JUDGMENT
B. Lentin, J.
1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of the India for setting aside the impugned orders dated 20th December, 1977 and 7th May, 1978 passed by the State Transport Authority (respondent No. 2) and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (respondent No. 1) respectively.
2. The short facts leading to this petition are as follows :
3. On 1st January, 1976, a Reciprocal Transport Agreement of the nature referred to in the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, was arrived at between the Government of Maharashtra on the one hand and the Government of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu on the other. This Agreement is referred to hereafter as “the Inter-State Agreement”. The purpose of this Inter-State Agreement was, inter alia, to expedite “the economic development of the country by encouraging long distance and Inter-State travel and transport of goods by road”. Clause 1(a) of this Inter-State Agreement refers to stage carriages and provide that Inter-State routes for stage carriages shall mean the routes connecting the main nearest traffic points on the either side of the boarder, penetration by passenger transports of either State into the other State being restricted upto the aforesaid traffic point unless otherwise mutually agreed upon in any particular case or cases. Sub-clause (b) provides that permits on Inter-State routes for operation of stage carriages as agreed upon shall be countersigned by the reciprocating States as shown in Appendix I. Clause III provides that the quota or public carrier’s permits of each State to be countersigned by the other in accordance with the proviso to section 63(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, shall be 500. Part-D of Appendix 1 pertains to the manner in which trips between the State of Maharashtra and Goa are to be operated on the Bombay-Panaji (viz., via Mahad, Chiplun, Rajapur, Sawantwadi, Mapussa) route. It provides that one return trip on this stage carriage air-conditioned coach from Goa shall be operated by a nominee appointed by the State of Goa, Daman and Diu and corresponding one return trip from Bombay to Goa shall be operated by the nominee appointed by the State of Maharashtra. The Note in part -D Appendix I reads as follows :—
“Note.—This stage carriage Air-conditioned coach is to be operated direct subject to the condition that no passenger to be picked up or set down any where on route, and also subject to the condition that no replacement of air-conditioned coach by a non-airconditioned coach will be allowed under any circumstances, even temporarily.”
4. The petitioner carries on transport business in Bombay in his own name of T.S. Naik. He is also a partner along with his sons of an identical business carried on in the name and style of Laxmi Motor Service at Mapussa, Goa. The petitioner’s firm of Laxmi Motor Service was, under the Inter-State Agreement, granted a stage carriage permit to operate a daily return air-conditioned coach service from Goa to Bombay on the aforesaid route, as the nominee of the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu. Along with others, the petitioner also made an application in his own name for being granted a stage carriage permit to operate a return air-conditioned coach service from Bombay to Goa on the aforesaid route, as the nominee of the State of Maharashtra. After a checkered history, which is not germane for the purpose of this judgment, the petitioner’s application was rejected by the State Transport Authority (viz. the 2nd respondent) by its impugned order dated 20th December, 1977 on the ground that any grant of permit to the petitioner as a nominee of Maharashtra would in effect mean that the service would be entirely operated by the nominee of Goa from both the ends of the Inter-State route, which was not desirable from the point of view of the spirit of the Inter-State Agreement under which the operation of service was to be distributed equally between nominees of Maharashtra and Goa. By that order, another application M/s. India Travels, viz. the 3rd respondent, was granted the stage carriage permit to operate from Bombay to Goa one return trip daily with air-conditioned buses along the aforesaid route as the nominee of the State of Maharashtra for a period of 3 years in accordance with the terms of the Inter-State Agreement. Being aggrieved by that order, the petitioner preferred the requisite appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (viz. the 1st respondents), which by its impugned order dated 7th May, 1978 upheld the findings of the 2nd respondent and dismissed the appeal after weighting the respective merit and demerits of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent. The 1st respondent held that the grant of the permit to the 3rd respondent was in public interest and that the grant of the permit to the petitioner also a s the nominee of Maharashtra, would lead to a monopoly of the petitioner having the exclusive right of running an air-conditioned coach service both from Goa and Maharashtra which would not be in public interest. It is therefore, to set aside these two orders dated 20th December, 1977, and 7th May, 1978 passed by respondents 2 and 1 respectively, that the petitioner has filed the present petition. Mr. Jaisinghani, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, challenged the validity of the impugned orders on the following grounds. He urged that while considering applications for stage carriage permits, the only consideration which should have prevailed with the authority are these mentioned in section 47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The next ground urged by Mr. Jaisinghani was that the consideration of the Inter-State Agreement for the grant or refusal of the permit vitiated the impugned orders. He next urged that the Inter-State Agreement is meant only for fixing the number of permits to on Inter-State routes and that it did not create any new rights and did not take away the rights which otherwise were given to the petitioner. The next ground urged by him was that the grant of one additional permit to the petitioner, would not create a monopoly so as to disentitle him from being appointed as the representative of the State of Maharashtra also. He further urged that in the impugned orders, there has been no comparable assessment of the merits of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent. He finally urged that a punishment noted out to the petitioner in 1972 should not have been taken into consideration.
