V.M. Jain, J.
1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant Insurance Company against the award dated 10.6.2004 passed by the Commissioner under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) vide which Rs. 4,07,000/- have been awarded as compensation to the claimants on account of death of Sohan Singh deceased during the course of his employment while working as a driver with Jagjot Singh respondent (owner of the vehicle and employer of the deceased).
2. After hearing the learned counsel and perusing the record. In my opinion, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed.
3. The claimants had field the claim petition under the Act seeking grant of compensation for the death of Sohan Singh deceased, who was employed as a driver with Jagjot Singh, respondent and had died in the course of his employment. Inasmuch as he was murdered during the way when he was going from Gurgaon to Patna alongwith the goods loaded in the truck driven by him. After considering the entire matter, the Commissioner under the Act found that the claimants were entitled to the compensation on account of death of Sohan Singh deceased during the course of his employment and that the owner (employer) and the Insurance Company, both were held liable to pay the compensation amount to the claimants alongwith interest etc. Aggrieved against the same, appellant Insurance Company filed the present appeal in this Court.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company submitted before me that under Section 3 of the Act, the claimants would have been entitled to claim compensation on account of injuries received by Sohan Singh deceased (resulting in his death) in case the injuries were caused to him by way of accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. It was submitted that since Sohan Singh was admittedly murdered when he was driving the truck, it would not amount to accident and as such the claimants were not entitled to claim any compensation under the provisions of the Act.
5. However, I find not force in this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company. It is no doubt true that under Section 3 of the Act the word used is “accident” arising out of and in the course of employment. However, the word “accident”, in my opinion, would not mean an accident as understood in common parlance.
6. In General Superintendent Talcher Thermal Station v. Smt. Bijuli Naik, 1994 Labour Industrial Cases 1379 (Orissa), while considering the question regarding “accident” as used in Section 3(1) of the Act, it was held by the Orissa High Court as under:-
“The pre-conditions for attracting the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act are that death or injury must be caused to a workman; the said injury must have been caused by accident; and the accident must have arisen out of and in course of his employment. A casual connection between the employment and the injury caused by the accident must exist. If after looking at the entire facts, a fair inference can be drawn that the employment caused the injury, then the employer would be liable to pay the compensation. The liability under Section 3(1) of the Act would accrue, if it is established that an injury has been caused to a workman and the accident arose out of and in course of his employment, the expression “injury” has not been defined in the Act, but it is of wide import. The dictionary meaning as given in Oxford Dictionary is “wrongful action or treatment, harm, damage”. “Personal injury” spoken of in Section 3(1) may lead to death or disablement or impairment of the powers of the body and mind in either of which event, the employer is liable to pay compensation if the conditions laid down in Section 3(1) of the Act are satisfied. This view was expressed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Smt. Mariambai w/o Adam Fakir v. Machinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd., A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 187: (1968 Lab.I.C. 629). “Occupational diseases” which are especially incident to a particular employment are also held to be “personal injuries” which would come within the ambit of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. Coming to the meaning of the word “accident”, in Halsbury’s Laws of England, it has been stated:-
“The term ‘accident’ generally means some unexpected event happening without design, but perhaps no general definition can be given of the word to cover all cases falling within the Act. To decide whether an occurrence is an accident, it must be regarded from the point of view of the workman who suffers from it, and if it is unexpected and without design on his part it may be an accidental though intentionally caused by the author of it, or caused by some act committed wilfully by him…….”
7. The word “accident” in Section 3(1) has been used in the popular and ordinary sense and means ‘mishap’ or untoward event not expected or designed’. In the case of Parwatibai v. Manager, Rajkumar Mills, Indore, A.I.R. 1959 Madh. Pra. 281, it has been held that if the injury or death from the point of view of the workman who dies or suffers the injury, is unexpected or without design on his part, then the death of injury would be by accident although it was brought about by a heart attack, or some other cause to be found in the condition of the workman himself. The basic and indispensable ingredient of ‘accident’ is unexpectedness and the second ingredient is that injury must be traceable, within reasonable limits, to a definite time, place and occasion or cause. If the death or the disability is due to heart attack which resulted from the exertion of the employee in the performance of the duties of his employment, the compensation should be awarded under the Act. (See, Madras State Electricity Board v. Ambathathingal Ithachutty Umma, (1966)2 Lab.L. 3 12. The Gujarat High Court in the case of Bai Shakri v. New Manekchowk Mills Co. Ltd., (1962)21 S.J.R. 19, held:-
“Though the word ‘accident’ occurring in Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is not defined in the Act, the word has been the subject-matter of a number of decisions as a result of which it has come to acquire a settled meaning. The word ‘accident’ generally means some unexpected event happening without design even though there may be negligance on the part of the workman. It is used in the popular and ordinary sense and means a mishap or an untoward even not expected or designed. What the Act really intends to convey is what might be expressed as an accidental injury. It includes not only such occurrences such as collisions, tripping over floor obstacles, falls of roof, but also less obvious ones causing injury, e.g. strain which causes rupture, exposure to a draught causing chill, exertion in a stock hold causing appolexy, and shock causing nurasthenia. But the common factor in all these cases is some concrete happening at a definite point of time and incapacity resulting from the opening.”
