JUDGMENT
R.K. Mahajan, J.
1. By this petition, the petitioner seeks a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the State Government, Respondent No. 1, to publish the award given by the Industrial Tribunal (I), Allahabad in Adjudication case No. 27 of 1984 in the matter of dispute referred to it for adjudication by order of reference dated October 1, 1984.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that there was a dispute pending between employer Ramsey Pharma Private Limited, Naini, Allahabad and their union of workmen. An order of reference was made by the Government on October 1, 1984 contained in Annexure-I to the writ petition. Although the reference was made by the
Government to the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad for adjudication of the disputes, the parties were continuing their bilateral negotiations and on October 14, 1984, they arrived at an amicable settlement resolving all their pending disputes including the four items referred for adjudication by order of reference, as mentioned above.
3. Later on, the settlement/compromise appears to have been taken place between the parties. On the basis of the settlement, the matter was disposed of by the industrial Tribunal vide its order dated November 29, 1984 and the Government vide its order dated January 29, 1985 disposed of the matter by observing that since the matter contained in order Annexure-I, has not been adjudicated upon, the same could not be published in the
official gazette. In fact, the Tribunal has described wrongly as order and it should have been described as an award which was based on settlement. The Government did not publish it on the ground that it does not fall within the definition of award vide Annexure-3 to the writ petition. Hence the writ petition has been filed for a direction of the Court to get the award published in the gazette.
4. It appears that this Court has directed the learned Standing Counsel to file the award vide its order dated April 2, 1985. In compliance of the said order, the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (I), Allahabad vide his letter dated April 10, 1985 addressed to the Standing Counsel, submitted the copy of the Tribunal’s order in Adjudication Case No. 27 of 1984 dated October 1, 1984 and copy of the letter dated January 29, 1985 informing that the said order of the Tribunal need not be published. The same is placed before us.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the material on record.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is the duty of the Government to publish the award under Section 6-C of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He further submits that the Government has taken erroneous view that it does not fall within the definition of award. On the other hand, Sri Vinay Malviya, appearing for the respondents, submitted that the Government did not find that the award falls within the definition of award and so it was not published. We don’t agree with the submission advanced by the Standing Counsel.
7. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present case, we would like to quote provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Award has been defined in Section 2(c) in the following terms :–
“(c) ‘Award’ means an interim or final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court or Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 5-B.”
‘Settlement’ has been defined under Section 2(t) of the said Act in the following manner:–
(t) ‘Settlement’ means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such an agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such a manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the State Government and the Conciliation Officer.”
8. Section 6-A deals with the commencement of the award. The same is being quoted as under:–
“6-A. Commencement of the award.–(1) An award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 6:
Provided that if the State Government is of the opinion that it will be inexpedient (on public grounds affecting national or State economy or social justice) to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare that the award shall not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty days.
Sub-section (3) of Section 6-A provides :–
“(3) Where any award as rejected or modified by an order made under Sub-section (2) is laid before the legislature of the State, such award shall become enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which it is so laid and where no order under Sub-section (1) is made in pursuance of a declaration under the first proviso to Sub-section (1), the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in Sub-section (2).
Section 6-B is quoted as under:–
“6-B. Settlement outside conciliation proceedings:–(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall except as provided in Sub-section (4), be binding on the parties to the agreement :
Provided that if the period for which a
settlement shall remain in force has not been laid down in such settlement itself, it shall remain in force for one year from the date of its registration.
(2) As soon as settlement referred to in Sub-section (1) has been arrived at, the parties to the settlement or any one of them may apply to the Conciliation Officer of the area concerned in the prescribed manner for registration of the settlement.
(3) On receipt of application for registration under Sub-section (2) the Conciliation Officer or an authority notified by the State Government in this behalf, either : (i) register the settlement in the prescribed manner, or (ii) refuse registration if it considers it to be inexpedient to do so on public grounds affecting social justice, or if the settlement has been brought about as a result of collusion, fraud or misrepresentation.
(4) Where a settlement under Sub-section (1) has been refused registration, it shall not be binding under this Act.”
9. The main question for determination in this petition is as to whether the matter under reference for adjudication falls within the purview of Section 2(c) of the Act or not. We find in the order dated November 29, 1984 that he has made Annexure A’ and ‘B’ tagged with the order while, disposing of the industrial dispute. It appears that the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal kept this statement in view while disposing of the matter and thereafter he remarked that since the dispute referred has been mutually settled by agreements in Annexures ‘A’ and ‘B’, the matter no longer remains to be adjudicated upon. So the Presiding Officer has applied his mind. There is no allegation that the settlement was arrived at as a result of coercion. We have gone through the settlement.