5. Coming to the first ground urged by Mr. Jaisinghani, it can hardly be gain said that the factors which must be taken into consideration by the concerned authority for granting permits, are those found in section 47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and to that extent, Mr. Jaisinghani is correct. Section 47(1) in so far as is material to the present case provides that the Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely :—
(a) the interest of the public generally;
(b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken;
(c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services;
(d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities;
(e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services, including these in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending.
Thus it is abundantly clear that the paramount consideration which the authority concerned must take into consideration is the interest of the travelling public. In Shri Rama Vilas Services v. Chandrasekhran, as the only consideration public interest was high lighted also in P.B. Pvt. Ltd. v. S.T. A. Tribunal, Punjab, , where it was, observed that the main consideration required to be taken into account in granting permits under section 47 is the interest of the public in general and the advantages to the public of the service to be provided and these would include, inter alia consideration of factors such as experience of the rival claimants their past, performances, the availability of stand by vehicles with them financial resources, the facility of well-equipped workshop possessed by them, etc. That public interest is also the paramount factor was also held by the Supreme Court in Ajantha Transports v. T.V.K. Transports, , where at page 130 of the Report, it was observed that under section 47 public interest must always be in the forefront as the dominant purpose while considering the applications for grant of permits and that sub-sections (b) to (f) of section 47(1) are only sub-categories or illustrations of public interest. In Abaul Rehman v. S.T. A. Tribunal, , the emphasis that under section 47(1) the interest of the public is paramount, was reiterated.
6. Now, if the aspect of paramountcy of public interest had not been taken into account in the impugned orders, Mr. Jaisinghani might well have been on strong ground. But this factor has been taken into account in the impugned orders. In the first impugned order, the 2nd respondent has observed that granting the petitioner’s application for being the nominee of the State of Maharashtra was “not desirable from the point of view of the spirit of the inter state agreement.” This observation was severely commented upon by Mr. Jaisinghani that the 2nd respondent has sacrificed the paramount consideration of public interest to what the 2nd respondent took to be the “spirit of the interstate agreement.” This criticism of Mr. Jaisinghani is without basis, and ignores the very purpose for which the Inter-State Agreement came into being, viz, inter alia, to expedite the economic development of the country by encouraging long distance inter-State travel. This could only be done by offering to the public the best carrier available after a selection from numerous applicants. The fact that the Inter-State Agreement provides for one nominee from Goa and one from Maharashtra for the operation of the return trip, is obviously to prevent any one party from getting a monopoly of operation both from Maharashtra and Goa. To prevent this, would also be in the interest of the travelling public which would then naturally have the choice of a carrier rather than be thrown on the tender mercies of a single monopolistic carrier. Thus the very purpose of the Inter-State Agreement is for the public weal which in no way conflicts, but on the contrary coincides, with the provisions of section 47(1) and the decisions of the Supreme Court, that public interest must be the paramount consideration and the dominant factor in the grant of carriage permits. It was also not correct for Mr. Jaisinghani to take a sentence in isolation from its context and harp on the words “spirit of the Inter-State Agreement.” In arriving at its finding against the petitioner, the 2nd respondent took into consideration the factor that the petitioner’s firm having already been made the nominee of the State of Goa, allowing the petitioner to be also the nominee of the State of Maharashtra, would naturally result in a monopoly being granted to the petitioner to run this particular air-conditioned route, and that the very purpose of the Inter-State Agreement was not to create a concentration or monopoly in favour of any single party. The findings of the 2nd respondent are as under :—
“As regards the application of Shri T.S. Naik, the State Transport observed that the fact, that he is a partner of M/s Laxmi Motor Service, Mapussa (Goa) who are the existing operator on the route as a nominee of Goa cannot be overlooked. Any grant of permit to him as a nominee of Maharashtra would in effect mean that the service is entirely operated by the nominee of Goa from both the ends of the Inter-State route which is not desirable from the point of view of the spirit of the Inter-State Agreement under which the operation of service is distributed equally between nominee of Maharashtra and Goa. The State Transport Authority, therefore, decided to reject the application of Shri T.S. Naik, on this count.”
