1. The Magistrate, in convicting the petitioners under Section 143, Penal Code, added to the sentence an order under Section 106, Code of Criminal Procedure, directing them to furnish security to keep the peace.
2. Now, an offence under Section 143, Penal Code, is not one of the offences specified in Section 106, which would justify such an order. As has been pointed out in the case of Jib Lal Gir v. Jogmohun Gir (1899) I.L.R., 26 Cal., 576, there may be findings in the case which would justify such an order if such findings can be brought within the terms of Section 106, but in the present case there are no such findings at all. The Magistrate in his explanation attempts to justify his order by stating that “the facts as proved showed that the accused came in a body, some of whom were armed with lathis and some of whom used threats and did other acts intending evidently to commit breaches of peace.” We can find no express finding to this effect, and we would observe further that if the accused or any of them acted in this manner, they should have been convicted of criminal intimidation or other offence which might enable the Magistrate to bind them over to keep the peace. We are inclined to think that difficulties arise in cases such as the present because Magistrates, instead of trying an accused for the offence constituted by all the acts proved, prefer to charge and try him for an offence under Section 143, Penal Code, because such a trial can be held under the summary procedure; and we take this opportunity of expressing our strong disapproval of such a course. The order under Section 106, Code of Criminal Procedure, is accordingly set aside.