JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. This bunch of 67 regular first appeals including cross objections arise from a common notification, common award and raises common question of fact and law for determination by this Court. Thus, it would be appropriate to dispose of these appeals by a common judgment.
2. Reference to the basic facts as they emerge from the record would be appropriate. 42.7 acres of land in village Shamshabad, Tehsil Sirsa, District Sirsa was intended to be a acquired by the State of Haryana as declared in a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), published on 17.2.1990. Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published in the official gazette of the State of Haryana on 12.3.1990 as a follow up to the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The exact area actually acquired on measurement was stated to be 42.80 acres and the difference of 0.3 acres was stated to be a difference resulting from error in measurement. This was so accepted by the revenue authorities as well as the Court below. Notices under Section 9 of the Act were issued, which were contested before the Collector, who vide his award dated 12.6.1990 awarded the following compensation keeping in view the nature of the land :-
i. Nehri land Rs. 65,000/- per acre
ii. Barani land Rs. 50,000/- per acre
Land abutting the Sirsa Dabwali Rs. 1,00,000/- per acre.
Road upto depth of 40 karams and
Gair Mumkin plots/abadi land.
The land owners-claimants were dissatisfied with the pronouncement of award and compensation awarded and they filed application for references under Section 18 of the Act. Upon reference, the learned Additional District Judge, Sirsa, consolidated all the 57 land references in LAC. No. 103 of 1992/1997, titled Dr. Balbir Singh v. The State of Haryana and decided all the land references by a common judgment dated 13.8.1997.
4. Before the learned Additional District Judge, the parties had led documentary as well as oral evidence. The claimants/landowners produced 19 witnesses who were examined in Court and produced on record 16 sale instances. Mainly the sale instances relied upon by the claimants were Ex.P/20, P/23, P/50, P/65 and P/72 (Award in relation to adjacent village Mirpur). The respondents examined three witnesses i.e. RW 1 to RW 3 and relied upon 14 sale instances Exhibits R/3 to R/16. The details of the value reflected in the sale instances produced by the parties reads as under:-
DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY THE CLAIMANTS.
Sr. Exhibit Date of Area Village Rate per Rate per
No Regn. Sold Sq. Yd. Acre (Rs.)
1. P-1 30.10.86 OK-7M Shamshabad 37.78 1,82,982/-
(211.75Sq.Yds.)
2. P-13 28.01.87 OK-4M Chattergarh 99.17 4,79,982/-
(121Sq.Yds.)
3. P-14 28.01.87 113 Sq. Yds. -do- 221.23 10,70,9827-
4. P-15 20.05.87 About 2M -do- 84.68 4,09,8517-
(53.77Sq.Yds.
5. P-17/P-66 12.07.90 26.88 Sq. Yds. Mirpur 3 255.60 1,57,55,1687-
6. P-18 04.10.89 6 & 2/3M Shamshabad 44.55 2,15,6437-
(202Sq.Yds.)
7. P-19/P-67 05.12.89 OK-8M -do- 123.96 6,00,0007-
(242Sq.Yds.) (Brij Colony)
8. P-20 21.06.82 -do- Shamshabad 150.82 7,80,0007-
9. P-21 02.06.88 5 Maria -do- 132.23 6,40,0007-
(242Sq.Yds.)
10. P-20/P-23/ 21.06.82 8 Maria -do- 150.82 7,30,000/-
P-65 (242 Sq.Yds.)
11. P-45 20.04.67 640 Sq. Yds. -do- 3.75 18,1507/-
(Brij Colony)
12. P-50 14.06.89 10 Maria Shamshabad 148.76 7,20,000/-
(302.50Sq.Yds.)
13. P-51 30.10.85 -do- -do- 99.17 4,80,000/-
14. P-61 07.02.89 6.6 Maria -do- 55.09 2,66,666/-
(181.50Sq.Yds.)
15. P-66/P-17, 05.12.89 - - - - - - 30,000/-
P-67/P-19
16. P-68 24.02.76 160. Sq.Yd. -do- 6.25 30,250/-
(Brij Colony)
DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY THE RESPONDENTS
1. R-3 25.05.89 4 Kanals 8.26 40,0007- Shamshabad
2. R-4 20.04.89 13K-8M 9.60 46,4647- -do-
3. R-5 15.05.89 28K-13M 8.26 40,0007- -do-
4. R-6 01.09.89 41K-5M 7.81 37,818.18 -do-
5. R-7 07.09.89 40K-15M 7.90 38,282.20 -do-
6. R-8 04.01.90 10K-19M 7.43 36,0007- -do-
7. R-9 08.01.90 21K-2M 11.35 54,9767- -do-
8. R-10 24.01.90 1K-9M 12.53 69,689.65 -do-
9. R-11 16.02.90 9K-11M 6.92 33,519.45 -do-
10. R-12 19.07.90 13K-13M 10.90 52,747.24 -do-
11. R-13 07.02.91 20K-0M 13.22 64,0007- -do-
12. R-14 22.08.91 4K-2M 16.12 78,048.78 -do-
13. R-15 17.09.91 1K-7M 18.36 88,8887- -do-
14. R-16 23.08.91 16K-OM 10.33 50,0007- -do-
4. The learned Additional District Judge mainly relying upon the sale-deeds produced on behalf of the claimants-landowners awarded the compensation of Rs. 7,25,0007- per acre to the lands located within 100 feet depth of the National Highway while beyond 100 feet has awarded Rs. 4,75,2007- per acre. The judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Sirsa, dated 13.8.1997 has been assailed before this Court in these regular first appeals.