Thus from this passage read as a whole, emerges that what the 2nd respondent has taken into consideration as the paramount factor, is the interest of the travelling public which section 37(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the decisions of the Supreme Court enjoin him to do. The 1st respondent also have in its impugned order come to the finding that granting the application of the petitioner for being made the nominee also of the State of Maharashtra, would lead to a monopoly in his favour and hence would not be in the interest of the travelling public. It is obvious that if one person is the nominee of the State of Goa and another person is the nominee of the nominee of the State of Maharashtra the public travelling by the air-conditioned coach service would have the choice of coaches operated by two persons instead of being left to the mercy of such facility as it would receive from a single person operating both from Maharashtra and Goa. In the latter case, the choice before the travelling public would be nil and would naturally, therefore, not be conductive to its interest and comfort. If on the other hand, the travelling public has a choice or option of the service of more than one operator, it would be in the interest of the travelling public not only because it has a choice (which is an important factor) but also because it would promote a healthy rivalry between the two competitors to offer their best to the travelling public and thereby be a conducive factor which would play a predominant role in the public interest being safeguarded and advanced.
7. Mr. Jaisinghani urged that in this case the question of monopoly would not arise at all. In support of his proposition, Mr. Jaisinghani relied on the case of K. Balasubramania v. N.M. Sambandamoorthy, where it was held that the mere fact that the applicant has more than one permit or is a recent granted, cannot by itself be regarded as a factor against him in the matter of granting permits in the comparative scale and that it would all depend on the facts and circumstances of the case which would indicate how such a fact is related to the interest of public generally. This decision can be of no assistance to the petitioner, inasmuch as in that case the applicant had not applied for two permits to and from the same route but had four permits for four different routes. Hence no question of monopoly arose if he was granted the permit applied for.
8. The appellate Tribunal, viz. the 1st respondent, has gone even a step further and has also taken into consideration the relative merits of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent before rejecting the petitioner’s appeal. In its impugned order, the 1st respondent has reasoned that in granting the permit applied for by the petitioner for operating the air-conditioned service also as the nominee of the State of Maharashtra, would virtually mean that the service would entirely operated by the nominee of Goa from both ends or the Inter-State route which is not desirable from the point of view of the spirit of the Inter-State Agreement under which operation of service is distributed equally between the nominees of Maharashtra and Goa. Hence it would not be in the interest of the public to allow one operator to operate a return trip from both the ends as this would encourage monopoly of the petitioner, who alone would be entitled to run the air-conditioned bus service along this route between Maharashtra and Goa. The 1st respondent also took into consideration the respective plus and minus points of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent and ultimately came to the conclusion that in the interest of the public, the Inter-State permit should be given to the 3rd respondent as the nominee of the State of Maharashtra in preference to the petitioner who was already appointed as the nominee of the State of Goa.
9. There is no doubt that after taking all the factors into consideration, the 1st respondent too correctly placed the interest of the public as the paramount and only consideration, which it was enjoined to do by section 47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the decisions of the Supreme Court.
10. There was also nothing wrong on the part of respondent 2 or 1 in referring to the Inter-State Agreement in their respective orders. There can be no doubt that the petitioner himself applied for the requisite permit under the Inter-State Agreement as the nominee of Maharashtra as is established from his letter dated 21st June, to the State Transport Authority wherein he has stated :—
“I have made an application of Form P.St. S.A. for a permit in respect of air-conditioned stage carriage from Bombay to Panjim under the reciprocal agreement between the State of Maharashtra and Administration of Goa that is in force.”
