JUDGMENT
Farooq Hasan, J.
1. In this appeal arising out of the conviction and sentence of one year’s RI with a fine of Rs. 100/- (in default one month’s further RI) for the offence under Section 324 IPC passed against the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer in Sess. Case No. 69/1979 under impugned judgment dated 13-2-1981. Shri O.S. Lakhawat, learned Counsel for the appellant at the very outset while not challenging the conviction and the finding arrived at by the court below urged that the appellant was entitled to be released on probation under Section 360 Cr.P.C. looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, or under the Probation of Offenders Act. Learned counsel then added that the appellant’s request for grant of probation, though made, but was rejected by the court below without recording any “Special reasons” as is envisaged Under Section 361 Cr.P.C. And thus, according to the learned Counsel, the court below committed error of lay in not releasing the accused appellant on probation.
2. Learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand, opposed to the grant of probation.
3. Having considered the points raised by the learned Counsel and gone through the impugned judgment of the court below, in my opinion, while refusing the grant of probation to the accused-appellant the trial court nowhere found that the antecedents of the accused do not warrant his release on probation, or that looking to the age and his past character, he cannot be given the benefit of probation of the Offenders Act. The trial court merely stated that the accused appellant inflicted one blow on the head of Bhanwar Lal by a sharp weapon. In my opinion, the reasons assigned by the trial court are no grounds and are not covered by the provisions of Section 361, Cr.P.C. which contemplate special reasons to be recorded by the court which hold the offender guilty of the offence charged.
4. Here I must refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishan Deo v. State of W.B. where in the Supreme Court observed that in the context of Section 360, the “special reasons” contemplated by Section 361 must be such as to compel the court to bold that it is impossible to reform and rehabilitate the offender after examining the matter with due regard to the age, character and antecedents of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. And thus, the Legislature indicated that reformation and rehabilitation of offender and not mere deterrence, are now among the foremost objects of the administration of criminal justice in our country.
5. Having benefitted by the enlightenments from the decision quoted above, I am of the opinion that the trial court while passing the order of sentence against the offender, and while granting or not granting probation to him, had to consider his age, character and antecedents; and had further to see and give special reasons as to whether it was impossible to reform and rehabilitate the offender if he would have been released on probation. But having failed to do so, the trial court committed error of law. And, in my view, in the light of the observations, quoted above, of the Supreme Court, the present case is a fit one where the appellant should be extended benefit of probation of offenders Act.
6. In the result this appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant Umraosingh S/o Tej Singh, Rajput r/o village Begliawas P.S. Masuda, Beawar Tehsil and Ajmer district, is maintained. But instead of sentencing him be is given benefit of releasing on probation under Section 360 Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, ordered that the appellant be released on probation on his furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 2,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court, Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Ajmer with this stipulation that he shall keep peace and be of good behaviour for a period of six months. He shall furnish bonds within two months. In case be repeats this offence during stipulated period, be taken in custody for under-going the sentence awarded to him, by the lower court. To the above extent this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is modified accordingly. The record be sent back.