It is definitely a matter of absolute grave concern that none other than the Telangana High Court itself in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Syed Dastagir vs The State of Telangana in Criminal Revision Case No. 515 of 2025 that was pronounced finally just recently on August 5, 2025 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that judicial remand was being allowed in a mechanical manner despite being legally unsustainable and contrary to guidelines framed by the Supreme Court. We need to note that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice N Tukaramji who authored this notable judgment expressed its deepest concern over the non-application of mind by Magistrates while authorizing the remand of accused persons in a mechanical manner without assessing statutory prerequisites. The Bench also made it indubitably clear that the Magistrate must ascertain whether or not custodial detention was warranted and most important of all, must not authorise detention mechanically.
It was also made amply clear by the Bench that this determination required the Magistrate to peruse the case diary and remand report and to examine whether there was a justification for police remand, judicial remand or no remand at all. So also it was made absolutely crystal clear by the Bench that a Magistrate does not act in an executive capacity when ordering detention. To put it succinctly, the key concerns of the Bench as highlighted in this pragmatic judgment are as follows:-
1. They do not follow Supreme Court guidelines on sentencing.
2. They often act mechanically without assessing statutory prerequisites.
3. They are too lenient in granting bail.
4. They are too strict in detaining accused persons.
It must be also laid bare that the Bench was dealing with a petition that had been filed by Syed Dastagiri who was a student-cum-driver with an app-based bike service who was accused of cheating and impersonating a public servant. His remand was allowed by the Magistrate court despite there being no material ground to justify such remand. He was produced before the Magistrate beyond the mandatory period of 24 hours and no notices were served under Section 35(3) of BNSS calling upon the accused to appear before the investigating officer before arrest.
By all accounts, the Telangana High Court very rightly took on record that the petitioner was produced an hour and twenty minutes beyond the prescribed 24-hour period, hence rendering the remand illegal. The Bench also took into account the most irrefutable fact that no notice was served before arresting the petitioner and no prima facie material was placed before the Magistrate. So it was but quite ostensible that the Bench set aside his remand and so also ordered his release on submission of bonds and sureties. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “This Criminal Revision Petition is filed under Section 438 read with Section 442 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’), challenging the remand order dated 08.07.2025 passed by the learned VII Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hyderabad, in connection with First Information Report (FIR) No. 252 of 2025 registered at Malakpet Police Station, Hyderabad.”
Needless to say, the Bench states in para 2 that, “I have heard Mr.Mohd. Azhar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.Jithender Rao Veeramalla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, representing the respondent-State.”
As we see, the Bench then points out in para 3 that, “The petitioner is arrayed as an accused No.8 for the offences under Sections 318(4), 204 read with 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘the BNS, 2023’).”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 4 that, “Briefly stated, the relevant facts of the case are that the petitioner was arrested by the concerned police and produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate. Pursuant to such production, and by virtue of the impugned remand order, the petitioner was remanded to judicial custody.”
As it turned out, the Bench after mentioning that it has perused the materials on record as stated in para 7 then enunciates in para 8 mandating that, “A legally sustainable remand order must reflect the following:
(i) physical production of the accused (except in exceptional circumstances);
(ii) the Magistrate’s perusal of the case diary and remand application to assess the necessity of remand;
(iii) recording of specific reasons justifying the need for custody, whether police or judicial; and
(iv) ideally, the accused’s signature shall be taken on the remand order, evidencing production before the Court.
The order should unambiguously indicate that the Magistrate considered all relevant materials and applied judicial mind to the facts before authorizing detention.”
While citing relevant and remarkable Apex Court rulings, the Bench then observes in para 9 that, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manubhai Ratilal Patel Tr. Ushaben v. State of Gujarat & Others, AIR 2013 SC 313, has authoritatively held that the act of remanding an accused is a purely judicial function. A Magistrate does not act in an executive capacity when ordering detention. It is incumbent upon the Magistrate to be satisfied, based on materials placed before him, that there exist reasonable grounds to remand the accused to custody. The very purpose of remand under Section 167 CrPC is to enable the Magistrate to ascertain whether custodial detention is truly warranted. This determination necessarily requires the Magistrate to peruse the case diary and remand report and to discern whether there is justification for police remand, judicial remand, or no remand at all.”
Adding more to it, the Bench then further hastens to add in para 10 stating that, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court further emphasized that the Magistrate must not authorize remand mechanically. If police custody is granted, the Magistrate must record that such custody is necessary for the purpose of further investigation, recovery, or confrontation with co-accused. An order lacking in such specific details is liable to be characterized as non-speaking, mechanical, and illegal.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 11 that, “In the instant case, the remand case diary clearly states that the petitioner was apprehended at 10:15 P.M. on 07.07.2025, and the remand order refers to production before the Magistrate at 11:35 P.M. on 08.07.2025, a delay of more than 24 hours. A Division Bench of this Court, in T. Ramadevi v. State of Telangana & Others, W.P. No. 21912 of 2024, held that the period of apprehension must be considered in calculating the 24-hour timeline under Section 57 of CrPC, not merely the time recorded in the arrest memo and production beyond 24 hours from initial apprehension violated the statutory mandate and rendered the detention illegal. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor fairly admitted that the petitioner was produced beyond 24 hours from the time of apprehension, with a delay of one hour and twenty minutes.”
