PETITIONER: TREOGI NATH Vs. RESPONDENT: THE INDIAN IRON & STEEL CO. LTD. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/08/1967 BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA SHELAT, J.M. CITATION: 1968 AIR 205 1968 SCR (1) 97 ACT: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. 33C (2)--Labour Court not specified for computing money value of the benefit claimed by workmen under s. 33C(2)--Jurisdiction. HEADNOTE: Under an award in an industrial dispute, it was held that the appellants-workmen were entitled to half wages from a certain date to the date they resumed duty. After the final disposal of the companies' appeal, the workmen were allowed to resume duties. Thereafter, a dispute arose as to the amount to which the workmen were entitled. The workmen, by separate applications, applied to the Second Labour Court, West Bengal for determination of the amounts due to them under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The companies challenged the jurisdiction of the Second Labour Court on the ground that the court had not been specified for the purpose of determining the amount at which the benefit claimed by the workmen was to be computed in terms of money under s. 33C(2) of the Act. The preliminary objection was accepted by the Second Labour Court, against which the workmen filed a writ petition. This petition was accepted by the High Court, but in appeal, the High Court dismissed the petition. HELD: The appeal must fail. The mere fact that a Labour Court has been constituted under s. 7(1) of the Act, for the purpose of adjudication of Industrial Disputes as well as for performing other functions that may be assigned to it under the Act does not mean that the court is automatically specified as the Court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under s. 33C(2) of the Act. Section 33C(2) confers jurisdiction only on those Labour Courts which are specified in this behalf, i.e., such Labour Courts which are specifically designated by the State Government for the purpose of computing the money value of the benefit claimed by a workman. The Second Labour Court, West Bengal, was never specified by any order of the State Government as one of those Labour Courts which was to exercise the powers or discharge the functions under s. 33C(2). [10OC-E]. Though the Civil Courts are constituted under s. 13 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, the power of those courts to take cognizance of civil suits, and decide them is conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not by virtue of their constitution under s. 13 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act that the Courts take cognizance (of civil suits and decide them. Section 33C (2), in the matter of applications made by individual workmen, is therefore, not comparable with s. 13(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, but in fact, lays down the requirement which must be satisfied before the Labour Court can take cognizance of the matter raised before it by the applications of the workman section 33C(2) would, thus, serve the purpose in the case of Labour Courts which is served by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure re- lating to cognizance in respect of Civil Courts. [102B-D] 98 JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 370 of 1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 22, 1963 of
the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 58
of 1963.
E. Udayaratnan and A. P. Chatterjee, for the appellants.
H. R. Gokhale and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondents Nos.
1-3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bhargava, J.-On an industrial dispute referred to it, the
Fifth Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal gave an award,
which was published on September 19, 1955, under which 41
persons, including the 30 appellants who had been dismissed
from service by the two Companies, which are respondents 1 &
2 in this appeal, were directed to be reinstated in service.
Under the award, it was held that these appellants were
entitled to half their salary from October 2, 1953 to the
date. of their actual resumption of duty. According to the
appellants, they were not allowed to resume duty by the
Companies, even though they offered to do so. The Companies
did not admit that there was any such offer and went up in
appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and obtained an
order of stay of implementation of the award from it. The
Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal, where after
the Companies came in further appeal to this Court, and this
Court also granted stay of the implementation of the award
during the pendency of that appeal. After the final
dismissal of the appeal by this Court, the appellants were
allowed to resume their duty. Thereafter, a dispute arose
as to the amount to which the appellants were entitled under
the award until the date of resumption of duty by them. The
appellants, by separate applications, applied to the Second
Labour Court, West Bengal, for determination of the amounts
due to them under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act. 1947 (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act”). The Companies challenged the jurisdiction of the
Second Labour Court on the ground that that Court had not
been specified for the purpose of determining the amount at
which the benefit claimed by the workmen is to be computed
in terms of money under S. 33C(2) of the Act. This
preliminary objection was accepted by the Second Labour
Court which held that it had no jurisdiction to make any
order on the applications presented by the appellants. The
appellants then filed a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the
correctness of the view taken by the Second Labour Court. A
learned single Judge of that Court came to the decision that
the Second Labour Court had jurisdiction to take proceedings
on the applications of the appellants under s. 33C(2) of the
Act, and
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consequently, issued, a writ of certiorari vacating the
order made by the Second Labour Court and a writ of mandamum
directing the Second Labour Court to decide on merits the
applications presented on behalf of the appellants. The
Companies then went before a Division Bench by a Letters
Patent Appeal and, in that appeal, the decision of the
learned single Judge was set aside and that of the Second
Labour Court was restored. The appellants have now come up
to this Court by special leave against this order of the
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by which it has
been held that the Second Labour Court had no jurisdiction
to deal with these applications of the appellants.
