ORDER
Srinivasan, J.
1. The writ petition is taken up at the request of the writ petitioner with the consent of the respondents.
2. The order challenged in the writ petition is passed by the second respondent, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies on 13.7.1989 exercising his powers under Section 83 of the Pondicherry Co-operative Societies Act superseding the management committee of the society of which the petitioner was the President. The Society is an apex society within the meaning of the Act and the rules. Under Section 32(3) of the Pondicherry Co-operative Societies Act, 1972, which is hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, the Committee shall consist of not less than nine and hot more than twenty one members as the society is classified as an apex society.
3. Under the by laws of the Society, the Management Committee shall consist of 17 members, six them being delegates appointed by each of the six apex societies, another six being elected from among the delegates from societies other than apex societies in Pondicherry region; two being elected from among the delegates from societies other than apex societies in Karaikai, Mahe and Yanam region, two being elected from among the individual members and one being the Registrar or his nominee. Admittedly, at the relevant time, the management committee consisted of 13 members only, functioning from 1.1.1989. In the course of an enquiry into certain alleged irregularities in the management of the society, the enquiry officer reported to the Registrar that two irregularities had taken place in the affairs of the society viz., (a) misuse of the property of the society and (b) default in carrying out the obligations and functions of the management committee. When the irregularities were under consideration, it was brought to the notice of the second respondent that eight members of the management committee had submitted their resignations between 6.7.1989 and 13.7.1989, as a result of which, the strength of the committee had fallen to five. Taking the view that the statutory minimum prescribed by Section 32(3) of the Act for an apex society was not fulfilled, the second respondent passed the impugned order, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:
In the context of the Committee having become defunct, I am further of the opinion that it is not reasonably practicable to give an opportunity to the committee to make its representation as to why it should not be dissolved and it is also not reasonably practicable under this emergent circumstances to inform and consult the financing bank under Sub-section (6) of Section 83 of the Pondicherry Co-operative Societies Act, 1972, as alternative arrangement to manage the affairs of the said Union will have to be made urgently without any interruption;
Now, therefore the undersigned in exercise of his powers conferred under Section 83(1)(a) read with Section 83(9) of the Pondicherry Co-op. Societies Act, 1972 hereby dissolves the Committee of Management of the Pondicherry State Co-op. Union with immediate effect and appoint Thiru D. Arunachalarn, Deputy Registrar, (Planning) to hold full additional charge as Special Officer to manage the affairs of the said Co-op. Union for a period of six months from the date of issue of this order.
4. The said order is challenged by the petitioner mainly on the ground that no opportunity was given to the management committee by the second respondent to explain the position before passing the impugned order and thus principles of natural justice had been violated. It was also the case of the petitioner that the provisions of Section 83(9) of the Act enabling the second respondent to pass an order without notice as prescribed in Sub-section 1(a) of Section 83, will not apply to the facts of this case. It is alleged that in the place of the members who had resigned, the committee had co-opted one person on 10.7.1989, another on 11.7.1989 and three others on 13.7.1989. According to the petitioner, by the co-option of the said five members, the minimum requirement of Section 32(3) of the Act was fulfilled. It is also alleged that the management committee is not guilty of the alleged irregularistics.
5. The petitioner produced before me the minutes book of the society from which it is seen that circular resolutions have been passed for co-option of members as alleged by the petitioner. The resolutions dated 13.7.1989 have been signed by seven members only. According to the petitioner, under the by-laws of the society, the quorum for meetings for the purpose of co-option is only seven.
6. The contentions of the second respondent are that a statutory appeal has been provided under Section 140 of the Act against the impugned order and this writ petition is not maintainable, that the alleged co-options were not communicated’ factually to the second respondent and that they were not valid in law as there was no committee validly in existence on 13.7.1989 since the number of members on that date was less than the minimum prescribed under Section 32(3) of the Act.
7. With reference to the question as to the validity of the co-option, it will depend upon disputed questions of fact. The question whether there was a committee validly in existence on 13.7.1989 is also one which arises for consideration. I do not wish to express any opinion on the above questions in the view I am taking in this matter that the writ petition should be dismissed as there is an effective statutory alternative remedy available to the petitioner.
8. Under Section 140 of the Act, an appeal lies against an order passed under Section 83 of the Act to the Tribunal. The petitioner did not disclose in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition the existence of the statutory remedy by way of appeal. In paragraph 15 of the affidavit, it is stated that the petitioners has no other alternative, effective, efficacious and speedy remedy available in law. There is no averment in the petition that the remedy of appeal under Section 140 of the Act is not efficacious or speedy enough to grant relief to the petitioner.
9. Apart from that, the petitioner has filed the writ petition as an individual. No doubt, he was the President of She Board of Directors of the society. But, in paragraph 17 of the affidavit, he has stated as follows:
I. respectfully state that the other 7 Directors excluding the Principal-cum-Nominee Director could not make themselves available to join me in this W.P. even though they are also opposed to the impugned order. They would be filing separate W.P. challenging the impugned order shortly, As no adverse order is sought to be obtained against the other Directors, they are not impleaded as respondents to this W.P. As I have to obtain urgent orders of stay, I am filing this W.P. in my own name.
This shows that the petitioner filed the writ petition as an individual and according to him, other writ petitions would be filed by the other Directors of the Board. But, in the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner himself, it is admitted that an appeal has been filed by another member of the Board of Directors by name Prabhakaran and the appeal has been taken on file by the Tribunal as Appeal No.2/89 and stay has also been prayed for in I.A.No.357/89. It is stated that the case stood (adjourned to 3.10.1989. Thus, it is clear that while one member of the Board of Directors is invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the other member is availing of the statutory remedy under Section 1,40 of the Act. The grievance is that of the committee which is superseded and individual members cannot seek different reliefs in different forums and still contend that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be exercised by (this Court.
