ORDER
Ajit J. Gunjal, J.
1. The petitioners are the members of a 95 year old Sangha (Karnataka Vokkaligara Sangha). The matter arises in the following manner, which has a checkered career:
The petitioners claim to be life members of the 3rd respondent Sangha, which is registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act 1960. The said Sangha is established for the welfare of the members belonging to Vokkaliga community and for the purpose of running of Educational Institutions etc. It is the case of the petitioners that they and respondents 4 to 6 filed a petition before the 2nd respondent-Deputy Registrar of Societies to declare that the Special General Body meeting held on 03.03.2002 by the 3rd respondent- Sangha in respect of certain bye-laws are illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 (For short ‘the Act’). In the first instance the 2nd respondent accepted the amended bye-laws by his order dated 11th June 2003, Consequently, rejected the petition of the petitioners and the amendment of the bye-laws was accepted by the 2nd respondent on 19.02.2003. The said order was questioned by some of the respondents and the petitioners in W.P.No. 9480/2003. This Court pursuant to its order dated 26th March 2003, a copy of which is produced at Annexure ‘F’, allowed the writ petition and remitted the matter to the 2nd respondent for fresh disposal in accordance with law in as much as, this Court observed, while remitting the matter that, the 2nd respondent did not follow and comply the requirements of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act. This Court also further directed the 2nd respondent to enquire into whether indeed as on 03.03.2002 a Special General Body meeting was held with the requisite quorum and the said proposed amendment to the bye-laws was passed in the said meeting. After the matter stood remitted to the 2nd respondent, the 2nd respondent has passed an order, a copy of which is produced at Annexure ‘A’ reiterating the stand and has recorded a finding that the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 was duly observed by issuing notice to the members 21 days prior to the Special General Body meeting. The Special General Body meeting was held in accordance with the bye-laws and consequently, there was no violation of bye-laws and the proposed amendment was duly approved in the said meeting and consequently, has accepted the said proposed amendment to the bye-laws. The said order is questioned in this writ petition.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that the notice dated 30.01.2002, of the Special General Body meeting, which was convened by the 3rd respondent was not notified to the members. In respect of certain issues referred to in the agenda of the notice and the Special General Body meeting, which was convened on the same day, after 2.00 p.m. was without proper quorum. It appears that some of the members of the Society had represented to the Ministry of Revenue, Government of Karnataka under whom the Society is registered under the provisions of the Act and to appoint an Observer to supervise the General Body meeting, which was convened by the 3rd respondent on the ground that there is every likelihood of obstruction by hooliganism in the meeting of the Society by certain rowdy elements. The said request was accepted by the then Minister, who appointed four observers to observe and for smooth conducting of the General Body meeting and Special General Body meeting, which was held on 03.03.2002. It is the case of the petitioners that the Special General Body meeting was not at all convened after 2.00 p.m. on 03.03.2002 and the records relating to the alleged Special General Body meeting are manipulated as the quorum fell short of requirement. The proposed amendment to the bye-laws is at 7.3 in the agenda, under which the tenure of the office bearers and the Committee was to be extended from the existing three years to 5 years, the reason being to cut down the cost of elections every 3 years. It is the case of the petitioners that after the matter stood remitted to the 2nd respondent for fresh consideration of the issue, sufficient opportunity was not given to them to present their case. Thus they were denied from leading evidence in support of their case. They would contend that the 2nd respondent was prejudicial as he was one of the observers of the General Body meeting and could not have acted as a Judge and decided the controversy in question. The petitioners, after the matter stood remitted to the 2nd respondent entered appearance, examined some of these petitioners and other witness by filing their affidavits. They were also cross-examined by the 3rd respondent. The main grievance of the petitioners is that when the matter was posted before the 2nd respondent on 09.06.2003, a request was made by the petitioners to defer the matter as they proposed to examine some more witnesses. But however, the said request was rejected. Consequently, it appears, an endorsement was made by the counsel appearing for the petitioners before the 2nd respondent that the entire procedure of conducting an enquiry was prejudicial. These are the main grounds on which the petitioners are before this Court questioning the orders passed by the 2nd respondent. It appears the petitioners have also filed a memo before the Registrar of Societies seeking transfer of the case to some other authority in view of the fact that no opportunity is being afforded by the 2nd respondent. A copy of the said memo for transfer is at Annexure ‘K’.
