PETITIONER:
TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
25/01/1951
BENCH:
KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ)
BENCH:
KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ)
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA
CITATION:
1951 AIR 174 1951 SCR 212
CITATOR INFO :
R 1952 SC 350 (11)
E 1974 SC 183 (32)
R 1979 SC1925 (8,13)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 22 (5)--Preventive
detention-Duty to communicate grounds of detention as soon
as may be--DUty to give earliest opportunity to make repre-
sentation--Grounds furnished after 15 days--" Supplementary
grounds" furnished after 4 months--Legality of
detention--Vague grounds and irrelevant grounds distin-
guishd--Supply of grounds first and details laterLegality-
Serving printed orders on same date on several persons-Bona
fides of detention.
HEADNOTE:
A large number of persons were detained under the Bengal
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930. The validity of this Act
was being challenged in the High Court. Meanwhile, the
Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was passed on 26th Febru-
ary, 1950, and on the same date detention orders under this
Act were served on them. The grounds of detention were
served on them on the 14th of March, and on the 16th of July
the Government served on them "supplementary grounds" in
continuation of the grounds already furnished on the 14th of
March. A second set of grounds were communicated to the
appellants on the 22nd or 23rd of July. They applied to the
High Court of Calcutta for writs of habeas corpus contending
that the orders of detention were invalid on various
grounds. The High Court rejected these applications and
they appealed to the' Supreme Court.
Held per KANIA C.J., FAZAL ALI, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRASEK-
HARA AIYAR JJ.--(i) that in the particular circumstances of
the case, especially in view of the fact that a large number
of causes had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preven-
tive Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that
the grounds were not communicated to the appellants "as soon
as nay be" within the meaning of Art. 22 (5); '
213
(ii) it cannot be held that the appellants were not
given the "earliest opportunity" to make a representation,
as required by Art. 22(5), merely because further details
and facts were communicated to the appellants on the 16th
July and 22nd July as these later communications did not
contain any new or additional grounds (though they were
described as "supplementary grounds ") but only furnished
details of the heads of grounds furnished on the 14th March;
(iii) merely because a ground is vague it cannot be
considered that it is no ground at all and therefore cannot
be sufficient to ' satisfy '.the authorities; a ' vague'
ground does not stand on the same footing as an irrelevant
ground, which can have no connection at all with the satis-
faction of the Government;
(iv) the sufficiency of the grounds for the purposes of
satisfaction of the Government is not a matter for examina-
tion by the court; their sufficiency to give the detained
person the earliest opportunity to make a representation can
be examined by the court, but only from that point of view.
Held also, per DAS J.--The fact that a large number of
fresh orders of detention were made overnight did not neces-
sarily indicate bad faith on the part of the authorities in
the circumstances of these cases as the authorities had
already applied their minds to the suspected activities of
each of the detenus and were satisfied that with a view to
prevent them from doing some prejudicial act, it was neces-
sary to detain them.
The State of Bombay, v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya supra
P.167 followed.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION: (Case No.
24 of 1050). Appeal under Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution
of India, against the judgment and order of the High Court
of Judicature at Calcutta in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.
361 of 1050.
A.C. Gupta and Sudhansu Sekhar Mukherjee (Arun Kumar
Dutta and S.N. Mukherjee, with them) for the appellants.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General, (B. Sen, with him) for
the respondent.
1051. Jan. 25. The Judgment of Kania C.J., Fazl Ali,
Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ., was delivered by
Kania C.J. Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ. delivered separate
judgments.
KANIA C.J.–This is an appeal under article 132 of the
Constitution of India from the judgment of the
214
High Court at Calcutta, which rejected the habeas corpus
petitions of the appellants. The detention orders under the
Preventive Detention Act, 1950, in all cases were served on
the appellants on the 26th February, 1950, and the grounds
for the detention were served on the 14th March, 1950. By
way of specimen we quote one of them:
“You are beings detained in pursuance of a detention
order made under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of subsection
(1)of section a of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, (Act
IV of 1950), on the following grounds:-
(1) That you have been assisting the operations of the
Communist Party of India, which along with its volunteer
organisations has been declared unlawful by Government under
section 16 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act (Act XIV
of 1908), and which has for its object commission of rioting
with deadly weapons, robbery, dacoity, arson and murder and
possession and use of arms and ammunitions and explosives
and thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order and that it is necessary to prevent you from
acting in such manner.
(2) That as a member of the C.P.I. on its Kishan front,
you have fomented trouble amongst the peasants of Howrah
District and incited them to acts of lawlessness and vio-
lence:
and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order:
That as a worker of the C.P.I. you have tried to foment
trouble amongst the tramways men and other workers at Cal-
cutta and in speeches which you delivered at the University
Hall and other places you actually incited them to resort to
acts of violence and lawlessness; and have thereby acted in
a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.”
