IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 06.10.2007
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.PALANIVELU
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL PETITION Nos.4332 and 8922 of 2007
1. Victor Auxilium
2. Susainathan ..Petitioners in Crl.OP.4332/2007
Auxillia ..Petitioner in Crl.OP.8922/2007
Vs
1. State,
rep.by the Assistant Commissioner of Police
W-19 All Women Police Station
Adyar
Chennai 600 020.
2. V.Florin Vinolia ..Respondents in both petitions
Petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
For petitioners in Crl.O.P.No.4332/2007 : Mr.A.Raghunathan for M/s.S.S.Jayanthi.
For petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.8922/2007 : Mrs.V.Uma Shankari
For respondent 1 in both petitions : Mr.A.Saravanan, Govt.Advocate (Crl.Side).
For respondent 2 in both petitions : Mr.Ramesh, for M/s.Ram & Ram
O R D E R
These petitions have been filed to call for the
records in C.C.No.3819 of 2006 on the file of IV
Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, and to quash the
same.
2. For the sake of convenience, the status of the
parties, as mentioned in Crl.O.P.No.4332 of 2007, would be
referred and the petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.8922 of 2007 by
name Auxillia.
3. The facts, in a nutshell, are as under :
3.1. First petitioner is son of second petitioner
and second respondent is the de facto complainant, who is
wife of first petitioner. The marriage of first petitioner
and second respondent was celebrated on 22.06.2000 in
St.Theresas Church, Trichy.
3.2. At the time of marriage, all the accused
demanded 80 sovereigns of gold jewels and Rs.6.00 lakhs in
cash towards dowry, however, the parents of the de facto
complainant offered 50 sovereigns of gold jewels, besides a
sum of Rs.1.00 lakh in cash. The couple was living at
Thiruvanmiyur in Chennai. First accused left for Singapore
and returned back after one year. In August, 2001, he took
the de facto complainant to Singapore. While the spouses
were at Singapore, second and third accused made phone
calls to fist accused, by means of which the attitude of
first accused changed suddenly and he started demanding a
sum of Rs.10.00 lakhs from the de facto complainant, stating
that if she did not bring Rs.10.00 lakhs, he would send her
back to her parents. While the de facto complainant asked
her parents over phone, they replied that they could not
arrange Rs.10.00 lakhs at once, which information was
conveyed to first accused, for which he replied that they
had to demand Rs.10.00 lakhs even at the time of marriage,
which they did not, and further asked her to arrange for the
amount. Thereafter, first accused called second accused to
Singapore and sent the de facto complainant with him to
India on 07.02.2002. Further, he proceeded to arrange for
cancellation of visa for the de facto complainant on
20.03.2002, consequent upon which it was cancelled. When
the de facto complainant asked second and third accused over
phone to arrange for re-union, they told her that only if
she arranged Rs.10.00 lakhs, they would make efforts for re-
union and disconnected the conversation. Second accused
contacted the de facto complainant in April,2002, stating
that first accused was coming down to India in that month
and Rs.10.00 lakhs might be kept ready and only, thereupon,
they would send her with first accused to Singapore, if not,
they would celebrate second marriage to him and settle them
at Singapore itself. The de facto complainant approached
third accused at once and asked her to take steps for re-
union, whereby she also told that only if de facto
complainant paid Rs.10.00 lakhs, they could do something.
3.3. On 24.04.2005, second accused contacted the
father of de facto complainant over phone and asked him to
pay Rs.10.00 lakhs, since first accused had arrived in
India. Thereafter, the de facto complainant came to know
that first accused contacted second marriage with one
Kavitha at Singapore.
3.4. First respondent police, after investigation,
laid charge sheet against the accused for the offences
punishable under Sections 498A and 494 IPC and Section 4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act.
3.5. On 02.02.2007, the trial Court framed charges
against the accused. While all the three accused were
charged under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act, the offence under Section 494 IPC was
framed against first accused alone.
