JUDGMENT
Anoop V. Mohta, J.
1. Heard. The present appeal has been preferred by the original appellant, thereby, challenged the judgment dated 24-4-1986, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Buldhana in Claim Petition No. 16/1984, whereby, the total amount of Rs. 14,000/- under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short ‘Old Act’) was awarded.
2. The Advocate appearing for the claimant restricted his case only in reference to the compensation in respect of “General Damages”. No other points argued and/or pressed by the Advocate for the appellant. The learned Tribunal, after considering the evidence, as well as, the material placed on the record, and after taking into consideration the injuries sustained by the claimant has awarded total compensation under this head of General Damages at Rs. 1000/- only. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellant, therefore, contended that the General Damages as awarded is on the lower side and it should have been on the higher side. He ST relied on , State of Kerala v. P. Vijaykumaran Nair. The basic reliance is on the para No. 8 which is reproduced as under :
“8. Turning to the quantum of damages, we may preface the discussions by observing that the person physically injured may recover compensation both for his pecuniary losses and non-pecuniary losses. Of these the pecuniary losses themselves comprise two separate items, namely the loss of earnings and other gains which he would have made had he not been injured and the medical and other expenses to which he is put as a result of the injury. The courts have sub-divided the non-pecuniary losses into three categories viz. pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of expectation of life. The question whether the damages should be itemised or whether it is more proper to make a global award need not be discussed as the Tribunal has itemised the award and nothing turns upon the propriety of the dichotomy in the appeal, the concept of pecuniary loss is self-explanatory which requires no elaboration but the kindred concept of non-pecuniary loss justifies in brief exposition. In the following discussion we have though it more convenient to draw upon Mc Gregor on Damages rather than cull relevant passages from decided cases. “Non-pecuniary loss is a very different field. Little can be stated with certainty as to the amount of damages awardable for such toss caused by personal physical injury. Indeed full compensation cannot be given in the sense that no amount can fully compensate for a serious physical injury. Beyond this, no yard-stick exists for measuring in money the compensation to be accorded a given amount of physical pain or mental suffering because, as far as money goes, the loss is imponderable, and any amount awarded must be in the nature of conventional sum” (Mc Gregor on Damages, 14th Edition, para 1211). “Pain and suffering is the first of the two main heads of non-pecuniary loss. Both past and prospective pain and suffering are covered, although the past loss is not claimed as special damages in the pleadings as it is not quantifiable with exactitude. Past and prospective loss are therefore claimed together as general damages”. (Ibid para 1212). “The term ‘pain and suffering’ has been used so constantly by the courts without any clear distinction between the two words that it is now a term of art. It has been suggested that ‘pain’ is the immediately felt effect on the nerves and brain of some lesion, or injury to a part of the body, while ‘suffering’ is distress which is not felt as being directly connected with any bodily condition. On this analysis pain needs no further elucidation; it may be noted that it will include, for the purpose of damages, any pain caused by medical treatment or surgical operation rendered necessary by the injury inflicted by the defendant.” (Ibid para 1213), “Loss of amenities of life is the second of the two main heads of non-pecuniary loss.” (Ibid para 3218) “This head of damages (loss of amenities of life) concentrates on the curtailment of the plaintiff’s enjoyment of life not by the positive unpleasantness of pain and suffering but, in a more negative way, by his inability to pursue the activities he pursued before hand. Birkett L.J. put it thus is Manley v. Rugby Portiant Cement Co. (1951) C. A. No. 286. “There is a head of damage which is sometimes called loss of amenities; the man made blind by the accident will no longer be able to see the familiar things he has seen all his life, the man who has had both legs removed will never again go upon his walking excursions – things of that kind – loss of amenities.” (Ibid para 1219) Later in the same para the learned author observes that “The appearance of loss of amenities as a distinct head of damage is however, a modern development. Not until the middle of the century does it, begin to become mentioned as such in the reports”. He continues : “It is doubtful whether this was intended to reflect a substantive change in the law; the idea of loss of amenities can be subsumed under ‘pain and suffering’, taking that term in its wide connotation, and no doubt that was what had been done with this element of loss before 1950.” As to the award the author states : “As with pain and suffering it is virtually impossible to give clear guidance on amounts, since here two awards vary with the particular injury, the particular circumstances and the particular judge. Before 1970 there was the difficulty that judges have tended to make global awards for all the plaintiff’s losses, pecuniary and non-pecuniary, and today even where they are separated, a single figure is generally arrived at which brackets the compensation for loss of amenities with the compensation for pain and suffering.”
3. The provisions as argued and as discussed above, is settled principle of law and need no further elaboration. Such claim shall depend upon the facts and evidence of each case. However, the question is, whether this court at this stage should interfere with the findings given by the court below, which was based on material evidence placed on record, including due assessment of the other damages as awarded. The said principle is also settled and observed in para No. 10, of the judgment referred (supra), which reads as under :
“10. … The ground upon which a court of appeal would interfere by reassessment of the damages has been stated by Groor L.J. In Flint v. Lovell, (1935) 1 KB 354 (CA) in the following passage which has been approved by the House of Lords in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Collieries, (1942)AC 601, and by the Privy Council in Nanco v. British Columbia Electric Ry. (1951) AC 601. “This court will be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial Judge as to the amount of damages merely because they think that if they had tried the case in the first instance they would have given a lesser sum. In order to justify reversing the trial Judge on the question of the amount of damages it will generally be necessary that this court should be convinced either that the judge acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was to extremely high or so very small as to make it, in the judgment of this court, an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage to which the plaintiff is entitled.” Thus the two grounds of interference are that the judge has acted on a wrong principle of law and that he had made an entirely erroneous estimate of the damages. Although the tribunal cannot be said to have acted upon any wrong principle of law we feel that the oversight of the pathetic condition of the petitioner which is established by his evidence and corroborated by the testimony of R.W. 1 has led to an entirely erroneous estimate of the damages on his head.”
4. Therefore, even on the basis of the above principle, I am of the view that there is no case made out for interference. We have gone through the evidence led by the parties in support of the various damages. As we are concerned with General Damages, there is no specific case or evidence or averment made for claiming Rs. 15000/- towards general damages. There is no dispute that it is difficult for the parties to claim any specific amount and/or to lead any evidence in support of “pains and sufferings”. However, in the facts and circumstances, considering other damages as were already awarded, as per material placed on record. I see there is no reason to interfere with the order passed by the Court below, of awarding Rs. 1000/- towards general damages. Even otherwise total compensation of all other heads cannot be overlooked while considering claim for such damages. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there is nothing pointed out that the order is perverse or based on wrong principle of law and/or is entirely erroneous assessment of the damages. The evidence led on record and as corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses in the facts and circumstances of the case, the general damages as awarded cannot be said to be erroneous assessment of damages as contended.
5. In view of this the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
