It is most extremely significant to note that none other than the Supreme Court itself in a matter directly pertaining to the personal liberty of a person to address inordinate delays in the judicial system in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Anna Waman Bhalerao vs State of Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal No. 4004 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11128 of 2025) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 1114 that was pronounced as recently as on September 12, 2025 has directed explicitly High Courts and District Courts across the country to ensure that regular bail and anticipatory bail applications are expeditiously decided preferably within a period of two months from the date of filing underscoring that matters involving personal liberty cannot be left hanging indefinitely in the name of judicial workload. The Bench also underlined that while docket explosion remains a chronic challenge, cases involving personal liberty deserve precedence. We need to note that a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr Justice R Mahadevan made it indubitably clear that prolonged pendency of such cases not only undermines the object of the Code of Criminal Procedure but also violates the constitutional guarantee of equality and personal liberty under Articles 14 and 21. The top court also cited several recent judgments where it had warned against delays in bail matters like Rajesh Seth Vs State of Chhattisgarh (2022), Sanjay Vs State (NCT of Delhi) (2022), Rajanti Devi Vs Union of India (2023), Sumit Subhaschandra Gangwal Vs State of Maharashtra (2023), Ashok Balwant Patil v. Mohan Madhukar Patil & Ors Etc (2024).
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice R Mahadevan for a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that, “Both these criminal appeals arise from a common judgment dated 04.07.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Anticipatory Bail Application Nos.1790 of 2019 and 1844 of 2019, whereby the appellants’ applications seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with F.I.R. No. 30/2019, came to be dismissed.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 3 while elaborating on the facts of this leading case stating that, “Based on a complaint lodged by one Vikas Narsingh Vartak, FIR No. 30/2019 was registered on 26.01.2019 at Arnala Sagari Police Station, District Palghar, Maharashtra against Mahesh Yashwant Bhoir and others, for offences punishable under Sections 420, 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 474 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (For short, “IPC”).
3.1. In the complaint, it was alleged that the complainant’s father, Narsingh Govind Vartak died on 29.01.1978. Out of his five brothers, four had died, and one Harihar Govind Vartak was still alive. It was further alleged that the land bearing Survey No. 29, Hissa No. 1 (Old) and Survey No. 233, Hissa No.1(A) (New), admeasuring 1.46 hectares situated at Village Agashi, was jointly owned by Narsingh Govind Vartak, Hari Govind Vartak, Mahadev Govind Vartak, Parshuram Govind Vartak, Raghunandan Govind Vartak, Harihar Govind Vartak, along with Purushottam Manohardas Shah, Amrutlal Manohardas Shah, and Kantilal Manohardas Shah, and their names stood recorded in the revenue records.
3.2. On 13.05.1996, a Power of Attorney was purportedly executed in favour of Vijay Anant Patil (A2) by Narsingh Govind Vartak, and his brothers, and another Power of Attorney was executed in favour of Rajesh Kamat (A3) by the Shahs. On the strength of these Powers of Attorney, on 18.05.1996, a sale deed was executed by A2 and A3 in favour of Mahesh Yashwant Bhoir (A1) for a consideration of Rs.8 lakhs. Mutation Entry Nos. 15177 and 15180 were recorded in 1996 on the basis of this sale deed.
3.3. At the relevant point of time, the present appellants were serving as Circle Officer and Talathi respectively in the Revenue Department of the State of Maharashtra. Subsequently, a revision application was filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bhiwandi seeking cancellation of the said mutation entries, and by order dated 30.09.1998, Mutation Entry Nos. 15177 and 15180 were accordingly cancelled.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 4 revealing that, “The appellants were not initially named in the FIR. They were later arraigned as Accused Nos. 5 and 6 on allegations that, in their official capacity, they had certified the said mutation entries on the basis of forged documents, thereby facilitating the illegal transfer of ownership of the immovable property. Apprehending arrest, they preferred Anticipatory Bail Application Nos.561 and 562 of 2019 before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Vasai (For short, “the Sessions Court”). By order dated 06.06.2019, the Sessions Court granted interim protection to them. However, upon hearing both sides, the Sessions Court, by order dated 21.06.2019, rejected their applications. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the High Court by filing Anticipatory Bail Application Nos. 1790 and 1844 of 2019, in which, interim protection was granted from time to time. Finally, by the impugned judgment dated 04.07.2025, the High Court rejected the anticipatory bail applications, but granted interim protection for a period of four week, which expired on 01.08.2025. Thereafter, the appellants have preferred the present appeals before this Court.”
