It is definitely absolutely in consonance with the all time-tested popular maxim titled “Justice delayed is justice denied” and entirely in order that one of the most prestigious High Court in India that is the Delhi High Court while reinforcing robustly the most fundamental principle of right to speedy trial in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Naresh Kumar @ Pahelwan vs State of NCT of Delhi in Bail Appln. 552/2025 and so also cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:5898 that was reserved on July 2, 2025 and then finally pronounced on July 22, 2025 has admitted on bail an accused under the most stringent Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act 1999 citing prolonged incarceration of over 8 years as primary reason for granting bail. It was also made crystal clear by the Delhi High Court that the right to speedy trial cannot be whittled down. Apart from this, it also needs to be borne in mind that it was also made abundantly clear by the Delhi High Court in this leading case that where there is a manifest and continuing violation of the right to a speedy trial, Constitutional Courts are not only empowered but duty-bound to intervene.
At tthe very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Sanjeev Narula of Delhi High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present bail application filed under Sections 483 read with 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS” seeks grant of regular bail in proceedings emanating from case FIR No. 55/2016 dated 19th April, 2016, registered at P.S. Crime Branch, under Sections 3/4 of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999. Subsequently, by a supplementary chargesheet dated 7th December, 2017, the Applicant has been implicated under Sections 3(1)/3(2)/3(3)/3(4)/3(5) of MCOCA (“MCOCA”).”
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Sanjeev Narula of Delhi High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present bail application filed under Sections 483 read with 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS” seeks grant of regular bail in proceedings emanating from case FIR No. 55/2016 dated 19th April, 2016, registered at P.S. Crime Branch, under Sections 3/4 of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999. Subsequently, by a supplementary chargesheet dated 7th December, 2017, the Applicant has been implicated under Sections 3(1)/3(2)/3(3)/3(4)/3(5) of MCOCA (MCOCA).”
To put things in perspective, the Bench while elaborating on the facts of the prosecution case envisages in para 2 that, “The factual background leading to the filing of the present application is summarised as follows:
2.1. The aforementioned case was registered against one Manoj @ Morkheri and his associates, part of a structured and well-organised criminal syndicate, operating primarily in Delhi NCR and adjoining states. The syndicate is stated to be involved in a series of grave offences, including murder, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, robbery, and attempt to murder, which are committed through acts of violence, intimidation, and other unlawful means. These offences were carried out with the objective of deriving pecuniary benefit and securing undue economic advantage. The gang’s sustained criminal activities have instilled fear in the region. The members of this syndicate, acting either individually or in concert, operate as part of, or on behalf of, an organised crime network.
2.2. The impugned FIR was registered following a proposal for approval to invoke the provisions of MCOCA under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act in light of the consistent and continuing criminal activities of the syndicate. Manoj Morkheri, acting in concert with his associates, is engaged in organised criminal activity within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) of MCOCA, primarily for pecuniary gain. They constitute an organised crime syndicate as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act. Their continued engagement in criminal conduct has resulted in accumulation of considerable illicit assets, both movable and immovable, which have been derived from the proceeds of crime. The network allegedly functions with a high degree of coordination and exerts influence through sustained patterns of criminal conduct.
2.3. The Applicant was absconding to evade arrest in the present case, leading to the issuance of Non-Bailable Warrants against him on 5th December, 2016. Meanwhile, he was apprehended in connection with FIR No. 28/2017, P.S. Barwala, Hissar, Haryana. Subsequently, he was arrested in the present case on 16th June, 2017, following which he was committed to trial before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Rohini Courts, where the matter is presently at the stage of prosecution evidence.
2.4. During investigation, the Applicant volunteered to make a confession and was accordingly produced before the competent authority. Pursuant thereto, his confessional statement under Section 18(1) of the MCOCA was recorded on 21st June, 2017, wherein he admitted to his involvement in the alleged syndicate. Similarly, other co-accused persons, whose confessions were also recorded, confirmed the Applicant’s involvement in the crime syndicate.
2.5. The Applicant is an active gang member of the crime syndicate. He is accused of playing a direct role in multiple offences, including those involving murder, kidnapping for ransom, robberies and extending threats, criminal intimidation, across different jurisdictions. For instance, he was implicated in FIR No. 415/2011, P.S. Narnaund, Hisar, under Sections 302/148/149 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act for allegedly murdering a rival using weapons supplied by Manoj Morkheri. Subsequently, the Applicant and co-accused are alleged to have kidnapped a student, Rishu Mittal, at gunpoint and demanded a ransom of INR 1 crore, resulting in the registration of FIR No. 497/2011, P.S. Prashant Vihar, under Sections 364A and 120B IPC. Further, under Manoj’s instructions, they allegedly committed a car robbery, pursuant to which FIR No. 914/2011, P.S. Civil Lines, Karnal came to be registered under Section 393 IPC and Section 25 Arms Act. Accordingly, based on the investigation conducted and the evidence collected, it is alleged that the Applicant is a habitual offender, involved in a number of serious crimes, and accordingly, should not be released on bail.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 5 that, “The Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced by the parties as well as perused the record. Section 21(4) of MCOCA imposes stringent conditions for granting bail, stipulating as follows:
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond, unless—
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application of such release; and
(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 7 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “The right to a speedy trial, now firmly entrenched in our constitutional jurisprudence under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is not an abstract or illusory safeguard. It is a vital facet of the right to personal liberty and cannot be whittled down merely because the case arises under a special statute such as MCOCA.”
