JUDGMENT
M.N. Rao, J.
1. As these writ-appeals are inter-connected the same are disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Writ Appeal No. 592 of 1985 is directed against Writ Petition 5464 of 1982, and Writ Appeal No. 593 of 1985 is directed against Writ Petition 994 of 1980. The Union of India, represented by the Secretary, Ministry or Railways the Railway Board represented by its Secretary, the General Manager, South Central Railway, the chief Personnel Officer, South Central Railway, and the Senior Personal Officer, South Central Railway, who are the respondents in the writ petitions, are the appellants herein. A learned Single Judge of this Court, Ramachandra Raju J., by a common order, allowed Writ Petition Nos. 994/80, 2444/82 and 5464/82 filed by B. Veeraraju, the respondent herein.
3. The following facts are necessary to understand the contentions that arise for consideration: The respondent joined service in the Railways on 20-12-1955 as a Lower Division Clerk claiming himself to be a Kondakapu – a recognised Scheduled Tribe. His recruitment was against a post reserved for members of Scheduled Tribes and it was based on the selection made by the Railway Service Commission. The respondent studied upto Intermediate and passed two in subjects. At the time of his selection he was required to produce SSLC certificate but he did not do so representing that the certificate was lost. He is a native of Eleswaram, Peddapuram Taluk, East Godavari District. He produced three certificates issued by three authorities viz., (i) by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapuram on 26-1-1954; (ii) by the Additional District Magistrate, East Godavari on 30-11-1954; and (iii) by the Special Magistrate, Peddapuram on 13-11-1955 in support of his claim that he is a Kondakapu. He was allowed to continue in service uninterruptedly without the railway administration making any further demand on him to produce his SSLC certificate. By 9-12-1977 he was holding the post of Head Clerk. In 1979, the Railway Service Commission conducted an examination for recruitment to the post of Law Assistant – a Class (3) post in Category – III- for which in -service candidates like the respondent also were eligible. Certain posts were reserved for members of Scheduled Tribes and the respondent applied for recruitment against the quota reserved for Scheduled Tribes. On 8-1-1979 he was selected as Law Assistant against a reserved post meant to be filled up by a member of a Scheduled Tribe. As he was required to produce a certificate about his caste status, he submitted a certificate issued by the District Collector, Hyderabad which disclosed that he is a member of Kondakapu tribe. He did not produce the SSLC certificate. From Tahsildar, Pathepadu, East Godavari District, he-obtained a certificate on 14-3-1979 to the effect that he is a Kondakapu by caste. This certificate was issued by the Tahsildar based upon the earlier certificates obtained by the respondent during 1954-55 from the revenue authorities of Peddapuram.
4. It appears, on a complaint received from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Welfare Association, the railway administration initiated an inquiry against the respondent in respect of his caste status. The Revenue Department was requested by the railway administration to conduct an inquiry as to the genuineness of the caste of the respondent, and in compliance with that request, an inquiry was conducted by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapuram after issuing notice to the respondent. Three witnesses were examined by the Revenue Divisional Officer viz., (i) Papiraju, Village Munsif, Eleswaram; (ii) K. Sitaramayya, a person associated with the family of the respondent for nearly fifty years; and (iii) N. Veeraiah, a member of the Gram Panchayat. All the three testified that the respondent is a Telaga by caste and not Kondakapu. The Transfer Certificate issued by ULCM School, Peddapuram in June 1948 (where the respondent studied) disclosed that the respondent was Telaga by caste. To the same effect was an entry in the Intermediate Admission Register maintained by Pithapuram College where the respondent studied Intermediate Course. Relying upon the testimony of the above three witnesses and the two documents, the Revenue Divisional Officer held that the respondent is not a Kondakapu but belongs to Telaga caste – a forward community. The District Collector, East Godavari by an order dated 10-2-1982, based upon the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, cancelled the certificate issued on 26-1-1954 by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapuram. Challenging that order of the District Collector, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 2444/82. Based upon the order dated 10-2-1982 issued by the Collector, the railway administration issued a notice to the respondent on 15-3-1982 proposing to consider and treat him as a Telaga. Subsequently, on 21-6-1982, an order was issued by the railway administration treating the respondent as belonging to Telaga caste. Challenging that order he filed Writ Petition No. 5464/82. Because the railway administration proposed to treat the respondent as a member of Telaga caste, it passed certain orders treating his appointment as Law Assistant as ad hoc and temporary. ‘Challenging that order, the respondent filed Writ Petition 994/80.
