ORDER
Rama Jois, J.
1. In this Writ Petition presented by Sri Murugharajendra Bruhan Mutt of Chitradurga, in which the petitioner has questioned the legality of the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Coorg, made under Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, (‘the Act’ for short), the following question of law arises for consideration :
“Whether under Sub-section 3 of Section 136 of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner has the power to interfere with an appellate order made by the authority exercising the appellate power under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act ?”
2. The facts of the case, in brief, are as follows : Large extent of agricultural and forest lands in the district of Coorg had been granted to the petitioner-Mutt in the year 1796 AD by the then Maharaja of Coorg. This is evidenced by copper plate grants, the contents of which have been published in Epigraphic Karnataka Vol. 1 at page 12 (Exhibit-B). There were two branches of the petitioner-Mutt called ‘Abbi Mutt’ and ‘Madapura Mutt’, situated in the district of Coorg. The agent of these two branch Mutts resides at Belur village in the district of Coorg and that building in which the agent resides is called ‘Belur Mutt’. AH along in the revenue records and in the record of rights, as against the column ‘Owner of the lands in question’ either Abbi Mutt or Madapura Mutt was shown as the owner. There is no dispute that Abbi Mutt and Madapura Mutt are the branches and the agent of these two Mutts is also the agent, of the petitioner-Mutt. The petitioner considered that instead of the name of Abbi Mutt and Madapura Mutt being shown in the revenue records as the owner, it is better that the principal Mutt, namely, the petitioner-Mutt is shown as the owner of the lands. In the circumstances, the power of attorney holder of the petitioner-Mutt by an application dated 11th August 1968, requested the Tahsildar to change the khata in the name of the petitioner-Mutt to avoid any complications in future. As respondents 4 to 26 raised some objections, the Tahsildar registered the application as a disputed case as provided under Section 129(3) of the Act. Thereafter the Tahsildar who is the authority prescribed to decide the dispute under Sub-section (4) of Section 129 of the Act issued notice to the parties and made an order on 11-3-1970 rejecting the application of the petitioner. Copies of these orders are produced as Exhibits-S and T in the petition. Aggrieved by these orders, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner who is the prescribed authority under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act The Assistant Commissioner heard the appeal and made an order on 28-4-1973 allowing the appeal and directed the entry of the name of the petitioner Mutt in respect of the lands in question. Copy of that order is produced as Exhibit-U in the petition. Respondents 4 to 26 preferred revision petition against the said order to the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 15-7-1976 allowed the Revision Petition and set aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner and restore the order of the Tahsildar. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has presented this Writ Petition contending that under Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Act the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain a Revision Petition against the order of the Appellate Authority made under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act, It is in these circumstances, the question of law set out first arises for consideration.
3. In order to appreciate the contention of the petitioner, it is necessary to set out the contents of the provisions of Chapter XI of the Act, which regulates the making of the entry in the Record of Rights. Section 127 of the Act deals with the preparation of record of rights according to the prescribed procedure. According to Sub-section (3) of Section 127 of the Act, the record of rights so prepared and completed in respect of any village is required to be published in the Official Gazette in such manner as may be prescribed. In other words, this provision relates to the preparation of record of rights in the first instance under the provisions of the Act. Section 128 of the Act provides for reporting of the acquisition of rights in respect of lands covered by the provisions of the Act. Therefore, whenever any person acquires the right to any landed property for which the Act applies from its original owner by lease, mortgage, gift, purchase etc., the said Section provides for reporting of such acquisition of rights and for receiving it by the authority specified on payment of prescribed fee. Section 129 prescribes the procedure for registration of mutations reported under Section 128. Sub-section (1) of Section 129 of the Act provides for making an entry in the register of mutations of every report made to him under the provisions of Section 128 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 129 of the Act provides for publication of a copy of the entry so made as also for giving written intimation to all persons interested, as disclosed in the revenue records. If there were to be any objections,, Sub-section (3) requires the prescribed officer to enter the particulars of the objection in the register of disputed cases. Sub-section (4) of Section 129 of the Act empowers the prescribed authority to decide the disputes following the procedure as prescribed under Sub section (5). Subsection (6) of Section 129 of the Act provides for making an entry and certifying the entry relating to mutations in accordance with the order made after such inquiry. Sub-section (7) of Section 129 provides for transfer of certified entries made in the register of mutations to the record of rights. Section 135 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in respect of an order made under any of the provisions of the Chapter against the Government. The proviso under the said provision, however, provides that a person aggrieved by any entry made in any record or register may institute a suit against any person denying or interested in denying his title to such right and also provides that the entries in the record of right shall be amended in accordance with any declaration granted by the Civil Court. Section 136 of the Act which arises for interpretation in this Writ Petition reads :
“136. APPEAL AND REVISION : (1) The provisions of Chapter V shall not apply to any decision or order under this Chapter.
