ORDER
G. Bikshapathy, J.
1. The Civil Revision Petition is filed against the judgment and decree passed in R.C.A.No.5/1987 by the Principal Subordinate Judge-cum-Rent Control Appellate Authority, Srikakulam reversing the judgment and decree of the learned Rent Controller-cum-Principal District Munsif, Srikakulam in R.C.C.No.10/1977.
2. The petitioner is the Respondent before the Rent Controller and Appellant before the appellate authority. For the sake of convenience, the parties are herein referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court.
3. It is necessary to narrate certain facts before dealing with the Revision Petition. The petitioner. (Sri Tbayi Ranga Brahma Rao) filed R.C.C. No. 10/1977 on the file of the Kent Controller-cum-Principal District Munsif, Srikakulam under Section 10(2)(i) and 6 (sic.(vi)) and Section 10(3)(1)(a) (sic.10(3)(a)(i)(a)) of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act. It was the case of the petitioner that he was the owner of the petition schedule building comprising of Door No. 8-12-15 and 8-12-16. He was also the owner of other buildings bearing Door No. 8-12-13 and 8-12-14 in Ananthapallivari Street of Srikakulam Town. However, we are concerned in this case with only Door No. 8-12-15 and 8-12-16. It was the case of the petitioner that the Respondent No. 1 was the tenant of these two houses. The premises was let out to the Respondents in the year 1972. Initially, the rent was fixed at Rs. 75/- per month in respect of Door No. 8-12-15 and Rs. 100/- in respect of the premises bearing No. 8-12-16. The rent was enhanced with effect from. 1-6-1974 @ Rs. 100/- and Rs. 125/- respectively for the aforesaid premises. The 1st Respondent was the son-in-law of the elder brother of the petitioner and there was no written agreement of tenancy between the parties. However, the Respondent No. 1 paid only a sum of Rs. 700/- and failed to pay the accumulated rent for the last several years. By 1-8-1977 the rent payable was Rs. 11,877/-. Thus, he committed wilful default in payment of rent. It is also the case of the petitioner that he retired from service and he required the premises for his personal occupation. To the notice sent by the petitioner, a reply was received with untenable contentions.
4. The Respondent No. 1 filed counter before the trial Court stating that the petitioner and his brother late Thayi Sri Rangamnaidu (father-in-law of the 1st respondent and elder brother of the petitioner) are together entitled to the portion bearing Door No. 8-12-13 in equal shares, but the petitioner had nothing to do with the portion bearing Door No. 8-12-14 and that his father-in-law was enjoying the petition schedule property. He denied that he was a Tenant for the petition schedule premises and that he was paying the rent. He also denied that there was relationship of Landlord and Tenant between the parties. It is the case of the 1st respondent that the petitioner has no title over the petition schedule premises and the question of petitioner requring the same for hier personal occupation does not arise. It is stated that the alleged letter dated 3-1-1974 is not a genuine one and it is a forged letter. The Respondent No. 1 further stated that on the instructions of his father- in-law, he occupied the premises, he and his brother-in-law (Sri Thayi Rama Krishna Rao (son of Sri Rangamnaidu) have been occupying the premises under the directions of his father-in-law and he renovated the premises by spending Rs. 25,000/-. He also fixed certain fixtures. The 2nd respondent namely brother-in-law of the 1st respondent also filed separate counter supporting the case of the 1st respondent. The trial Court framed the following issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner has got title to the petition schedule house?
(2) Whether the Respondent committed wilful default in payment of rent to the petitioner?
(3) Whether the requirement of petition schedule house by the petitioner for personal occupation is bona fide?
(4) Whether there is Landlord and tenant relationship between the parties?
After considering the evidence adduced by the parties and also the documents filed in support of the respective contentions, the trial Court refused to render any finding on point No. 1 on the ground that the subject matter of the ownership was pending in a L.P.A. and with regard to the issue relating to the relationship of Landlord and Tenant, the Trial Court held that the petitioner failed to prove the relationship and therefore held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain petition and give relief to the petitioner. Basing on the findings on the aforesaid issues, the petition was dismissed by the Principal Rent Controller by a judgment and decree dated 30-9-1986. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner carried the matter in appeal. The appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court in Rent Control Appeal No. 5/1987 dated 26-2-1991. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the 1st respondent filed the present Revision Petition.
5. The learned Counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner submits that the petitioner has no title to the suit schedule property and therefore the findings of the lower appellate Court holding that the petitioner is the owner is illegal and contrary to evidence on record.
