Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.
1. I am not persuaded that the judgment of the lower appellate Court in this case is wrong. In the plaint itself the grant has been stated by the plaintiff-appellant to partake, at least in part, of a grant for kattu kaluva service Such service has, in the decision referred to and relied upon in the Courts below, been held to be a public service. If the grant was originally made for public service, that is, in other words, service to the villagers and not for private service to the zamindar himself, it follows that the plaintiff cannot resume the inam on the ground that he does not need any longer the service to be performed to him. Though the lower appellate Court has found that it was a grant in lieu of wages on the footing that it was a grant, at any rate partly for public service to be performed for the villagers, it follows that the plaintiff has no right by himself to resume the land terminating the service. Again, in this case the ground on which the argument was put forward was that ever since the permanent settlement the plaintiff has had cast on him and also has undertaken the duty in respect of the irrigation of the village, but whatever may be the rights and obligations of the landlord as between himself and the Government under the terms of the permanent settlement, it does not follow that the landlord is entitled to put an end at his pleasure and without concurrence on the part of the villagers, to certain services which have been provided for by the grant. It is not suggested that the villagers in whose favour or for whose benefit the services are to be performed have agreed to the resumption of the grant. There is also one other aspect which I might advert to. The grant, it is admitted, was made before the permanent settlement. It was made by the villagers. It is said that the grant could not have been made without the consent of the landlord. Assuming for argument that the zamindar was also a consenting party to the grant being made, it then follows that two persons having interest in particular property made a grant of the same for the purpose of securing certain service. If both of them joined in making the grant it does not hold to logic or reason that one of them should be entitled to cancel or revoke the grant and resume the inam merely at his pleasure and without the concurrence of the other party who was also a grantor. No doubt if there had been such a condition in the grant itself or if it was pleaded and found, such a thing may be considered. But that is not this case. On the finding of both the Courts below that the service for which the grant was originally made by the villagers was at least partly of a public nature, it follows that the resumption claimed could not be supported. The lower Courts were right in their judgment. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
2. S. A. 1406 of 1924.–Following my judgment in the connected Second Appeal 1405 of 1924 this second appeal is dismissed with costs.