It is entirely in order and so also absolutely in the fitness of things that the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Sukhjinder Singh @ Bittu vs State of Punjab in CRA-D-1103-2022 (O&M) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:PHHC:113259-DB that was reserved on August 21, 2025 and then finally pronounced on September 2, 2025 has granted bail to the accused who had to spend 5 years in jail due to his arrest under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) after noting that the State was unable to give an estimate of when the criminal trial against him was likely to conclude. It must be disclosed here that the accused had been booked under the UAPA following the alleged recovery of a pistol and drug money of Rs 50,000 from his possession. It must be noted that the Division Bench of Chandigarh High Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Deepak Sibal and Hon’ble Ms Justice Lapita Banerji pointed out that the accused, Sukhjinder Singh, has spent over 5 years and 2 months in jail and that all the 36 witnesses are yet to be examined during the trial despite the chargesheet having been filed in 2021.
It also is worth mentioning that while concluding that the end of the trial in the present case is not in sight, the Chandigarh High Court proceeded to grant bail to the accused on a bond of Rs 10 lakh with two sureties of Rs 10 lakh each. While granting bail, the Division Bench pointed out that, “Learned State counsel is also unable to give any reasonable estimate of the time that may be required for completion of the trial. Therefore, the Court is left with no other option but to release the appellant on bail.” Very rightly so! It must be borne in mind that the Court very rightly added that even if one assumes that all the co-accused were indulging in terrorist acts, some relevant material connecting the accused to such terrorist acts had to be brought on record to justify the rejection of his bail plea after a long period of incarceration. No denying it!
At the very outset, this compassionate, courageous, concise, cogent and composed judgment authored by Hon’ble Ms Justice Lapita Banerji for a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Deepak Sibal and herself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth precisely in para 1 that, “The appellant has challenged the order dated October 31, 2022 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kapurthala, exercising the power of Special Court, whereby his bail application in FIR No.140 of 07.05.2020 registered under Sections 384, 465, 467, 468, 471, 473, 489 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”), Sections 25,54,59 of the Arms Act, Sections 13/18/19 of The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the UAPA”), later on added Sultanpur Lodhi, District Kapurthala, has been dismissed.”
Needless to say, the Division Bench states in para 9 that, “This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.”
Do note, the Division Bench notes in para 10 that, “The allegation against the appellant is that he was present when the house of Lovepreet Singh @ Love was raided. As per the prosecution story, one .32 bore pistol with 07 rounds of .32 bore and 08 rounds of .30 bore along with drug money of Rs.50,000/- was recovered from the appellant.”
Do further note, the Division Bench then notes in para 11 that, “From the reply filed on behalf of the State, it transpires that during investigation, the prosecution recorded disclosure statement dated May 17, 2020, of the co-accused Baljinder Singh @ Billa, who purportedly stated that present appellant was involved in a car snatching incident along with him and also fired a bullet at the foot of the driver of Verna car. The said incident was repeated in the disclosure statement dated September 07, 2020 of Gurpreet Singh @ Gora, who also mentioned the present appellant’s name in the car snatching incident.”
Do also note, the Division Bench also notes in para 12 that, “It also appears from the reply that no specific role has been attributed to the appellant in the car snatching incident nor has any incriminating material been found against the appellant at this stage, evidencing towards his involvement with any offence under the UAPA. Except the above, the learned State counsel was unable to show any further evidence against the appellant connecting him to an offence committed under UAPA.”
