It is definitely in the fitness of things that while firmly sticking to the fundamental canon of natural justice and maxim ‘Audi alteram partem’ which means that “no one should be judged without a fair hearing” and in short “to listen to the other side”, the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Mujahat Ali Khan vs Lokpal of India Through Under Secretary in W.P.(C) 16035/2025 that was reserved on 4.11.2025 and then finally pronounced on 14.11.2025 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that the Lokpal must give an opportunity of hearing to public servants before ordering an investigation against them. We need to note that a Division Bench of Delhi High Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Hon’ble Mr Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar mandated that Section 20 of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act of 2013 leaves no room for doubt that the requirement of affording an opportunity of hearing at the pre-investigation stage as well as at the post-investigation stage is mandatory. We also need to take into account that the Division Bench of Delhi High Court held so in this leading case while setting aside two Lokpal of India orders that had triggered a corruption investigation against Railway officer Mujahat Ali Khan and other officials over alleged manipulation of OMR answer sheets in a 2023 departmental promotion examination. To put it differently, we thus see that the Division Bench held most explicitly that the Lokpal proceedings against Mujahat Ali Khan stood vitiated for non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar for a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Anil Kshetrapal and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present Writ Petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India (COI) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking quashing of the Orders dated 21.02.2025 and 23.09.2025 (Impugned Orders) passed by the Respondent- Lokpal of India (Lokpal), as well as all consequential and further proceedings arising out of Complaint No. 190/2024 initiated against the Petitioner.”
To put things in perspective, the Division Bench then envisages in para 2 stating that, “By the Impugned Order dated 21.02.2025, after considering the Preliminary Inquiry Report, the comments of the Competent Authority, the observations of the Investigating Officer, and the statements of the public servants, the learned Lokpal held that a prima facie case existed warranting a detailed investigation into the alleged manipulation of OMR sheets in favour of certain candidates in the Departmental Promotion Examination conducted by the West Central Railway. Accordingly, the Lokpal directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct a deeper probe under Section 20(3)(a) of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (Lokpal Act).”
As we see, the Division Bench then reveals in para 3 that, “Subsequently, upon receipt of the Investigation Report, by Order dated 23.09.2025, the Lokpal called upon the concerned public servants and the Competent Authority to furnish their comments in terms of Section 20(7) of the said Act.”
While elaborating briefly on facts of the case, the Division Bench lays bare in para 4 disclosing that, “The Division Railway Manager’s Office, Kota (West Central Railway), conducted a Departmental Promotion Examination for the post of Chief Loco Inspector on 13.05.2023 and 17.05.2023. A total of 96 candidates participated, and the final result was published on 15.09.2023, wherein the Petitioner was declared successful.”
As it turned out, the Division Bench enunciates in para 5 that, “On 06.09.2024, a complaint was lodged before the learned Lokpal alleging tampering of OMR sheets of the said departmental examination in exchange for Bribe. The complaint was registered as Complaint No. 190/2024.”
While elaborating further, the Division Bench reveals further in para 6 stating that, “On 20.09.2024, the Full Bench of the learned Lokpal, invoking powers under Section 20(1)(a) of the Lokpal Act, directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct a Preliminary Inquiry into the allegations. The Preliminary Inquiry Report was submitted on 09.12.2024.”
Furthermore, the Division Bench then specifies in para 7 mentioning clearly that, “Thereafter, the Competent Authority submitted its comments, and upon consideration of the Preliminary Inquiry Report, the learned Lokpal passed an Order dated 15.01.2025, observing that a detailed investigation by the Investigating Agency would be necessary to ascertain the role and responsibility of the officials involved. In terms of Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act, the learned Lokpal issued show cause notices to five officers of the West Central Railway, referred to as RPS-1 to RPS-5, to file written submissions and appear personally or through counsel on 12.02.2025.”
Do note, the Division Bench notes in para 8 that, “The RPS-1 to RPS-5 filed their respective written submissions and appeared before the learned Lokpal on 12.02.2025. After considering their oral and written submissions, along with the observations of the Inquiry Officer, the learned Lokpal passed the first Impugned Order dated 21.02.2025. The Petitioner, however, was neither called for participation nor heard by the learned Lokpal prior to the passing of the said Order.”
Do also note, the Division Bench then notes in para 34 that, “Upon a careful perusal of the record, we find that the controversy pivots around the compliance of the procedural safeguards envisaged under Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act. The chronology of events, as emerging from the record, is not in dispute. Pursuant to the complaint being registered as Complaint No. 190/2024, the learned Lokpal, by its Order dated 15.01.2025, directed the issuance of show cause notices to five identified Respondent Public Servants (RPS-1 to RPS-5) and afforded them an opportunity of hearing under Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act. Subsequently, upon consideration of the Preliminary Inquiry Report submitted by the CBI, along with the comments of the Competent Authority and submissions of Public Servants (RPS-1 to RPS-5), the learned Lokpal passed the Impugned Order dated 21.02.2025, directing a detailed investigation under Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act.”
It cannot be lost sight of that the Division Bench points out in para 35 that, “It is a matter of record that the Petitioner was named in the complaint dated 06.09.2024 filed before the learned Lokpal; however, no notice was issued to him prior to the passing of the Order dated 21.02.2025. It is further an admitted fact that, unlike the other RPSs, the Petitioner was not afforded any opportunity either to file a response or to be heard at the stage of consideration under Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act. The Petitioner was brought within the ambit of the proceedings only after the CBI registered the FIR pursuant to the said Order and arraigned him as RPS-6. Thereafter, vide notice dated 25.09.2025, the Petitioner was called upon to furnish his comments under Section 20(7) of the Lokpal Act in response to the Investigation Report dated 09.09.2025.”
Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 36 that, “It is, therefore, evident that the Petitioner was not a participant in the proceedings at the stage contemplated under Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act. The Petitioner has consistently asserted that the denial of an opportunity of hearing prior to the initiation of the investigation constitutes a fatal infirmity which vitiates the entire proceedings.”
It would be instructive to note that the Division Bench hastens to add in para 37 noting that, “The statutory framework of Section 20 leaves no room for doubt that the requirement of affording an opportunity of hearing at the pre-investigation stage as well as at the post-investigation stage is mandatory. Section 20(3) explicitly provides that the learned Lokpal “shall”, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the concerned public servant, decide whether a prima facie case exists and thereafter proceed to direct an investigation.”
Do further note, the Division Bench then also notes in para 38 that, “The legislative intent in this regard is further evident from the structure of Section 20 itself. Even at the stage of Section 20(1), where the Lokpal decides to direct an investigation, as distinguished from ordering a preliminary inquiry under Section 20(1)(a), the third proviso thereof mandates that before such investigation is ordered, the Lokpal “shall” call for the explanation of the public servant so as to determine whether a prima facie case for investigation exists.”
Briefly stated, the Division Bench then further notes in para 39 that, “A similar mandate is contained in Section 20(7), which operates at the post-investigation stage. Therefore, the legislative scheme under Section 20 makes it abundantly clear that compliance with the requirement of affording an opportunity to the public servant is not optional but mandatory at the pre-investigation stage as well as the post-investigation stage.”
Most significantly, the Division Bench encapsulates in para 42 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely and mandating that, “The language employed in Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act is peremptory and admits of no discretion. The legislative intent is that the prima facie satisfaction necessary for directing an investigation under the Act must be reached only after considering the explanation of the concerned public servant. Omission of this step, especially when it results in the registration of an FIR and the initiation of a criminal investigation, constitutes a violation of the statutory mandate and of the Principles of Natural Justice.”
It is worth noting that the Division Bench notes in para 43 that, “The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the Respondent that the Petitioner’s subsequent participation in the proceedings, by filing a written representation dated 07.10.2025 in response to the notice issued under Section 20(7) of the Lokpal Act, operates to cure the earlier procedural defect, is wholly untenable.”
Most rationally, the Division Bench propounds in para 44 holding that, “Once the statutory opportunity of hearing contemplated under Section 20(3) is denied, subsequent participation at the post-investigation stage under Section 20(7) cannot retrospectively validate an order passed without fulfilling the mandatory precondition of hearing. Where the statute expressly requires that before directing an investigation, the Lokpal must call for and consider the explanation of the public servant, any omission in that regard renders the entire subsequent process unsustainable in law.”
It would be worthwhile to also note that the Division Bench then notes in para 45 that, “Neither can it be said that the fulfilment of the requirement under Section 20(7) would also satisfy the requirement of Section 20(3) as these are independent and individual requirements mandated under the law. These operate at different stages of the entire process under Section 20 of the Lokpal Act and one cannot substitute the other.”
Most forthrightly, the Division Bench expounds in para 46 holding that, “ The Lokpal, being a quasi-judicial authority vested with powers that carry penal and stigmatic consequences, is duty-bound to act in strict conformity with the procedure prescribed by law. It must ensure that its process remains fair, transparent, and consistent with the principles of natural justice. Failure to adhere to these safeguards, particularly when the outcome entails serious civil and criminal consequences, strikes at the very root of administrative fairness and justice.”
It cannot be glossed over that the Division Bench points out in para 47 that, “We also take note of the various provisions of the Lokpal Act, particularly those pertaining to the liability of a public servant who is under investigation by the Lokpal. Under several provisions of the Act, for instance, Sections 29 and 32, a public servant may be transferred, suspended, or even subjected to attachment of assets. Having regard to these stringent and penal consequences that may ensue merely upon being named in a complaint, we are of the considered view that there exists an absolute and unqualified necessity for a strict adherence to the procedural and substantive safeguards prescribed under the Statute.”
As a corollary, the Division Bench then holds in para 48 that, “In view of the foregoing discussion and upon a careful examination of the material placed on record, we are of the considered opinion that the Impugned Orders dated 21.02.2025 and 23.09.2025, to the extent they pertain to the Petitioner, stand vitiated for non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act.”
Resultantly, the Division Bench directs and holds in para 49 that, “Accordingly, the present Writ Petition is allowed, and the Impugned Orders, insofar as they relate to the Petitioner, are quashed and set aside.”
For sake of clarity, the Division Bench clarifies in para 50 holding that, “It is, however, made clear that the learned Lokpal shall be at liberty, if it so chooses, to initiate proceedings afresh against the Petitioner in accordance with law, strictly adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section 20 of the Lokpal Act.”
What’s more, the Division Bench then directs and holds in para 51 that, “The present application, along with pending application(s), if any, is disposed of in the above terms.”
Finally, the Division Bench then concludes by holding in para 52 that, “No Order as to costs.”
In a nutshell, in this leading case, the Delhi High Court has made it indubitably clear that Lokpal cannot order probe against public servants without hearing them. It was also made clear that although the proceedings against the petitioner have been quashed as the Lokpal proceedings against him stood vitiated for non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act but the learned Lokpal shall be at liberty, if it so chooses, to initiate proceedings afresh against the Petitioner in accordance with law, strictly adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section 20 of the Lokpal Act. The petitioner thus got the relief that he was seeking most fervently from the Court for the reasons herein aforesaid! No denying it!
Sanjeev Sirohi