On the 16th of July, 1950, the Government of West Bengal
served on the appellants “in continuation of the grounds
already furnished on the 14th of March, 1950, supplementary
grounds” for their detention a specimen of which is in the
following terms:–
215
“In continuation of the grounds already furnished under
order No. 6163 H.S. dated 14th March, 1950, you are being
informed of the supplementary grounds for your detention
which are as follows: –
You as the Secretary of the Bengal Chatkar Mazdoor
Union, as a member of the Executive Committee of the Federa-
tion of Mercantile Employees’ Union, as the honorary report-
er of the ‘Khabar’ newspaper (C. P.I. organ) carried on the
disruptive programme of the C.P.I. On the 29th July, 1948,
you along with others led a procession at Howrah preaching
discontent against Government and have been thus acting in a
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. ”
As in the case of the first grounds, these “supplemen-
tary grounds” were also served on each appellant separately.
The appellants applied for a Rule of habeas corpus separate-
ly under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and on
the 21st July, 1950, the High Court issued a Rule in each
case on the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Ben-
gal. A second set of grounds were communicated to the
appellants on the 22nd or 23rd of July, 1950. A specimen of
one is in the following terms:–
“In continuation of the grounds already furnished under
order No. 12820 dated 14th July, 1950, you are being in-
formed of the supplementary grounds for your detention which
are as follows:–
1. That in a meeting held at the University Institute on
the 19th March, 1947, under the auspices of the Calcutta
Tramway Workers’ Union, you held out the threat that any
attempt to take out tram cars on the 20th March, 1947, would
be inviting disaster and you further said that if the au-
thorities tried to resume the tram service you and your
friends would not hesitate to remove the tram lines and cut
the wires.
2. That on the 13th June, 1948, you presided over a
meeting under the auspices of the Students’ Federation
(C. P.I. controlled) and delivered speech
28
216
advocating withdrawal of ban on the Communist Party of India
and its organ Swadhinta.”
The High Court after considering the whole matter re-
jected the petitions of the appellants and the appellants
have thereupon come in appeal before us.
In the High Court, it was first contended on behalf of
the appellants that the communication of the grounds dated
the 14th March was not a compliance with article 22 (5)of
the Constitution of India, as those grounds were not commu-
nicated “as soon as may be.” The High Court rejected this
contention. Under the circumstances of the case, we agree
with the High Court and are unable to hold that in furnish-
ing the grounds dated the 14th March, 1950, the authorities
had failed to act in accordance with the procedure laid down
in article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Under the Bengal
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, a very large number of
persons were detained. The validity of that Act was being
challenged in the High Court and the judgment was expected
to be delivered towards the end of February, 1950. The
Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was passed by the Parliament
of India in the last week of February, 1950, and these
orders on all those detenus were served on the 26th of
February, 1950. Having regard to the fact that the Provin-
cial Government had thus suddenly to deal with a large
number of cases on one day, we are unable to accept this
contention of the appellants.
On behalf of the appellants it was next urged that there
has been a non-compliance with the procedure laid down in
article 22 (s)of the Constitution and section 7 of the
Preventive Detention Act in the manner of supplying grounds
to the appellants resulting in not providing to the appel-
lants the earliest opportunity to make a representation,
which they had a right to make. In the judgment delivered
today in Case No. 22 of 1950(1) we have discussed in detail
the nature of the two rights conferred under article 22 (5).
We have to apply those principles to the facts of this
appeal for its decision.
(11 Supra, P. 167.
217
When the authorities sent their second communication
dated 16th July, 1950, to the appellants they described
it as “in continuation of the grounds already furnished”
and as the “supplementary grounds for your detention”.
Relying on the wording of this communication it was argued
that these were additional grounds which were furnished to
the detenu and therefore the procedure prescribed under
article 22 (5) had not been followed. It was argued that
the obligation to communicate grounds “as soon as may be”
was absolute. The grounds for detention must be before the
Provincial Government before they could be satisfied about
the necessity for making the detention order. If the grounds
before the detaining authorities on the 26th of February,
1950, were only those which they communicated on the 14th of
March, they cannot support the detention on additional
grounds which were not before them on that day and which
they set out in the second communication four months later.
It was also contended that the fact of this communication
showed that the authorities were not satisfied on the origi-
nal grounds and had therefore put forth these supplementary
grounds as an afterthought. In our opinion these arguments
cannot be accepted. A ‘description of the contents of the
second communication as “supplementary grounds” does not
necessarily make them additional or new grounds. One has to
look at the contents to find out whether they are new
grounds as explained in our judgment in Case No. 92 of
1950(1). Examining the contents of the later communication
in that way we find that they only furnish details of the
second heads of the grounds furnished to the appropriate
appellant on 14th March, 1950, in respect of his activities.