5. The learned single Judge, by a common order dated 19-1-1985, allowed all the three writ petitions. After going into the merits of the case and on the possibility of the respondent having declared his caste on the previous occasion as Telaga because his mother was born into that community, the learned single Judge held that the Revenue Divisional Officer did not give any opportunity to the respondent “to question the statements made by the three witnesses on whose evidence” the conclusion that the respondent was not a member of Kondakapu was arrived at. The report of the Revenue Divisional Officer was also set aside on the ground that “his finding is so unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the court”. Because of the long lapse of time since the inquiry had commenced, the learned single judge felt that “it is too late for the railway administration now to involve the petitioner in any inquiry merely because the Service Commission desired the appointing authority to satisfy itself about the community of the petitioner. In the service record of the petitioner, he is described only as a Kondakapu., belonging to the Scheduled Tribes. Prudence required the railway administration to have based itself on the service record and satisfy itself that the petitioner belonged to a scheduled tribe.” A further observation made by the learned Single Judge is that the principle of estoppel ” out to be” raised in favour of the respondent. In conclusion, Writ Petition 2444/82 was allowed quashing the order of the District Collector dated 10-2-1982, and the order dated 21-6-82 issued by the railway administration treating the respondent as a member of Telaga Caste, which was impugned in Writ Petition 5464/82, was also set aside and that writ petition was allowed. Writ Petition 994/80 which was filed against the order of the railway administration treating the promotion of the respondent as temporary arid ad-hoc was also allowed with a declaration that “the railway administration shall continue to treat the petitioner as Kondakapu belonging to the Scheduled Tribe community”.
6. In so far as Writ Petition 2444/82 is concerned, the railway administration could not prefer an appeal within time and the application filed by them seeking condonation of the delay in preferring a writ appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court. Special Leave Petition filed against that order has not yet come up for adjudication before the Supreme Court.
7. Sri S.R. Ashok, learned Counsel for the appellants, contends that there was a reference in the correspondence that ensued between the respondent and the railway administration about the evidence of the three witnesses which formed the basis for the revenue Divisional Officer to conclude that the respondent is not a Kondakapu by caste and that evidence is sufficient to conclude the social status of the respondent. Although to two documents adverted to in the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer were not put to the respondent, it is not necessary for the purpose of ascertaining the genuineness of the social status of the respondent to refer to the two documents. Even assuming that the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer was vitiated because of breach of principle of natural justice, in that the necessary material which constituted the foundation for the conclusion arrived at was not put to the affected party, the learned Single Judge ought to have remitted the matter to the railway administration to conduct an inquiry afresh by affording an effective opportunity to the respondent. Giving a declaration in favour of the respondent about his social status, according to the learned counsel, is contrary to the well settled principle that, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court will not convert itself into a regular civil court for purposes of adjudicating disputed facts. The dismissal of the application seeking condonation of the delay in preferring the writ appeal will not constitute res judicata to decide the present two appeals preferred against the other two writ petitions; the quashing of the order of the District Collector dated 10-2-1982 (by which the earlier certificate issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapuram on 26-1-1954 to the effect that the respondent is a Kondakapu was set aside) will not preclude the railway administration, being the appointing authority, to cause an inquiry into the social status of the respondent since the respondent was appointed against a post reserved for members of Scheduled Tribes and there is any amount of suspicion about the genuineness of the claim putfourth by him. The Principle of estoppel has no application in cases where a fraud is played on the administration in the matter of selection to posts reserved for members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and in support of this reliance, is placed upon a latest decision of the Supreme Court viz., Vasantkumar Radhakrishan Vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, .