6. The Union of India was dissatisfied with the award given by the learned Judge. But it was somehow not mentioned as a party in the memorandum of the judgment passed. However, by an order of this Court dated 27.10.1998 Union of India was granted leave to prefer the appeals against the judgment in question following the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1004. Consequently, 57 appeals preferred by the Union of India were entertained by this Court. Similarly, claimants filed 15 appeals and 2 cross objections in the appeals preferred by Union of India.
7. It must be noticed at this stage that supplementary award was given by the Land Acquisition Collector on 30.6.1990 awarding compensation for superstructure in relation to few of the claimants. Though the compensation awarded for superstructures was maintained by the learned Additional District Judge, Sirsa, in five cases while it was increased in two cases. Those cases where claimants have asked, for further enhancement of compensation on account of superstructures are not dealt with under this judgment.
8. The contentions raised on behalf of Union of India while praying for reduction in the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Additional District Judge are as under:-
i. Sale instances in relation to small pieces of land cannot lay foundation for awarding of reasonable compensation in relation to acquisition of larger chunks of land;
ii. The learned trial Court ought to have applied the cut of 33% atleast while awarding the amount of compensation;
iii. Sale instances submitted by the Union of India have not been considered in the right perspective by the learned trial Court. As such the learned trial Court has fallen in error while appreciating the evidence.
9. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel appearing for various claimants-landowners:-
i. Tat the amount of compensation ought to be enhanced in view of the sale instances produced and proved on record by the claimants.
ii. It is further contended that there is no basis for applying the belting system to the facts of the present case and in any case, the same could not be restricted to 100 feet depth.
iii. The area being a developed area, the amount of compensation should have been Rs. 7,80,000/- per acre in terms of the aforesaid documents, with element of increase and statutory benefits.
10. In order to critically examine the merits and effect of the respective contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it will be but essential for the Court to first decide the question, which of the evidence produced on record is admissible and can be looked into in accordance with law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 16 sale deeds have been produced by the claimants. They have also examined either the vendor or the vendee or led other evidence necessary to prove these sale instances. Consequently, the sale deeds which have been exhibited and proved in accordance with law can be read in evidence and would be a material piece of evidence to be considered by the court. The claimants also produced on record Ex.P/72, the award dated 16.2.1994, in relation to the land of. village Mirpur, which was also acquired though by a different notification, but of the same date and is a village adjacent to village Shamshabad. Thus, the entire documentary evidence led by the claimants alongwith the oral evidence has to be considered by the Court in order to determine the amount of compensation awardable to these claimants.
11. On the contrary, the respondents produced 14 sale instances in Court being Ex.R/3 to Ex.R/16, but neither the vendor nor the vendee of these sale instances/sale deeds were examined in Court. The respondent did not even summoned a witness from the Registrar’s office to prove the sale-deeds in accordance with law. In other words, all the sale instances brought on record by the respondents are inadmissible in evidence and cannot form the basis for awarding the amount of compensation to the claimants. This question is no more res Integra and stands fully covered by the judgment of the Supreme court in the case of A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad v. P. Venkaiah and Ors., A.I.R. 1997 Supreme Court 2600; Special Duty Collector and Anr. etc. v. Kurra Sambasiva Rao and Ors., A.I.R. 1997 Supreme Court 2625; Baldev Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1996 Supreme Court 498 and Mehar Ban and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1997 Supreme Court 2664.
12. In the case of P. Venkaiah and Ors. (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: –
“Admittedly, none of the persons connected with the documents, namely, neither the vendee nor the vendor has been examined. This Court in Kumari Veeaiah v. State of A.P., 1995(4) S.C.C. 136, held that in the absence of adduction of any evidence through the vendor or the vendee, the document per se cannot be relied upon. This was reiterated in State of Bihar v. Madheshwar Prasad, 1996(6) S.C.C. 197. Acceptance of certified copy of the sale deed under Section 51-A relates only to the production of the original sale deeds but it does not dispense with proof of the contents of the documents, relative features vis-a-vis 193, the land under acquisition. All is needed to be proved by examining the persons connected with the same and parties to the document. Following the above ratio, we hold that the view taken by the High Court and that of the reference Court is entirely illegal.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. The Judgment and award of the reference Court as modified stand set aside. The matter is remitted to the reference Court for disposal of the matter afresh after an opportunity is given to adduce evidence afresh and the same is considered. No costs.”