Most remarkably, the Bench then expounds in para 15 holding succinctly that, “Apart from the relief of anticipatory bail, a significant issue that arises for consideration herein is the inordinate delay in the disposal of the appellants’ applications for anticipatory bail by the High Court. The record discloses that the applications remained pending for several years without any final adjudication, although interim protection was extended to the appellants from time to time, including even after the dismissal of the applications, until 01.08.2025. It is true that the appellants themselves did not suffer prejudice, having continued to enjoy interim protection. Nevertheless, this Court has consistently underscored, in a long line of decisions, that applications affecting personal liberty – particularly bail and anticipatory bail – ought not to be kept pending indefinitely. The grant or refusal of bail, anticipatory or otherwise, is ordinarily a straightforward exercise, turning on the facts of each case. There is, therefore, no justification for deferring decision-making and allowing a sword of Damocles to hang over the applicant’s head. In matters concerning liberty, bail courts must be sensitive and ensure that constitutional ethos is upheld. While docket explosion remains a chronic challenge, cases involving personal liberty deserve precedence.” Quite significantly and as a corollary, the Bench propounds in para 17 holding that, “In light of the foregoing discussion and the precedents cited, certain clear principles emerge. Applications concerning personal liberty cannot be kept pending for years while the applicants remain under a cloud of uncertainty. The consistent line of authority of this Court makes it abundantly clear that bail and anticipatory applications must be decided expeditiously on their own merits, without relegating the parties to a state of indefinite pendency. Prolonged delay in disposal not only frustrates the object of Code of Criminal Procedure, but also amounts to a denial of justice, contrary to the constitutional ethos reflected in Articles 14 and 21.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 18 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely about directions issued stating explicitly that, “We accordingly issue the following directions:
a) High Courts shall ensure that applications for bail and anticipatory bail pending before them or before the subordinate courts under their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within a period of two months from the date of filing, except in cases where delay is attributable to the parties themselves.
b) High Courts shall issue necessary administrative directions to subordinate courts to prioritise matters involving personal liberty and to avoid indefinite adjournments.
c) Investigating agencies are expected to conclude investigations in long pending cases with promptitude so that neither the complainant nor the accused suffers prejudice on account of undue delay.
d) Being the highest constitutional fora in the States, High Courts must devise suitable mechanisms and procedures to avoid accumulation of pending bail/anticipatory bail applications and ensure that the liberty of citizens is not left in abeyance. In particular, bail and anticipatory bail applications shall not be kept pending for long durations without passing orders either way, as such pendency directly impinges upon the fundamental right to liberty.
18.1. The Registrar (Judicial) of this Court shall circulate a copy of this judgment to all High Courts for immediate compliance and prompt administrative action.”
For clarity, the Bench clarifies in para 19 holding clearly that, “In fine, both appeals fail, and the impugned judgment of the High Court rejecting the anticipatory bail applications is affirmed. However, we clarify that the appellants shall be at liberty to apply for regular bail before the competent court, and if such an application is made, it shall be considered on its own merits, uninfluenced by any observations made by the High Court or by this Court in these appeals.”
Further, the Bench directs and holds in para 20 that, “With the aforesaid directions and observations, the Criminal Appeals are dismissed.”
Finally, the Bench then directs and concludes in para 21 holding aptly that, “Connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, stand disposed of.”
Sanjeev Sirohi