4. The contention of the petitioners in both the
petitions are two folded, namely, (i) first respondent
police has no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the
case, as the allegations in the F.I.R. would clearly portray
that every stage of offence was held in Singapore, besides
the reason being that though the marriage was celebrated in
Trichy and first accused was also a resident of Trichy, he
left for Singapore immediately after the marriage and both
the spouses were leading married life in Singapore for
sometime, particularly, during when the alleged demand was
made, and (ii) as per Section 198 (c) Cr.P.C., where the
person aggrieved by an offence punishable under Section 494
or 495 IPC is wife, complaint may be made on her behalf by
her father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter or by
her father’s or mother’s brother or sister and since the
offence under Section 494 IPC is not expected to be
investigated by police, the de facto complainant should have
laid a private complaint before the jurisdictional
Magistrate Court for necessary relief and clubbing of the
offence under Section 494 along with other offences in this
matter is not legally permissible, whereby the accused are
prejudiced.
5. Besides the above said grounds, the petitioner
Auxillia, in her petition, has taken another ground to the
effect that she was, in no way, connected with the alleged
demand of dowry and jewels by first and second accused, as,
she, right from the date of her marriage or even from the
marriage of the de facto complainant with first accused was
living away from the family and that she never interfered
with the affairs of the de facto complainant and that she
was an utter stranger to the domestic affairs of first
accused and, hence, she had not played any role in the
matter, so as to attract the provisions of IPC and Dowry
Prohibition Act.
6. As far as the first point, namely, territorial
jurisdiction of first respondent is concerned, it was much
said that the averments in the complaint would clinchingly
show that in Chennai, no part of cause of action arose and
no police station or any Court in Chennai could exercise
jurisdiction over the matter.
7. In my view, the said contention is not tenable,
for the reason that a reading of the complaint, charge sheet
and the charges framed by the Court as well would vividly
indicate that major portions of cause of action for the
complaint have arisen in Chennai, which are being enumerated
as below:
(a) At the time of marriage, there was a demand
for Rs.6.00 lakhs in cash and 80 sovereigns of gold
jewellery, for which the parents of de facto complainant
offered 50 sovereigns of gold jewels and Rs.1.00 lakh in
cash.
(b) In the year 2001, while the de facto
complainant was at Singapore with first accused, second and
third accused contacted first accused from Chennai over
phone, pursuant to which, first accused demanded Rs.10.00
lakhs as dowry from the de facto complainant.
(c) After the de facto complainant was sent from
Singapore with second accused by first accused, while she
was at Chennai, second accused told the de facto complainant
in April,2002, that first accused was coming in that month
and only if she arranged Rs.10.00 lakhs, they would send her
to Singapore with first accused, otherwise they would
perform second marriage to first accused. Thereafter, the
de facto complainant went to the house of third accused at
Shenoynagar in Chennai and asked her to do favour to her,
for which third accused replied that they would not take any
steps, if Rs.10.00 lakhs was not paid.
(d) On 24.04.2005, second accused told the father
of the de facto complainant that on that day itself, first
accused came to India and only if the demanded dowry in
question was paid, his daughter would lead a happy married
life.
8. The above said allegations would clearly show
that sufficient portions of cause of action had taken place
at Chennai. Under the circumstances, the contention that no
cause of action has arisen at Chennai would not be
countenanced.
9. Learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side)
would draw attention of this Court to a decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt.of
Delhi) and another, 1999 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1503,
wherein it has been held that at the stage of investigation,
no question of interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would
arise, on the ground that the investigating officer has no
territorial jurisdiction and after investigation is over, if
the investigating officer arrives at a conclusion that cause
of action for lodging the F.I.R. has not arisen within his
territorial jurisdiction, then, he is required to submit a
report accordingly under Section 170 Cr.P.C. and to forward
the case to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the
offence.
