ORDER
K.M. Natarajan, J.
1. The unnumbered revision petition with the connected C.M.Ps. is posted before this Court for deciding as to its maintainability. The revision is filed by defendants 1 and 2 in O.S. No. 55 of 1987 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry, on being aggrieved by an interim order passed by the Court below in I.A. No. 891 of 1987 under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code read with Section 151, Civil Procedure Code. The said order runs as follows:
The interim injunction is modified and restricted against sale, mortgage or make any alteration only in the suit properties pending enquiry in the I.A. This order is without prejudice to rights of parties in the suit. Call on 13.4.1987.
The petitioners challenged the said order on the ground that the Court below erred in not considering the counter affidavit filed by the second petitioner (second defendant) while continuing the earlier Ex Parte order which was granted without giving any reasons, and that the plaintiff has no Prima Facie case for asking for injunction. As against the said order, they preferred the revision before this Court. The Office returned the papers stating that the interlocutory application is kept pending that the petitioners can move the lower Court itself for setting aside the order, that any order passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. is only appealable and that the appeal will lie only in the District Court and not a revision in the High Court. Further, no revision or appeal lies against an interim order passed by the Court below.
2. Learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of this Court reported in Sundaram Pillai v. Govindasami, , and submitted that this Court interfered with the erroneous order of interim mandatory injunction passed by the trial Court and that the same principle is to be applied to this case also. On going through the said judgment, I find that the said decision is not applicable to the case of the petitioners. It is seen from para 8 of the said judgment that the effect of the impugned order is that the suit filed by the plaintiff substantially stands decreed on the very day on which the suit has been filed at the end of the day. Further, the learned Chief Justice came to the conclusion that the said order is perverse and has been obtained by suppressing material facts and as such interference under Section 115, C.P.C. is necessitated to set aside the order which amounts to an abuse of the powers vested in the trial. Court and that by one stroke of the pen of the learned Judge, the defendants have been summarily divested of the ownership of the shares in question of the value of more than Rs. 10,00,000. Only in that view, the power under Section 115, C.P.C. was exercised in view of the extraordinary circumstances of the case.
3. On the other hand, we have to see the various decisions of this Court on this point regarding maintainability of revision. A Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Shukoor v. Umachander, 89 L.W. 330 : A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 350, consisting of Ramaprasada Rao, J. (as he then was) and Ratnavel Pandian, J. held:
No appeal will lie against an Ex Parte ad interim injunction but the specific remedy available in Order 39, Rule 4, C.P.C. has to be availed of by the interdicted party so that a final reasoned order could be obtained in the trial Court itself against which the Code has provided an obvious appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(r), C.P.C.
That was also a case where the question arose whether an appeal or a revision is maintainable against the Ex Parte Interim order, and the same was decided after giving notice to the Bar Association, Advocates Association and other Associations by the Division Bench of this Court. The above case was also referred to in the judgment in Sundaram Pillai v. Govindasami, , relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. The learned Chief Justice also accepted the proposition of law laid down therein. It is also significant to note that Ratnavel Pandian, J. had an occasion to consider a similar question of maintainability of revision against the interim order in Ramalinga Naicker v. Chinnakrishna Konar, 96 L.W. 62, where it was held as follows:
Held: admittedly in the present case, the party has not moved the trial Court, availing Rule 4 of Order 39. Therefore, the order against which the revision is now sought to be filed, is not a final reasoned order within the expression of the judgment in Abdul Shukoor”s Case, 89 L.W. 330 : A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 350. The explanation given by the party for not moving the trial Court is that there was no presiding officer in the District Munsif Court at the relevant time for him to get a final order by filing a petition under Order 39, Rule 4, C.P.C. On verification from the office, it comes to light that a new officer has already taken charge as District Munsif even on 26th November, 1982, that is six days after the filing of this petition. Notwithstanding the above position, as under Section 115(2), C.P.C. the High Court is debarred from varying or reversing any decree or order against an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate to it, this Court cannot interfere with the impugned order in question by entertaining a revision.
In this connection it is worthwhile to note the provisions of Section 115, C.P.C. which reads as follows:
Section 115(1) The High Court may call for the records of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears:
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.
Provided….
(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.
So, it is clear from the above provision that a revision lies only in cases where no appeal lies against the order either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. Further, only in any case, where it has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court, Section 115 applies. The question what is meant by ‘case which has been decided’ has been considered in the decisions. In Baldevdas v. Filmistan Ltd., , it has been held:
The expression ‘case’ is not limited in its import to the entirety of the matter in dispute in a proceeding. Such an interpretation may result in certain cases in denying relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed. But equally, it is not every order of the Court in the course of a suit that amounts to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided only if the Court adjudicates, for the purpose of the suit, some right or obligation of the parties in controversy.
In Ramdas v. Subhan Bakshi , R.S. Pathak, C.J. (later Chief Justice of India) and C.R. Thakur, J., held:
‘A case is decided’ when there is an adjudication on the rights or obligations of the parties in controversy. Such adjudication may be in the nature of a decision expressly deciding these rights or obligations. For example, the entire suit or appeal may be disposed of or a distinct part of the suit or appeal may be disposed of finally so far as the subordinate Court is concerned. Or the adjudication may be such as to have the necessary effect of deciding those rights or obligations. Object of Section 115, C.P.C. pointed.
It is clear from the above decision that only in cases where the rights or obligations of the parties in controversy were adjudicated by the Court, the question of revision against that order arises under Section 115, C.P.C., and not otherwise. Lastly, it is relevant to quote the decision in M/s. Parijatha v. Kamalsha Nayak A.I.R. 1982 Karn. 105. In that case, relying on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Abdul Shukoor v. Umachander, 89 L.W. 330 : A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 300, it was held:
No appeal lies against an Ex Parte interim order of injunction granted under Rule 1 or 2 of Order 39 Remedy of aggrieved person, even if he be a stranger to the suit or proceeding, is to move trial Court under Order 39, Rule 4 in the first instance.
In the present case, these requirements have not been satisfied, Admittedly, against any order passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, the petitioner has got a remedy to move the said Court for vacating or modifying or altering the said order and in the instant case, the matter is adjourned to 13.4.1987, for further hearing of the parties and the interim order is only in respect of the sale, mortgage or alteration pending enquiry in the interlocutory application. Admittedly, the petitioners have not moved the said Court for a remedy falling under Rule 4 of Order 39, C.P.C. So far no final order has been passed and the matter is posted for hearing on 13.4.1987. It is open to the petitioners to raise their contentions before the Court below and insist for passing final order. Applying the ratio laid down in the decisions cited and also considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view, that this revision is not maintainable at this stage and accordingly it is rejected. However, it is open to the petitioners to move the trial Court under Order 39, Rule 4, C.P.C., to vacate the said order or modify or alter the said order if so desired.