(2) Any person affected by an order made under Subsection (4) or an entry certified under Sub-section (6) of Section 129 may within a period of sixty days from the date of communication of the order or the knowledge of the entry certified, appeal to such officer as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf and his decision shall be final.
(3) The Deputy Commissioner may, on his own motion or on application of a party, call for and examine any records made under Section 127 and Section 129 and pass such orders as he may deem fit ;
Provided that no order shall be passed except after hearing the party who would be adversely affected by such order.”
Sub-section (1) of Section 136 of the Act excludes the application of Chapter V of the Act. This is a very significant provision for the reason that in the absence of the said provision every order of a revenue authority is subject to first and second appeal to the next higher authority as provided in Sections 49 and 50 of the Act. Therefore, by the operation of Sub-section (1) of Section 136 of the Act, the hierarchy of appellate authorities which is available in respect of any other order passed under the Act is excluded. Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act provides for an appeal against an order made under Sub-section (4) or an entry certified under Sub-section (6) of Section 129 of the Act to the prescribed authority. The said sub-section expressly states that the decision of the said authority on such appeal is final. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 43 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Rules specifies the Assistant Commissioner of the sub-division concerned as the appellate authority. It also reiterates that the order of the Assistant Commissioner on appeal shall be final.
4. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that though Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act provides that the order of the appellate authority is final, it only meant that there was no appeal and not that there was no further revision. He submitted that an order made by the appellate authority under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act should also be regarded as an order made under Section 129 of the Act and if it was so construed, it becomes clear that under Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Act the order is subject to revision at the hands of the Deputy Commissioner. In support of the above submission, Learned Counsel relied on the judgment of a Learned Single Judge in Bowramma v. Special Deputy Commissioner, 1979 (2) KLJ 200. In the said case, the Learned Judge held that an order of the Assistant Commissioner made under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act was to be regarded as an order passed under Section 129 of the Act and therefore a revision under Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Act was maintainable because the said section expressly refers to Section 129 of the Act.
5. Sri H. R. Venkataramaniah, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act cannot be regarded as an order made under Section 129 of the Act and further having regard to the language of the provisions of Section 136 of the Act, Subsection (3) cannot be construed as conferring a revisional power against an order of the appellate authority which is made final under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act. In support of his submission that an order made under Subsection (2) of Section 136 of the Act cannot be treated as an order made under Section 129 of the Act, Learned Counsel relied on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co., in which Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was, explained the effect of the appellate order thus :
“There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law the position would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the tribunal. As a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement.”
He next relied on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Gojer Brothers v. Ratan Lal, . Relevant portion of the same reads :
“10. The juristic justification of the doctrine of merger may be sought in the principle that there cannot be, at one and the same time, more than one operative order governing the same subject matter. Therefore the judgment of an inferior Court, if subjected to an examination by the superior Court, ceases to have existence in the eye of law and is treated as being superseded by the judgment of the superior Court. In other words, the judgment of the inferior Court loses its identity by its merger with the judgment of the superior Court.”
In view of the above position in law, Learned Counsel contended that the order of the Assistant Commissioner is only an order made in exercise of its appellate powers under Subsection (2) of Section 136 of the Act though it relates to a matter arising out of an order made under Section 129 of the Act, but the order itself cannot be regarded as an order made under Section 129 of the Act. In view of this Learned Counsel maintained that in the absence of an express reference to Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act in Sub section (3) of Section 136 of the Act, the said sub-section cannot be construed as conferring a power of revision in respect of an appellate order made under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act.
