JUDGMENT
L. Rath, J.
1. The question referred to the Division Bench in this case is regarding executability of a decree passed in pursuance of this Court in Second Appeal No. 319/77 when the judgment was passed at a time when the notification Under Section 3 (1) of the Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Consolidation Act’) was made during the pendency of the second appeal declaring the land as consolidation area. The brief facts necessary to illustrate the question are that the opposite parties brought T.S No. 98/70 as the plaintiffs for declaration of right and title and for recovery of possession against the present petitioners as the defendants. The suit having been decreed, the petitioners carried Title Appeal No. 58/75 in which they succeeded for which the opposite parties preferred Second Appeal No. 313/77 in this Court. The notification Under Section 3(1) of the Consolidation Act was made on 28-2- 1979 but the fact was not brought to the notice of the Court and no question of abatement of the suit was raised. The second appeal was allowed to the judgment dated 26-8-1981 in pursuance of which the decree was drawn up and thereafter application for execution of the decree was made in Execution Case No. 54/84 before the Munsif. At the execution stage question was raised of the decree being a nullity and this Court having no jurisdiction to pass the decree as the effect of notification Under Section 3 (1) of the Consolidation Act was abetment of the suit, Prior to it, the petitioners had also filed Civil Review No. 20/81 on the self-same ground but the review application was dismissed after hearing on 19-2-1982. Undaunted, the same objection was raised in the execution proceeding.
2. The question raised at present is no longer res Integra having been conclusively decided by the Division Bench decision reported in 1986 (II) OLR 566 (Bishnu Mohan Mallik v. Dhruba Naik) wherein it has been held that abatement of a suit Under Section 4 (4) of the consolidation Act is not an automatic process and that no abatement takes place until an order to that effect has been passed. If no objection is raised in the suit of the suit having become liable for abatement and decree is passed, it is a valid decree and objection to its executability is not available to be raised at the execution stage.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners tried to raise the question of the decree being without jurisdiction referring to Section 51 (2) of the Consolidation Act contending that the decree was without jurisdiction. The submission is misconceived as Section 51 of the Consolidation Act has no application to pending suits and only bars entertainment of any suit or proceedings which means that if a notification Under Section 3 (1) of the Consolidation Act is already existing, no suit, the question involved in which is available to be adjudicated by the consolidation authorities, shall be entertained. Section 4(4) and Section 51 of the Consolidation Act thus supplement each other with the former applying to the pending suits and the latter applying to the future suits by the date of the notification Under Section 3(1). The notification Under Section 3 (1) of the Consolidation Act in the present case having been made at the second, appellate stage. Section 51 of the Consolidation Act had no application.
4. “Entertainment” of a suit was explained in ILR (1975) Cut, 1526 (Sankar Kumar Bhattar and Ors. v. Tahasildar-cum-Revenue Officer, Basta and Ors.) as either to mean to “receive or accept” or also to deal with the matter after the receipt or acceptance has already been made, depending upon the scheme of the legislation. It was clarified that whether the word “entertain” means one or the other would depend upon the entire scheme of the status in which me expression occurs and on the legislative purpose underlying the scheme. So far as the scheme of the Consolidation Act is concerned, as has already been observed. Section 51 is supplemental to Section 4 (4) and as between them, they take care of the entire civil proceedings either pending by the date of the notification Under Section 3(1) or to be instituted thereafter. In the context the word “entertain” in Section 51 would not embrace pending suits since such suits are specifically taken care of Under Section 4(4) and to that extent would exclude the applicability of Section 51.
5. In that view of the matter, this revision has no merit and is dismissed.
B.N. Dash, J.
6. I agree.