3. Pursuant to the notice issued, the 3rd respondent have entered appearance and filed their Statement of objections. The Statement of objections can be summarized as follows:
They have denied that Special General Body meeting was not held on 03.03.2002. They would contend that indeed the notice of the General Body meeting as well as the Special General Body meeting was sent to all the members and the meeting was convened at 10.30 a.m. on that day. Since not many members were present, the meeting was deferred for some time so as to enable the other members to participate. Eventually, after the required quorum, the proceedings commenced. According to the 3rd respondent after conclusion of the General body meeting, for conducting the Special General Body meeting, the total members present at that point of time were 1,720 as borne out by the Registrar. Of course they would make a clean breast of the fact that there was certain disturbance and certain members started shouting slogans to disturb the meeting. To ward off any further disturbances, the Registrar adjourned the meeting for a while. At the instance of some of the members and on account of the helping hand extended by the Police, peace was restored and the Special General Body meeting was convened again at 2.45 p.m. and the proceedings were conducted and the amendments to the bye-laws were approved in the said Special General Body meeting. They would also further contend that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioners to buttress their contention, and they have participated in the said proceedings. Consequently, it cannot be said that they were denied any opportunity of participating in the proceedings before the authority.
4. An application for impleading is also filed by some of the members to participate in the present proceedings to come on record as the petitioners. It is noticed that the said application is still pending. Nevertheless, it is necessary to hear them also. They would substantially support the case of the petitioners and would contend that the Special General Body Meeting, which was convened after 2.00 p.m. did not have the requisite quorum. They would also rely on certain observations. They would also contend that the elections were to be conducted in a manner which was agreed upon between the petitioners and the 3rd respondent in a writ appeal filed by the 3rd respondent in W.A.No. 3525/2003, a copy of which is produced at Annexure ‘A7’. The sum and substance is that in the absence of any Special General Body meeting, the amended bye-laws increasing the tenure of office bearers from 3 years to 5 years cannot be sustained. Objections to the said application are also filed by respondent No. 3 who is the contesting respondent inter alia denying that they are necessary and proper parties to the proceedings.
5. Mr. Devadas, learned Sr.Counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously contends that the Special General Body meeting was not at all held on 03.03.2002 as there was no requisite quorum. Consequently, the approval of the bye-laws by the 2nd respondent pursuant to Annexure ‘A’ is bad. He would also rely on a report of the observer, a copy of which is produced at Annexure ‘J’ to the effect that there was commotion and the observers had to quit the meeting and leave. In these circumstances, he would submit that a perusal of the report of the observers would clearly indicate that no Special General Body meeting was convened. In so far as the proceedings before the 2nd respondent is concerned, he would reiterate the fact that no sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioners to put forth their case in as much as opportunity was denied to lead evidence.
6. The next contention of Mr. Devdas is that the 2nd respondent being one of the observers could not have adjudicated the controversy in question in as much as he had participated in the proceedings as an observer. Consequently, he was biased and it was inappropriate on his part to have decided the matter. He would also contend that there is no compliance of Section 10 of the Act and consequently, there is no application of mind by the 2nd respondent, in as much as the directions issued in the order of remand have not been followed. With reference to the minutes of the meeting, he would submit that the Register, which was produced before the Competent Authority namely respondent No. 2 regarding the presence of the members at the Special General Body meeting cannot be accepted. Consequently he would submit that the Register, which was produced before the Competent Authority was not a valid one. In the circumstances, sought for interference.