13. On the very next day, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while reiterating the above principles in great detail, pronounced the judgment in Kurra Sambasiva Rao’s case (supra) and elaborated the need for a fair and reasonable assessment of market value which was always a question of fact. It has held by the Supreme Court as under:
“In that case, the features required to be present are: it must be within a reasonable time of the date of the notification; it must be a bona fide transaction; it should be a sale of land similar to the land acquired or land adjacent to the land acquired; and it should posses similar advantageous features. These are relevant features to be taken into consideration to prove the market value of the acquired land as on the date of the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Act. This would be established by examining either the vendor or the vendee. If it is proved that they are not available, the scribe of the document may also be examined in that behalf. Section 51-A of the Act only dispenses with the production of the original sale deed since acquisition proceeding would take long time before award of the compensation attains finality and in the meanwhile the owner of the sale deed is precluded from using the same for other purposes vis-a-vis this land. The marking of the certified copy is per se is not admissible in evidence unless it is duly proved and the witnesses vis. the vendor or the vendee, are examined. This principle has been repeated in a catena of subsequent decisions of this Court.”
“Whether fair and reasonable and adequate market value is always a question of fact depends on the evidence adduced, circumstantial evidence, and probabilities arising in each case. The guiding star or the acid test would be whether a hypothetical willing vendor would offer the lands and a willing purchaser in normal human conduct would be willing to buy as a prudent man in normal market conditions prevailing in the open market in the locality in which the acquired lands are situated as on the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act; but not an anxious buyer dealing at arms length with throwaway price nor facade of sale or fictitious sales brought about in quick succession or otherwise to inflate the market value. The judge should sit in the arm chair of the said willing buyer and seek an answer to the question whether in the given set of circumstances as a prudent buyer he would offer the same market value which the Court proposed to fix for the acquired lands in the available market conditions. The Court is, therefore, enjoined with the bounden duty of public function and judicial dispensation in determination of the market value of the acquired land and cornpulsory acquisition.”
In the other cases referred above, the Hon’ble Apex Court consistently reiterated the view that such sale deeds are inadmissible in evidence and cannot be looked into for the purposes of awarding the compensation.
14. The effect of the above enunciated principles of law without ambiguity is that the entire documentary evidence in relation to sale-deeds led by the respondents would become inadmissible and they would left only with the oral evidence produced on their behalf, seen in the light of other relevant documents in relation to acquisition of land and Award Ex.P/72 to which they were also a party.
15. The ancillary question that arises therefrom is whether this Court should remand the matter for consideration or decide the case on merits on the basis of the legal evidence available on record. As is evident from the above narrated facts, there is sufficient material before this Court to come to a fair conclusion rather than compelling the parties to face the further agony of years for final determination of their dispute as a result of order of remand. The present case is certainly not one which even in absence of the sale deeds produced by the respondents can be said to be a case of “no evidence” on record. There is sufficient material oral and documentary evidence admissible in accordance with law which can form the basis with the able assistance rendered by the learned counsel for the parties for determination of the issues in question. Consequently, following the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Meharban and Ors. (supra), it will be more appropriate that this Court decides the case on merits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in that case held as under:-
“It is the duty of the Court to take all the relevant factors into account before determination of the compensation. Applying the above acid test, in view of the paucity of evidence, instead of remitting the matter to the reference Court and prolonging the agony of the claimants, we think that the appropriate course would be to base the award of the reference Court in respect of the notification dated April 5, 1980 in which the compensation was determined at the rate of Rs. 70/- per sq. yard and which has become final. That would form the foundation and base to determine the compensation treating that area as a block. That was determined after giving necessary deductions towards developmental charges, as required under law. The belting in this case is not reasonable for the entire lands are situated in well defined and developed blocks.”
16. The need of administration of justice and obvious delay in disposal causing anxiety to the litigants and keeping in view the sufficiency of evidence on record, I am of the considered view that there is no occasion for this Court to remand the case to the Court below. Thus, I proceed to discuss the further merits of this case.
17. It will be appropriate to examine the cumulative effect of the rival contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties. Thus, I propose to proceed to discuss certain basic principles which would help in providing the clear answer to the rival contentions raised.
1. “In the facts and circumstances of the case whether any cut ought to have been applied on the amount of compensation awarded or not by the learned Court below?”
18. At the very outset it must be pointed out that there is no occasion for this Court to comment upon the sale deeds produced by the respondents. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the cases of Hasanali Walimchand (dead) by LRs v. State of Maharashtra, 1998(1) L.A.C.C. 120 Jhandoo (dead) by LRs and Ors. v. Union of India, 1997(1) L.A.C.C. 402 and The Land Acquisition Officer Revenue, Divisional Officer, Chittoor v. Smt. L. Kamalamma (dead) by LRs and Ors., 1988(1) L.A.C.C. 116, the cut of 33% to 50% ought to have been applied by the learned trial Court even on the amount warded to the landowners falling within the 100 feet belt created by the learned trial Court. In other words, a cut of 33% to 50% ought to have been applied-on the amount of Rs.7,25,000/- awarded and thereupon further cut should have been applied in awarding of the amount in regard to the lands located beyond 100 feet depth.
19. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the claimants that no cut ought to have been applied, as the area in question was a developed area and there is no reason or justification whatsoever, for applying the cut to any extent. They further contended that no cut ought to have been applied even on the areas beyond 100 feet belt and universal compensation should have been awarded to all the claimants. For this purpose he relied upon Harinder Pal Singh and Anr. v. Punjab State through the Collector, Amritsar and Ors., (1997-2)116 P.L.R. 447, to argue that as the lands were situated in Municipal area, no cut need be applied at all. He also relied upon Buta Singh and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., (1991-1)99 P.L.R. 330.
20. What is the purpose of applying the cuts has been clearly elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme court of India in the cases of Smt. L, Kamalamma (dead) through LRs and Jhandoo through LRs referred supra. It was stated that 1/3rd of market value has to be deducted towards development charges. The factors like lump sum payment, its investment value, the time factor involved in formation of layouts and the period for which the money in addition thereto shall be locked, would be relevant for applying the cut. Consequently, in these cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court applied 33% cut while in the other raised the curt to 50% from 25% (awarded by the High Court).
21. In the case of Bhagwathula Samanna v. Special Tehsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, 1992(1) Recent Revenue Reports 256 relied upon by learned counsel for the claimants, the observations of the Court were that where complete development has taken place, the land is located on the National Highway and the land was to be valued only as building site, applying the principle of cut would not be called for. The other judgments of this Court state that where the area acquired was part of the Municipal developed area, it may not be appropriate to apply the principle of cut.
22. As is clear from the above discussion, it is difficult to lay down a strait jacket formula, which would universally apply to all cases of land acquisition, but these are the guiding factors which the Court would have to take into consideration to determine whether the principle of cut should or should not be applied to a given case.
23. In the present case heavy reliance was placed on cross-examination of RW-2 and RW-3 by the claimants. All that has been stated by these witnesses is that the acquired land is an agricultural land. Some shops have been constructed and there is hospital and Dharamshala on the land acquired, but these shops were not put to use. The witnesses specifically denied that there were any tea shops. S.T.D. booth or shops regularly running on the area in question. The statement of RW3 further clearly indicate that people had tried to cover large area by constructing boundary walls and there were hardly any buildings. It is very relevant to refer to a portion of the statement of RW3 recorded during his cross-examination as under:-
“It is wrong that I have deposed falsely in this behalf. Air Force Station, Sirsa, is single compact area, comprising of area of village Ahemdpur, Mirpur and Shamshabacl. Land of Krishan Baldev acquired in 1990 is adjacent to the present acquired land. I cannot tell the distance of that land of Krishan Baldev from G.T. Road. However, that land is at the back of the present acquired land qua G.T: Road.”
24. Exhibit P-16 and P-19 which are the site plans submitted by the claimants themselves do not show alleged constructions and the so called development of the area in question. On the side notes mentioned on the maps there is no indication in regard thereto. It only indicates superstructures of a particular applicant which is allegedly acquired. In other words these documents cannot be of any great assistance to the claimants as a whole except to the extent that it shows superstructure of a particular applicant. The draftsman who was examined by the claimants to prove these site plans, has clearly stated that he acted upon the instructions of the claimants. There is no clarity and definiteness in his report and the statement. In his cross-examination PW8 stated as under: –
“I have not passed by examination of cost accountancy. The quotations attached with my report had been supplied to me by the parties. I do not associate any officials of any department in this survey and nor I issued any notice to the Land Acquisition Collector. It is incorrect to suggest that I had blindly followed the directions of the parties which engaged me and that otherwise I was not competent and qualified in this regard.”
Thus, it would be very difficult to place reliance upon these documents. The respondents again have not brought on record any direct documentary evidence to show whether the area in question is a developed area or not. The statements of the PWs and even attaching some partial correctness to other documents, at best it can be said that there is some scattered construction on the land and there are some haphazard roads existing on the site in question. It was admitted by one of the witnesses that the land acquired falls in the Municipal area and this was not even disputed before this Court.
25. In order to have a pervasive but a plausible approach to the aforementioned aspect, the Court must examine the cumulative effect of oral and documentary evidence placed on record, which is otherwise admissible in accordance with law. The concept of a developed area must be understood in its correct perspective. A mere fact that some construction has come up including that of a Dharamshala or a small hospital would not by itself be sufficient to term the area as a developed area. The term ‘developed area’ is of a definite connotation and meaning. It must indicate development of area in accordance with law and keeping in view the civic sense seen in the light of the Municipal lands or other local Acts or Bye-laws applicable to that area. Haphazard development and a planned development as understood in law or even in common parlance cannot be treated as synonymous to each other. They describe uncomparable areas and as such mere indication of some structural existence or roads would not per se be termed as a developed area which would totally exempt the area acquired from the operation of principle of cut.
