JUDGMENT
R.M. Lodha, J.
1. On 5th July, 2002 the petitioner made an application to the Advocate General of the State of Maharashtra for his consent to file a criminal contempt petition before this Court. The petitioner also forwarded draft of contempt petition. The Advocate General declined to grant consent and a communication to that effect was sent to the petitioner. The said communication dated July 8, 2002 reads thus:—
"GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA (SEAL) No. AG/282/02 1st Floor, Chamber No. 5, G.E. VAHANVATI, High Court Extension Bld. ADVOCATE GENERAL Mumbai 400 032. July 08, 2002 To, Mr. Sham Sunder Arya, Chief General Secretary, Samajwadi Party, Mumbai. Sub: Sanction for filing petition before the Hon'ble Bombay High Court for criminal contempt. Dear Mr. Arya,
This refers to your application dated July 5, 2002 for sanction for filing petition in the Bombay High Court in terms of the draft submitted to me. I note from the draft that the statements alleged to constitute contempt are said to have been made at a meeting held in Haridwar on 22-6-2002. Further, the proceedings referred to in para 3 of the draft petition are said to be pending in the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court. I further note from the cause title that none of the respondents reside within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court and as such the statement in para 9 that the respondents are within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court (i.e. Bombay High Court) does not appear to be correct. In the premises, I am of the opinion that the Bombay High Court is not the appropriate Court to take cognizance of the case and as such I decline to grant consent.
Yours Sincerely,
Sd/-
(G.E. VAHANVATI)”
2. The aforesaid communication sent by the Advocate General to the petitioner declining to grant consent under section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short, ‘Act of 1971’) is subject matter of challenge in this writ petition.
3. At the outset, the learned Advocate General raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of writ petition. His submission in that regard was refusal to grant consent by Advocate General under the Act of 1971 is not justifiable nor it is amenable to judicial review. In this connection he invited our attention to few judgments viz. (i) N. Venkataramanappa v. D.K. Naikar and another, , (ii) Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers and others, 1977(3) All England Law Reports 70, (iii) Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1973(3) All England Law Reports 54, (iv) P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker & others, and (v) Shri Harish Chandra Mishra and others v. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ali Ahmed, . The learned Advocate General, however, did not dispute the legal position that even after the consent has been declined by Advocate General, it is always open to the concerned party to place the information in his possession before the Court and request the Court to take action and, thus, the petitioner cannot be said to be without remedy.
4. On the other hand Mr. Sebastian, learned Counsel for the petitioner relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Conscientious Group v. Mohammed Yunus and others, strenuously urged that it is not that refusal to grant consent by Advocate General or for that matter Attorney General as well as Solicitor General is not subject to judicial review and Court’s interference.
5. The question whether the order passed by the Advocate General refusing to grant consent is justiciable and subject to Court’s scrutiny is of quite importance but the learned Advocate General submitted that it is not necessary for us in this matter to go into the said question and leave this issue to be decided in suitable case later on and present matter declining to grant sanction by him be examined on merits. We, accordingly, leave the issue concerning the justiciability of the order passed by Advocate General refusing to grant consent as the learned Advocate General did not press the said point.
6. Adverting now to the reasons given by the Advocate General in the impugned communication, it would be clear that three reasons have been set out by the Advocate General for declining to grant consent. The said reasons are:
(i) The statement alleged to constitute criminal contempt have been made at a meeting held in Haridwar;
(ii) The Court proceedings concerning Babri Masjid and Ram Janmabhommi are pending in Allahabad High Court and in Supreme Court and
(iii) None of the respondents reside within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court and, therefore, the respondents are not within the jurisdiction of this Court.
7. The question before us is whether the said reasons call for any interference by us in extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. According to the petitioner, there was a meeting of Kendriya Margadarshak Mandal (Central Advisory Body) of Vishwa Hindu Parishad (V.H.P.) on 22nd June, 2002 at Haridwar. In the said meeting V.H.P. decided and declared that the construction of Ram temple at Ayodhya was non-negotiable and matters of faith could not be decided by the judiciary. The petitioner has averred that the resolution of V.H.P. and the statements of its leaders was widely published on 23rd June, 2002 in the State of Maharashtra and in the city of Mumbai in the media, both print and electronic and millions of people have read and listened to the resolution and statements of V.H.P. and its leaders and as the statement interferes with the stream of justice, cognizance of criminal contempt deserves to be taken against V.H.P. and its leaders such as Mr. Ashok Singhal and Mr. Praveen Togadia. Mr. Sebastian, learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that V.H.P. has a large following and the statement made by the Central Advisory Board of V.H.P. on 22nd June, 2002 amounts to denigrate Indian Judiciary and, therefore, it tantamounts to criminal contempt under section 2(c) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Advocate General was not justified in declining the consent under section 15.
9. Section 2(c) of the Act of 1971 defines “criminal contempt” thus:
“2(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.”
Section 2(d) defines “High Court” which means the High Court for a State or a Union territory, and includes the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any union territory.
Section 11 empowers High Court to try offences committed or offenders found outside jurisdiction. Section 11 read thus:
“11. Power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders found outside jurisdiction.—A High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into or try a contempt of itself or of any Court subordinate to it, whether the contempt is alleged to have been committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction, and whether the person alleged to be guilty of contempt is within or outside such limits.”
10. In view of admitted fact that the meeting of the Central Advisory Board of V.H.P. took place on 22nd June, 2002 at Haridwar and the fact that the dispute concerning Ram temple at Ayodhya is pending in the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court and the alleged contemnors reside outside the jurisdiction of Bombay High Court, it cannot be said that Advocate General committed any error in declining the consent sought for by the petitioner for initiating criminal contempt proceeding against V.H.P. and its leaders before this Court. Merely because the resolution passed by the Central Advisory Board of V.H.P. held at Haridwar on 22nd June, 2002 was published in the print and electronic media in the State of Maharashtra and in the city of Mumbai, it cannot be said that a case was made out for invocation of contempt jurisdiction by this Court. When the judicial proceedings are pending before the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court, by the resolution alleged to have been passed in the meeting of V.H.P. at Haridwar to the effect that matters of faith could not be decided by judiciary, it cannot be said that contempt of this Court has been committed. We are satisfied that refusal to grant sanction to the petitioner by the Advocate General to initiate contempt proceedings against Vishwa Hindu Parishad and its leaders like Mr. Ashok Singhal and Mr. Praveen Togadia cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
11. Writ petition is dismissed accordingly.