ORDER
A.V. Srinivasa Reddy, J.
1. The petitioner calls in question the validity and correctness of the order dated 11-6-1999 passed in H.R.C. No. 513 of 1998 on the file of the X Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore dismissing the eviction petition filed under Section 21(1)(h) of the Kanataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (the ‘old Act’ for short).
2. The petitioner filed the petition for eviction under Section 21(1)(h) of the old Act alleging that she requires the petition premises for purpose of running a cycle shop by her son Srinivas. The Court below came to the conclusion that the petitioner’s need was not real on finding that the petitioner let out the premises adjoining the petition premises in the year 1997 after it fell vacant. The reasoning adopted by the Court below is that if really the petitioner needed the premises to run the cycle shop business, she would have certainly occupied the vacant premises instead of letting it out again. In that view of the matter, the Court below dismissed the eviction petition. Being aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the petitioner has come up in this revision.
3. I have heard the learned Counsels on both sides.
4. During the pendency of the revision in this Court, the old Act was repealed and in its place the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (‘the Act’ for short), which has in its wake brought about far-reaching changes in the matter of regulation of eviction, has been brought on the statute book. By. comparison with the rigour of proof required to be established under Section 21(1)(h) of the old Act, the rigour of proof that a landlord has to discharge for getting an order of eviction against a tenant on any of the grounds available to him under Section 27 of the Act has been considerably whittled down by incorporation of a legal fiction in Explanation I to Section 27. By Explanation I to Section 27 the Act mandates that the Court shall presume that the premises are so required, without the landlord being required to prove the genuineness of the requirement. The provisions of the new Act, while introducing this legal fiction in favour of the landlord, has imposed the only onus on him of proving that he does not possess a more suitable accommodation for his occupation. Thus, the need of the landlord to prove that the premises is required by him for his own bona fide use and occupation has been totally done away with by Explanation I to Section 27 of the Act by introduction of this legal fiction. In the course of this order I shall refer to Section 27(2)(r) of the Act since the Court is required under the Act to examine the relative merits of this revision petition only with reference to the provisions contained in the Act as the old Act has been repealed in its entirety. Chapter VI of the Act lays down the several grounds under which the landlord can recover possession of the premises. Section 27(2)(r) covers the ground of occupation for self or for any member of his family. The relevant provision reads:
“27. Protection of tenants against eviction.–(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by the Court, District Judge or High Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant, save as provided in Sub-section (2).
(2) The Court may, on an application made to it in the prescribed manner, make an order for tide recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely.-
(r) that the premises let are required, whether in the same form or after re-construction or re-building, by the landlord for occupation for himself or any member of his family if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation:
Provided that where the landlord has acquired the premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under this clause unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition.
Explanation I.–For the purposes of this clause and Sections 28 to 31.-
(i) where the landlord in his application supported by an affidavit submits that the premises are required by him for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, the Court shall presume that the premises are so required; (ii) premises let for a particular use may be required by the landlord for a different use if such use is permissible under law. Explanation II.--For the purposes of this clause and Sections 28 to 31 an occupation by the landlord of any part of a building of which any premises let out by him forms a part shall not disentitle him to recover possession of such premises". (emphasis supplied)
5. From a conjoint reading of Section 27(2)(r) and Explanation I it becomes clear that the Act creates a legal presumption in favour of the landlord that the premises is in fact required by him for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. In the light of this presumption that is available to a landlord under Explanation I to Section 27 of the Act, there could be no challenge to the requirement of the premises by the landlord for his own use and occupation or for any member of his family if he is the owner thereof. In the present case the Court below was convinced of the defence taken by the tenant that the petition filed for eviction was for exploitation of property by the landlord to get the maximum returns in derogation of the tenant’s need for protection from eviction. The Court below was certainly justified in arriving at the conclusion as the old Act subjected every landlord seeking for eviction of a tenant to stringent proof of her need as also to establish that the claim is not accentuated by greed but by bona. fides. But, then, this is no longer the position in law as of now. In the light of the legal presumption available to the landlord under Explanation I to Section 27(2)(1), the landlord is not required to prove the reasonable and bona fide requirement. The requirement of a landlord for self-occupation or for occupation of a relative who is the owner thereof could be defeated only if it is shown that as of now the landlord has a suitable accommodation. From the facts available on record it is quite clear that as of now the landlord is not in possession of any other suitable accommodation. In the changed situation in law the fact that she had let out an adjoining premises after it fell vacant cannot be held against her as a circumstance to defeat her claim. Moreover, right from the inception it is the case of the landlord that the petition premises alone would meet her requirements.
6. It is submitted by learned Counsel for respondent that the claim of the landlord for eviction of the tenant from the premises has to fail because in terms of Section 27(2)(r) a claim made for eviction for the requirement of a relative can be sustained only if the relative happens to be a owner of the premises thereof and in the present case the requirement urged being that of the adopted son of the petitioner who is not a owner thereof, this Court cannot grant the prayer for eviction.
7. How the expression ‘for his own use’ which is in part materia with the expression ‘occupation for himself as found in Section 27(2)(r) of the Act has to be construed is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, the following terms:
“Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular religion, to which the landlord belongs, it may be the obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord”.
In the case on hand the requirement is for the adopted son of the petitioner. Her husband is no more and she has no children of her own. Considering the fact that she may require someone to take care of her in the evening of her life it becomes essential that the adopted son must be made economically independent so that she could get his support later on in her life. In the light of the close interrelation and interdependence between the petitioner and the adopted son, as it has come in evidence that he is staying with her and not with his natural mother, the claim made by the petitioner for the benefit of her adopted son has to be given a wide construction and treated as the requirement of the landlord herself.
8. In the light of my above discussion, the revision petition succeeds and the respondent-tenant is given three months time to quit and deliver vacant possession of the petition premises.