6. Sri Kadidal Manjappa, Learned Counsel appearing for respondents 4 to 26, relied on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Payappa Nemanna Haded v. Chamu Appayya Huded, 1969 (2) Mys. L.J 198. All that was decided in the said case was that an order of the Revenue Officer made under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act regarding the record of rights was not final as it may be a subject matter of a title suit and therefore a Writ Petition cannot be entertained. There is nothing in the said Judgment which supports the construction suggested for by the Learned Counsel for respondents 3 to 26. Learned Counsel, however, submitted that a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. Ramachandrachar, 1977 (1) KLJ 367 had taken the view that the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction under Sub section (3) of Section 136 of the Act to interfere with an order of the Assistant Commissioner made under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act. On going through the said decision, we are satisfied that the question which arises for consideration in this case did not arise for consideration and has not been answered. What was decided in the said case was that the decision of the revenue authorities regarding record of rights was final and the same could be corrected only pursuant to a decree of a Civil Court. This is so, in view of the proviso to Section 135 of the Act.
7. Sri S.V. Jagannath, Learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State, also agreed that the correct interpretation of Sub section (3) of Section 136 of the Act was the one made for the petitioner.
8. In the light of the arguments addressed by the Learned Counsel, we proceed to construe the provisions of Section 136 or me Act. As pointed out earlier, under the scheme of the Act,, Section 127 provides for preparation of record of rights in the first instance. That is not made a subject matter of appeal under Section 136 of the Act. The entry made under Section 127 can be corrected either in revision under Section 136(3) of the Act or pursuant to a decree obtained, as permitted under the proviso to Section 135 of the Act. Section 128 of the Act provides for reporting the acquisition of rights by any method. Section 129 of the Act provides for (i) entering such report, in the first instance, in me register of mutations, (n) for giving public and individual notices of such entry to all persons interested as revealed from the revenue records, (iii) for registering the objection in the register of disputed cases, if there were to be objections to such entry, (iv) for inquiring into such disputes and passing final order in the dispute, (v) for correcting and/or certifying the entry in the register of mutations in accordance with the order so made, and (vi) finally for transferring such certified entries to the record of rights. There is no dispute that the authority prescribed to hold the inquiry under Sub-section (4) of Section 129 of the Act is the Tahsildar. Sub section (1) of Section 136 of the Act excludes the operation of Chapter V of the Act under which an appeal lies from an order of any revenue officer to the next higher revenue officer, in the matter of record of rights. The Legislature in its wisdom has considered that hierarchy of such appeal should be excluded. Under Subsection (2) of Section 136 of the Act, an appeal is provided to the prescribed authority in respect of an order made under Sub-section (4) or an entry certified under Sub-section (6) of Section 129 of the Act. The period of limitation prescribed for such appeal is sixty days from the date of communication of the order. This sub-section expressly provides that the decision of such authority is final. Under Rule 43 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Rules, the Assistant Commissioner is designated as the appellate authority. When Subsection (2) of Section 136 uses the expression ‘final’ as regards the order of the appellate authority made under that provision, unless there are express words in any other provision, which affects such finality and constitutes an authority to decide the validity of such an appellate order, it is difficult to hold that any other authority has the power to interfere with such an order. Now coming to the language of Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Act, it expressly empowers the Deputy Commissioner to interfere in revision either suo motu or on the application of any party, with the decision taken either tinder Section 127 or Section 129 of the Act. It is significant to note that the decision under Section 127, has not been made a subject matter of appeal under Section 136(2), but is made revisable under Section 136(3). An amendment of the entry relating to record of rights is not a decision falling under Section 127 of the Act, but it falls only under Section 129 of the Act. An order under Section 129 is made applicable under Section 136(2). Therefore, if an order made under Section 129 of the Act is not appealed against either because the person concerned was not aware of order or he was not a party to the proceeding, he can move the Deputy Commissioner under Section 136(3) to interfere with such an order. The Deputy Commissioner also, if he comes to know of any illegality committed in making such entries, can interfere suo motu. There is also no period of limitation for exercising the power of revision. The provision under Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Act, it appears to us, is a safeguard provided against any illegal entries made without the knowledge of the parties or to the prejudice of the State. But in respect of a case which is registered as a dispute and is decided by contest and the matter was appealed against before the prescribed authority under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act and there has been an appellate order, the intention of the Legislature is, the party aggrieved by the appellate order can only resort to the remedy of filing a civil suit as permitted under the proviso to Section 135 of the Act. Any interpretation of Sub-section (3) of Section 136 as conferring power to interfere with an appellate order of the Assistant Commissioner made under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 would render the words ‘and his decision shall be final’ otiose. It is a settled rule of construction that no portion of a Section can be rendered otiose. Further the Legislature has expressly referred only to Sections 127 and 129 in Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Act. If the intention of the Legislature was that the Deputy Commissioner should also have the power to interfere with an appellate order made under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act, it would have specified the said provision also in Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Act just as Sections 127 and 129 are specified.