6. The petitioner filed a suit in O.S.No.131/1977 for partition and separate possession of his half share in ‘A, B and C plaint schedule properties on the ground that the properties belong to the joint family consisting of the petitioner and his elder brother (Thayi Sri Rangamnaidu). While accepting the claim of the petitioner in respect of A, B schedule properties, he resisted the claim of ‘C schedule property consisting of four mulgies on the ground that late Sri Rangamnaidu was in exclusive and uninterrupted posession of the property over for a period of 40 years and therefore the petitioner had no manner of any right. The trial Court held that the petitioner was entitled for half share in the plaint ‘C schedule property. Plaint ‘C schedule property originally belonged to one Smt. P. Ranganayakamma, paternal aunt of the petitioner and his brother. She bequeathed the said property under a registered Will Ex.A-1 dated 8-3-1937 in favour of one Smt. P. Mahalaxmamma (cousin sister of the petitioner and Sri Rangamnaidu). After the death of Smt.Mahalaxmamma, the petitioner and his brother came into possession as joint owners. On appeal by the Defendants (L.Rs. of Sri Rangamnaidu), the learned Single Judge of this Court while confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court observed that” letter Ex.A-2 was not admissible in evidence since it affected the rights acquired by Smt. P. Mahalaxmamma, the legatee while under Ex.A-1 executed by Smt. P. Ranganayakamma. In Ex.A-2 letter Sri Rangamnaidu to the petitioner stated that the house at Srikakulam consists of 5 portions, the portion abutting the gate was purchased by his wife Smt. P. Ranganayakamma and she is entitled to enjoy the same with absolute rights and other 4 portions belong to my brother and they are registered in the name of my brother. He has got absolute rights to the same and he can dispose of the same as he likes, but the house cannot be alienated to any outsider. The learned Judge under the impression that Ex.A-2 was in the nature of testamentary disposition and the same was not admissible in evidence as it was not stamped and registered. The matter was carried in Appeal in L.P.A. No. 275/85 by the Defendant. The L.P.A. was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court by judgment dated 3-3-1993. The Division Bench while dealing with the ‘C schedule property and letter dated 3-1-1974 (Ex.A-2) observed thus:
“The learned Judge held that the above two paragraphs deal with two dispositions: in regard to the first disposition a condition was imposed that the house may not be alienated to any outsider and in the second disposition another condition was imposed that except Srirangam’s brother none else has (not) any right in respect of the four acres of land. The document was not admissible in evidence since it was not stamped and registered. We are only concerned, in this appeal, with the so called first disposition. On a close reading of the same, we are of the view that it is not at all a disposition of property. Late Srirangam merely stated as a fact in Ex.A-2 that four portions of the house belong to his brother and the same are registered in the name of his brother. He acknowledged the title of his brother in respect of the four portions of the house in unequivocal terms “He has got absolute rights to the same……” Simply because late Srirangam also has stated that his brother”……..can dispose of the same as he likes……”, no inference can be drawn that late Srirangam had either settled the four portions on the plaintiff or gifted them away. Nowhere in Ex.A-2, do we come across any recital to the effect that ‘C’ schedule property exclusively belonged to late Srirangam. On the other hand, from the statement in Ex.A-2 that the four portions are registered in the name of the plaintiff, the conclusion clearly emerges that the plaintiff is the owner of the four portions. As Ex.A-2 is not a testamentary disposition, we are of the view that the same was admissible in evidence and the trial Court acted correctly in receiving the same as evidence. In so far as the ‘C schedule property is concerned, we are constrained to hold, with great respect to the learned single Judge, that the view taken by him was not correct.
That the ‘C Schedule property stood in the name of the plaintiff was also evidenced by Exs.A-6 and A-7, house-tax demand registers. There is also reference to ‘C’ schedule property in the letters Exs.A-3, A-4 and A-5. The onus that lay on the plaintiff was discharged satisfactorily. The evidence adduced by the plaintiff stood unrebutted. The defendants did not make any attempts to lead any evidence in proof of what they pleaded. What is more surprising is that they did not even doubt the genuineness of the Will Ex.A-1, on which, the claim of the plaintiff was largely founded.
For the aforesaid reasons, this Letters Patent Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Thus, it is finally settled that the petitioner was the owner of plaint schedule ‘C property in the suit a part of which consists of the petition schedule property. Therefore, the said judgment became final. It is beyond the pale of controversy that the petitioner is the owner of the plaint schedule property. The trial Court did not give any finding on the ground that the issue relating to the ownership of the plaint schedule property was the subject matter in L.P.A.No.272/1985. Thus as between the petitioner and his brother Srirangam Naidu the ownership of petition schedule property became final. Admittedly the 1st respondent has no manner of right in the premises. His defence throughout was that he was inducted by his father-in-law and therefore he has been occupying the premises. Now that the issue has been set at naught by the judgment of Division Bench in L.P.A. the defence of the 1st respondent pales into insignificance. But, however it was contended that in Ex.A-1 Will the name of Sri Ranga Kurma Rao was only mentioned by the Executant and that the original Will was not produced. On the other hand, the Respondent No. 1 filed Ex.B-21, stating the name of Sri Ranga Kurma Rao as the legatee. Therefore, there is a bona fide dispute with regard to title and the denial of title is also a bona fide. I need not go into this aspect as the ownership of the schedule property has now been confirmed. It is true that the title of the party cannot be decided by a proceeding under Rent Control Act and the same has to be decided by the Civil Court, but however, it is open for the Court to render an ancillary finding on the title of the party. But, this issue need not detain us further for the aforesaid reasons. In view of the foregoing discussion, I do not find any illegality.