10. In the said decision, the Supreme Court has
elaborately dealt with the statutory provisions on the
subject and laid down a law to be followed by the Courts of
the country. Further, after analysing the import of Sections
177 and 178 Cr.P.C., it is observed therein as under :
“A reading of Sections 177 and 178
Cr.P.C. would make it clear that
Section 177 provides for “ordinary”
place of enquiry or trial. Section
178, inter alia, provides for place of
enquiry or trial when it is uncertain
in which of several local areas an
offence was committed or where the
offence was committed partly in one
local area and partly in another and
where it consisted of several acts done
in different local areas, it could be
enquired into or tried by a court
having jurisdiction over any of such
local areas. Hence, at the stage of
investigation, it cannot be held that
the SHO does not have territorial
jurisdiction to investigate the crime.”
11. The Apex Court also dealt with the power
exercisable by High Court, conferred under Section 482
Cr.P.C. and rendered findings in the following terms :
“The legal position is well settled
that if an offence is disclosed the
court will not normally interfere with
an investigation into the case and will
permit investigation into the offence
alleged to be completed. If the FIR,
prima facie, discloses the commission of
an offence, the court does not normally
stop the investigation, for, to do so
would be to trench upon the lawful power
of the police to investigate into
cognizable offences. It is also settled
by a long course of decisions of the
Supreme Court that for the purpose of
exercising its power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR or a complaint,
the High Court would have to proceed
entirely on the basis of the allegations
made in the complaint or the documents
accompanying the same per se; it has to
no jurisdiction to examine the
correctness or otherwise of the
allegations.”
12. Following the dictum laid down by the Supreme
Court, in this case, it is to be held that the requests of
the petitioners are not at all supported by settled legal
positions. In the first place, ample averments with
reference to the jurisdiction point of view are available in
the complaint itself, on the basis of which charge sheet was
laid by the police and charges were framed by the Court. In
another angle, even if the allegations do not satisfy the
Court as to the point of territorial jurisdiction, the law
does not permit for quashing of the proceedings in toto,
but, provides for a direction to the investigating officer
to submit a report under Section 170 Cr.P.C. and to forward
the case to the Magistrate, who is empowered to take
cognizance of the offence.
13. In so far as the first contention with regard
to the territorial jurisdiction is concerned, the
petitioners have to be out of Court and, as regards the
charge under Section 494 IPC, it is the outcry of the first
petitioner that the police have no power to investigate, but
the law is otherwise.
14. It is true, as mentioned in Section 198 (c)
Cr.P.C., if the aggrieved person is the wife, her close
relative has to file a private complaint before the
jurisdictional Magistrate and, since it is a non-cognizable
offence, police are precluded from investigating the case.
But, Section 155 (4) Cr.P.C. contemplates that where a case
relates to two or more offences of which at least one is
cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable
offence, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-
cognizable.
15. While the intent of the said provision is
taken for consideration with respect to the request of the
petitioners, though the offence under Section 494 ICP is a
non-cognizable one, since the police have investigated the
same along with other cognizable offences viz., Sections
498A IPC and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, it is to be deemed
to be a cognizable offence and the hands of police are not
tied in this regard and the police can very well investigate
the offence under Section 494 IPC also, along with other
offences.
16. The contention of the petitioner Auxillia that
she was away from the family of first and second accused and
that she had no links with them as regards the demand of
dowry from the de facto complainant and, therefore, she
should be absolved from the liability, in my view, suffers
outright rejection. As already stated, the allegations in
the First Information Report go to the effect that third
accused, namely, petitioner Auxillia also played a
considerable role in the demand of dowry from the de fact
complainant and there is no circumstance to infer that she
was away from the family affairs of first and second
accused. She has got every opportunity to establish her
contention at the time of trial and quashment of the
proceedings against her cannot be thought of, at this stage.
17. For the foregoing reasons, the irresistible
conclusion, to be arrived at by this Court, is, rejection of
contentions of the petitioners and the complaint is
exhaustive in nature as to the point of territorial
jurisdiction and criminality of all the accused. As such,
these petitions are dismissed. Consequently, the connected
Criminal M.P.Nos.1 and 4 of of 2007 in both the petitions
are closed.
dixit
To
1. The Assistant Commissioner of Police,
W-19 All Women Police Station,
Adyar,
Chennai 600 020.
2. The Public Prosecutor,
High Court,
Madras.
