JUDGMENT
R. Bayapu Reddy, J.
1. This revision petition is filed by the respondents in I.A.No.17 of 1992 In unnumbered A.S-of 1992 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Cuddapah, questioning the orders dated 2-7-1993 by which the petition filed under Section 5 of the limitation Act by the petitioner was allowed.
2. The respondent herein is the plaintiff and the revision petitioners are the defendants in O.S. No. 20 of 1984 on the file of the Principal District Munsir Court, Cuddapah. The said suit filed for the reliefs of declaration of title and mandatory injunction relating to the suit property was dismissed on contest on 21-11-90 by the trial Court. Subsequently the plaintiff filed the appeal in the District Court, Cuddapah on 24-10-91 questioning the decree and judgment of the trial Court. As the said appeal was beyond the period of limitation involving delay of nine months fourteen days, the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 17 of 1992 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of such delay contending that she was suffering from heart ailment and was bed-ridden and taking treatment at Kurnool during the relevant period and as such she could not contact her advocate for taking steps to file the appeal in time; that when she returned to Cuddapah from Kurnool, she made enquiries and came to know that the case bundle which was sent to her by her advocate was misplaced by her daughter- in-law and the same could be traced only a day prior to the filing of the appeal; that soon after the same the appeal was filed involving the above said delay which is not intentional and mat, therefore, the appeal may be numbered by condoning the delay. The defendants in the suit, who are the present revision petitioners contested the said petition contending mat the reasons urged by the plaintiff for condoning the delay are false; that she was not suffering from any ailment and not taking any treatment at Kurnool; that she originally did not intend to file any appeal against the Judgment of the lower Court and she subsequently chose to file the appeal only on account of some disputes that arose between them; that there are no sufficient reasons for condoning the delay and that the petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.
3. On the basis of the evidence adduced before him, the learned District Judge allowed the petition for condoning the delay. The present revision petition is filed questioning such orders of the District Judge.
4. The point for consideration is whether there are any valid reasons to interfere with the orders of the lower Court in allowing the petition filed for condoning the delay?
5. It is to be seen from a perusal of the material on record including the affidavit filed by the respondent herein in support of her petition filed for condoning the delay and the orders of the lower Court by which the petition was allowed, that the delay of 9 months 14 days involved in filing the appeal is attributed to some alleged illness due to which she is said to have been under the treatment of a Medical Practitioner at Kurnool and as such the appeal could not be filed within time. The respondent herein had also filed a certificate said to have been issued by the Medical Practitioner, Kurnool under whom she is alleged to have taken the treatment during the relevant period and the said certificate was marked as Ex. A-l. The respondent herein was examined as P.W.1 while the second petitioner herein was examined as R.W.I. It is seen from a perusal of the orders of the lower Court that the contention of the respondent regarding her illness and her consequent inability to file the appeal in time was accepted by the lower Court on the basis of Ex. A-l and the other evidence placed on record and the delay was accordingly condoned. But it is to be seen from a perusal of such orders and the material on record that the lower Court has erred in coming to such conclusion by drawing an erroneous and incorrect inference regarding the cause for the delay in filing the appeal and that such conclusion arrived at by the lower Court is not borne out by the evidence on record and is also manifestly contrary to the evidence and palpably a wrong conclusion. As already Stated above, the suit was dismissed on 21-11-1990 by the trail Court. As per Ex. A-l medical certificate, the truth and genuineness of which is specifically disputed by the petitioners herein, the respondent is said to have been under the treatment of the said Medical Practitioner at Kurnool from 10-1-1 991 to 2040-1991. A perusal of the affidavit of the respondent filed in I.A. No. 17/92 and her evidence as P.W.I shows that there is practically no explanation whatsover offered by her for her failure to file the appeal before she is said to have gone to Kurnool for taking treatment which is said to have commenced on 10-1-1991 only. The copy of the application for grant of certified copies of the Decree and Judgment of the trial Court was made on 22-11-90 and the certified copies were delivered on 17-12-1990 itself. Even after 17-12-1990, the respondent did not make any effort to file the appeal before 10-1-91 from which date alone she is said to have been under treatment at Kurnool. Not even a whisper is made either in her affidavit or even in her evidence regarding the cause which prevented her from filing such appeal during that intervening period. The lower Court completely neglected this aspect and allowed the petition as a matter of course by saying that there is no reason to disbelieve Ex. A-l certificate.
