Suman Sinha vs General Manager (Personnel), … on 10 July, 2000

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Patna High Court
Suman Sinha vs General Manager (Personnel), … on 10 July, 2000
Equivalent citations: (2001) IILLJ 642 Pat
Author: R M Prasad
Bench: R M Prasad

ORDER

Radha Mohan Prasad, J.

1. As in all the three writ petitions the questions for consideration are common, with consent of the parties, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.

2. In the first two writ petitions, the petitioner is the widow of Late Gopal Sinha, who died in harness on March 6, 1999 while posted as Assistant Branch Manager, Punjab National Bank, Belaganj, Gaya and in the third writ petition, petitioner No. 1 claims to be the son and petitioner No. 2 claims to be the daughter of the deceased. The widow, in the instant case, is the second wife of the deceased and the son and daughter are from the first wife of the deceased.

3. In the first writ petition the widow has claimed for grant of death-cum-retiral benefits like family pension, gratuity, leave encashment, provident fund and benevolent fund and in the second writ petition filed by her, she has claimed for her appointment on compassionate ground in the Bank’s service. In the writ petition filed by the son and the daughter of the deceased, their claim is also with respect to appointment of petitioner No. 1 on compassionate ground and also for payment of 50% of the amount of retirement benefits of his deceased father for the purpose of marriage of petitioner No. 2 and also for payment of share of family pension to her (petitioner No. 2) till her marriage.

4. Separate counter affidavits have been filed in the first writ petition filed by the widow and in the writ petition filed by the son and daughter.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the widow-petitioner has submitted that the petitioner being the nominee with respect to provident fund and gratuity of the deceased
employee, under the rules of the Bank, she is entitled for grant of the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition and also for her appointment on compassionate ground whereas learned counsel appearing for the son and daughter has
submitted that in view of the principle decided by the Apex Court in the case Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, reported in AIR 1984 SC 346 : 1984 (1) SCC 424, mere nomination does not create any absolute right in the nominee to
claim that such amount shall belong to him/her.

7. Learned counsel appearing for the Bank has submitted that insofar as the payment of the amount of gratuity is concerned, as per the rules of the Bank, the said payment is to be mades per the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act and under Section 4 of the said Act, the nominee, if any, is entitled to get the payment

of the amount of gratuity on the death of the employee. With respect to provident fund, he submitted that under the Rules of the Bank, the nominee of the employee is entitled to receive the amount of provident fund. He also submitted that with respect to the scheme for appointment on compassionate ground, the Bank has its own scheme for employment of the dependents of the employees who die while in service of the Bank. As per the said Scheme, contained in Annexure J employment is to be given to the dependents of the deceased and as per the definition of the word ‘dependent’, it means widow/widower, a son, a daughter or any other close relative nominated by the widow/widower on whom she or he will be wholly dependent. It has thus been submitted that the widow has preferential right for grant of appointment on, compassionate ground. Learned counsel appearing for the son and daughter-petitioners has failed to show any other provision under which the son can claim preferential right over the widow.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the Bank has submitted that so far as the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi (supra) is concerned, the question involved in the present case was not directly in issue before the Apex Court. It is true that the Apex Court while considering the scope of the provisions contained in Section 39 of the Life Insurance Act has held that the nominee of the life insurance policy does not get absolute right to the amount due. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. It was further held that the amount received under the policy can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them, but the Apex Court did not say that the said question shall be considered by the Company while discharging its liability.

9. This Court finds substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the Bank. In order to discharge its liability, the Bank is obliged to release the payment as per the statutory provision/nomination made by the deceased, but in view of the principle decided by the Apex Court that the nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy the other heirs can claim share in the said amount in accordance with law of succession governing them. The Apex Court has held that the provision in Sub-section (6) of Section 39 of the Insurance Act says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees.

10. Under such circumstances, all these three writ petitions are disposed of with a direction to the respondent-Bank to release the entire dues found payable after the death of the deceased employee and provide appointment on compassionate ground in accordance with law within two weeks of the receipt/production of a copy of this order.

11. Meanwhile, the petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 9415 of 1999 shall be at liberty to move the appropriate forum for appropriate relief with respect to their claim.

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