively and conveniently without impleading them.
44. For the reasons given in I.A. 12820/95, this application is also dismissed.
45. I.AS. 12820/95 and 8362/99 are accordingly disposed of.