Banerji and Aikman, JJ.
1. This was a suit for profits by a co-sharer against the lambardar under Clause (b) of Section 93 of Act No. XII of 1881. The claim was to recover Rs. 104-12-6. On the 29th of May 1893, the Court of First Instance made a decree in favour of the plaintiffs for Rs. 15-12-5. The plaintiff did not appeal from that decree, although an appeal lay under Section 189 of the Act. He, however, applied on the 2nd of July 1893, for a review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance under Section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That Court granted the application, modified its decree and made a decree in favour of the plaintiffs for Rs. 37-2-9. From this decree the defendant appealed to the District Judge, who affirmed the decree passed on the review. The defendant has preferred this second appeal; and he urges in this Court, as he did in the Court below, that Section 623 did not apply, and that the Court of First Instance was not competent to review its judgment. In our opinion this plea must prevail. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure no doubt apply to proceedings under the Rent Act when the Act itself is silent; but we find that in the matter of review of judgment the Act contains special provisions. Section 185 provides that in a suit in which the judgment of the Collector of the District is final, he may order the rehearing of a suit upon the ground of the discovery of new evidence and on no other ground. That section differs from Section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure in two respects. It authorizes the Court to grant a review of judgment only in a suit in which the judgment is final, and it limits the ground for review to that of the discovery of new evidence. This, in our opinion, is a clear indication of the intention of the Legislature that the provisions of Section 623 should not apply to a suit in a Court of Revenue. It is also clear from the provisions of Sections 201A and 201B, that in the case of orders passed upon applications a review of judgment is allowable only when the orders are final and no appeal lies from them. A comparison of these sections with Section 188 confirms us in our opinion that what the Legislature intended was that where there was a right of appeal there should be no right to apply for a review of judgment. It is only in cases where there is no right of appeal that a review can be granted, and that only on the special ground provided for in the Act itself. The provisions of the sections quoted show that in the matter of review the Rent Act is not silent; consequently Section 623 and the following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which deal with reviews of judgments have no application to suits and proceedings under the-Rent Act. The Assistant Collector was therefore wrong in reviewing his judgment and in modifying the decree which he made on the 29th of May 1893. The plaintiff’s ought to have sought their remedy by appeal. We set aside the decrees below and restore the decree of the Assistant Collector, dated the 29th of May 1893. The appellant will get the costs incurred by him here and in the Courts below subsequent to the 29th of May 1893.