8. In opposition to the above contentions, Sri Y. Suryanarayana, learned counsel for the respondent, says that, inasmuch as the order of the District Collector dated 10-2-1962 which is the foundation for the action taken by the railway administration against the respondent was set aside by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition 2444/ 82 which became final as of now because of the dismissal of the application seeking condonation of the delay in preferring to writ appeal, it is not open to the railway administration to initiate any further action and, therefore, the declaration made by the learned Single Judge in favour of the respondent shall be allowed to stand. As the respondent has since retired from service during the pendency of the writ appeals, no useful purpose would be served, says the learned counsel for the respondent, by instituting an inquiry afresh now. he also relies upon a Division Bench judgment of this court in Writ Appeal 473/89 dated 24-7-1990 in support of his contention that the learned Single Judge was right in giving the declaration in favour of the respondent.
9. We may briefly notice to the evolution of the concept of reservations in favour of Scheduled Tribes. Aboriginals in our country who unfortunately were left untouched by civilisation were accustomed to primitive conditions of living. They are distinguishable by tribal characteristics and cultural isolation from the main stream of society. The British Government realised the necessity to protect the tribal population from exploitation by the advanced sections of society and also to insulate them from contact with the sophisticated sections and so the areas inhabited by them were placed outside the operation of general law; the protective measures brought by legislation for their safety and welfare are found in chapter V (Excluded Areas and Partially Excluded Areas) of the Government of India Act, 1935. These enclaves were formally called Backward Areas in the Government of India Act 1919 and earlier to that they were described as Scheduled Districts under the Scheduled Districts Act 14 of 1874. In the 1935 Act, first time provision was made for representation of “Backward Tribes” in Provincial Legislatures and a list of Backward Tribes was promulgated in 1936 for all the provinces except Punjab and Bengal. In public services also reservation as made in certain categories of posts. The beneficial measures contemplated under Article 15(4) and 16(4) and 335 are available to members of Scheduled Tribes, in addition to reservation of seats in State Legislatures and Parliament under the provisions of Part XVI of the Constitution. The President is empowered under Article 342 by public notification, after consultation with the Governor of the concerned State, to specify the tribes or tribal communities which shall be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State for the purpose of the Constitution. By making some additions to the 1935 list of Backward Tribes, the President promulgated the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, certain amendments were made to this order by Act 108 of 1976. Parliament alone has power by law to alter that list under Article 342(2). The Scheduled Tribes were defined partly not only by habitat and geographic isolation but also on the basis of social, religious, linguistic and cultural distinctiveness – their tribal characteristics See Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India Page 150 . Although the line of demarcation between tribals and non-tribals is not very precise, it is now settled by judicial pronouncements that it is not permissible for courts to issue directions for exclusion or inclusion of any castes or tribes from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950. See Bhaiya Lal v. Harikrishan Singh, and Parsram v. Shivchand, .
10. The first aspect to be considered is, whether the failure of the Railway administration to prefer an appeal within time against the judgment in Writ Petition 2444/82 has resulted in the above judgment becoming final, and inasmuch as the order of the Collector, East Godavari dated 10-2-1982 cancelling the certificate issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapuram dated 26-1-1954, was set aside in Writ Petition 2444/82 and since it constituted the basis for the action taken by the railway administration, unless the Supreme Court grants special leave to the railway administration against the order passed by this Court refusing to condone the delay in preferring writ appeal, the questions raised in these writ appeals cannot be gone into ? It is true that the order of the Collector, East Godavari dated 10-2-1982 was the basis for the railway administration to issue notice to the respondent proposing to consider him as a non-tribal, and its subsequent order dated 21-6-1982 treating him as a Telaga, a forward community. But, the railway administration is not denuded of its power independently to inquire into the social status of the respondent. As early as 20th February 1962 the Railway Board issued letter No: E (SCT) 62 CM 18/1 clearly stating that the following authorities are authorised to issue caste certificates to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for employment in the Central Government:
(1) District Magistrate/Additional District Magistrate/Collector/Deputy Commissioner Additional Deputy Commissioner/Deputy Collectors/Ist Class Stipendary Magistrate/ (*) Sub-Divisional Magistrate/Taluka Magistrate/ Executive Magistrate/Extra Assistant Commissioner.
