ORDER
Srinivasan, J.
1. This appeal is against an order passed by the District Judge, North Arcot at Vellore, under the provisions of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1981 directing the sale of mortgaged properties. There is no dispute that a sum of Rs. 8,96,352-38 is due to the respondent from the appellant.
2. Three points raised before me by learned Counsel for the appellant are as follows – The District Judge, North Arcot, Vellore, had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 21 of the said Act as the appellant had shifted his business to Madras even before the filing of the petition, Learned Counsel submitted that the mortgage deed on which the respondent has applied under Section 31 of the Act for sale of the properties, related to the properties situated within North Arcqt District. At the time when the petition was filed, the second schedule properties -had been removed outside the district and were brought to Madras. Learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that the only court which would have jurisdiction to entertain a petition with reference to the second schedule properties is, the Court at Madras and not the court at Vellore. The said contention was rejected by the learned District Judge on the ground that the appellant had not obtained permission of the respondent before removing the machinery to Madras. In my view the failure to obtain the permission of the respondent before removing the machinery is not relevant to decide the question of jurisdiction. It may be that the respondent may have other remedies against the appellant for removal of the machinery without his permission to a place outside the district. However, the petition filed by the respondent before the District Judge is, certainly maintainable and the District Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the same because the plea that the machinery was removed to Madras prior to the filing of the petition has not been proved by the appellant.
3. Section 3(1) of the Act so far it relates to our purpose reads:
that the Financial Corporation may apply to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its business.
In the counter statement filed by the appellant, the plea raised by him is in the following terms.
The respondent submits that dues to severe power shortage and lack of trained technical hands to repair the imported machineries, which are so advanced in technology the respondent was forced to shift the entire machineries and the business to premises No. 24, Dharmarajan Koil Street, Chintadripet, Madras in the month of early June, 1983, after intimation to the petitioner.
The plea raised in the counter statement is vague with regard to date of shifting. If really, the appellant had shifted to Madras on any particular date he would have made a specific plea with regard to the same.
4. When the evidence was let in, the respondent relied on three documents marked as Ex.R-1 to R-3 before the learned District Judge in support of his plea that the machinery had been shifted. Ex.R-1 is the copy of the letter dated 4-1-1983, addressed to the respondent herein by the appellant, in which the appellant sought permission of the respondent to remove; the machinery to Madras. Even assuming that the said letter reached the respondent, admittedly, the permission sought for by the appellant was not granted by the respondent.The next document is Ex.R-2, dated 17-11-1983, which is written by the Divisional Manager, National Insurance Company to the appellant. It is seen from the order of the District Judge that the contents of’ the letter show that Insurance Company, had agreed to keep the policy alive with reference; to the machinery even after they were shifted to Madras. Ex.R-2 does not prove that the machinery was shifted before the filing of the petition by the respondent herein. Ex-R-3 is the copy of the letter dated 25-4-1984, written by the appellant to the respondent. In that letter, the appellant had stated that anticipating that permission would \be granted by the respondent for shifting the machinery. The machinery was shifted during the period between February, 1983 and June, 1983. Obviously, this letter was obtained for the purpose of the case. This letter is written after the filing of the petition. When the appellants has not chosen to mention the date in the counter statement of shifting the machinery to Madras and when he makes an attempt by Ex.R-3 to substantiate his plea, it cannot be accepted to be true. There is little doubt that the shifting of the machinery has if at all taken place only during the pendency of the proceedings. Hence it has to be held that on the date of the petition, the District Judge, North Arcot at Vellore had jurisdiction to entertain the same as the respondent was carrying on business within the limits of his jurisdiction. Hence I reject the first contention of learned Counsel for the appellant.
5. The second contention urged by learned Counsel for the appellant is that there was no ad-interim attachment effected on Schedule II properties, and therefore, the final order passed by the learned District Judge directing sale is not valid. Learned Counsel draws my attention to Section 32 of the Act. Clause (1) of Section 32 provides for passing an ad-interim order, attaching the security, or so much of the property of the industrial concern as would on being sold realise iq his estimate an amount equivalent in value to the outstanding liability of the industrial concern. Clause (7) reads: ‘after making an investigation under Sub-section (6) the District Judge may (a) confirm the order of attachment and direct the sale of the attached property; (b)…(c)…(d)… and (e)\ Learned Counsel submits that unless an attachment is effected under Clause (1) there can be no order of sale at the time of final disposal of the petition filed by the Financial Corporation. It may be seen that the section refers, to only an order of attachment. The section does not speak of the actual effecting of the attachment. In this case there is no dispute that an order of attachment was passed by the District Judge with regard to both the Schedules I and II as soon as the petition was filed by the respondent. The order of attachment could not be effected because the factory was kept locked, by the appellant. While dealing with point No. l, I have held that the appellant shifted his business only after the filing of the petition in order to thwart the order of attachment by shifting the machinery and keeping the factory locked. The appellant cannot take advantage of his own fault and contend that the order of attachment not having been effected, there could not be any final order of sale. After all, attachment is intended to keep the property intact for the benefit of the creditor. It has been held under the Civil Procedure Code that any defect in effecting the attachment is only an irregularity which does not render the execution sale void.
6. As pointed but earlier, the section speaks only of an order of attachment. The requirements of the section have been fulfilled in this case by the interim order of attachment passed by the District Judge at the time of filing of the petition. Later the same has been confirmed after hearing the parties under Clause 7(a) of Section 32. Therefore, the District Judge has directed the sale of the property and I do no find any error in the order of the learned Districts Judge. This contention urged by learned Counsel is also rejected.
7. The third submission by learned Counsel is that in order passed by the District Judge he has directed the sale of not only properties described in the petition, but also other properties belonging to the appellant. The respondent herein has prayed for sale of all the properties of the appellant including Schedule II properties. The respondent cannot in those proceedings seek any relief with regard to the properties owned by the appellant which do not form the subject-matter of the mortgage. The District Judge was clearly in error in directing the sale of other properties belonging to the appellant. The order of the learned District Judge is set a side in so far as it relates to the direction for sale of other properties belonging to the appellant. The order of the District Judge is confirmed in so far as it directs sale of the properties described in the second schedule attached to the petition.
8. No other point was argued before me. Hence, the civil miscellaneous appeal is partly allowed and partly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
