JUDGMENT
V.S. Aggarwal, J.
1. The present revision petition has been filed by State Bank of Patiala, hereinafter described as “the petitioner” directed against the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh, dated 1.6.1987 and of the learned Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, dated 21.3.1992. The learned Appellate Authority affirmed the order passed by the learned Rent Controller.
2. The relevant facts are that the respondents had filed a petition for eviction against the petitioner with respect to the ground floor, first floor and second floor of S.C.O. No. 175-176, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh. The surviving ground of eviction which found favour with the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority was that, as per landlords, the petitioner had sublet the premises in question to one Naurata Ram. Naurata Ram was stated to be running a canteen and was in exclusive possession of that premises.
3. In the written statement filed by the petitioner, this fact had been denied. It was asserted that the petitioner was permitted to sublet the premises. No terms and conditions of the settlement had been contravened. However, it was specifically denied that the property had been sublet Naurata Ram. Plea was raised that with respect to the portion with Naurata Ram, he was a direct tenant of the landlords paying rent regularly to them. It was further the plea of the petitioner that the portion in possession of Naurata Ram was separate from the main portion and the bank had never occupied that portion. It was always in exclusive possession of Naurata Ram.
4. The learned Rent Controller as well as the learned Appellate Authority rejected the plea of the petitioner and, as mentioned above, passed an order of eviction against the petitioner. Aggrieved by the same, present revision petition has been filed.
5. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the petitioner has submitted an application seeking permission to lead additional evidence and that the same has not been decided. According to him, this courses prejudice to the rights of the petitioner. He fairly did concede that inadvertently in the grounds of revision it had been mentioned that the application for additional evidence had been declined while, in fact, according to him, the said application had not been decided.
6. In paragraph 3 of the grounds of revision, the petitioner had pleaded as under :-
“That the lease commenced with lease deed executed on 26.12.1977 as admitted by the landlord in the very first sentence of his statement. The lease deed dated 26.12.1977 was also withheld. Enclosed with this lease deed was a letter of the landlord specifying the leased premises in which this shop was expressly excluded. The application was made under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. before the Appellate Authority but the same has been declined without any cogent reason. The document was clincher of the whole case.”
7. However, the law is well settled that the admission which on the face of it is erroneous can always be explained. If the application seeking permission to lead additional evidence had not, in fact, been decided, then merely writing that it had been declined will not make any difference. As would be seen hereinafter, the said application has, in fact, not been decided.
8. Against the order of eviction, an appeal had been preferred. During the pendency of appeal, the petitioner had filed an application for additional evidence and the second application seeking amendment of the written statement. By virtue of one application seeking permission to lead additional evidence, the petitioner-bank wanted to produce its account books to show that no rent was received by them from Naurata Ram, the third person who is described as a sub-tenant. Yet another application had been filed seeking permission to lead additional evidence. In the second application, the petitioner pleaded that it is a nationalised bank and had taken all the appropriate steps in ascertaining the carpet area. Inadvertently, the petitioner-bank could not bring on record the material evidence regarding the existence of the shop under the stair-case. The petitioner has now found a letter dated 20.12.1977 written by the respondent-landlords to the petitioner-bank showing the carpet area and the rate of rent for the carpet area. The area which exists pertaining to the said shop had been excluded from the tenanted premises. The said document would show and demolish the case of the petitioner that the property has been sublet.
9. The application as such had been contested and the respondent-landlord contended that the lease deed clearly indicate the portion let out to the petitioner. The petitioner cannot be allowed to lead evidence to show that the tenanted premises are different. The report given by Batra and Associates which the petitioner intended to establish will be of no use and consequence.
10. The application seeking amendment of the written statement was dismissed as withdrawn. So far as the other application for additional evidence was concerned, the learned Appellate Authority had mentioned this fact in paragraph 7 of the impugned judgment. Thereafter, in paragraph 11 to 13 of the impugned judgment, the learned Appellate Authority had discussed the said application and concluded as under:-
“11. Shri Battas while pressing his application for additional evidence stated that the applicant-bank is a corporate body and no individual employee could receive the rent from Naurata Ram and, therefore, there is no question of sub-letting and that the bank may be allowed to produce its account books to prove this assertion. It was stated that the account books of the bank were audited annually and there is no chance of these forged or fabricated. In support of his contention Shri Battas made reference to 1986(1) P.L.R. 121 Kaushalia Devi v. M/s. Hussan Lal Bihari Lal, (1990-2)98 P.L.R. 51 Kishan etc. v. Narain Dass, (1990-2)98 P.L.R. 577 Daya Nand Dahiya v. Shailu Singh, (1985-2)88 P.L.R. 279 Badha Ram v. M/s Munshi Ram Ram Bhai and Anr., and the Apex Court of the land held in 1987 R.C.J. 238 Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar.