For convenience, the provisions of sub-ss. (1) and (2) of
section 33C of the Act, as they stood at the relevant time,
are reproduced below: –
“33C. Recovery of money due from the
Employer-(1) Where any money is due to a
workman from an employer under a settlement or
an award or under the provisions of Chapter
VA, the workman may, without prejudice to any
other mode of recovery, make an application to
the appropriate Government for the recovery of
the money due to him, and if the appropriate
Government is satisfied that any money is so
due, it shall issue a certificate for that
amount to the Collector who shall proceed to
recover the same in the same manner as an
arrear of land revenue.
(2)Where any workman is entitled to receive
from the employer any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, the
amount at which such benefit should be
computed may, subject to any rules that may be
made under this Act, be determined by such
Labour Court as may be specified in this
behalf by the appropriate Government, and the
amount so determined may be recovered as
provided for in sub-section (1).”
The language of Sub-s. (2) of s. 33C is perfectly clear in
laying down that the computation in terms of money of the
benefit claimed by a workman is to be made by such Labour
Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
Government and, consequently, the only question that falls
for determination is whether it can be held that the Second
Labour Court, to which applications were presented by the
appellants, bad been specified as “the Court” to make the
determination under s. 33C(2). It was conceded by counsel
for both parties that there was no general or specific order
mentioning the Second Labour Court, West Bengal as the
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Court specified for purposes of making the determination
under s. 33C(2). On behalf of the appellants, it was urged
that the Second Labour Court should be held to have
jurisdiction to deal with these applications, because it was
constituted under s. 7(1) of the Act and every Labour Court
constituted under the Act would be competent to make the
determination under s. 33C(2) by virtue of the provision
contained in that sub-section itself.
Section 7(1) of the Act lays down that:-
"The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
constitute one or more Labour Courts for the
adjudication of industrial disputes relating
to any matter specified in the Second Schedule
and for performing such other functions as may
be assigned to them under this Act.”
The submission which was made before the High Court was that
the matter which was raised by the applications presented on
behalf of the appellants related to one of the matters
specified in the Second Schedule, because the Second
Schedule at Item No. 6 contained the entry “all matters
other than those specified in the Third Schedule” and
determination of money value of a benefit claimed by a
workman is not one of the matters specified in the Third
Schedule. This contention was rejected by the appellate
Bench of the High Court. It was not sought to be pressed
before us by learned counsel for the appellants when it was
pointed out to him that even if it be held that the matter
raised by the appellants him their applications related to
one of those enumerated in the Second Schedule, that would
be immaterial, because, tinder s.7(1) of the Act, a Labour
Court is constituted for the purpose of adjudication of
industrial disputes relating to those matters, and it cannot
possibly be contended that these disputes raised by in-
dividual workmen for determination of amounts due to them
under the award constituted industrial disputes. In fact,
this Court, in the Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S.
Rajagopalan etc.,(1) clearly held that proceedings under s.
33C of the Act are in the nature of execution proceedings
and are not meant to include in them proceedings for
adjudication of industrial disputes which can only be
competently decided by a Labour Court on reference by the
appropriate Government under s-10(1) of the Act. It was in
view of this clear legal position that the counsel appearing
for the appellants relied on the second part of s.7(1) of
the Act, under which Labour Courts are constituted “for
performing such other functions as may be assigned to them
under this Act”.
Labour Court, West Bengal, having been constituted for
performing such other functions also as may be assigned to
it under the
(1)[1964] 3 S.C.R. 140.
101
Act, it should be held that it was competent to decide the
dispute raised by these applications of the appellants,
because this function of deciding the applications had been
assigned to it by s. 33C(2) of the Act. The submission of
learned counsel was that s. 33(C)(2) should be read as
containing a general assignment to all Labour Courts of the
function of determining the money value of a benefit claimed
by a workman under that provision. We are unable to accept
this interpretation. The language of s. 33C(2) itself makes
it clear that the appropriate Government has to specify the
Labour Court which is to discharge the functions under this
sub-section. The use of the expression “specified in this
behalf” is significant. The words “in this behalf” must be
given their full import and effect. They clearly indicate
that there must be a specification by the appropriate
Government that a particular Court is to discharge the
function under s. 33C(2) and, thereupon, it is that Court
alone which will have jurisdiction to proceed under that
provision. The more fact that a Labour Court has been
constituted under s. 7(1) of the Act for the purpose of
adjudication of industrial disputes as well as for
performing other functions that may be assigned to it under
the Act does not mean that that Court is automatically
specified as the Court for the purpose of exercising
jurisdiction under s. 33C(2) of the Act. S. 33(C)(2)
confers jurisdiction only on those Labour Courts which are
specified in this behalf, i.e., such Labour Courts which are
specifically designated by the State Government for the
purpose of computing the money value of the benefit claimed
by a workman. The Second Labour Court, West Bengal, was in
fact, never specified by any order of the State Government
as one of those Labour Courts which is to exercise the
powers or discharge the functions under s. 33C(2).