9. The only other point for consideration is: whether the view taken by the Learned Single Judge in Bowramm’s case, 1979(2) KLJ 200 that an order made under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act can be regarded as an order made under Section 129 of the Act is correct ? In view of the enunciation of law by the Supreme Court in Bhogilal’s case, and in Gojer Brothers’ case, , it is not possible to say that an order made by the Assistant Commissioner under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act is an order made under Section 129 of the Act. In fact, as held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases, the moment the appellate authority makes an order under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act, the order made by the original authority under Section 129 of the Act merges in the latter and as a result, the order made by the appellate authority under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 alone remains. For these reasons we are of the view that the true scope of Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Act, is that the Deputy Commissioner has the power to interfere with an order made under Section 129 of the Act if only the said order had not been the subject matter of an order in appeal made under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act, and that he has no power to revise an appellate order made under Section 136(2) of the Act.
10. It is further necessary to refer to a Writ Appeal which was the cause for referring this Writ Petition to a Division Bench. As can be seen from the order made by the Learned Single Judge referring this Petition to a Division Bench under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act, the Petition was referred because a similar question was pending before a Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 888 of 1979. The number appears to be a mistake. The reference is really to Writ Appeal No. 889 of 1979 V. Srinivasa Murthy v. The Special Deputy Commissioner, W.A. No. 889 of 1979 DD. 20-3-1985. In Writ Petition No. 7571 of 1979. out of which the Writ Appeal arose, the Learned Single Judge followed the Judgment in Bowramma’s case, 1979(2) KLJ 200 and held that the Deputy Commissioner had the power under Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Act to revise an order of the appellate authority made under Sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the Act. Though appeal was entertained against the said order, in the final order made by the Division Bench the Writ Appeal was dismissed solely on the ground that the party had a right of filing a suit as provided under the proviso to Section 135 of the Act without going into the correctness of the interpretation of the provision. The result is that in the said case also the Division Bench has not interpreted the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act.
11. Before concluding it is necessary to observe that as far as respondents-4 to 26 are concerned, they unnecessarilly took the trouble of filing the revision petition and created trouble to the petitioner, for. their rights were not in any way questioned by the petitioner and the change of entry in the record of rights sought for was only to bring the name of the principal/owner the petitioner in the place of their agents, in order to avoid unnecessary difficulties for the petitioner in all matters connected with the land. We asked the Learned Counsel for the petitioner also to clarify as to whether the petitioner accepts the right of respondents-4 to 26 against Abbi Mutt or Madapur Mutt, as the case may bo in any of the proceedings pending before the Land Tribunal or otherwise, as also a right against the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, frankly submitted that all or any of the rights of respondents-4 to 26 against Abbi Mutt on Madapur Mutt stands intact against the petitioner for the very reason that the petitioner-Mutt has sought for change of khata on the ground that Abbi Mutt and Madapur Mutt were only the agents of the petitioner-Mutt. That being the position, we are satisfied that none of the rights of respondents 4 to 26, howsoever, is affected as every right against Abbi Mutt or Madapur Mutt also happens to be a right against the petitioner-Mutt as the former is only the agent of the latter.
12. For the reasons mentioned above, we answer the question set out first as follows :
“Under Sub-section (3) of Section 136 of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner has no power to interfere with an appellate order made by the authority exercising the appellate power under Sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Act.”
In view of the answer to the question of law arising for consideration as above, the order made by the Deputy Commissioner in revision should be held as made without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be set aside.
13. Accordingly, we make the following order :
(i) The Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) The impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner, Coorg 15-7-1976 (Exhibit-V) is set aside.
(iii) No Costs.