6. Ex. A-l certificate is dated 4-11-1991 and it was therefore evidently not filed along with the petition for condoning the delay which was filed alongwith appeal on 24-10-1991. The said certificate appears to have been filed only subsequently when the enquiry in that petition was taken up. It is alleged in the certificate that one “Smt K. Narayanamma” was treated by the said Doctor who issued the certificate for some heart disease from 10-1-1991 to 20-10-1991 and she was advised to take rest. Neither the name of the husband nor her age nor her place of residence is mentioned in the said certificate and the signature of the person relating to whom the certificate is said to have been issued was also not taken in that certificate so as to identify the person relating to whom such certificate was issued by the Doctor. The petitioners have categorically stated in their counter filed in the petition as well as in the evidence of R.W.I that the respondent was never suffering from any illness and never took treatment at Kurnool They have also categorically disputed the truth and genuineness of Ex. A-1 medical certificate by putting a suggestion to P.W.I during her cross- examination that it is a forged document. In spite of the same and in spite of the fact that the certificate was issued as a matter of course for the alleged illness relating to a sufficiently long period of about 9 months, no effort was made by the respondent to examine the Doctor who is said to have issued such certificate or at least obtain and file his affidavit to show that such a certificate was in fact issued by him relating to her illness. No reason is also attributed by the respondent for non-examination of the Doctor who is said to have issued that certificate. Apart from this, it is to be seen from the said certificate as well as from the evidence of P.W.I that the respondent was not admitted as in-patient in any hospital during the above said period of about 9 months at Kurnool and there is nothing to show that she was staying at Kurnool throughout that period either as out-patient or as in-patient. What is mentioned in that certificate is that she was under treatment from 10-1-1991 to 20-10-1991 and she was advised to take rest. It is not even bed-rest that is said to have been advised to her by the Doctor. Under such circumstances, it cannot be inferred that the respondent even if it is to be said that Ex. A-l certificate was issued relating to her alleged illness, was staying only at Kurnool throughout that period of about 9 months without coming to Cuddapah at any time. In spite of such infirmities in the evidence placed on record for condoning such abnormal delay and inspite of the fact that the person who is said to have issued Ex. A-l certificate is not even examined and his affidavit atleast was not filed, the lower Court took such certificate for granted and condoned the delay in a casual manner without making any effort to see whether there is any truth in the contention of the respondent regarding her alleged illness and the reasons put forward by her to condone the delay in filing the petition.
7. It is seen from the material on record that the husband and the sons are all educated persons and her husband is a retired Government employee while her sons are also employed in the Marketing Committee at Cuddapah and all of them have been staying at Cuddapahduring the relevant period. P.W. 1 has also admitted that her husband and her sons were aware of the litigation and they did not also write any letters to her informing her that the suit was dismissed. As a matter of fact, the suit was dismissed even before her alleged treatment commenced at Kurnool, as already stated above. The respondent had put forth another reason for not filing the appeal in time by stating that the case records were handed over to her daughter-in-law by her advocate’s clerk and the said records were, however, misplaced and they could be traced only a day prior to the filing of the petition and as such, there was the delay involved in filing the appeal. Such version looks quite artificial and clearly appears to have been invented for the purpose of explaining the delay in filing the appeal and no effort was also made by the respondent to prove such circumstances. The learned District Judge did not even care to look into any of these circumstances which were all alleged by the respondent in her affidavit as well as in her evidence before coming to the conclusion that she was prevented by “sufficient cause” in not filing the appeal in time. As already stated above, the learned District Judge treated the matter in a most casual manner without trying to appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective and allowed the petition in a much moral casual manner and condoned the delay. On account of such circumstances and as the finding of the learned District Judge is not borne out by the evidence on record and is manifestly contrary to the evidence and palpably wrong, it will result in grave injustice if such orders are allowed to stand. Under these circumstances, there is every justification to exercise the revisional powers vested in this Court to set right such wrong by allowing the revision and dismissing the petition filed for condonation of such delay.
