PETITIONER: THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: BAKHSHISH SINGH DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/05/1997 BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA. ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
THE 5TH DAY OF MAY, 1997
Present,
Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswamy
Hon’ble Mr. Justice D.P.Wadhwa
A.S. Sohal, Adv. for R.S. Sodhi, Adv. for the appellants.
O R D E R
The following order of the Court was delivered:
Though all steps have been taken to ensure the service
of notice, the respondent could not be contacted for
service. Even the last know address was tapped to effect
the service; but that has also proved abortive. Under these
circumstances, notice must be deemed to have been served.
Leave granted.
The respondent, who was a Constable in the police
service of the state of Punjab, absented himself from duty
for a long period, i.e., from November 7, 1986 to March 1,
1988, without any leave. As a result, disciplinary action
was conducted. The disciplinary authority on the basis of
finding of dereliction of non-reporting for duty, dismissed
him from service. The ci trial court dismissed the suit
filed by the respondent. On appeal, the first appellate
Court remanded the matter for reconsideration by the
trial court on the point of punishment. The High Court has
dismissed the Second Appeal No. 155/96 summarily by its
judgment and order dated August 21, 1996. Thus, this
appeal by special leave.
The appellate court recorded the finding as under:
“I have gone through the above
authorities and am of the
considered opinion that although
the plaintiff was admittedly
guilty of misconduct in absenting
himself but misconduct could not be
classified as the gravest act of
misconduct within the meaning of
the sub-rule. The contention
appears to be well-founded. It is
true that, generally speaking, it
is for the punishing authority to
determine the seriousness of
punishment and it is not within the
ambit of the powers of this Court
to interfere with the direction of
the authority. But then there rule
and that is that the court will
strike down an order which has
been passed illegal only and
arbitrarily. In the present case,
it was incumbent on the punishment
of dismissal, to come to a finding
that the misconduct attributed to
the respondent was a ‘gravest act
of misconduct’. It is true that
in the context in which that
expression is used it does not mean
an act of misconduct and means,on
the other hand, an act denoting a
very high degree of misconduct as
opposed to a merely grave or a very
grave act of misconduct. But then
it appears that the defendants when
awarding the punishment were not
alive to the provisions of the sub-
rule otherwise he would not only
not have awarded the punishment of
dismissal without coming to a
finding that the misconduct
attributed to the respondent was of
the Gravest type but would at all
for the reasons that the misconduct
even though grave was not of the
Gravest type. The lack of finding
about the misconduct being of thre
requisite tupe makes the impugned
order arbitrary in nature and,
therefore, liable to be quashed.”
It is settled legal position that it is for the
disciplinary authority to pass appropriate punishment; the
civil Court cannot substitutte its own view to that of the
disciplinary as well as appellate authority on the nature
of the punishment to be imposed upon the delinquent
officer. In view of the finding of the appellant Court
that it is a grave misconduct, the appellate Court ought not
to have interfered with the decree of the trial Court. The
High Court dismissed it without application of the mind and
ignoring the settled legal principles.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. The orders of the
High Court and the appellate Court stand set aside and that
of the trial Court stands confirmed No. costs.
