It is entirely in the fitness of things that while striking the right chord, the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Moin Akhtar Qureshi vs Central Bureau of Investigation in CRL.M.C. 2867/2021 & CRL.M.A. 18029/2021 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:11909 that was reserved on 03.11.2025 and then finally pronounced on 24.12.2025 has minced absolutely just no words whatsoever to hold in no uncertain terms that ordering a person to provide voice samples for comparison with intercepted phone calls does not violate their fundamental rights against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution. It must be mentioned that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Neena Bansal Krishna who authored this notable judgment also clarified that such an order does not violate a person’s right to privacy either. No denying it!
To put it simply, the Bench was most unequivocal in holding that, “The direction to provide a voice sample does not violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution as it does not constitute testimonial compulsion…While the Right to Privacy is a fundamental right, it is not absolute and must yield to legitimate State interests, such as the prevention and investigation of crime.” It merits mentioning that the Bench made the key observation while rejecting a plea that had been made by Kanpur businessman Moin Akhtar Qureshi who had challenged a Trial Court order that had directed him to provide his voice samples to the CBI for comparison with intercepted telephone conversations that had been recorded in 2013-14. What also needs to be noted is that the Delhi High Court while rejecting his contention also vacated the interim order of November 2021 in which the CBI was ordered to keep the report of the voice sample in a sealed cover and to not use the same against Qureshi.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Neena Bansal Krishna of Delhi High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present Petition has been preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C), for the quashing and setting aside of the Impugned Order dated 26.10.2021 passed by the Ld. Special Judge (PC Act) (CBI) in RC No. 224 2017 A0001/CBI/AC-VI/SIT, whereby the Petitioner is directed to provide his voice samples for verification and comparison with certain intercepted telephonic conversations.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 that, “Briefly stated, it is alleged that between the period of 25.10.2013 to 23.12.2013 and 06.01.2014 to 06.03.2014, the Income Tax Department intercepted telephonic conversations of Mobile Nos. 9810035614 and 9711305614, allegedly belonging to the Petitioner.”
As it turned out, the Division Bench enunciates in para 3 laying bare mentioning that, “On 15.02.2014, the Income Tax Department conducted searches at the premises of the Petitioner. Subsequently, the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) filed a Complaint with the CBI on 31.08.2016, requesting the registration of an FIR based on the said intercepted telephone recordings and Blackberry Messenger (BBM) messages, alleging that the Petitioner was acting as a middleman for certain public servants.”
As we see, the Bench then further discloses in para 4 observing that, “Consequently, the CBI registered the subject FIR No. 224/2017 A001 on 16.02.2017 under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 8, 9, and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.”
As things stands, the Bench points out in para 5 that, “The Petitioner joined the investigation and appeared before the CBI on multiple occasions in 2018. In March 2021, the CBI filed an Application before the Ld. Special Judge seeking directions for the Petitioner to give voice samples for comparison by the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) with the intercepted calls obtained from the Income Tax Department.”
Further, the Bench reveals in para 6 that, “The Ld. Special Judge, vide the Impugned Order dated 26.10.2021, allowed the Application relying primarily on the judgment of the Apex Court in Ritesh Sinha v. State of U.P., (2019) 8 SCC 1.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 15 that, “At the outset, it is pertinent to observe that the procedure is hand-made and not the mistress of justice and cannot be permitted to thwart the facts finding force in litigation, as was observed in the case of Vatal Nagaraj vs. R. Dayanand Sagar, AIR 1975 SC 349.”
While citing the relevant case law, the Bench points out in para 16 that, “Hon’ble Mr. Justice V. R. Krishna Ayer, in the case of Sushil Kumar Sen vs. State of Bihar, 1975 (1) SCC 774, succinctly noted that the morality of justice at the hand of law, troubles the Judge’s conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in Judges to act ex debito justiciae, where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. It was further observed as under:
“The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in Judges to act ex debito justiciae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. ….Parliament, I hope, will consider the wisdom of making the Judge the ultimate guardian of justice by a comprehensive, though guardedly worded, provision where the hindrance to rightful relief relates to infirmities, even serious, sounding in procedural law. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence-processual as much as substantive. ……I must sound a pessimistic note that it is too puritanical for a legal system to sacrifice the end product of equity and good conscience at the altar of processual punctiliousness and it is not too radical to avert a breakdown of obvious justice by bending sharply, if need be, the prescriptions of procedure. The wages of procedural sin should never be the death of rights.”
Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 17 that, “Therefore, it needs no reiteration that procedural laws cannot be over-emphasized to defeat the substantive justice, as they are only intended as a path to reach the justice and not the result itself.”
Quite significantly and as a corollary, the Bench then propounds in para 35 mandating that, “In view of the foregoing analysis and the binding law laid down by the Supreme Court in Rahul Agarwal v. The State of West Bengal & Anr. (2025), the Ld. Special Judge was fully empowered to pass the Impugned Order. The power to direct voice sampling exists with the investigating Agency under the Cr.P.C through judicial interpretations especially in Ritesh Sinha (supra) and is now explicitly codified in Section 349 of the BNSS.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 36 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “The direction to provide a voice sample does not violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution as it does not constitute testimonial compulsion. The only caution is to provide the safeguards, which have been ensured by the Ld. Special Judge.”
Equally significant is what is then expounded in para 37 holding clearly that, “Another contention raised by the Petitioner is the violation of privacy. While the Right to Privacy is a fundamental right, it is not absolute and must yield to legitimate State interests, such as the prevention and investigation of crime. The procedure adopted by the Ld. Special Judge in the Impugned Order, included these safeguards. The Court had directed that the text to be read by the Petitioner for the sample, shall not contain inculpatory sentences from the disputed conversation, but only words necessary for spectrographic comparison.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 38 that, “Thus, this plea of the Petitioner is untenable.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 41 that, “In the present case, the investigation is in progress to establish the identity of the speakers. Merely because the intercepts were made 7-8 years ago, does not inherently, invalidate them for the purpose of investigation.”
Do further note, the Bench notes in para 42 that, “The stage of investigation focuses on the collection of evidence. The admissibility, authenticity, and evidentiary value of the intercepts, are matters to be agitated and determined at the stage of trial. Pre-judging the validity of the source material to deny the collection of comparison samples, would amount to a mini-trial at the investigation stage, which is impermissible.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 43 noting that, “As held in Rahul Agarwal, (supra) the Magistrate’s power to order sampling is necessary for the purpose of investigation. The investigating agency has the prerogative to scientifically verify if the voice in the material available with them, matches with that of the Petitioner.”
Resultantly, the Bench then holds in para 44 that, “Accordingly, this Court finds no illegality, perversity, or abuse of process in the impugned Order dated 26.10.2021 of the Ld. Special Judge.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench then directs and holds in para 45 that, “The Petition is devoid of merit and is hereby, dismissed.”
Adding more to it, the Bench then directs and holds in para 46 that, “The interim order, if any, stands vacated. The Petitioner is directed to comply with the directions of the Ld. Special Judge and present himself for giving voice samples as per the schedule to be fixed by the Trial Court/Investigating Officer.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 47 that, “Pending Applications, if any, are also disposed of.”
Sanjeev Sirohi