Union Of India (Uoi) vs Ratan Lal on 18 March, 1987

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Rajasthan High Court
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Ratan Lal on 18 March, 1987
Equivalent citations: 2 (1988) ACC 232
Author: A Mathur
Bench: A Mathur

JUDGMENT

A.K. Mathur, J.

1. This is an appeal against the award of the Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jodhpur dated 13-10-82.

2. The brief facts, giving rise to this appeal are that on 3rd June, 1979 at about 930 A.M. claimant’s truck RJQ 9681 was standing outside his godown in village Fidusar on Jodhpur Jaisalmer Road. At that time, truck No. 281/74F 1010 alongwith trailer No. 7552490H came with an excessive speed in a rash and negligent manner from Jodhpur side and struck against the truck of the claimant and as a result of this the truck of the claimant was damaged. On account of the accident the excel, shaft and back side body of the the truck was seriously damaged. Three tyres of the truck were also damages. Chesis also got little bend. Claimant suffered hige and he got his transport repaired for that he had to pay a sum of Rs. 9171 60 The claimant claimed a sum of Rs. 5600/- for period 3rd June, 79 to 28th July, 1979 when the truck remains unserviceble for a period of 56 days. The daily income by the truck was Rs. 100/- therefore, a sum of Rs. 5600/- was claimed for loss of income. Thus Rs. 14,771/- was claimed as damages. The truck was driven by the driver Ram Kripal Singh, who was in the service of non-claimant No. 2. The learned Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jodhpur after considering over the matter, came to the conclusion that non-claimant driver drove the truck in rash and negligent manner and caused damages to the truck of the claimant. Therefore, the claimant is entitled to the damages to the extent of money spent by him for repairing the truck. On this head the amount of compensation was quantified to the extent of Rs. 9,234/- which was caused on account of the accident. The truck remained idle for a month and 26 days, therefore, the learned Judge, awarded Rs. 1700/- for loss of business to the claimant on account of truck being remained idle. Thus, a total sum of Rs. 10,934/- was awarded as a compensation with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of the filing of the claim petition till realisation.

3. Aggrieved against this, the non- claimants Union of India and Ram Kripal Singh, driver have filed the present appeal.

4. I have heard both the learned Counsel at length. Mr. Sisodia, learned Counsel for the appellant, strenuously urged that the accident took place by the military truck of the appellant in discharge of sovereign function, therefore, the claimant is not entitled to any compensation against the appellant. This application of the learned Counsel cannot be accepted for the simple reason that in somewhat identical situation their lordships of Supreme Court have not accepted the argument in the matter of such accident. In the present situation, the plea of sovereign function cannot be accepted. Reference in this connection may be made to Pushpa Thakar v. Union of India 1984 ACJ 559. In view of this decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court the contention of the sovereign function cannot be accepted.

5. Learned Counsel has contended that negligence in the present case is not attributable to appellant alone, therefore, the Union of India and the, driver Ram Kripal Singh cannot be made liable.

6. I have considered this argument of learned Counsel and perused the evidence on record and the finding given by the Tribunal. The very fact that the truck was catrying a tank alongwith it and there was sufficient space on road. If the driver of the military truck was little careful then perhaps he would have avoided the accident. The truck of the claimant was standing away from the main road. The plea of the driver that since there was a small passage and a truck from opposite direction was coming therefore, in order to avoid that the later struck against the stationary truck of the claimant. The accident was inevitable and there was no negligence on the part of the military truck driver. I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned Counsel. Since the driver of the military truck knew very well that the truck is already standing then in that case he should have slowed down his speed and he should have been more vigilant while passing through the populated area. Mr. Jasmatia has submitted that as a matter of fact when the military truck passed alongwith the tank then normally they fly red flags so that the incoming traffic would have sufficient notice. That was not done in the present case. Moreover the truck of the claimant was not standing on the main road but it was standing away from the road and as such the stationary truck was hit by the military truck and was dragged to 30 to 50 ft. Thus, in these circumstances, it cannot be said that the driver of the truck was not negligent and negligence is not attributable to him.

7. Mr. Sisodia has submitted that the claimant has failed to prove the vouchers nor damage to the truck. Mr. Sisodia invited my attention to the statement of PW 1 Ram Pal Singh He has also submitted that only voucher 1 to 5 have been proved but rest of the vouchers 6 to 14 have not been proved. Therefore, the assessment of damages on the basis of these vouchers is not correct.

8. Mr. Jasmatia learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that in a case like the present one before the Tribunal a strict proof is not required. Mr. Jasmatiya submitted that strict principle of proof cannot be made applicable to these proceedings. In this connection, learned Counsel has invited my attention to Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) Rule 16 reads as under:

Method of recording evidence.