8. The learned counsel for the respondent herein has tried to rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in M.L. and B. Corporation v. Bhutnath, wherein it is observed by Their Lordships that it is not open to the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. to question the findings of feet recorded by a Subordinate Judge’s Court. But as already stated above, the orders of the lower Court suffered from infirmity as the findings arrived at by the said Court are not borne out by the findings on record and is manifestly contrary to such evidence and as such there is every justification for interfering with such orders to do justice in the matter. In another decision of the Supreme Court reported in Manik Chandra Nandy v. Debdas Nandy, it is observed by their Lordships:
“In determining the correctness of the decision reached by the Subordinate Court on such plea, the High Court may, at any time, go into a jurisdictional question of law or fact, that is it may have to decide collateral questions upon the ascertainment of which the decision as to jurisdiction depends. For the purpose of ascertaining whether the Subordinate Court has decided such a collateral question rightly, the High Court, however, cannot function as a Court of first appeal so far as the ascertainment of evidence is concerned and substitute its own findings for those arrived at by the Subordinate Court unless any such finding is not in any way borne out by the evidence on record or is manifestly contrary to evidence or so palpably wrong that if allowed to stand, would result in grave injustice to a party.”
It is already found that the findings of the lower Court are clearly erroneous and are not in any way borne out by the evidence on record and are manifestly contrary to such evidence. The petitioners herein who are the respondents in the petition filed in the lower Court have acquired a vested right under the law of limitation due to the fact that the appeal was not filed within time and that there was abnormal delay which is not at all explained by the respondent in a proper manner. It is evident from such circumstances that the respondent is guilty of gross negligence in prosecuting her litigation by failing to take necessary steps to file the appeal within the period of limitation or within a reasonable time thereafter and instead dragged on the matter for more than nine months and subsequently came up with the appeal for her own reasons by putting forth false and untenable reasons to explain such delay.
9. The learned counsel for the respondent has also tried to rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Collector, Land Acquisition, Ananthanath v. Mst. Katiji and Ors., , wherein it is observed by their Lordships that in considering the applications filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court should adopt liberal approach. It is to be seen from a perusal of the said Judgment of the Supreme Court that such observations were made and the delay was condoned in view of the facts and circumstances of that particular case. It is observed at the end of para-3 of that Judgment that, in view of the facts in that case giving rise” to tine appeal before the Supreme Court, their Lordships were satisfied that there was ‘sufficient cause’ for condoning the delay. In the present case, as already stated above, there is no such ‘sufficient cause’ for condoning the delay of 9 months 14 days and the respondent has utterly failed to show that there was any such sufficient cause which prevented her from filing the appeal in time. As a matter of fact, there was practically no explanation at all for not filing the appeal from the date when certified copies were granted till her treatment at Kurnool is said to have commenced, as already stated above.
10. The present petition was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay involved in filing the appeal. Section 5 of the Limitation Act as well as the provisions of Order 41 Rule 3-A C.P.C. state that the delay involved in filing the appeal can be condoned only if the appellant satisfies the Court that he had ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ no doubt deserves to receive aliberal construction, but striking a just and equitable balance between the right secured by the respondent as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievance on the merits of the appeal for cause beyond his reasonable control. This is a matter for the exercise of judicial discretion of the Court and each case has to be decided on its own peculiar facts. “Sufficient cause” should be given to a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no ignorance nor inaction nor want of bonafide is imputable to the appellant. In condoning the delay, the Court should consider that by lapse of time a legal right has been accrued to the other side and that right should not be disturbed lightly without sufficient cause. But if ‘sufficient cause’ is shown the Court has ample power to condone the delay. If the delay is to be condoned as a matter of course even when no such ‘sufficient cause’ is shown and when there is inaction or want of bona fides on the part of the appellant by putting forth the theory of liberal construction of the expression ‘sufficient cause’, it will clearly lead to undesirable results and will amount to encourage the inaction and mala fides on the part of the persons trying to take recourse to the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by approaching the Court whenever they want to do so for questioning the orders of the Court by filing an application for condonation of delay at their will and pleasure. If liberal construction of the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is to be extended to such an extent, then practically there is no necessity for having Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the statute as it will amount to saying that the affected party can come and file a petition for condonation of delay at whatever time he wants by putting forth some reason or other, whether true or false and soliciting the discretion of the Court in his favour. I am afraid that such a liberal construction cannot be imported into the expression ‘sufficient cause’ as incorporated in Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Order 41 Rule 3-A C.P.C. The facts of the present case reveal that the respondent was grossly negligent in prosecuting her litigation and there are also no bona fides on her part in putting forth the cause for delay involved and as such, the orders of the lower Court allowing such petition cannot be sustained.
11. In the result, the revision is allowed with costs and the orders of the lower Court are set aside arid the petition filed for condoning the delay is dismissed with costs.