7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the finding of the lower appellate Court that there was a relationship of Landlord and Tenant is also equally untenable. It was sought to be contended that the Respondent No. 1 has been paying municipal tax and also the electricity bills. But, however, it was in the evidence that the receipts were only issued in the name of Respondent No. 1, but the Demand Notices were issued in the name of the petitioner. It was also admitted that the Assessment numbers also stood in the name of the petitioner. The property receipts issued by the municipality would not confer any right, on the person, who paid the amount. But the relevant criteria is the name which is available in the Assessment Register. Admittedly, the name of the petitioner was mentioned in the Assessment Register and the Assessment numbers also stood in the name of the petitioner and also the demand notices were sent in the name of the petitioner. The lower Court found that as the petitioner was away on duty in all probabilities appeared to have entrusted the property to his brother Sri Rangamnaidu. The lower appellate Court also relied on Ex.B-6, and B-7 written by R-5, who is none-else-than the daughter of late Sri Rangamnaidu and wife of R-1 and she did not come into witness box to deny the genuineness of the documents. Therefore, in view of the preponderance of the evidence, the lower appellate Court, even though there was no written agreement and considering the fact that the Respondent No. 1 was managing the properties of his father-in-law late Sri Rangamnaidu and the properties of the petitioner, and his father-in- law inducted R-1 into possession of the property, held that late Sri Rangamnaidu was only an agent. Therefore, for all these reasons, the lower appellate Court rejected the contention that there was bona fide dispute with regard to the title of the plaint schedule property and that the finding of the trial Court is vitiated by mala fides. Even though the learned Counsel for the petitioner elaborately argued on the matter that the findings of the lower appellate Court are wholly perverse and untenable, I am not persuaded myself to accept the said contention. The findings of the lower appellate Court are quite cogent and plausible and it cannot be said that the lower appellate Court committed an error in coming to such a conclusion. The lower appellate Court also disbelieved the plea of the Respondent that no rent at all was paid. The lower appellate Court after considering Exs.A-4 and A-5, held that the 1st respondent has been paying the rents and there was wilful default in payment of rent. On this aspect also, the learned Counsel submits that the findings are untenable. I am unable to countenance with the argument of the learned counsel for the simple reason that Exs.A-4 and A-5 which are the account extracts prepared by R-2 in respect of plaint schedule properties inclusive of Door Nos. 8-12-12 to 15. R.W-3 has been maintaining the accounts even till date and he is being paid salary. The original accounts which are in the custody of R.W-3 were not filed. Therefore, the learned appellate Court drew adverse inference. Therefore, considering the evidence on record, the learned Appellate Judge came to a conclusion that there was a default. I do not find any infirmity in the said finding. It is to be noted that it is a revisional proceedings and not an appellate proceedings. It is well settled that the powers of revisions under Section 22 of the Act are much wider than that conferred under Section 115 C.P.C, yet this Court cannot act as an appellate authority and reappreciate the evidence afresh. If the finding is based on some acceptable evidence, this Court is precluded from interfering with the said finding. The sufficiency or otherwise of evidence is not within the realm of the revisionsal jurisdiction. Even in cases of reversing judgments, like one on hand, the same yardstick is applicable. Therefore, the findings of the lower appellate Court that there was a tenant-land lord relationship and that there was wilful default in payment of rent are not susceptible of interference and I hold accordingly.
8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also submits that there is no finding with regard to the requirement of personal occupation. I am afraid, I cannot accept this contention and it is clearly mentioned in the petition that he retired from service in 1956 and he required it for his personal occupation. There is no evidence that the petitioner was having some other alternative accommodation. Under these circumstances, the finding that the petitioner requires the petition schedule property for his personal occupation cannot be said to be untenable.
9. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality, irregularity and impropriety in the order of the lower appellate Court and accordingly, the Revision Petition is dismissed. The order and decree of the Rent Controller in R.C.C. No. 10/77 (sic.) shall be implemented within two months from to- day. There shall be no order as to costs.
10. Before parting with the case, the way in which the litigation is kept alive, impels me to make certain observations. The seed of litigation was sown in 1977 and now the vires has crept to the second generation and it continues to persist. Not only the brothers strained their relations, but it reached a stage where the progeny of these two branches are made to acquire the litigation syndrome for over decade as they are to continue the litigation per force. The litigation inter se relations leave alone siblings always converts near and dear sworn enemies. Therefore, it is always desirable to nip the bud before it percolates to next generation, and it will create adverse effect on the society. The 1st respondent centenarian had put up valiant legal battle successfully, but ultimately it does not ensure to his own benefit. Hence, it should be the endeavour of Courts to deal with such matters on priority basis before the L.Rs. get into the fray save in unavoidable and exceptional cases.