26. No doubt the area acquired is abutting the G.T. Road, it is in municipal limits, but still it cannot be equated to a developed area in a municipal limit in the real sense of the term. The following reasons could be supportive of the view that the principle of cut should be applicable to the present case:-
a) There is no planned development or even the area is not developed as such, but there does exist some constructions of shops, boundary walls, small hospital, Dharamshala and roads. But more pertinent is that it is all half-hazard (haphazard?), scattered construction existing on the land sought to be acquired.
b) The land is being acquired not for a commercial or profitable activity but is for a national purpose and more particularly for the defence of the country. It has clearly come in evidence that land is acquired for the construction of various buildings for development of two forward base support unit for air force. Such a purpose cannot be equated to the purpose of even benefit activity where different colonies are developed by constructing houses and commercial complexes.
c) Payment of lumpsum amount with statutory benefits to the landowners. (See Kamalamma case supra).
d) Period for which the funds of the Government would be blocked for the purpose sought to be achieved by the present acquisition.
e) The claimants-landowners are equal beneficiaries from the purpose of acquisition. Necessary implication of the achieved object is protection of person and property amongst the public at large of the claimants as well.
In view of the above discussion and for the reasons aforestated I am of the considered view that the element of cut should necessarily be applied to the amount of compensation hereinafter awarded by this Court.
27. The ancillary question to this which arises for consideration now is that what should be the extent of cut. The Courts have applied cuts varying from 20% to 50%, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. From the evidence discussed above, it is clear that present case is not one where the highest extent of cut should be applied. The land of the agriculturists is being acquired, which in given cases, may even deprive some of them of their source of income at least temporarily. Furthermore, the area is developed, though in a haphazard manner, but still the area cannot be equated to a simple barren or agricultural land which cannot be put to any other use. In my humble view it will be just and fair if the cut of 20% is applied to the amount of compensation to be awarded.
II. “Whether the claimants are entitled to enhancement of the amount awarded or the Union of India is entitled to pray for reduction of the amount awarded, based on the rival contentions addressed by the learned counsel at the bar?”
It will be appropriate to advert to the pertinent sub-heads under this head of the argument, as under-
a) Whether the sale instances of small pieces of land could be relevant?
b) Whether adoption of belting systems was proper in the facts and circumstances?
c) Permissibility of element of increase.
d) Potentialities of the acquired lands.
a) The instances of sale Ex. P/20 and Ex. P/23 produced by the petitioners relate to 242 square yards while Ex. P.15 is the sale deed dated 14.6.1989 measuring about 302 square yards for a sum of Rs. 45,0007- (Rs. 7,20,000/- per acre), while in other cases the value has gone upto Rs. 7,30,000/- per acre). The sale is of 21.6.1982. The sale deeds certainly relate to comparatively small pieces of land, but they are not which can be simply ignored from the zone of consideration. Ultimately the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that when haphazard development starts and the people start living and using the agricultural land for other purposes and some buildings are constructed, normally there would not be sale of huge chunk of land, but it would mostly relate to small pieces of land. Once the sale-deeds are executed for a valuable consideration and proved in accordance with law, they become piece of evidence which ought to be considered by the Court.
28. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bakshi Ram Jain and Ors. v. State of Haryana, 1997(3) All Instant Judgments 634, held that small pieces of land cannot be said to reflect the market value on the date of acquisition with certainty. In the case of Administrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 943 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that evidence of market value of sales of small developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extent of lands, must be understood in its proper perspective. It requires that the price fetched for small developed plots cannot be directly adopted in valuing large extents. However, if it is so, they could be treated relevant piece of evidence and appropriate cut could be applied in awarding the compensation.
29. A Single Bench of this Court in the case of Surjit Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, 1990 P.L.J. 69, while following the principles enunciated in the case of Bangaru Narasingha Rao Naidu etc. etc. v. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizianagaram, A.I.R. 1982 Supreme Court 63 and Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha v. Amritsar Improvement Trust, A.I.R. 1982 Supreme Court 940 held that sale transactions of small pieces of land forming part of acquired land provide genuine basis for ascertaining the market value of the land at the relevant time.
30. In the case of Food Corporation of India, Faridkot, Punjab and etc. etc. v. Makhan Singh and Anr. etc. etc., A.I.R. 1992 Supreme Court 1406 the Hon’ble Supreme Court while commenting upon the application of principles applicable to such determination and taking into consideration small segments of land observed as under-
“These statements by themselves are no concessions and are at best indications of vacillation to find the correct market value. On such statements public persons cannot be allowed to open their mouths. Having regard to these conflicting claims we get to the view that important points affecting valuation had been overlooked or misapplied in arriving at and sticking to the rate of compensation at Rupees 1,20,0007- which would require a correction from us. We Feel that in the facts and circumstances of the case the compensation must in comparison get lower than the price at which sale Ex.A-11 took place, but at a figure which does not overlook the rate as given in award Ex.A-24. Now we lift our thumb and put it to reduce the compensation to Rupees 80,0007- per acre slicing down 1/6th (roundedly) from the rate reflective from sale instances.”