We are unable to treat them as new grounds and we agree with
the High Court in its conclusion that these are not fresh or
new grounds. We do not think it proper to consider the true
effect of the communication only by reading its opening
words. The whole of it must be read and considered togeth-
er. The contention that the authorities were not satisfied
on the original
(1) Supra, p. 167.
218
grounds and therefore put forth this. communication as the
supplemental grounds is again unsound. The fact that these
details were communicated later does not necessarily show
that they were not within the knowledge of the authorities
when they sent the communication dated the 14th of March.
The contention that this communication of the 16th of July,
1950, was not “as soon as may be”, has to be rejected having
regard to the principles set out in our judgment in Case No.
22 of 1950. The facts in each case have to to be taken into
consideration and if the detained person contends that this
part of the procedure prescribed in article 22 (5) was not
complied with, the authorities will have to place materials
before the court to refute that contention. In the present
case the High Court has considered that there has been no
infringement of this procedural law and we see no reason to
come to a different conclusion.
It was next argued that the grounds being vague, they
could not be considered as grounds at all and therefore they
could not be sufficient “to satisfy” the authorities. On
this point we have nothing to add to what we have stated in
our judgment in Case No. 22 of 1950. We are unable to
accept the contention that “vague grounds” stand on the same
footing as “irrelevant grounds”. An irrelevant ground has
no connection at all with the satisfaction of the Provincial
Government which makes the order of detention. For the
reasons stated in that judgment we are also unable to accept
the contention that if the grounds are vague and no repre-
sentation is possible there can be no satisfaction of the
authority as required under section 3 of the Preventive
Detention Act. This argument mixes up two objects. The
sufficiency of the grounds, which gives rise to the satis-
faction of the Provincial Government, is not a matter for
examination by the court. The sufficiency of the grounds to
give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a
representation can be examined by the court, but only from
that point of view. We are therefore unable to accept the
contention that the quality and characteristic of
219
the grounds should be the same for both tests. On the ques-
tion of satisfaction, as has been often stated, one person
may be, but another may not be, satisfied on the same
grounds. That aspect however is not for the determination
of the court, having regard to the words used in the Act.
The second part of the enquiry is clearly open to the court
under article 22 (5). We are therefore unable to accept the
argument that if the grounds are not sufficient or adequate
for making the representation the grounds cannot be suffi-
cient for the subjective satisfaction of the authority.
As regards the grounds furnished by the Government in
each case in its first communication, it is sufficient to
notice that while the first ground is common to all the
appellants, the second ground is different in most cases.
The High Court has considered the case of each appellant in
respect of the communication dated the 14th of March, 1950,
sent to him. In their opinion those grounds are not vague.
They have held that the procedural requirement to give the
detained person the earliest opportunity to make a represen-
tation has not been infringed by the communication of the
grounds of the 14th of March and by the subsequent communi-
cation made to the appellants in July. This point was not
seriously pressed before us. After hearing counsel for the
appellant we see no reason to differ from the conclusion of
the High Court on this point. The result is that the
appeal fails and is dismissed.
PATANJALI SASTRI J.–This appeal was heard along with
Case No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar
Vaidya)(1), as the main question involved was the same. In
the view I have expressed on that question in my judgment
delivered today in that case, this appeal cannot succeed and
I agree that it should be dismissed.
DAS J.–The same important questions have been raised in
this appeal by 100 detenus against an order of a Bench of
the Calcutta High Court as were raised
(1) Supra, p. 167,
220
by the detenu in the appeal of the State of Bombay in which
judgment has just been delivered. One additional point
raised in this appeal was that the fact that a large number
of fresh orders of detention were made “overnight” indicates
bad faith on the part of the authorities, for the authori-
ties could not have applied their minds to each individual
case. I am unable to accept this contention as correct. The
authorities had already applied their minds to the suspected
activities of each of the detenus and were satisfied that
with a view to prevent them from doing some prejudicial act
of a particular kind it was necessary to make an order of
detention against them under the local Acts. There being
doubt as to the validity of the local Acts and the Preven-
tive Detention Act having been passed in the meantime the
question was to make a fresh order under the new Act. The
minds of the authorities having already been made up as to
the expediency of making an order of detention against them,
an elaborate application of mind, such as is now suggested,
does not appear to me to be necessary at all. I do not think
there was any failure of duty on the part of the authorities
which will establish bad faith on their part. In my view,
for reasons stated in my judgment in the other appeal, there
being no proof of any mala fides on the part of the authori-
ties, no fundamental rights of the petitioners have been
infringed. In the case of each of the detenus, apart from
the common ground, there were one or more specific grounds
of detention which are quite sufficient to enable the detenu
concerned to make his representation. Therefore, the ques-
tion of supplementary particulars does not arise at all. In
my opinion the conclusions arrived at by Roxburgh J. were
correct and well-founded, and, therefore, this appeal should
be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: P.K. Chatterjee.
Agent for the respondent: P.K. Bose.
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