JUDGMENT
1. This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugns the orders of the Labour Court, Thane, dated April 18, 1985 and January 24, 1986 made under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
2. The salient facts relevant for deciding this writ petition are as under :
The First Petitioner is a Company which carries on the business of manufacturing Steel Ingets and Rolled Products. The First Respondent was employed in the service of the First Petitioner as an Electrician from or about 1979. He was paid a salary of Rs. 850 per month. While in service he was given a letter dated March 31, 1981, by which he was informed that he had been appointed as an Electrical Supervisor with effect from November 3, 1979 and that his services had been confirmed with effect from May 3, 1980. Apart from describing him as an Electrical Supervisor, this letter of appointment does not indicate the nature of work which was to be carried out by him as an Electrical Supervisor On June 13, 1981, when the rolling mill was in operation, the electrical motor was stopped by the first respondent at about 2-15 p.m. There is controversy between the parties as to the exact reason for stopping the rolling mill. The first respondent’s version is that the electrical mill was making noise indicating over-loading on account of overfeeding and that continuation of the operation of the mill under such circumstances might have caused damage to the motor, because of which he switched off the motor. The Petitioners’version is that the first respondent had stopped the motor without any justifiable cause. What transpired thereafter is also a matter of controversy. The Petitioners’ version is that 3 or 4 of the co-workmen approached the first respondent and asked him the reason for shutting off the motor. Instead of behaving, civilly with them, he abused them and slapped 2 or 3 workers. Acdording to the Petitioners, on June 13, 1981, all the 44 workmen of the rolling mill had signed a joint memorandum addressed to the Manager of the petitioner-factory complaining against the first respondent, saying inter alia, that he, “quarrelled with us, abused us and also slapped 2-3 workers from amongst ourselves. Therefore, we all workers are bringing to your notice that there is danger to anybody’s life from amongst ourselves”. The workers, therefore, asked for action being taken in the matter. The last signatory to the said memorandum is one Gopal Singh, Foreman of the said rolling mill. Gopal Singh had also made a written complaint to the Manager in which he said, inter alia, that the first respondent was not a good workman, that he intended to damage the mill and when the mill was giving full production, he had stopped the mill without any cause. The situation which developed thereafter is best described in his own words :
“When I enquired with him as to why he has stopped the mill, he asked me as to who I was to ask him about it, when I am incharge of the Plant. He also abused Rampal Singh and Mohan Ram. He also slapped some workers. He is trying to create terror in the plant. He quarrels with workers on petty things. He also abuses me. He has threatened me saying that he will see me outside.”
On these facts he requested that the first respondent be removed from service and for necessary legal action. Interestingly, on the same day there was a complaint made by the first respondent to the Manager, presumably placing on record his version of the incident. Two Officers Lalitkumar Gupta and Dixit, and three foremen confabulated on the same day and decided that the first respondent’s services deserved to be terminated. Next day, Dixit was asked to investigate the facts and he is said to have made a report conveying the results of his investigation. Thereafter, nothing happened for almost a month. On July 13, 1981, a letter was issued to the first respondent by which he was informed that, after receiving his complaint as well as complaints from other workers, the Petitioners had taken an explanation-cum-report from the incharge of the rolling mill, Foreman Ram Gopal Singh, and according to that they had come to the conclusion that the presence of the first respondent in the Plant may create violence and accordingly they were constrained to terminate his services with immediate effect. Consequently upon this letter, the first respondent’s services were terminated upon payment of one month’s notice pay.
3. The first respondent moved the Labour Court by a complaint under Section 28 read with Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act. After narrating the circumstances, he contended that the action of his removal from service amounted to unfair labour practice and sought relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. The complaint was contested by the Petitioners, firstly, on the ground that it was untenable in that the first respondent was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, not an employee within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the Act. By the impugned order dated April 18, 1985, the Labour Court over-ruled the objection as to the tenability of the proceedings and held that the First Respondent was a workman. Being aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioners approached this Court by Writ Petition No. 3085 of 1985 which was summarily rejected at the stage of admission with liberty to the Petitioners to challenge the order in a petition against the final order if it goes against him.
4. The parties led evidence on the merits of the case and after assessing the evidence on record the Labour Court made the second impugned order dated January 24, 1986, holding that there was an Unfair Labour Practice engaged in by the Petitioners and directing reinstatement of the First Respondent in service with continuity of service and full back wages with effect from July 13, 1981. Both the above orders are impugned in the present writ petition.