Still in the case of Smt. Indumati Chitaley v. Government of India and Anr., A.I.R. 1996 Supreme Court 531, held as under;-
“The question is what would be the principle to be adopted in this case. This Court has repeatedly deprecated the method of evaluating the compensation on the basis of square foot. When a large extent of 17.57 acres of land is offered for sale by private negotiation, would any prudent purchaser negotiate to purchase lands put for sale in open market at square foot basis? No one would come forward to purchase such a vast extent of land on square foot basis. It is seen that the lands are admittedly agricultural lands. Therefore, no one would prefer to purchase the agricultural land on square foot basis. The principle of determining the compensation on square foot basis is per se illegal.”
31. In a very recent judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while analysing the existing law in relation to adoption of price of small pieces of land for determination of compensation in larger acquisitions in the case of Land Acquisition Officer, Revenue Divisional Officer, Chittoor v. Smt. L. Kamalamma (dead) by LRs. and Ors., 1998 Supreme Court 781, held as under:-
“When no sales of comparable land, was available where large chunks of land had been sold even land transactions in respect of smaller extent of land could be taken note of as indicating the price that it may fetch in respect of large tracts of land by making appropriate deductions such as for development of the land by providing enough space for roads, sewers, drains, expenses involved in formation of a lay out, lump sum payment as also the waiting period required for selling the sites that would be formed. Where the huge extent of land acquired was situated on a main road and in heart of a town, the land would be said to possess potentiality of being developed as urban area, reliance on a sale transaction under which 100 sq. ft. of land situated very close to the acquired land was sold could not be said to be improper. The market price fixed by relying on such sale transaction has to be reduced by 40% taking into consideration not only the space that was required for formation of roads or other amenities but also the time required for formation of the lay out, the period for, which the money would be locked up in the investment and the waiting period as also for the reduced price for land when lump sum payment is made.”
32. On a fair analysis of the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India it is only possible to draw one conclusion and that is sale instances relating to small pieces of land will not per se be a safe criteria for fixation of compensation amount payable in regard to huge acquisition of land. But equally true is that it will not be prudent for the Court to totally ignore such instances merely on the ground that they do not relate to larger pieces of land. Application of law and formation of a view in this regard should be one which is pragmatic as well as practical in its application. The parties have led evidence, produced sale deeds admissible in evidence and an award which can provide a reasonable basis for determination of compensation. In other words, such sale instances may not be by itself a determination factor, but they would always be a material piece of evidence relevant to the controversy in issue and would ultimately with certain deductions and cuts could form reasonable basis for awarding the amount of compensation.
33. Improvisation of such a principle would neither be deprivative nor a unique enunciation. The formidable conclusion on the basis of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court can be drawn to the effect that in the present case instances of small pieces of land can be taken into consideration and could for the basis of the extent of compensation payable to the landowners, but of course, with the necessary cuts and variations in consonance with the above principles.
b) In the present case, as already noticed, the Collector while awarding compensation had bifurcated the acquired land into two portions, firstly, the land falling within 40 Karams of the G.T. Road and, secondly, the remaining land This was reduced to 100 feet by the learned Additional District Judge while maintaining the bifurcation of the land into two categories. In other words, belting system has been adopted for determining the extent of compensation.
In order to examine the correctness of the application of belting system to the present case, reference can be made to certain judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the case of Gulzara Singh and Ors. etc. v. State of Punjab and Ors., 1993 L.A.C.C. 612 (S.C.), after discussing the law at some length and giving the principle of retail and wholesale prices where the sale instances were available, the Court observed that adoption of belting system was not proper. The relevant observations are as under:-
“The principle of belting is perfectly legal and unexceptionable as the lands abutting the main road upto a specified depth, depending on factual material on record, would fetch higher market rate than the lands situated in interior area. However, on facts of this case the belting is not warranted for the reason that as seen on three sides there exists a road cutting across the acquired lands. Therefore, there is not only access on three sides but also to interior lands. Thus in our view belting and fixation of differential rates of value is not justified.”
34. In the case of Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority and Anr. v. M/s Dominion Land and Industries Ltd. and Anr., 1996 L.A.C.C. 132, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: –
“Because of the availability of the said genuine and bona fide agreement to sell pertaining to the very land acquired under the LA Act which reflected the real market value of the acquired land at about the time of acquisition, i.e., November 2, 1978, there was no scope for determining the market value of the said acquired land by resorting to the method of Belting or Hypothetical building layout or method of Comparable Sales in the vicinity of the acquired land or the like. Hence, in our view, the Tribunal as well as the High Court had committed a manifest error in adopting the method of Belting for determining the market value of the aforesaid land acquired under the LA Act, with the market value of which we are concerned here.”
35. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that the lands are located adjacent to G.T. Road and extend quite a distance in depth. It has also come in evidence that scattered constructions have been done of Dharamshala, shops, factories, roads etc. There are sale instances available of small pieces of land, of course, measuring around 250 square yards to 302 square yards or even above. As such these sale instances could give an indication towards the price of the land which an individual would be ready to buy and, thus, in its reasonable proportion, the concept of wholesale price would be applicable and flat belting system may not be very appropriate to be adopted in this case. It was vehemently argued by learned counsel for some of the respondents/some of the appellants (owners of the lands) in different appeals that the lands are uniformly located as there are roads stated to have been built even inside haphazard developed area. The site plans in question does indicate the construction of roads and some bye-lanes on the site on which the construction had been raised. Thus, fixation of price on sale instance basis would be a better method to be adopted for fixation of amount of compensation rather than the belting system.
36. The belting system can be adopted where it is not otherwise possible to fairly determine the market value of the land acquired. The Court cannot lose sight of Anr. very important factor that the whole land is being acquired for a purpose of development of “2 Forward Base Support Unit for Air Force.” The map annexed to notification under Section 6 of the Act clearly shows that the Air Force Station is existing and these lands are around the Air Force Station. This document was produced by learned counsel for the claimants themselves. In other words, to say that a part of the land will be of a greater or prominent user in comparison to the other land and, therefore, belting system would be applicable because it is being far or nearer to the G.T. Road, would lose its significance at the face of it.
37. In view of this discussion I am of the considered view that adoption of belting system in this case would not be. permissible as per the judgment pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
(c) and (d) So far as potentiality of the land acquired is concerned, the same is certainly not of a greater significance. At the cost of repetition it must be emphasised that the land is not being acquired for a general purpose or for the purpose of developing commercial or residential buildings or the colonies. It is being acquired for a national purpose i.e. the air defence of the country. In terms of value of land it may be of significance that the lands situated nearer to the G.T. Road would have a greater potential and the areas which are located at a distance from G.T. Road would not have similar potential in regard to commercial and residential purpose. Importance of this comparison would further be reduced if not eliminated because it is common case of the parties that roads have been built inside the area and the construction is scattered one. This must be seen in the background of the purpose for which the land is acquired. The land is going to be put to a common use or a uniform use i.e. building for establishing the Air Force Station already existing. Pervasive reasoning leading to the ultimate conclusion of this case would certainly render the distinction potentiality of the land acquired as not the main ground for determining the extent of compensation payable.
39. It is a settled principle of law that element of increase must be provided where the facts of the case demand. It is commonly accepted fact that value of the land has increased over the years. In the present case the Award. Ex.P.72 awarding amount of Rs. 4,26,000/- is dated 16.2.1994, while sale instances placed on record by the claimants relate to the period immediately preceding the year of acquisition. Ex.P.50 is dated 14.6.1989 giving a value of Rs. 7,20,000/- on the basis of an area sold under the sale deed being 302 square yards while Ex.P.20 is dated 21.6.1982 where the land was sold for Rs. 7,30,000/- per acre on the basis of a plot of 242 square yards. The date of notification under Section 4 is dated 17.2.1990. As such the relevant sale deed favourable would be of 14.6.1989 which would not demand any element of increase of price to be introduced. The award Ex.P.72, which is otherwise admissible, relates to the year 1994. The lands had been acquired at the same time i.e., 17.2.1990 and the Collector awarded the amount on 12.6.1990, which was enhanced by the learned Additional District Judge to the afore-stated figure of Rs. 4,26,000/- in 1994. However, it is subject matter of appeal before the High Court.
40. The cumulative effect of this discussion is that the increase element need not be provided for while considering the question of compensation payable and potentiality of the land is not the main ground for consideration in the facts and circumstances of the case for awarding the compensation.
41. On the basis of the afore-stated well enunciated principles of law, the Court has now to proceed to come to the final issue in the matter relating to actual amount of compensation which should be awarded in the present case. The award Ex.P.72, which was pronounced on 16.2.1994, though subject matter of an appeal before the Court, still is a document which is admissible in evidence and can safely be relied upon by this Court in final determination. The said award relates to village Mirpur, the land of which is just adjacent to this land, and all these lands of three villages i.e., Mirpur, Shamshabad and Ahmadpur were acquired by different notifications of the same date and for the common purpose. As such this valuation has a direct bearing on the matter.
42. The petitioners have produced number of sale instances on record, but main reliance has been placed on Ex.P.20, P.23, P.50 and P.65. These sales are instances of small piece of land varying from 242 square yards to above 302 square yards. As already discussed above, they are relevant piece of evidence to be considered by the Court while determining the amount of compensation. It is a settled principle of law that the claimants would be entitled to take benefit of the sale-deeds proved on record by them, which are otherwise admissible and relevant. The highest value indicated in different sale-deeds certainly be a relevant factor to be considered by the Court. In Ex.P.20 which relates to the period 1982, much prior to the acquisition, land measuring 242 square yards was sold at the rate of Rs. 150.82 per square yard, thus, giving a value of Rs. 7,80,000/- per acre. Ex.P.50 which relates to June, 1989, immediately prior to the acquisition of the land, has indicated a value of Rs. 7,20,000/- per acre. The law of average would be fairly, applicable in such circumstances because the value of the land even as per sale deeds above mentioned have been fluctuating towards decrease by a considerable margin during the period for which the saledeeds have been produced. In the case of Khushi Ram and Anr. v. The State of Haryana, 1988 L.A.C.C. 653, it was considered by Division Bench of this Court to apply the principle of average to reach at a fair conclusion.