Hence the petitioner’s application for grant of the permit to him could not be decided dehors the Inter-State Agreement itself. Further more, what cannot be lest sight of is that the Inter-State Agreement cannot be equated with an agreement made by two private parties. An Inter-State Agreement is envisaged by the proviso to section 63(3) of the Motor Vehicle Act which reads as under :—
“Provided that it shall not be necessary to follow the procedure laid down in section 57 for the grant of counter-signature of permits, where the permits granted in any one State are required to be countersigned by the State Transport Authority of another State or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned as a result of any agreement arrived at between the States after complying with the requirements of sub-section (3-A), or for the grant of countersignatures of permits in pursuance of any direction issued by the Commission under Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 63-A.”
No argument was advanced Mr. Jaisinghani and rightly so, that the Inter-State Agreement violates any of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or is otherwise susceptible to challenge. Hence for respondents 1 or 2 to have ignored this Agreement on the strength of which the petitioner himself applied for a permit, would have been untenable. This also answers Mr. Jaisinghani’s 2nd contention that the Inter-State Agreement should not have been considered by respondents 1 and 2. In any event, as stated earlier, what ultimately weighed with respondents 1 and 2 was the public interest and it was that which was the conductive factor which prompted them to reject the petitioner’s application.
11. Apart from the fact that the petitioner has no fundamental right to the permit, if he is disqualified on the cogent grounds contained in the impugned orders, that is the end of the matter.
12. There is also no substance in Mr. Jaisinghani’s third contention that the Inter-State Agreement is meant only for fixing the number of permits on the Inter-State routes and that it does not create any new rights or take away rights which are otherwise given to the petitioner. There is nothing in the Inter-State Agreement which substantiates this contention of Mr. Jaisinghani. All that the Inter-State Agreement does, is to seek to expedite the economic development of the country, inter alia, by encouraging long distance and Inter-State travel, not merely by fixing the number of merits, but by putting an end to monopoly and making paramount the interest of he travelling public. It can hardly be gain said that in the interest of the travelling public and for its benefit and comfort, monopoly by a single carrier should be discouraged and that a healthy rivalry should be encouraged. That is exactly what the Inter-State Agreement seeks to do in the interest of the public which is also the paramount consideration under section 47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It neither creates any new rights or take away any existing once.
13. Mr. Jaisinghani relied on the decision in T.N. Bachunatha Reddy v. Govt. of A.P., , where it was held that he Inter-State Agreement in so far as it determined the number of permits and the stage carriages that might ply on the Inter-State routes did not contravence any provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. Under the Inter-State Agreement operators of State other than Andhra Pradesh were deprived of their right to apply for permits on routes specified in Part ‘A’ and operators of States other than Tamil Nadu were deprived of their right to apply for permits on routes specified in Part-B. Obviously the preference that was sought to be given to the operators of either the State of Andhra Pradesh or the State of Tamil Nadu in the matter of granting stage carriage permits on the Inter-State routes allotted under Part ‘A’ or Part ‘B’ of the agreement was neither covered by any legislation nor was one intended to deal with the situation arising from scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India. Consequently the discrimination made or preference given to the operators of the State over the operators of other States was an interference with the free trade, commerce and intercourse ensured under Article 301 of the Constitution. In these circumstances, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh struck down the part of the impugned Inter-State Agreement which was violative of Article 301 of the Constitution. This decision can be of no assistance to the petitioner, inasmuch as in the matter before me, there has been no challenge to the Inter-State Agreement on the ground that it violated Article 301 of the Constitution.