(*) Not below the rank of Ist Class Stipendary Magistrate.
(2) Chief Presidency Magistrate/Additional Chief presidency Magistrate/ Presidency Magistrate
(3) Revenue Officer not below the rank of Tahsildar
(4) Sub-Divisional Officer of the area where the candidate and/or his family normally resides.
(5) Gazetted Officers of Central or of a State Government countersigned by the District Magistrate concerned.
(6) Administrator/Secretary to Administrator (Laccadive and Minicoy Islands).
(7) Harijan Welfare Officer, Delhi (for candidates from the Union Territory of Delhi).
The said letter also says:
“It will however be open to the appointing authorities to verify the claim in any case, if desired, through the District Magistrate of the place where the candidate and/or the family ordinarily resides”.
However, by subsequent orders, Officers mentioned against items (5)’, (6) and (7) were directed not to issue Caste Certificates. Over the years, because of the advantages conferred upon Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, many cases of bogus claims came to the notice of the authorities and, therefore, it was felt that stringent steps were warranted to weed-out persons who entered service against reserved quota by producing false caste certificates. Accordingly a letter was issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs on 27-2-1981 in which, after making reference to false claims that were noticed, it was mentioned:
“….. Obviously, these have occurred due to appointing authorities not scrutinising the caste certificates of the persons to be appointed or promoted. It has now been decided that the appointing authorities should verify the caste status of a Scheduled Caste/Tribe Officer at the time of initial appointment and promotion against a vacancy reserved for Scheduled Caste/Tribe……”
It was, therefore, incumbent upon appointing authority to satisfy itself about the genuineness of claims put forward by persons seeking recruitment against reserved vacancies. For this purpose, the appointing authority may itself verify the social status of an employee, or, may request some one else to conduct an inquiry and submit a report. In the present case, the order of the Collector dated 10-2-1982 was based upon the inquiry conducted by the Revenue Divisional Officer, and the final order issued by the railway administration was founded upon the Collector’s report. When the inquiry conducted by the Revenue Divisional Officer was vitiated due to violation of the principles of natural justice, as was declared by the learned Single Judge, in the present case, the order of the District Collector accepting the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer also falls to the ground. That violation does not disentitle the appointing authority from making a fresh inquiry into the social status of the respondent either by itself or by requesting another agency to do so. The argument that, because the application filed seeking condonation of delay in preferring a writ appeal against the judgment in Writ Petition 2444/82 was dismissed, nothing survives in the other two writ petitions, therefore, does not merit acceptance.
11. The respondent joined service as far back as 1955 as a Lower Division Clerk claiming himself to be Konda Kapu, a recognised Scheduled Tribe. He was selected as a Class-III Officer to the post of Law Assistant by direct recruitment on 8-1-1979 against a reserved vacancy. At that stage of selection it was necessary for the railway administration to have caused verification of his social status. Silence or in-action on the part of the railway administration during the period between 1955 and 1979 in not insisting upon acceptable proof about the social status of the respondent could not be a factor in favour of the respondent disentitling the railway administration from calling upon him to prove his social status. The Principle of estoppel has absolutely no application to cases of the present nature. The learned Single Judge was not right in holding that the principle of estoppel operated in favour of the respondent. This position is now firmly settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Vasantkumar Radhakrisan Vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, . Dealing with the application of principle of promissory estoppel in matters relating to benefits conferred under Articles 15 (4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. His Lordship K. Ramaswamy, J. held:
“Equally promissory estoppel should not be extended, though it may be founded on an express or implied promise stemmed from the conduct or representation by an officer of the State or public authority when it obtained to play fraud on the constitution and the enforcement would defeat or tend to defeat the constitutional goals. For instance a right to reservation either under Article 15 (4) or 16(4) in favour of the Schedued Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes was made with a view to ameliorate their status socially, economically and educationally so a to assimilate those sections into the main stream of the society. The persons who do not belong to those classes, but produce a certificate to mask their social status and secure an appointment to an office or post under the State or public employment or admission into an educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State, on later investigation though belated, was found that the certificate produced was false and the candidate was dismissed from the post or office or debarred or sent out from the institution or from the balance course of the study, the plea of promissory estopped would always be found favour with the courts and being easily extended in favour of the candidate or party that played fraud on the Constitution. It would amount not only putting a premium on the fraud on the constitution, but also a denial to a reserved candidate and the general candidate as well. Therefore, the plea of promissory estoppel should not be extended to such areas”.