The claims Tribunal shall as examination of witness proceeds make brief memorandum of the substance of the evidence of such witness and such memorandum shall be written and signed by members of the Claims Tribunal and shall form part of the record; provided that the evidence of any medical witness shall be taken down as nearly as may be word for word.

9. Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that as a matter of fact before these tribunals strict rule of evidence should not be adhered to as the Tribunal is to make the enquiry for assessing the amount of compensation. The learned Counsel for the appellant has invited my attention to New India Assurance Company Ltd. and Ors. v. Gauri Shanker Sharma and Ors. 1985 ACJ 734 and Smt. Gunwat Kumar and Ors. v. Sardar Sandhu Singh and Ors. AIR 1987 1020. In both these cases it has been observed that the Tribunal has to make enquiry only. Therefore, the strict rule of evidence should not be adhered to. Rule 16 also lays down that the Tribunals should examine the witnesses and make a brief memorandum of the substance of the evidence of such witnesses. Therefore, in this view of the matter, the strict principle of legal proof is not required to be adhered to in the enquiries conducted by the Tribunal. All that Tribunals have to see that whether the damages suffered has been established by producing necessary vouchers or not, Tribunal has to see prepondrance of probability in each case.

10. Now coming to the case in hand PW 5 claimant has produced vouchers, showing the damage to his truck and the goods purchased by him from various shops. If the strict proof is required then each voucher will be proved by calling the person from where the particular part of the vehicles were purchased. If this process is adopted then perhaps the very purpose of establishing the Tribunal would be frustrated and it will take months to examine 10 to 20 shopkeepers to prove each individual vouchers. Thus, the Tribunal has to use its prudence to judge the damages with reference to the vouchers produced before the Tribunal In case vouchers which have been found to be got up and if it is found that parts which have been purchased for the damaged vehicle Were not required then of course, the Tribunal can reject the claim to the extent of that part It is a matter of appreciation only, therefore, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. In the present case petitioner has produced vouchers for the part which were purchased and replaced by the claimant. The claimant instead of proving each voucher by calling the shopkeeper from whom part was puchased has proved by his evidence only. It has not been shown that how part were not required in present. Thus, in this view of the matter I overrule the objection of Mr. Sisodia.

11. Next question arises for the consideration is when the old parts were replaced by the new one’s then what credit be given for replacement of new parts. In the present case the Tribunal has given a rebate of Rs. 60/-. As a matter of fact when the new parts are being replaced on account of the accident and in that case it cannot be said that the owner of the vehicle has used the old parts and has availed their benefits and new parts are being replaced for this damaged one then a sufficient credit has to be given for that purpose. Therefore, I think l/3rd of the total amount should be given a credit to the appellant and I reduce the amount Rs. 5160/- by giving l/3rd credit to the appellant to Rs. 4634/-.

12. Mr. Sisodia has urged that the claimant is not entitled for a future loss of income arising out of the present accident.

13. The Tribunal has awarded under this head a compensation to the extent of Rs. 1700/-. In this connection Mr. Sisodia has invited my attention to Raj Kumar v. Mahendra Singh and Ors. ACJ 1985 Page 103 In this case the division bench of M.P. High Court has interpreted the provisions of Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act and held that the tribunal is only entitled to grant compensation in respect of (i) death (ii) bodily injury and (iii) damage to property. As such loss of the business can not be compensated. Therefore, this claim cannot be entertained. With great respect I do not agree with the view taken by the M.P. High Court. It may not be lost sight of that legislature in its wisdom has thought it proper to draft Section 110 for purpose of giving benefit to the victims of the Motor accidents. It will not be proper to circumscribe the scope of Section 110 by narrow interpretation. It is a social legislation for the benefit of the public at large and it should be interpreted in a more wider and comprehensive manner so as to give relief to the victims and not to debar them. The expression damage to property is of very wide amplitude. Though the future earning cannot be said to be ascertained sum. But it is a property in future which the owner of the damaged vehicle would have earned out of this track, if this vehicle has not been damaged. Thus his recurring income has been lost on account of this damage and how can this be deprived to owner of vehicle. In this connection, the reference may be made to Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act which have the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, meaning thereby that all the claims arising out the motor accidents should be disposed of by the Tribunal only. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court has been bared. It would mean that part of the claim is to be raised before Tribunal and for remaining the incumbent has to take recourse to the civil courts then this will give rise to multiplicity of the proceedings. Thus, the scope of Section 110 is wide enough to include the future earning as a damage to the future property of the claimant.

14. In this view of the matter, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sisodia. The Tribunal has already awarded a sum of Rs. 1700/- for future loss of earning and rightly so.

15. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed and claim of the appellant is decreed to the extent of Rs. 7860/-. The claimant shall also be entitled to the interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition. No costs.

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