43, The instances of sale proved by the claimants relate to very small pieces of land and indicate considerably a higher value of the land! Such value cannot form a comprehensive base for determination of a definite market value of the acquired land at the relevant date. I other words, the Court must take recourse to an equitable balance between the two extremes and such balance must not be founded only on a guess work, but apparently should have an acceptable rationale or reason behind it. The principle that the highest value of the land emerging from the sale instances should be fixed as the market value of the acquired land, was rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of india in the case of Gulzara Singh and Ors. etc. v. State of Punjab and Ors., 1993 L.A.C.C. 612 : 1993(3) R.R.R. 247 (S.C.). In this very judgment the Hon’ble Court further held that the belting system would again be not appropriate method of computation and it must be better to based on the principle of average price. It could be relevant at this stage to refer to the following observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court:-
“That highest value should be fixed cannot be accepted in view of the consistent later view of this court. In Collector of Lakhimpur’s case (supra) this Court accepted the principle of average, but however, rejected the small extent of the lands and enhancement based on the average at Rs. 15,000/- per Bigha was reduced to Rs. 10,000/- per Bigha. In Smt. Kaushalya Devi’s case (supra), this Court noted that large extent of land in the developed Aurangabad town was acquired for Medical College, accepted the principle of average worked out by the reference Court, varying between Rs. 2.25/- to Rs. 5.00 per square yard and this Court ultimately fixed the market value at the rate of Rs. 1.50/- per sq. yard. In Administrator General of West Bengal’s case (supra) this Court upheld rejection of the small plots of lands and accepted two sale-deeds of large extent working out the average rate at Rs. 500/- per Decimal and ultimately reference Court fixed the market valus at the rate of Rs. 200/- per Decimal. It is, therefore, clear that the Court in the first instance has to determine as to which of the sale deeds are relevant, proximate in point of time and offer comparable base to determine market value. Thereafter, the average price has to be worked out. It would be seen that this Court has taken consistent view of working out average and further deduction have been made in fixing just and fair market value when large chunk of the land was acquired. We respectfully agree and adhere to the principle and we find no compelling reason to divert the stream or arrest the consistence.”
While enunciating this principle the Hon’ble Supreme Court quoted with approval the case of The Collector of Lakhimpur v. Bhuban Chandra Dutta, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 2015.
44. The award Ex.P.72 is Anr. material piece of evidence which has to be considered by this Court. Ex.P.72 is. the award of the learned Additional District Judge which is prior to the present award. It relates to the lands in Mirpur which are the lands which has been acquired for the same purpose by the notification of the same date, though differently published. Thus, this material piece of evidence would be having quite a bearing on the matter in issue. In the case of State of Madras v. A.M. Ranjan, A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court 651, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: –
“The awards given by the Collector are at least relevant material and may be in the nature of admission with regard to the value of the land on behalf of the State and if the land involved in the awards is comparable land in the reasonable proximity of the acquired land, the rates found in the said documents would be a reliable material to afford a basis to work upon for determination of the compensation on a later date. The awards, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inadmissible for the purpose of determination of the compensation.”
Resultantly the value of the lands acquired can be computed following the principle of average price based on the four sale-deeds Ex.P.20 (Rs. 7,80,000/-), Ex.P.23 (Rs. 7,30,000/-), Ex.P.50 (Rs. 7,20,000/-), and Ex.P.65 (Rs. 7,30,000/-) and the amount of compensation awarded under the Award Ex.P.72 (Rs. 4,26,000/-). The average of the above figures would be Rs. 6,77,200/-.
45. I have already dealt in great detail the reason as to why the land in question cannot be termed as a developed area for applying the principle of cut. It also needs to be noticed that the learned Additional District Judge, Sirsa, has riot given any specific finding in the entire judgment that the area in question is a developed area as commonly accepted. Haphazard development would be of some consequence, but could no way be equated to a fully developed area. The purpose for which the land is acquired, the relevant records declaring the entire land as agricultural land and the fact that the sale deeds relate to comparatively small pieces of land would fully justify the application of the element of cut to the afore-said amount. It has been held above that 20 per cent cut on uniform basis would be a fair determination of the market value of the land in question. Thus the amount awardable would be Rs. 5,41,760/- per acre after applying the cut.
46. The result of the whole discussion is that the appeals/cross objections would be allowed to the extent that the landowners-Claimants would be awarded a sum of Rs. 5,41,760/- per acre with statutory benefits available to them, more particularly under Sections 23(1-A), 232(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. Consequently, the appeals of the Union of India as well as that of the claimants are partly accepted and the impugned award/judgment of the learned Additional
District Judge, Sirsa, dated 13.8.1997 shall stand modified to that extent. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