10. We have gone through the terms of the reference and settlement. The parties have claimed for increase of wages from different dates and the spirit of the settlement shows that the referred matters to the Industrial Tribunal have more or less been settled. There is emphasis under Section 2(c) that award means an interim or final determination of any industrial dispute. It is nowhere mentioned that the final determination
must come to an end by judicial settlement and not by private negotiations and settlement cannot form the basis of the award. In Industrial Law the settlements are honoured as they promote industrial peace. We find that the learned Tribunal has applied judicial mind and disposed of the matter in view of the settlement though by mistake he has described it as order and not award. It makes hardly any difference in such misdescription as the Courts are to be beyond the spirit of the award based upon the settlements.
11. To our notice there is Krishna Kutty Nair v. Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum AIR 1960 Kerala 31. In this case, it was observed that it is the elementary right of the parties to a dispute to adjust their matters of difference wholly or in part, by any lawful agreement or compromise and every authority entrusted with the task of adjudicating the dispute has a duty, not a discretion, to record such agreement or compromise subject possibly to an inherent power of refusal when substantial injustice would be worked. A Tribunal, therefore, to whom an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, must record a lawful agreement or compromise placed before it by the disputants. There is nothing in the Act to suggest that a particular class of agreement or compromise is outside its scope, though whether a particular compromise is lawful or not will vary with the varying character of different disputes. The expression “determination” in the definition of “award” in the Act indicates only a coming to an end of a dispute. To our mind, the dispute, as referred to, has come to an end through the settlements/agreement which form the basis of award. In the same judgment quoted, there is observation of Supreme Court at page 53 that Courts should not be astute to discover formal defects and technical flaws to overthrow settlements peacefully and quickly arrived at within the framework of the Act. For after all the adjudication by the Tribunal is only an alternative form of settlement of the dispute on a fair and just basis having regard to the prevailing condition of the industry. The public need requires more and more production if any settlement arrived at between the management and the workmen conduces thereto that is an end which the Court will welcome and no amount of
technicality need stand in its way. See State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathi (1953-I-LLJ-174) (SC).
12. We are of the view that it would be very unreasonable to assume that the Industrial Tribunal would insist upon dealing with the dispute on merits even after it is informed that the dispute has been amicably settled between the parties. There can, therefore, be no doubt that if an industrial dispute before the Tribunal is amicably settled, the Tribunal would immediately agree to make an award in terms of the settlement between the parties. We are also of the opinion that a consent decree is as good as a decree made by the Court after contest. Similarly, a consent award is as good an award as an award made by the Tribunal after contest and there is no bar to hold that it is not an award. It would be travesty of justice if we hold that the award must be based on merits which would negate the very spirit of settling the industrial disputes.
13. It may be pointed out that the distinction has been brought between commercial and industrial arbitration as pointed out by Ludwig Teller (Labour Disputes and Collective Bargaining) Vol. 1, page 536 mentioned in Kerala ruling cited (supra). In the said authority, it is also observed as under :
“This distinction does exist and there is no doubt that an Industrial Tribunal is not so fettered as a Court of law and may create new obligations or modify contracts in the interest of industrial peace, to protect legitimate trade union activities and to prevent unfair practice and victimisation. But it seems to me that the apprehensions of the learned counsel are rather unjustified. For the motivating idea of the parties there would appear to have been only to maintain what may be called an industrial truce for a reasonable period, say, three years, but at the same time without sacrifice of any of the rights of the workmen. It is in fact in this perspective that the Tribunal itself found that each one of the clauses of the compromise terms would work to the manifest advantage of the workmen in the long run.”
14. It may also be pointed out that the preamble of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well as the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is to settle industrial disputes and also for other incidental matters. So the logic behind It, as we have already discussed, is that the industrial disputes are to be settled to maintain production and peace.
15. The learned counsel has also relied on Workmen, Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur v. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur and Ors. (1973-II-LLJ-261)(SC). The relevant brief note is quoted as under :-
“Brief Note :- (A) Even if the matter referred to a Labour Court is held not to be an industrial dispute the State Government is under a mandatory duty to publish the award submitted to it by the Labour Court. It has no authority under the law to withhold publication on the ground that the finding recorded by the Labour Court indicated that the dispute referred to it was not an industrial (sic) on the State Government. AIR 1964 SC 160, followed.”
16. We are of the considered opinion in view of the aforesaid discussion that the Government committed an error in interpreting the order of Presiding Officer dated October 29, 1984 by way of holding that it is not an award. We are of the opinion that it is an award and it is the duty of the Government to publish it. We accordingly hold that it requires publication in accordance with Section 6-A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The State Government Respondent No. 1 is directed to publish the award given by the Industrial Tribunal (I), Allahabad in Adjudication case No. 27 of 1984 in the matter of dispute referred to it for adjudication by order of reference dated October 1, 1984 within a month from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.