We, therefore, find it impossible to accept the view expressd by the learned Single judge that silence on the part of the railway administration in not calling upon the respondent to prove his social status during the period 195 and 1979 attracted the principle of promissory estoppel.
12. The inquiry conducted by the Revenue Divisional Officer regarding the social status of the respondent, in our view, was clearly in breach of principles of natural justice. The Revenue Divisional Officer examined the Village Munsif, Papiraju, and two others viz., K. Sitaramaiah and N. Veeraiah of Yeleswaran village, who stated that the respondent is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe but a Telaga by caste, a forward caste. The transfer certificate issued by the ULCM High -School, Peddapuram as also the Intermediate admission register of Pithapuram College where the respondent studied, contained entries showing the respondent as a Telaga by caste. This evidence constituted chiefly the basis for the Revenue Divisional Officer to hold that the respondent is not a Kondakapu. But, unfortunately, the respondent was not apprised of this evidence: the statements of the witnesses were not furnished to him, nor was he given an opportunity to see the two documents. It is, therefore, clear that the finding arrived at by the Revenue Divisional Officer as to the social status of the respondent was clearly in breach of principles of natural justice. The contention advanced by Sri S.R. Ashok, learned counsel for the railway administration, is that, even if those documents are excluded, still it could be sad that the respondent is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe. We are not inclined to accept this. The report of the Revenue Divisional Officer clearly shows that the finding was grounded largely on the basis of the aforesaid two documents and the statements of the witnesses. Therefore, we agree with the learned single judge only to the extent that the finding recorded by the Revenue Divisional Officer was vitiated because of breach of principles of natural justice.
13. When once the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer deserves to be set aside on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, is it open to this court to look into other evidence and give a positive finding regarding the social status of the respondent? In our considered opinion, the answer is emphatically in the negative. The maxim ‘audi alterem partem’ incorporates very valuable procedural safeguards. If an order is set aside on the gound that it is vitiated for violation of principle of natural justice, the matter must be remitted to the concerned authority for disposal afresh in accordance with, law. Power to grant judicial review does not extend to this court substituting itself for that of the concerned authority. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, 1982 – I Weekly Law Reports, 1155 @ 1175, Lord Brightman stated in his speech:
“Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process, Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power”.
This view was approvingly referred to by the Supreme Court in Dwarkadas Marfatia and sons v. Bombay Port Trust, . Even when an appellate authority, whose powers are co-extensive with that of the original authority, records a finding that the order appealed against is liable to be set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, it was ruled by the Supreme Court, a duty was cast upon the appellate authority to remit the mater to the original authority for proper disposal in accordance with the procedure prescibed by law Kapurchand Shrimal v. C.I.T., .