12. Shri R.S. Walia, learned counsel for the landlords respondents, on the other hand, relied upon on 1978(1) R.C.R. 161 Bachan Singh and Ors. v. Amar Singh and Ors., to oppose the application for additional evidence.
13. The learned counsel for the parties are agreed that no party can claim production of additional evidence as a matter of right and it is the requirement of the court for a complete and effectual adjudication of the dispute between the parties that the court can allow the additional evidence. In the present case both the parties knew each other case. They led whatever evidence they thought fit before the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh. The evidence on the file is sufficient to pronounce the judgment and the court does not require the additional evidence as being prayed for by the appellant-tenant. Therefore, the application for additional evidence moved by the appellant-tenant is dismissed.”
11. It is abundantly clear from the aforesaid that only the application seeking additional evidence to produce the account books had been dismissed. There was no reference in the appellate order about the second application whereby permission was claimed to produce the letter showing the area of the tenanted premises. In fact, with the help of the respondents counsel, entire file was scanned. On 9.5.2000 the present revision was adjourned to 10.5.2000 for that purpose. There was no order or one on the file to indicate that the said application had been decided. The only conclusion, therefore, would be that the application seeking additional evidence has not been decided whereby the petitioner wanted to produce the letter showing the floor area.
12. Confronted with that position, the learned counsel for the respondents urged that once the application has not been decided but the appeal has been dismissed, it deemed that the said application had also been dismissed. He relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Lal Chand v. Chanan Singh and Ors., (1997-2)116 P.L.R. 465, wherein it was held as under-
“It was next argued that before the first Appellate Court, an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for leading additional evidence was filed, but that application was not decided by the first appellate Court. Therefore, case be remanded to the first appellate Court to decide the application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code and the appeal afresh. I am of the considered view that in the case of the appellate Court omits to decide an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that implies that the appellate Court did not require any additional evidence for pronouncing the judgment. Rule 27 of Order XLI, Code of Civil Procedure, does not entitle the parties to an appeal to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary. The parties can be allowed to lead additional evidence only in the contingencies mentioned in clauses (a) and (aa). The appellate Court may also allow the parties to bring additional evidence on record in the form of oral or documentary evidence if the Court finds itself unable to pronounce the judgment on the basis of the evidence already on record or for any other substantial cause. If a party is allowed to lead such evidence or produce a document, the Court has to record the reasons for its admission. In case the Court finds that the judgment can be pronounced on the evidence already on the record., it is not required to record the reasons for refusal of additional evidence. No other point has been argued.”
13. The ratio decidendi of this decision will not apply to this case and will not help the respondent-landlords. Herein, it cannot be presumed or even assumed that the Court did not require the document for the purpose of pronouncing the judgment. This is for the reason that the Appellate Authority did consider the earlier application and not the application under consideration. Once the application has not been dealt with, then it cannot be taken that it deemed dismissal of the application. In the peculiar facts, therefore, it is an inadvertent mistake not to consider the said application.
14. The learned counsel for the respondents in that case even had argued that the application should not be allowed. But this Court feels that it is better that this fact is considered by the learned Appellate Authority. Any opinion expressed by this Court would be embarrassing for either party. Consequently, the precedents cited at the bar are not gone into.
15. For these reasons, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned judgment of the learned Appellate Authority is set aside. The case is remanded to the learned Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, to consider and decide the said application in accordance with law. The decision as such must be taken along with the appeal and appropriate order passed. The said decision should be taken within two months from the next date of hearing. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Appellate Authority/District Judge, Chandigarh, on 7.6.2000. The learned District Judge/Appellate Authority will either decide the application himself or assign it to other Court of competent jurisdiction. It is made clear that nothing said herein should be taken as any expression of opinion pertaining to the merits of the said application.