Equally significant is what is then underscored so perfectly by the Bench while citing relevant and recent case laws of Apex Court propounding in para 8 that, “The Supreme Court has consistently held that where trials under special laws are unduly delayed, the rigour of stringent bail provisions must yield to the constitutional promise of liberty. The more rigorous the provisions of the legislation, the more expeditious the adjudication must be. [Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51]. In other words, where enactments stipulate strict conditions for granting bail, it is the unequivocal responsibility of the State to ensure that such trials are prioritized and concluded within a reasonable timeframe. Therefore, although Section 21(4) of MCOCA imposes stringent conditions for the grant of bail, these provisions must be balanced with the fundamental right to personal liberty of the accused, the presumption of innocence, and the societal interest in ensuring the right to a speedy trial. [Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC Online SC 929].”
Briefly stated, the Bench points out in para 9 that, “In this context the observations in the recent decision of Mohd. Muslim, are apposite, where the Supreme Court, while dealing with Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is pari materia to Section 21(4) of MCOCA, held that protracted incarceration as an undertrial, even in cases involving serious offences, must weigh heavily in favour of granting bail, particularly when such delay is not attributable to the accused.”
Tersely put, the Bench observes in para 10 that, “This view was reaffirmed in the case of Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, where the Supreme Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of earlier decisions dealing with prolonged incarceration and delay in trials. The Court clarified that the mandate under Section 436A of the CrPC, requiring release of an undertrial on bail if the trial is not concluded within a stipulated period, applies equally to prosecutions under special statutes, notwithstanding the rigours they impose.”
While continuing ahead in a similar vein, the Bench then points out in para 11 recalling rightly, robustly and rationally that, “A similar position was adopted in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 where while dealing with bail application under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Supreme Court underscored that the constitutionality of stringent bail conditions under special enactments, such as the NDPS Act or the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, must be primarily justified based on the requirement of speedy trials, ensuring that the fundamental rights of accused persons are safeguarded.”
It is also worth noting that the Bench then notes succinctly in para 23 that, “Although the State has drawn the attention of this Court to the Applicant’s status as a Proclaimed Offender and the fact that a substantial number of witnesses are yet to be examined, it is well settled that bail cannot be denied solely on apprehensions, particularly when the Applicant has already undergone significant detention and the trial is not likely to conclude in the near future. Moreover, any concerns the Prosecution may have regarding the Applicant fleeing from justice or tampering with evidence can be adequately addressed by imposing appropriate conditions at the time of granting bail.”
Most forthrightly and as a corollary, the Bench enunciates in para 24 directing and holding clearly that, “In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the Applicant has made out a case for grant of bail. Accordingly, it is directed that the Applicant shall be released on regular bail on furnishing a personal bond in the sum of INR 50,000/- along with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court/Metropolitan Magistrate, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The Applicant will not leave the country without prior permission of the Court.
(b) The Applicant shall provide permanent address to the Trial Court. The Applicant shall intimate the Court by way of an affidavit and to the IO regarding any change in his residential address.
(c) The Applicant shall appear before the Court as and when the matter is taken up for hearing.
(d) The Applicant shall provide all mobile numbers to the concerned IO, which shall be kept in working condition at all times.
(e) The Applicant shall not switch off his phone or change his mobile number without prior intimation to the concerned IO.
(f) The Applicant will report to the concerned IO on the second and fourth Friday of every month, at 4:00 PM, and will not be kept waiting for more than an hour.
(g) The Applicant shall not indulge in any criminal activity and shall not communicate with or come in contact with any of the prosecution witnesses, or tamper with the evidence of the case.
(h) It is clarified that the Applicant shall not be released on bail till the time he has secured bail in other cases, as required as per law.”
For clarity, the Bench clarifies in para 25 holding that, “It is explicitly clarified that, observations, if any, concerning the merits of the case are solely for the purpose of deciding the question of grant of bail and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.”
More to the point, the Bench then also clarifies further in para 26 observing briefly that, “In case the Applicant violates any of the afore-noted conditions or is found to be involved in any other or similar offence, the Prosecution shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of the bail granted to the Applicant, uninfluenced by this order.”
Further, the Bench then directs in para 27 holding that, “A copy of the order be sent to the Jail Superintendent for information and necessary compliance.”
Finally, the Bench then aptly concludes by directing and holding in para 28 that, “With the above directions, the present application is disposed of.”
Sanjeev Sirohi