Do further note, the Bench then notes in para 12 that, “Additionally, the impugned remand order merely notes the fact of production, engagement of counsel, alleged physical abuse, medical assistance, and compliance with Sections 47, 48, 53 and 58 CrPC. It cursorily observes that a prima facie case exists against the petitioner, without addressing the legality of the arrest, the delay in production, or the statutory mandate under BNSS and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This omission indicates that the Magistrate failed to apply judicial mind to the essential requirements before authorizing judicial custody, thereby vitiating the remand order. Consequently, the continuation of custody and the judicial remand under the impugned order are vitiated for non-compliance with Section 57 and 167 CrPC.”
Furthermore, the Bench then points out in para 13 that, “That apart, Section 35 of the BNSS empowers a police officer to arrest a person without obtaining a warrant or prior sanction from a Magistrate if the person commits a cognizable offence in the officer’s presence, or if credible information or reasonable suspicion exists that the person has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. However, such arrest must be justified on specific grounds, such as the necessity to prevent further offences, to ensure proper investigation, to prevent tampering with evidence, or to avoid inducement, threats, or coercion of witnesses. Otherwise, the police are first required to serve a notice under Section 35 (3) of BNSS, calling upon the accused to appear before the investigating officer. Thereafter, arrest is permitted only if the person fails to comply with such notice without sufficient cause, and the officer must record reasons for the arrest in writing. Thus, while Section 35 permits warrantless arrests, however it incorporates significant procedural safeguards to protect individual liberty.”
While citing yet another relevant, renowned and remarkable case law, the Bench then propounds in para 14 mentioning that, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another, (2014) 8 SCC 273, has clearly laid down that in cases involving offences punishable with imprisonment less than seven years, arrest is not automatic and arrests for cognizable offences punishable up to seven years must be justified by written reasons such as prevention of further offences, ensuring presence during trial, or prevention of tampering with evidence. Therefore the investigating officer is obligated to issue a notice of appearance under Section 35(3) of BNSS unless exceptional circumstances exist. It has been expressly directed that Magistrates must not authorize detention mechanically but must record detailed and reasoned orders reflecting judicial satisfaction. Failure to comply with these directives renders the remand unlawful and invites judicial or departmental scrutiny. These safeguards are incorporated into the BNSS under Sections 35(3), 35(2) and 35(6).”
Most significantly and most forthrightly, the Bench encapsulates in para 15 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “In the present case, the grounds for arrest as cited include:
(a) the likelihood of the accused resuming illegal activities if released;
(b) apprehension that evidence may be tampered with;
(c) possibility of threats, inducements, or coercion of witnesses;
(d) ensuring the presence of the accused during trial; and
(e) the fact that Accused Nos. 1 to 5 are absconding.
While these grounds may provide a basis for arrest in theory, they must be assessed in light of the procedural safeguards mandated by law and judicial precedent. The record fails to show that the Magistrate made such an assessment.”
Equally significant and as a corollary, the Bench then rules in para 16 holding that, “For all the aforementioned reasons, it is evident that the investigating agency failed to adhere to the procedural safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar (supra) and the learned Magistrate authorized judicial remand without applying judicial mind to the delay in production or the statutory prerequisites.”
Resultantly, the Bench then directs in para 17 holding that, “In consequence, the impugned remand order dated 08.07.2025 passed by the learned VII Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hyderabad, in FIR No. 252 of 2025 registered at Malakpet Police Station, Hyderabad, is hereby set aside and quashed.”
Quite significantly, the Bench then further directs in para 18 mandating that, “In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case and considering the period the petitioner has remained in judicial custody, the VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, upon receipt of a copy of this order, shall take immediate and appropriate steps to secure the release of the petitioner, namely Accused No. 8, without any further delay. Within one week from the date of his release, the petitioner/Accused No. 8 shall execute a personal bond for Rs. 10,000/- and furnish two sureties, each for an equivalent amount, to the satisfaction of the VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The petitioner shall remain available and cooperate with the ongoing judicial proceedings. It is needless to say that any failure in compliance of the order would make the petitioner liable for action by the investigating agency and the Court, as per law.”
Finally, we see that the Bench then draws the curtains of this robust judgment and concludes very rightly by directing and holding aptly in para 19 that, “In the result, the criminal revision case is allowed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. Registry is directed to communicate this order to the Court concerned forthwith.”
Sanjeev Sirohi
