United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Smt. Patramma And Anr. on 22 February, 1995

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76
Karnataka High Court
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Smt. Patramma And Anr. on 22 February, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1995 (3) KarLJ 653
Bench: M Saldanha

JUDGMENT

1. An aspect of crucial importance has been projected in the course of this appeal. The proceeding was one under the Workmen’s Compensation Act where the death had occurred and the widow of the deceased who was the driver of a vehicle, had applied for compensation. In the course of the proceeding, the matter was referred to the Lok Adalath for a speedy adjudication and the Lok Adalath after hearing the parties recorded that the case, had been compromised for a sum of Rs. 59,735/- Subsequently, when the matter came up before the authority a submission appears to have been made on behalf of the claimant that the figure is not acceptable and that consequently the matter should be heard on merits. The authority recorded some evidence which consisted of the statement of the wife of the deceased who deposed to the fact that he was being paid a salary of Rs. 900/- per month and on the basis of this figure, the authority adjudicated the matter and awarded a sum of Rs. 78,088/-. It is this award that is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. As per the normal requirement, the Insurance company had deposited the entire claim amount before the authority and the claimant has withdrawn the same.

2. The principal submission canvassed by the appellant’s learned Advocate centres around an aspect of procedural propriety. The argument also canvasses a proposition that where a matter has been referred to an alternate forum for purposes of adjudication and that forum has indicated its verdict that thereafter it shall not be open to the claimant to resile from the decision to abide by that verdict and to ask for a normal adjudication on merits. The rule issue is, as to whether a litigant in these circumstances can be precluded from asking the Court or the Tribunal to go on with the case on the ground that the figure suggested by the Lok Adalath must be acceptable.

3. The system of having resort to Alternate Disputes Redressal machinery (hereinafter referred to as A.D.R.) has evolved in the course of the last few decades and the most common forum of such alternate forums is by having resort to arbitration. In Europe and North America where the A.D.R. system is very much prevalent, it is an inflexible principle of procedure that if the parties voluntarily agree to submit themselves to such an A.D.R. machinery, that it is incumbent upon them to abide by its decision. This again is the underlining principle even under the provisions of the Arbitration Act whereunder, it is implicit that when the dispute is referred for arbitration that the parties do so being aware of the fact that the remedy is a speedy one, the fact that a detailed investigation procedure will be done, aware that they still (sic) agree to abide by the verdict because they have full faith in adjudicating the authority and the manner in which the dispute will have to be resolved. It is only in exceptional circumstances therefore that the Court will permit a party to challenge an arbitration award. On an analogy, the same principle would hold good once a reference has been made to a Lok Adalath and it will therefore be necessary for the party who desires to resile from the decision that has been obtained from that forum to demonstrate that the decision is manifestly bad or perverse or so inherently wrong that it stares one on the face and therefore requires not to be accepted. It is in these circumstances that one will have to uphold a high degree of acceptability to the decisions of these A.D.Rs.

4. The appellant’s learned Advocate, has demonstrated to me that in the present instance admittedly the parties voluntarily referred the matter to the Lok Adalath and that the Lok Adalath indicated what according to it would be a fair compensation. An assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case is bound to differ from person to person and authority to authority. Appellant’s learned Advocate placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in I.L.R. 1993 Kant 1959 in the case of Sakamma v. Divisional Commissioner wherein the Court was considering a situation whereby the parties had arrived at a compromise which was acceptable to both of them and which was thereafter placed before the tribunal and an award obtained in those terms. Subsequently the award was sought to be challenged on the ground that had the matter been adjudicated through the traditional manner that it would have qualified for a higher amount of compensation and this Court while considering the facts of that case had occasion to observe that one needs to take cognizance of the fact that where a quick assessment is done and a figure fixed, undoubtedly it may be slightly higher or lower than what would have otherwise emerged at the end of a full-dressed hearing but that the Court takes notice of the other aspect of the matter namely that in the interest of a speedy conclusion to the dispute, the parties themselves bargain to settle for possibly even a lower amount as they would receive the compensation much earlier. There are many such aspects to the matter which do not require to be recounted. But the principle is very clear namely that once the matter is referred for settlement and it is accepted, that it shall thereafter not be open to the parties to resile therefrom unless, exceptional circumstances such as the quantum being absolutely perverse are demonstrated.

5. In this background appellant’s learned Advocate submitted that the tribunal could not have passed an award for any figure other than the one that was agreed upon. Normally, I would have straightway accepted this argument except for the fact that the record of this case clearly indicates that even though the appellants were duly represented before the authority, that they have not challenged the evidence that was led by the wife of the deceased who stated that his monthly income was Rs. 900/-. The fact that there was some dispute in the pleadings is not the relevant issue but the fact is that the witness was not cross-examined and more importantly, that no application was made to the Court to summon evidence from the employer which could have been conclusive. Appellants’ learned Advocate submitted that the onus of proof lay on the claimant and that the Insurance company was not obliged to go through this exercise. I am not in agreement with this submission because even though the onus of establishing the income lay on the claimant if that figure was disputed by the respondent Insurance company, then the evidence should not have been allowed to go uncontorverted and positive evidence ought to have been asked for. In the absence of this procedure having been resorted to, it would be difficult to find fault with what has happened before the authority though as indicated by me, under normal circumstances but for the fact that the appellants did not specifically point out also to the authority that it must make an award in terms of the earlier agreed amount since the matter has virtually gone by default and the amount having been deposited and withdrawn, there is virtually nothing that could survive in this appeal.

6. The respondents’ learned Advocate has submitted that the cases referred to A.D.R. machinery such as the Lok Adalath are only sent for purposes of effecting a compromise and that it is on the basis of the decision of that forum that the Court or the Tribunal or the authority is required to thereafter translate that decision into a decree or an award. He therefore submits that the issue is absolutely open until the latter procedure is adopted and under these circumstances where the claimant is aggrieved by the quantum’ arrived at, that nothing prevents the party from refusing to accept it and asking for a normal adjudication. Under these circumstances, it is his submission that this Court ought not to interfere with the order passed by the tribunal. I have already indicated that the process assumes a stage of finality when the parties appear before the Disputes Redressal Forum and accept the verdict there and it is only a procedural formality that is left thereafter unless as indicated above in the very small category of cases there are very compelling reasons to not to accept that decision. If that is the case, a specific application will have to be filed to this effect setting out very clearly what the grounds in support thereof are.

7. Having regard to the aforesaid position, to my mind, as far as the present appeal is concerned and that too in the circumstances in which it is now placed, there is hardly any corrective action that this Court can take. The only direction that is competent at this point of time would be that the Insurance company cannot be directed to make any further payments than what has already been deposited and withdrawn. Though a submission was made that if the order of the authority does not desire interference with, that the Insurance company must be directed to pay the balance amount of interests, costs etc. I am not in agreement with this because on a strict appraisal, the correct order would have been that the order stands modified to the figure awarded by the Lok Adalath and that the respondents be directed to refund the (sic) amount that has been drawn to the Insurance company. However having regard to the status of the respondents that amount is obviously irrecoverable at this point of time and is therefore virtually written off.

8. The appeal filed by the insurance company therefore succeeds. That the success’ is virtually an academic one. It is however of some importance that the point raised has been decided and that the same be upheld as this is an issue of some consequence which would arise in a large number of similar cases. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of.

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