Most significantly and tersely put, the Division Bench encapsulates in para 13 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Article 21 of the Constitution of India enshrines the fundamental right to protection of life and liberty which also includes the right to a speedy trial. It has been held by the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments that long custody by itself would entitle the accused under UAPA to the grant of bail by invoking Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The appellant has undergone an actual sentence of 05 years, 02 months and 30 days. The Constitutional Court would like to prevent a situation where the lengthy and arduous process of trial becomes the punishment in itself. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.A. Najeeb’s case (supra), wherein it has been held that long custody would be an essential factor while granting bail under UAPA. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides right to speedy trial and long period of incarceration would be a good ground to grant bail to an under-trial for an offence punishable under UAPA. It has also been held that the embargo under Section 43-D of UAPA would not negate the powers of the Court to give effect to Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”
To put it briefly, the Division Bench observes in para 15 that, “In the case of Shoma Kanti Sen (supra), the Supreme Court has held that generally pre-conviction detention at the investigation stage is necessary to maintain purity in the course of trial and also to prevent ac accused from being a fugitive from justice or to prevent further commission of an offence. Once it is apparent that a timely trial is not possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Court would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail as any form of deprival of liberty must be proportionate to the facts of the case and also follow a just and fair procedure. A balance must be made between the prosecution’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously, the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution.”
Succinctly put, the Division Bench states in para 17 that, “In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that criminals are not born but made out. Howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a right to a speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India. Moreover, the purpose of bail is only to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial and bail is not to be withheld as a form of punishment.”
Quite significantly, the Division Bench hastens to add in para 18 observing that, “In the case of Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari (supra), it has been held that right to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A Constitutional Court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law, of which liberty is an intrinsic part. Furthermore, it was held that the view taken in K.A. Najeeb’s case (supra) rendered by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court was binding on a Two Judge Bench like Gurwinder Singh’s case (supra) or the present case under discussion.”
Briefly stated, while citing a recent and relevant case law, the Division Bench points out in para 22 that, “In a recent case in Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322, by a judgment dated February 14, 2025, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court rejecting the bail of the appellant. As per the prosecution’s case, the appellant was travelling in a vehicle carrying articles which could be ordinarily related to Naxalite activities.”
Most rationally, the Division Bench propounds in para 24 holding that, “In the present case, even if one assumes that the co-accused were indulging in terrorists acts or were participating in acts preparatory to the commission of terrorist acts, relevant material at this stage connecting the accused to advocating, abetting, advising, inciting or conspiring to commit any terrorist act had to be brought on record to justify rejection of bail after a long period of incarceration.”
Most forthrightly, the Division Bench directs in para 25 holding that, “It is pertinent to note that in the present case all the 36 witnesses remain to be examined despite the charge-sheet being filed on 22.02.2021. Learned State counsel is also unable to give any reasonable estimate of the time that may be required for completion of the trial. Therefore, the Court is left with no other option but to release the appellant on bail.”
As a corollary, the Division Bench then holds in para 26 that, “In view of the aforesaid discussion, especially when the appellant is in custody for 05 years, 02 months and 30 days and the end of the trial is not in sight, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated October 31, 2022 is set aside. The appellant is ordered to be released on regular bail subject to following conditions besides furnishing of requisite bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court/Duty Magistrate concerned:-
(i) He shall furnish bond of Rs 10 lakh with two sureties of Rs 10 lakh each;
(ii) He shall surrender his passport in the Trial Court, if he is holding the same and is still with him;
(iii)He shall appear before the Trial Court on each and every date, unless exempted by the Court;
(iv) He shall appear before the Investigating Officer, as and when summoned;
(v) He shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case or who is cited as witness;
(vi) He shall not involve in any criminal activity and if during the pendency of trial, he is found involved in commission of any offence punishable under UAPA, the prosecuting agency would be free to approach this Court for recalling this order and cancellation of his bail;
(vii) He shall not sell, transfer or in any other manner create third party right over his immovable property;
(viii) He shall furnish an undertaking to the effect that in case of his absence, Trial Court may proceed with the trial and he shall not claim re-examination of any witness;
(ix) At the time of release of the appellant, the concerned SHO shall be informed. He shall appear before the SHO on every alternate Monday till the conclusion of the trial.”
Finally, the Division Bench then aptly concludes by directing and holding in para 27 that, “In the event there is a breach of any of the abovementioned conditions, or of the conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court independently, it would be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of the bail of the defaulting appellant without any further reference to this Court. Similarly, if the appellant seeks to threaten or otherwise influence any of the witnesses, whether directly or indirectly, then also the prosecution shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of bail of the concerned appellant by making appropriate application before the Trial Court.”
Sanjeev Sirohi