7. Mr. Vijaya Shankar, learned Senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 – Sanga would meet the contention of Mr. Devadas regarding observer being judge. He submits that the said contention was never pressed into service in the earlier proceedings in W.P.No. 9480/2003. Consequently, when such a contention was not raised in the earlier proceedings, the said contention is deemed to have been waived and the petitioners cannot raise the said contention again here, in these proceedings. He would also contend that the earlier order was also passed by the same authority (same person) and according to him since the said question was not pressed into service in the earlier proceedings, the same is deemed to have been waived. He would also contend that the petitioners 1 & 3 had contested the election, which was held on 13.07.2003 and having lost have filed this writ petition. He would contend that the amended bye-laws were accepted on 03.03.2003. This Court in another companion proceedings had directed elections to be held on a particular day. Elections were held. Petitioners 1 and 3 having participated in the said election cannot raise a contention now at this point of time that the amended bye-laws were not approved in the Special General Body meeting. In so far as the 2nd petitioner is concerned, Mr. Vijaya Shankar would contend that the election was held on 13.07.2003 and the petition is filed on 10.11.2003. Consequently, according to him, the petition of petitioner No. 2 is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches, notwithstanding the fact that the delay may not look enormous, but in the context of present situation, it would be relevant. In so far as the contention regarding sufficient opportunity, he would refer to the order sheet, a copy of which is produced at Annexure ‘G’ to show that the petitioners had participated in the proceedings and had filed their affidavits and by way of evidence, they were also cross-examined. When the matter was set down for final hearing on 09.06.2003, an application is filed. In the circumstances, he submits that the petitioners were given enough opportunity from 24.04.2003 till 09.06.2003 to lead evidence but they having not chosen to avail the said opportunity, they cannot be heard to say that they have been denied sufficient opportunity. In so far as the non-compliance of Section 10 of the Act is concerned, Mr. Vijayashankar would contend that there is proper compliance, in as much as the notice was issued to every member of the Society, 21 days prior to the date of the Special General Body meeting. In the circumstances, he would submit that there is proper compliance of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act.
8. In so far as the first contention regarding the observer being a Judge of the cause, it is to be noticed that the right to object a disqualified adjudicator may be waived. The Court would certainly insist that the objection shall be taken as soon as the party prejudiced knows the fact, which would entitle him to object. If the petitioners know of the disqualification and they let the proceedings continue without protest they are held to have waived the objection and the said determination cannot be challenged at a later point of time. This rules will have to be strictly applied to writ of certiorari unless it is specifically shown that the petitioners had no knowledge of the disqualification. In the case on hand it is to be noticed that notwithstanding the fact that the 2nd respondent was an observer, had passed an earlier order accepting the amended bye-laws. The said order was subject matter of an earlier writ petition. A perusal of the order passed by this Court in the earlier petition does not give an indication that this question regarding the 2nd respondent being an observer and he should not participate in the proceedings was raised and was pressed into service. Apparently, what was pressed into service in the earlier proceedings was that the Special General Body meeting, which was convened on 03.03.2002 at 2.00 p.m. did not have the requisite quorum. That was the only contention, which was raised in the earlier writ petition. Apparently, the earlier order was passed by the same authority, who has passed the present impugned order, i.e., the same Registrar of Societies. If the petitioners were really apprehensive that the 2nd respondent himself being an observer would be prejudicial to the petitioner’s cause, they could have raised the objection at the earliest point of time i.e., in the earlier writ petition No. 9480/2003. That was not done. They accepted the feet that the 2nd respondent could certainly adjudicate upon the issue in question. That apart, it is to be noticed that when, the matter stood remitted to the 2nd respondent and when it was called before him on 24.04.2003, the petitioners did not raise their little finger raising objection that since the 2nd respondent was an observer he should not hear the matter. It is no doubt true that such an objection was raised but however, the said objection seeking transfer of the case was raised only on 09.06.2003. i.e., after participating in the proceedings by filing their evidence by way of an affidavit and they were cross-examined by the 3rd respondent. When that is the case, the petitioners at this point of time cannot be heard to say that the 2nd respondent ought not to have conducted the said proceedings. This would be a case where there is a clear waiver and acquiescence on the part of the petitioner.