14 . Learned Counsel for the respondent endeavoured to justify the view taken by the learned Single Judge by placing reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Writ Appal No: 473 of 1989 dated 24-7-1990. Reported as D. Manikyamala v. Principal Andhra Medical College, Visakhapatnam, 1990 (3) ALT Page 355. That case related to admission into MBBS Course. The respondent therein was admitted into I year MBBS Course in Andhra Medical College, Visakhapatnam on the basis of certificate issued to her by the Tahsildar, Nakkapally, Visakhapatnam District to the effect that she is a Konda Kapu by caste. She was provisionally admitted against a seat reserved for Scheduled Tribes. The question of her social status was referred to the Director of Tribal Welfare, Hyderabad and an inquiry was conducted by the Joint Director of Tribal Welfare who opined that she is not a Konda Kapu by caste. “On that basis, her admission was cancelled. Challenging the order of cancellation of her admission, she filed a writ petition which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge holding that the evidence considered by the Joint Director, of Tribal Welfare was sufficient to hold that she is not a Konda Kapu by caste. The Writ Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge was allowed by a Division Bench taking the view that Kapus of Agency Taluks are Konda Kapus, and that, while conducting the inquiry regarding the Social Status of the candidate, the Joint director of Tribal Welfare did not furnish copies of the documents on which he recorded the finding, to the candidate. With great deference to the learned judges, we are not inclined to agree with them, except on the question of violation of principles of natural justice. The question of estoppel does not arise in matters relating to social status is settled by the judgment of the supreme Court in Kapurchand Shrimal’s case (5-A supra). When an order of an authority is set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by this Court, the matter must be remitted to that authority for fresh disposal in accordance with law is also a settled principle, in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court. Whether a particular caste is a Scheduled Caste/Tribe cannot be inquired into by this court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is also finally settled by the Supreme Court in Bhaiya Lai’s case (2 supra). In view of these authoritative pronouncements, we are of the opinion that the decision in Writ Appeal No. 473 of 1989 (6 supra) is per incurium and so there is no need to refer the matter to a Full Bench.
15. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as also Backward Classes have been enjoying several benefits long prior to the advent of the constitution. A mere entry in the school register regarding the social status of a candidate should not lead to an inference that he/she really belongs to the caste/tribe mentioned therein. There is every possibility of resourceful parents furnishing information about the social status of their children at the time of admissions into educational institutions with a view to reaping benefits conferred on disabled and backward sections. Whenever an appointing authority or head of an educational institution entertains a doubt about the social status of a candidate/student, it is always open to him either to conduct an inquiry by himself, or, by entrusting the same to another agency in order to ascertain the truth.
16. We are of the opinion that delay by itself will not be a reason to condone or compound attempts to snatch away benefits granted by the Constitution from the deserving. If any doubt is thrown on the varacity of the declaration, whether that person belongs to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or backward class, it is the duty of the instrumentalities of the State to investigate the claim in depth, notwithstanding the expiry of time. This shall be so, even in spite of the retirement of the concerned person from service, since once a declaration is made in favour of an undeserving person, it will enure to the benefit of succeeding generations of persons to claim and enjoy the advantages which they would not have otherwise obtained. We are therefore clear that in circumstances where the allegation that an undeserving person has claimed and obtained the benefit meant only for Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or Backward Class, such claim shall be investigated throughly with due notice to parties, notwithstanding the passage of time and any principles of estoppel or other like technical doctrines. This is so due to more reasons than one. Not only does the claimant obtain an undeserving benefit, but effectively denies an opportunity to a deserving person. The second is that it is not only one person who will be denied that benefit – as we already mentioned, succeeding generations of undeserving will be the beneficiaries of that undue advantage by reason of the alleged fraud. We find that this important aspect of the question was not considered in W.A.No. 473 of 1989. We are of the opinion that the decision in the above writ appeal has to be distinguished on the basis of this important aspect.
17. As the inquiry conducted by the Revenue Divisional Officer, in this case, was vitiated because of breach of principles of natural justice, we are of the view that the matter must be remitted to the appointing authority for fresh inquiry.
18. Therefore, the writ appeals are allowed with a direction to the appointing authority to conduct an inquiry into the social status of the respondent after issuing notice and affording proper opportunity to him, or, to entrust the same to any other authority including the Director of Tribal Welfare, Government of Andhra Pradesh, and depending upon the result of the inquiry appropriate further action shall be taken in the matter. There shall be no order as to costs.