14. The next ground urged by Mr. Jaisinghani was that even if the petitioner had also been appointed the nominee of the State of Maharashtra, no monopoly would have been created in his favour, because the travelling public had the choice of travelling to and from Goa along this route not only by the air-conditioned bus service but also by other services, viz., the ordinary bus service or the luxury bus service operated by others. This contention must be advanced to be rejected. If at all, it discloses that a monopoly would be created in favour of the petitioner in respect of the air-conditioned route and would put the travelling public to the mercy of the petitioner. Rather than travel by an ordinary or even a luxury bus and be inconvenienced by dust, hear and noise over a long distance between Maharashtra and Goa, passengers may well find themselves with no option but to travel in a badly maintained or badly run air-conditioned service which otherwise they would not do, if a competitor, also running an air-conditioned bus service on the same route is available. Further more Part D of Appendix I of the Inter-State Agreement provides that the stage air-conditioned coach shall operate directly from Bombay to Goa vice versa without stopping any where on route. This is an added advantage of the air-conditioned bus service, which an unwilling passenger would per force have to opt for even in a bad-run air-conditioned service of a monopolist rather than go though the tedium and discomfort of diverse stoppages in the case of, say and ordinary bus service even if it is running on the same route. Part D of Appendix I further provides that there shall be no replacement of an air-conditioned coach by a non-air-conditioned coach under any circumstances, even temporarily. Thus by compelling a passenger to take any other kind of bus, would virtually be tantamount of indirectly encouraging a breach of this provision. If Mr. Jaisinghani’s contention is accepted, it would result in putting the travelling public into the hands of a monopolist, who even if he does not turn out to be entirely unscrupulous, cannot be expected to be constantly on his toes as he would be if faced with the presence of a rival compitor also offering the service of air-conditioned road travel on the same route.
15. Mr. Jaisinghani urged that while the 1st respondent stated at length in its order, the advantages and facilities offered by the 3rd respondent, the 1st respondent did not do so in the case of the petitioner but merely stated that the petitioner also has some experience of the operation of stage carriage service on the Bombay-Panaji route having obtained temporary seasonal stage carriage permit, that he has 3 air-conditioned buses and that the petitioner had stated in his application that he has made the requisite arrangements with local garages on route and also at Mapussa (Goa), for repairs. It must be remembered that only had the 1st respondent the benefit of the arguments before it but also the entire record before it. Having considered the record in its entirety and after hearing the arguments advanced before it, no fault can be found if it summarised in its order the benefits offered by the petitioner as enumerated in his application. On the basis of the respective amenities offered by the petitioner and the 3rd respondent, the 1st respondent has preferred the 3rd respondent to the petitioner. That is certainly no cause for interference by the Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
16. According to Mr. Jaisinghani, there was nothing in the impugned orders to indicate that if the petitioner had been appointed also as the nominee of the State of Maharashtra, he would neglect the interest of the public or would not be keen on keeping his service in good and efficient order. There is no merit in this contention. This is exactly what in public interest has to be avoided in advance, and not after the damage is done Mr. Jaisinghani relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Rama Vilas Service v. Chandrasekhran, , where it was held that it would not be irrelevant for the authority to hold that if any applicant is or would be in the position of a monopolist if a permit is granted to him he would be liable to neglect the interest of the public and may not be keen on taking all steps to keep his service in good and efficient order. This decision can be of no assistance to the petitioner. It vitiates the very contention sought to be propounded by his learned Counsel.
17. Mr. Jaisinghani made a grievance that the only factor which the 1st respondent held against the petitioner was that his past record was not free from blemish because the petitioner’s contract carriage permit was once suspended for a period of 3 months way back in 1972, whereas the 1st respondent ignored the fact that in August 1976, the 3rd respondent’s vehicle was detached at a certain place on its way to Goa without any permit, which was minimised by the 1st respondent merely as a technical breach. To say that this was the only factor held against the petitioner, is a misreading of he impugned order, where all the grounds states earlier have been taken into consideration by the 1st respondent in coming to its decision against the petitioner.
18. What Mr. Jaisinghani virtually invited me to do was to substitute my judgment in the place of the reasons given by the 1st respondent. In exercise of writ jurisdiction, I am not sitting as a Court of Appeal. There is nothing in the reasoning of the 1st or the 2nd respondent which warrants interference on the grounds of manifest error, perversity, patent illegality, excess of want of jurisdiction or other considerations warranting interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
19. In the result, the petition must stand dismissed, Rule discharged. There will be no order as to costs.