9. It is also to be noticed that petitioners 1 & 3 had taken advantage of the said amended bye-laws and participated as candidates in the said election and contested the same. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that they have any real grievance as the petitioners 1 & 3 having contested in the election it is deemed that they have accepted the bye-laws. Once, having participated, contested and lost the election, they cannot be heard to say that the amended bye-laws were not approved in the Special General Body meeting on 03.03.2002. This will be a case of grapes turning sour. A Division Bench of this Court has observed, while dealing with a similar, if not identical situation wherein the parties who have submitted themselves to jurisdiction, cannot later turn around and contend that the authority does not have jurisdiction once the decision having gone against them. This Court in case of Shaik Abdul Rahim v. Chintamanarao Madhavarao and Anr. reported in 1964 My.L.J. Suppl. P.721 has held thus:
a party invoking power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution cannot now raise the question of jurisdiction when a decision has been taken before the Tribunal whose order is being challenged. The power of jurisdiction is a discretion one and when a party who has not challenged the jurisdiction of a Tribunal but submitted to it and took the chance of a decision in his favour, later turns round when the decision goes against him and challenges the jurisdiction of the very Tribunal, the High Court will not exercise its discretionary power in favour of such a party.
In these circumstances, they having participated and having lost in the election cannot now contend that the amended bye-laws were not approved in the Special General Body meeting. In so far as the petition of petitioner No. 2 is concerned, it is to be noticed that the impugned order Annexure ‘A’ was passed on 11.06.2003. The elections were held on 13.07.2003 and the present petition is filed on 10.11.2003. Though by normal standards the five months delay in filing the writ petition cannot be said to be enormous. If one were to see the filing of the writ petition in the background it would amount to delay and laches. Apparently, the amended bye-laws were approved on 03.03.2003. The impugned order accepting the bye-laws by the 2nd respondent was passed on 11.06.2003 and the election was held on 13.07.2003. If realty the 2nd petitioner was aggrieved by the acceptance of the amended bye-laws by the 2nd respondent, he would have certainly rushed to the Court at the earliest point of time. But however, he allowed the grass to grow under his feet, permitted the elections to go on, on the basis of the amended bye-laws and when petitioners 1 and 3 who had contested having lost, the present petition is filed on 10.11.2003. This is a case where the petitioners have sat on the fence and allowed the proceedings to continue. White dealing with such a situation, the Apex Court in the case of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor, Delhi has observed thus:
Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the validity of the notification even after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 in 1966. Of the two writ petitions one is filed by one of the appellants. There was apparently, no reason why the petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the public purpose were not specified. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics.
(emphasis by me)
This observation made by the Apex Court is aptly applicable to the facts on the hand.
10. Re: Sufficient opportunity. In so far as this contention is concerned, a reference will have to be made to the order sheet, a copy of which is produced at Annexure ‘G’. After the matter stood remitted to the 2nd respondent, the matter was called before the 2nd respondent on 24.04.2003. It is noticed that as on that date, Advocate for both the parties were present. The matter was thereafter adjourned to 28.04.2003. The case was called, the counsel for the petitioner was present and made a request to call for the Register and submitted the affidavit by way of evidence of respondent No. 4. The matter was thereafter posted for cross-examination of respondent No. 4. Suffice it to say from 08.05.2003 till 03.06.2003, the matter was adjourned from time to time. The petitioners examined themselves by way of an affidavit they were also cross-examined. When the matter was listed on 05.06.2003 respondent No. 5 was cross-examined at length by the Secretary of the 3rd respondent-Sangha and the matter was posted on 09.06.2003 for final hearing. On that day, the Advocate for the petitioners filed an affidavit by way of evidence of one Shivalinge gowda, that is the 2nd petitioner and the same was allowed and petitioner No. 2 was cross-examined. Thereafter, the Advocate for the petitioners gave a list of independent witnesses. The 2nd respondent was bound by specific direction issued by this Court in the earlier proceedings, wherein he was directed to complete the enquiry within a period of one month (30 days) from the date of the receipt of the copy of the order. Apparently, the proceedings ought to have concluded on or before 25.05.2003. But however, the matter was dragged on for over a period of close to eight weeks. This attitude of the petitioners was seriously objected by the 2nd respondent and rightly so, when there was a specific direction that the enquiry should be completed within a period of 30 days, from the date of receipt of the order. In these circumstances, the petitioners had enough opportunity from 28.04.2003 till 09.06.2003 to bring an his witnesses and examine them. But however, he has not chosen to do so. This fact would clearly indicate that the petitioners wanted to get over the directions of this Court in W.A.3525/2003 wherein this Court had directed that the election process should be completed including accounting of funds and declaration of results on or before 14.07.2003. Apparently, it is to be noticed that the petitioners wanted to take advantage of this observation and participated in the election and wanted to take a chance, Petitioners 1 and 3 having failed in their attempt to get themselves elected and petitioner No. 2 being one of the members who appears to have actively supported petitioners 1 and 3 have filed this petition after much water have flown under the bridge. Consequently, this contention also stands rejected.