5. The evidence on the preliminary issue of tenability consisted of testimony of Lalitkumar Lalaram Gupta, Finance Manager, during the course of which, in the examination-in-chief itself, he enumerated the duties carried out by the first respondent while working as Electrical Supervisor as (i) to supervise the electrical installation, (ii) to advise the management as to what type of electrical equipments to he procured for another rolling mill, (iii) to advise with regard to what type of equipment management should have with regard to existing rolling mill, (iv) to advise with regard to notification to be made with regard to existing rolling mills, (v) to plan the preventive maintenance, (vi) to sanction the leave and to recommend the loans to his subordinates. It is interesting to note that this witness is a Chartered Accountant and qualified Company Secretary, who works in the Head Office of the Company at Masjid. Bunder takes financial decisions at the Head Office and once or twice in a week visits the factory. The witness did not have any technical qualification and it is obvious that he has little knowledge of the technical work in the factory. The first respondent-workman in his evidence maintained that, despite his having been described as ‘Electrical Supervisor’, there was no change in the nature of his work which consisted of attending to the motor, attending to the minor break-down in the motor and also doing rewinding work and replacement of parts. He also pointed out that Lalsingh and Singh and Guptaji were taking rounds of all sections. He was categorical in his assertion that, except for discontinuing the card system, there was no difference in his duties after issue of the letter of appointment as an Electrical Supervisor. After assessing this evidence on record, the Labour Court, in my view rightly, arrived at the conclusion that the First Respondent was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, an employee within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the Act and that the complaint was tenable.
6. Though Mr. Cama, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, strenuously contended that this finding was perverse, I am unable to accept the contention for two reasons. Firstly, I do not find the reasoning faulty at all. Even if I were to slit in appeal over the finding recorded by the Labour Court, I might not have differed from the conclusion recorded by the Labour Court on the issue as to whether the first respondent is a workman. Secondly, I am not exercising appellate powers and where the Labour Court has recorded a finding of fact after proper appreciation of evidence, this Court is reluctant to interfere with it in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
7. Turning next to the merits of the case, I pointed out of Mr. Cama that the situation is one of accepting one set of evidence as against the other and, unless there were some extraordinary good reasons as to why the conclusion recorded by the Labour Court ought to be rejected, it would not be permissible for this Court in writ jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of facts recorded by the Labour Court. Mr. Cama has taken me through the entire evidence on record. He also read out paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Labour Court’s impugned order on merits and strenuously contended that the order shows non-application or mis-application of mind and, at any rate, perverse application of mind while assessing the evidence on record. This contention also cannot be accepted. That there was application of mind to the evidence on record is obvious ex facie upon reading the impugned order. In paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the impugned order, the Labour Court has given several reasons as to why it was not impressed with the evidence placed on record by the Petitioners. Having scanned those reasons with the assistance of the learned Counsel, I am unable to accept the contention that those, reasons were perverse reasons. In my view, each of the reasons assigned by the learned Judge for rejecting the evidence adduced by the Petitioners is a valid reason and displays proper exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Labour Court to record conclusions of fact upon assessment of evidence. It is, therefore, difficult for me to accept the contention that the order, dated January 24, 1986, needs to be interfered with because there is perverse appreciation of evidence on record.
8. Mr. Cama then raised two interesting questions of law, which, in his submission, should be sufficient to persuade this Court to interfere with the impugned order. His first contention is that this was a situation where the employer had bona fide come to the conclusion that he had lost confidence in the workman and, therefore, irrespective of whether such conclusion was factually justified or not, industrial adjudication must adopt a ‘hands off policy and accept the conclusion arrived at by the employer. In Support, Mr. Cama cited the locus classiscus on this subject, Air India Corporation, Bombay v. V. A. Rebello and another, (1972-I-LLJ-501). Undoubtedly, in the circumstances which were present before the Supreme Court in Rebello’s case, there was no occasion for the industrial adjudicator to take any different view on the issue of loss of confidence. Even the Tribunal had found that it was a case of bonafide loss of confidence.