In this connection, learned counsel appearing for the appel-
lants wanted to draw an analogy with section 13 of the
Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act XII of 1887, under
which a State Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, fix and alter the local limits of the
jurisdiction of any Civil Court under that Act. It was
urged by him that this provision was similar to the
provision contained in s. 7(1) of the Act. Section 13(2) of
the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act thereafter gives
the power to the District Judge, in cases where same local
jurisdiction is assigned to two or more Subordinate Judges
or to two or more Munsifs, to assign to each of them such
civil business cognizable by the Subordinate Judge or
Munsif, as the case may be, as, subject to any general or
special orders of the High Court, he thinks fit. It was
suggested that s.33C(2) of the Act makes a provision in
respect of Labour Courts of the same nature as the provision
made by s.13(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts
Act in respect of Subordinate Judges or Munsifs, and since
Subordinate Judges and Munsifs can exercise jurisdiction by
virtue of s. 13(1) of that Act to decide civil suits, it
should be held that Labour
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Courts, by virtue of their constitution under s.7(1) of the
Act, get the jurisdiction to decide applications under
s.33C(2) also, and the specification of Courts mentioned in
that sub-section is only for the purpose of deciding which
Labour Court should exercise jurisdiction where there may be
more than one Labour Court. We do not think that this
comparison is correct or justified. Though Civil Courts are
constituted under s.13 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil
Courts Act, it has to be remembered that the power of those
Courts to take cognizance of civil suits and decide them is
conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not by
virtue of their constitution under s.13 of the Bengal, Agra
and Assam Civil Courts Act that the Courts take cognizance
of civil suits and decide them. Section 33C(2), in the
matter of applications made by individual workmen, is,
therefore, not comparable with s.13(2) of the Benaal, Agra
and Assam Civil Courts Act, but, in fact, lays down the
requirement which must be satisfied before the Labour Court
can take cognizance of the matter raised before it by the
applications of the workmen. Section 33C(2) would, thus,
serve the purpose in the case of Labour Courts which is
served by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
relating to cognizance in respect of. civil courts. S.
33C(2), by its language, makes it clear that the
jurisdiction under that provision is to be exercised only by
those particular Courts which are specified in that behalf
by the State Government and, in fact, confers jurisdiction
on only those Courts and not on all Labour Courts, which may
have been constituted under s.7(1) of the Act.
It was also urged- by learned counsel before us that we
should give a liberal construction to the provisions of
s.33C(2) so as to ensure that the benefits of that provision
are not denied to a workman even if a State Government
neglects to specify a Labour Court in that behalf. We do
not think that there is any force in this submission. When
a provision has been made in s.33C(2) for specification of a
Labour Court in that behalf by the appropriate Government,
it is presumed that that Government will carry out its duty
and will make the necessary specification. Even under
s.7(1) of the Act, the power is granted to a State
Government to constitute Labour Courts, and if the State
Government neglects to constitute Labour Courts, the
provisions of s.33C(2) would automatically become
ineffective. This would be no ground for giving an
interpretation to s.7(1) which would do away with the
necessity of the Labour Court being constituted by a State
Government. It may also be incidentally mentioned that in
West Bengal the State Government had made Rules in 1958
under s.38 of the Act and Rule 74 was as follows: –
“74. Application for recovery of dues-An
application under section 33C shall be
delivered personally or forwarded by
registered post in triplicate to the Secretary
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to the Government of West Bengal in the
Department of Labour or to such officers to
whom powers have been delegated under section
39 of the Industrial Disputes Act.”
This Rule lays down that all applications under s.33C are to
be delivered to the Secretary to the Government of West
Bengal in the Department of Labour, or to such officers to
whom powers may have been delegated under s.39 of the Act.
The purpose of the application being sent to the Government
is clear. If the application is under s.33C(1), the
Government is to take action on that application itself and
is to realise the money claimed in that application. On the
other hand, if the application happens to be under s.33C(2),
the purpose of delivery of that application to the Secretary
to the Government clearly would be that, on that applica-
tion, the Government would specify the Labour Court which is
to deal with that application. It appears that, in some
States, the appropriate Government has. by general orders,
specified Labour Courts for the purpose of exercising
jurisdiction under s.33C(2). So far as the Government of
West Bengal is concerned, it did not issue any similar
general order, and the intention of Rule 74 was that any
workman wishing to obtain relief under s.33C(2) should apply
to the State Government when the Government would specify
the Labour Court for the purpose of dealing with that
application. This position has been further clarified by a
subsequent amendment of Rule 74 under which it is clearly
provided that where any work. man is entitled to receive
from the employer any benefit which is capable of being
computed in terms of money, the workman concerned may apply
to the State Government in the prescribed Form for the
specification of a Labour Court for determining the amount
of his dues. It is true that this Rule 74 did not in this
form exist at the relevant time, with which we are concerned
in the pro sent case, but we agree with the Bench of the
Calcutta High Court that Rule 74, as it stood at that time,
was also intended to lay down that a workman claiming relief
under s.33C(2) must present his application to the State
Government, whereupon the State Government would specify the
Labour Court which was to deal with it under s.33C(2) of the
Act.
For the reasons given above, we hold that the decision of
the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is correct and
must be upheld. The appeal fails and is dismissed, but, in
the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to
costs.
Y. P. Appeal
dismissed.
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