8. From the perusal of the above, it would be clear that the liability under Section 3(1) of the Act, would accrue, if it is established that the injury had been caused to a workman and the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. Furthermore, the word “accident” as used in Section 3(1) of the Act, would mean “mishap” or “untoward” event not expected or designed”. Furthermore, the basic and indispensable ingredient of “accident” as used in Section 3(1) of the Act is unexpectedness and the second ingredient is that injury must be traceable within reasonable limits to a definite time, place and occasion or cause. In the present case, the deceased had received the injuries (which resulted in his death) by way of homicide inasmuch as certain persons had committed his murder. Thus, the injuries received by the deceased were unexpected and without any design on his part. That being so, in my opinion, the injuries suffered by the deceased would be by way of accident and the case would be covered under the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act.
9. A similar view was taken by Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of National Mineral Development Corporation Bailadila Iron and Ore Project v. Smt. Bindi Bai Nagesh and Anr., 1997 Labour Industrial Cases 2519 and it was held that an “accident” is an event which belongs to the realm of the unforeseen and the unexpected. It was further held that it does the colours of mishap when the consequences are untoward. It was further held that thus anything which happens out of the ordinary would amount to accident. Reference was made to the law laid down by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case Sundarbai v. General Manager, Ordinance Factory, 1976 Labour Industrial Cases 1163, in which it was held that “accident” would mean an untoward mishap, which was not expected or designed by the workman. Reference was also made to various other authorities, which had placed reliance on the law laid down in 1976 Labour Industrial Cases 1163 (supra).
10. Furthermore, in Mathew Joseph and Ors. v. Johny Sunny and Anr., 1995 Labour Industrial Cases 1350 a Division Bench of Kerala High Court was considering the question as to whether the homicidal; attack made on the deceased could be termed as an “accident”, as contemplated under Section 3(1) of the Act. After considering various aspects, it was held by the Division Bench as under:-
“The next question for us to consider is whether the homicidal attack which was perpetrated upon Baby Mathew on the fateful night can be termed as an accident to attract Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 runs as follows :-
“If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.”
It was contended before us that Baby Mathew did not suffer an injury on account of an accident but only on account of an attack made upon him. We are not able to agree with the said contention. When there is a lack of design on the part of a person who suffered that injury then the act which caused that injury on that person is certainly an accident. Here Baby Mathew did not certainly have any design to suffer a homicidal attack though it can be said that there was design on the part of the attackers to cause injuries on Baby Mathew.
In Varkeyachan v. Thomman, (1979 K.L.T. 97), a Division Bench of this court took the view that the term ‘accident’ for the purpose of the law relating to compensation for personal injuries sustained by workman and the employer’s liability in that behalf includes any injury which is not designed by the workman himself, and it is of no consequence that the injury was designed and intended by the person inflicting the same. We adopt the said view of the earlier Division Bench.”
11. In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Mathew Joseph v. Johny Sunny, 1995 Labour Industrial Cases 1350 (supra), in my opinion, it would be clear that the injuries received by the deceased in the present case were the result of “accident”, even if the deceased was murdered, inasmuch as the deceased had received the injuries, which were not designed by the deceased though those injuries were designed by the attackers, while causing the injuries to the deceased. I am further of the opinion that even if the deceased had received the injuries at the hands of others by way of homicidal attack resulting in his death, the same would amount to “accident” as used in Section 3(1) of the Act and it could not be said that the present case would not be covered by Section 3(1) of the Act.
12. Once it is found that the deceased had suffered injuries (which resulted in his death) by way of accident, as contemplated under Section 3(1) of the Act, in my opinion, the Commissioner was perfectly justified in awarding compensation to the claimants since it is not disputed before me that the deceased had suffered those injuries in the course of his employment, while working as a driver on the truck in which goods were being carried, as part of his employment.
13. No other point has been urged before me in this appeal.
14. For the reasons recorded above, finding no merit in this appeal, the same is hereby dismissed.