11. Re. Compliance of Section 10 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 : It is to be noticed that Section 10 of the Act would deal with the change of name, Rules and Regulations of a Society. Sub-section (1) of Section 10 would deal with a situation where a Special General Body meeting is convened for the purpose of which a written or a printed notice will have to be delivered or sent by post to every member of the Society, Twenty one days prior to the date of the Special General Body meeting and the resolution proposing the amendment is passed by the votes in favour of the resolution by members who being entitled to do so or by proxies if they are allowed. Sub-section (2) would deal with the filing of the amendment with the Registrar and if the Registrar is satisfied that the amendment is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules thereunder, shall register it. Such amendment shall have effect only after it is so registered. Sub-section (3) of the Act is not relevant for our purpose.
12. The 2nd respondent is a fact finding authority. A perusal of the impugned order after the matter stood remitted, it is to be noticed that he has dealt and has recorded a positive finding to the effect that Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act is duly observed and a notice to the members 21 days prior to the Special General body meeting was issued. He has also further recorded a finding that there were 1,109 members present whose signatures are also to be found in the Register. Admittedly, the 3rd respondent has also produced 11 attendance registers along with the present proceedings. On perusal of the same, he has recorded a finding that the conduct of the Special General body meeting is proved beyond doubt. In so far as the quorum is concerned, he has looked into Clause 93 of the bye-laws wherein minimum of 200 members are required for the quorum. Since the attendance of the members was more than 1000 he has recorded a finding that there is no violation of the quorum. He has also found that all the members of the Sangha have accepted this amendment, but only few disgruntled, unsuccessful members have chosen to question the approval of the amendment. A perusal of the impugned order clearly indicates that the 2nd respondent has recorded a finding that there is proper compliance of Section 10 of the Act.
13. It is to be noticed that the burden of establishing malafides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Ashok Kumar and Ors. has observed thus:
The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Mala fides is the last refuge of a losing litigant. The courts would be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before them by a party particularly when the imputations are grave and then are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration.
(underlining try me)
14. It is not the law that malafides in the sense of improper motive can be established only by direct evidence but it must be discernible from the established sound factors which preceded the order. The same can be deduced by reasonable interference from true facts. The facts here do not disclose and also do not establish that malafides are proved and no evidence either direct or indirect is forthcoming to show that the 2nd respondent has acted in any manner detrimental to the post, which he was holding.
15. In the matter of administration of law Judicial Review is reiterated and it is settled position. The Apex Court in the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra has observed thus:
It is well settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not dosed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonable and supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process.
Judicial review not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the Rules and natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority.
16. The same view is reiterated in the case of Delhi Development Authority and Anr. v. UEE Electricals Engg. (P) Ltd. and Anr. .
17. In the case on hand it is to be noticed that Annexure ‘R1’ which is produced along with the Statement of objections, is an entire extract of the proceedings of the Special General Body meeting held on 03.03.2002. A perusal of the same would clearly disclose that after the acrimony, the Special General Body meeting was convened at 2.45 p.m. on the same date and the said amended bye-law was approved. A perusal of this would indicate that indeed the Special General Body meeting was convened and the said amendment to the bye-law was accepted. In so far as the report of the observers, a copy of which is produced at Annexure ‘J’ itself reveal that the observers left the place when certain disturbances took place during the meeting but however, a perusal of the said meeting would also disclose that they were not present when the meeting was reconvened again. Be that as it may, the 2nd respondent being a fact finding authority has recorded a finding that there is compliance of issuance of notice of the meeting to the members 21 days prior to the Special General Body meeting and the bye-laws have been approved. The 2nd respondent being a fact finding authority has recorded categorically indeed the meeting was convened and amendment of the bye-laws was passed. This Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot interfere with the findings recorded by the fact finding authority. As stated in the decisions stated above, it is not brought to my notice that either there is denial of opportunity or it is in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. Consequently, I do not find any merit in this petition.
Petition stands rejected.