10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance of the decision in Rakhaldas Mukherjee v. S.P. Ghose . In that case, Sinha, J. has laid down the following propositions:
(a) The Writs of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, and for the matter of that, all high prerogative writs, are ordinarily not issued where there exists an alternative remedy equally efficient and adequate,
(b) But there is no inflexible rule that such writ cannot be issued where the Court thinks it just and convenient to do so. The fact that it ordinarily does not do so is a question not of want of jurisdiction but on expediency.
(c) Whether the alternative remedy is equally efficacious or adequate is a question of fact to be decided in each case.
(d) Where a complaint is made against any act done or purported to be done under any statutory provision, the fact that there exists in the statute itself a possible remedy, is an important fact to be taken into consideration. Where such provisions exist, the Court will be extremely reluctant to interfere by way of high prerogative writs and especially so if the applicant has actually taken recourse to his remedy under the statute.
(e) But the fact that there exists a remedy under the Statute does not take away the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue the writs in appropriate cases.
(f) In the following cases it has been held that a writ will be issued notwithstanding an. alternative remedy, whether under a statutory provision or otherwise:
(i) Where an inferior tribunal assumes jurisdiction and the want of jurisdiction is patent on the face of it; (ii) where the proceedings complained of are against the principles of natural justice; and (iii) where the alternative remedy is too costly or ineffective or entails such delay that the applicant would be irreparably prejudiced or the remedy might prove valueless.
11. This case does not fall under any of the three categories referred to in proposition (f) by the learned Judge. Far from supporting the petitioner, the decision is really against him. The contention of the petitioner that principles of natural justice have been violated is untenable. In the view taken by the second respondent, the management committee had become defunct with the resignation of eight members thereof and when Sub-section (9) provides for a situation in which it is not reasonably practicable to give an opportunity to the committee to make its representation, there is no question of violation of any principle of natural justice. If according to the petitioner, the committee had not become defunct on account of the co-options alleged to have been made, it is a matter to be urged before the appellate Tribunal and as it depends upon proof of certain facts which are in dispute the tribunal will be the appropriate forum for canvassing the same.
12. My attention is drawn to the decision in MS. Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheswari v. Antarim Zila Parishad Now Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar . It was held in that case that where an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not to invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. Though it was pointed out that the existence of a statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ, it is a matter to be taken into consideration before granting writs and where such a remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a writ petition unless there are good grounds therefor. It was held in that case that the rule regarding alternative remedy is a self imposed limitation, a rule of policy, and discretion rather than a rule of law and the Court may, therefore, in exceptional cases issue a writ such as a writ of certiorari, notwithstanding the fact that the statutory remedies have not been exhausted. This case is not an exceptional case contemplated in the said judgment.
13. Learned Counsel cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. It was held in that case that it is always a matter of discretion with the Court and there is no rule of law that the High Court should not entertain the writ petition where an alternative remedy is available to a party. I do not find any circumstance in this case warranting the exercise of the discretion in favour of the petitioner. On the other hand,I have already referred to the circumstances which would justify the rejection of the petition.
14. In The Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery Industries , cited by learned Counsel for the petitioner himself, it was held that unless the High Court is satisfied that the normal statutory” remedy is likely to be too dilatory or difficult to give reasonably quick relief, it should be loath to act under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This judgment is clearly against the petitioner as nothing has been made out in this case to the effect that the statutory appeal provided under Section 140 of the Act is likely to be too dilatory or difficult to give reasonably quick relief to the petitioner.
15. Learned Counsel cited the decision of a Division Bench in K.M. Muthusamy v. The Commissioner, Panchayat Union, Thookanaickenpalayam, Gobi Taluk and Anr. . It was held in that case that where an impugned order is totally without jurisdiction, an alternative remedy is not a bar to the exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the impugned order is not one totally without jurisdiction.
16. Lastly, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur U.P. and Ors. was cited. In that case it was held that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition when an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction and the High Court should not refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. For the reason mentioned in the previous paragraph, this judgment does not have any bearing on the present case.
17. Thus, it is clear that unless the Court is satisfied that the alternative remedy is not efficacious or too dilatory or difficult to give, relief to the petitioner, reasonably quickly, this Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Apart from that, there is a more salient principle which has to be adhered to in matters of this type while considering the question of maintainability of the writ petition on the basis of an available alternative remedy.
18. No doubt, an alternative remedy is, not a bar as such to the maintainability of the writ petition. But, before the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is invoked by a person, it is necessary for him to inform the Court of the existence of such a remedy and the reason for not availing it the Court has to be satisfied when the matter comes up for admission that he alternative remedy is not efficacious on the facts and circumstances of the case. If a person chooses not to disclose the existence of the alternative remedy, he is guilty of suppression of relevant facts. A general statement in the affidavit that there is no alternative, effective, efficacious and speedy remedy available in law, is as good as non-disclosure of the existence of such a remedy particularly when it is a regular statutory appeal. In such cases, when the Court finds that an alternative remedy exists, the writ petition shall be dismissed more because the petitioner misled the Court than because of the existence of the remedy.
19. On the facts and circumstances of the case, J am convinced that the remedy under Section 140 of the Act is efficacious and speedy enough and there is no warrant for exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner not having come to Court with clean hands as he has not chosen to disclose that an alternative remedy exists by way of salutary appeal, the petition deserves to be dismissed. Hence, it is hereby dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fee Rs.1500/-.