9. In the Petitioners’ case, it ‘is difficult to accede to the contention because the element of bona fides seems to be lacking. Though the Labour Court has not spelt them out in terms, the circumstances are discernible on record and it would be worthwhile to recount them. In the first place, the incident occurred in the presence of all workmen and there was hardly any justification for not holding the domestic enquiry. lfthere were over-riding circumstances for not holding the enquiry, neither were they pleaded nor proved. Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that such over-riding circumstances did not exist. Barring over-riding circumstances, failure to hold a domestic enquiry indicates lack of bona fides. Secondly, the first respondent himself had made a written complaint about the incident putting forth his version as to what had happened. This was a material piece of evidence which could have been assessed for proper appreciation of the events. Curiously, though its existence is averred in the letter of termination of service, that document has not been placed on record and the Court has been deprived of consideration of the contemporaneous version of the first respondent by its suppression. This is a second circumstance indicating lack of bona fides. Thirdly, it is admitted that Model Standing Orders are applicable to the establishment of the petitioners. Mr. Cama does not dispute that the Model Standing Orders contemplate two modes of termination of service : (1) Dismissal after enquiry and (2) the short circuit of simple discharge upon giving requisite notice or payment of requisite notice charges. But, while following the latter of these alternatives, the employer is required to place on record the circumstances which impelled him to terminate the service of the workman. Curiously, in the instant case, though it is admitted that such an order was made indicating the reasons which impelled the employer to terminate the service ofthe first respondent-workman, that order has not been placed on record and what we have is only the bowdlerized version in the actual letter of termination of service. In my view, there is another circumstance of lack of bona fides. Finally, there is no evidence on record to indicate that the first respondent was holding a post of confidence. In this view of the matter, I am unable to accede to the argument that this was a case of Employer bona fide arriving at the conclusion that he had ‘lost confidence’ in the workman and terminating his service.
10. Mr. Cama referred to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Srinarayan Mevalal Gupta v. Padamjee Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. and Others, 1991 (1) CLR 93. Having perused the judgenent, I do not find anything said in this Judgment which was not said by the Supreme Court in the cases of Sidhartha Krishnaji Kadam v. Dadaji & Dhackji and Co. and Mickel and Another v. M/s. Jonson Pumps Limited, both of which have been referred to in paragraph 3 of the judgment and respectfully followed. This judgment does not advance the case of the petitioners.
11. Finally, Mr. Cama raised another question of law. He contends that in the case of an unfair labour practice complained under the provisions of the Act, where the dismissal of a workman is in issue, the mere fact that the domestic enquiry, has been found to be bad or that there was no enquiry, could not per se be the reason for granting relief and that the Court must further go ahead and record a finding of want of bona fides or presence of mala fides without which there was no power to grant relief. He relied on the judgment of a learned Single Jjdge of this Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Niranjan Sridhar Gade andanother, 1985 LIC 294. I am afraid, that the ratio decidendi of this judginent has been misappreciated. This Court said in Niranjan Gade’s case (supra) :
“It is not enough in a complaint filed under the Act 1 of 1972 charging the employer with unfair labour practice to merely allege or to prove that the act is not justified for one or the other reasons. As has been pointed out by this Court in Navnath S. Koli v. Shri Siddheshwar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana, 1981 83 Born LR 470, in a case where the employer has been charged with an unfair labour practice of dismissal or discharge of a workman for patently false reasons, it is not enough for the Labour Court to hold that the order of dismissal or discharge was wrong or that the domestic enquiry had become vitiated for some other reasons. It must be established that the dismissal was motivated by false reasons and that such false reasons were patent. Similarly in the present case the Labour Court was entitled to see whether the act of the dismissal of the Respondent by the petitioner amounted to an unfair labour practice under one or the other clause of Item 1 of Sch. IV of the Act I of 1972 as alleged by the Respondent.”
In coming to this conclusion, this Court followed its earlier decision in Navnath S. Koli v. Shri Siddheswar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana, 1981 83 Born LR 470,(supra) wherein it had been laid down that, unless the Labour Court came to the conclusion that there was an unfair labour practice, within the meaning of one or the other item in the Schedule, engaged in, the Court could grant relief merely on the allegation that the order complained of was otherwise illegal or improper. This proposition is well-settled and beyond cavil. But, the question is whether the Labour Court has interfered in the instant case, without there being an unfair labour practice. In paragraph 11 of the impugned order, the Labour Court has recorded its finding that the facts brought on record, in the background circumstances of the case, amounted to an unfair labour practice on the part of, the petitioners. In view of this clear finding of the Labour Court on the question of unfair labour practice, the judgment in Niranjan Gade’s case (supra) would be of no avail to the Petitioners.
12. In the premises, I see no reason to interfere with the two orders impugned in this writ to petition as I see little merit in the petition. It is unfortunate that this writ petition is pending from 1986 in this Court and the first respondent is out of service from 1981. Taking an overall view of the matter, I am of the view that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief at the hands of this Court in exercise of the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction.
13. Petition is dismissed with costs. Rule discharged.
14. Certified copy expedited.
