It is absolutely in the fitness of things that while striking the right chord in consonance with the most fundamental canons of justice that even the basic legal rights of prisoners in custody have to be taken fully care of, the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Shakila vs State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors in W.P.(C) 3476/2013 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:4972 that was reserved on 15.04.2025 and then finally pronounced on 12.06.2025 while granting compensation to the kin of a man who died in judicial custody following a gang related assault inside Tihar jail has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that it is the bounden duty of the State to ensure the safety of persons in its custody. It must be mentioned here that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar who authored this most sagacious judgment was hearing a writ petition that had been filed by Shakila who was the mother of the deceased Javed @ Bhura seeking a judicial inquiry into the custodial death of her son and compensation asserting that she was dependent on him which definitely makes her case more compelling. We thus see that the Delhi High Court in this leading case ordered the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DSLSA) to release Rs 2 lakh to the legal heirs (siblings & grandchildren). It also very rightly asked DSLSA to conduct a fact-finding investigation to probe into the extent of physical or monetary dependence on Javed.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar of Delhi High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present petition has been preferred by Ms. Shakila [Mother] (since deceased), seeking, inter alia, a judicial inquiry into the death of her deceased son, Javed @Bhura (Deceased) , who was in judicial custody at that time, and for appropriate compensation. The prayers, as sought in the writ petition, are extracted herein below for the sake of convenience: –
“i. Pass a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus of other appropriate order directing a judicial inquiry into the death of the Petitioner’s son, and grant her appropriate compensation.
ii. awarding the costs of this litigation to the Petitioner.
iii. Any other order this Court deem just and proper”.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while elaborating on facts of the case stating that, “The facts germane, leading to the institution of the present petition, are as follows:
(i) The Petitioner’s son, Javed @ Bhura, was convicted in the case arising out of FIR No. 12/2007 registered at P.S. New Usmanpur, Delhi, under Sections 394, 397 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 18603 and was serving a 7-year term of imprisonment at the Tihar Jail. The Deceased was due to be released on 05.05.2013. However, on 03.05.2013, the Mother was informed of the unfortunate demise of her son. The cause of death was apparently a fight between two groups of inmates in the jail.
(ii) On the same day, i.e. 03.05.2013, FIRs bearing No. 194/2013 under Sections 147, 149, 323, 324 and 34 of the IPC and No. 195/2013 under Sections 324, 323, 307, 147, 148, 149 and 34 of the IPC were registered at PS Hari Nagar, Delhi, in respect of the fight that broke out in Tihar Jail.
(iii) The Mother preferred the present Petition seeking a judicial inquiry into the death of the Deceased and grant of appropriate compensation on the ground that the Deceased was the sole bread earner and she was a dependant of the Deceased.
(iv) Admittedly, during the pendency of the present Petition, the Mother was compensated on 29.12.2014 with an amount of Rs.1,00,000/-.
(v) During the pendency of the Petition, the Mother, who apparently suffered from various ailments, passed away on 17.03.2016.
(vi) In light of this fact, this Court, on 22.08.2017, disposed of the present Petition as having abated on her demise.
(vii) The counsel for the Mother preferred applications being CM NO. 36673 of 2018 and CM NO. 36674 of 2018, seeking setting aside of the order dated 22.08.2017 and for substitution of legal representatives of the Mother respectively. This Court, vide order dated 27.08.2019, allowed the afore-noted applications and substituted the following persons as legal heirs of the Mother (substituted Petitioners) in the present petition:
(1) Ms. Amir Jahan, (2) Ms. Qamar Jahan, (3) Ms. Shahajawan, (4) Mr. Islamuddin, (5) Ms. Nasreen, (6) Ms. Roobi, (7) Ms. Yasmeen, (8) Ms. Israt, (9) Ms. Nargis, and (10) Master Shejan.
(viii)The substituted Petitioner Nos. 1-4 are the siblings of the deceased – Javed @Bhura, the first three being the sisters and the fourth being the brother. Petitioners 5-10 are the grandchildren of the Mother. At the time of filing the amended memo of parties, the substituted Petitioner Nos. 8-10 were minors. By the passage of time, it would appear that all have now become major.”
Briefly stated, the Bench points out in para 55 that, “The Jail manual and Rules provide for the safety and security of prisoners. In fact, various High Courts and the Apex Court have time and again deliberated and reiterated that prisoners being entrusted to the care of the prison officials, have a right to protection, and it becomes the duty of those authorities to safeguard the life and wellbeing of every inmate, including those who have been convicted and are serving their sentence. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Suramalla Ramulu and Ors 1996 SCC OnLine AP 185 has observed that the mere fact that prisoners have been convicted by a court of law and are serving their sentence does not absolve the authorities of their responsibility. A prisoner does not forfeit his fundamental rights and cannot be deprived of the protections guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, except insofar as such deprivation is permitted by law.” Relevant extract of the Suramalla Ramulu (supra) judgement is reproduced herein below:
12. Once it is held, as in the instant case, that the death of Shankar occured on account of the negligence of the prison officials, negligence in discharge of their duties, the State has to be held vicariously liable for the loss resulting from such negligence. We are fortified in this view by a direct decision of a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Challa Ramkonda Reddy v. State of A.P. by District Collector, Kurnool (6) AIR 1989 AP 235 and the more recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Kewal Pati (Smt.) v. State of U.P. (7) (1995) 3 SCC 600.”
Most significantly, most fundamentally, most remarkably and so also most forthrightly, the Bench encapsulates in para 56 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “This Court is of the firm opinion that it is the bounden duty of the State to ensure the safety of persons who are in its custody. While the deceased Victim may have been a person with criminal antecedents, the State is not absolved of its duty to ensure the safety and well-being of the prisoners in its custody. This Court believes that it is the duty of the State to ensure that every person who is in custody is kept safe and secure from themselves as well as other such inmates who are present therein. The fact that two “rival gangs”, as per the contention of the Respondents, chose to have an altercation and that the victim participated in the same, would not absolve the authorities of their bounden responsibility to carry out their duty of ensuring the safety and security of prisoners. This Court is of the view that part of the duties of the State is to ensure that such “gangs” are not permitted to proliferate in jails and certainly to ensure that such gang rivalries are not permitted to come to the fore. The fact that, in the present case, such an altercation has transpired and that the two “rival gangs” have had access to weapons or tools by which they have been able to cause injuries to each other, leading to the death of the deceased, does not speak highly of the manner in which the jail authorities have dispensed their duties.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 57 that, “This Court also takes note of the fact that the Delhi Government had, sometime in late 2024, proposed an amendment to the Delhi Prison Rules, which had provided a compensation of Rs. 7.5 Lakhs to the next of kin or legal heirs of the Prisoners who suffered an unnatural death. The said scheme set out a “no fault liability” compensation scheme for persons who suffered unnatural deaths in custody, including for those who died as a result of a quarrel among prisoners.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 58 that, “Though the said scheme is not notified, it is apparent that the said scheme, following the theme of victimology recognised the State’s responsibility for the provision of compensation to persons affected by the unnatural death of those in custody.”
Be it noted, the Bench further notes in para 59 that, “These aspects, coupled with the NHRC record, which seems to suggest that there was some delinquency on the part of the Jail personnel in the demise of the Petitioner’s son, would also lead this Court to conclude that the State is vicariously responsible for the unfortunate death of the deceased and thereby too, liable to pay compensation.”
Succinctly stated, the Bench most rationally in its conclusion holds in para 60 that, “Apropos the discussion and analysis hereinbefore, this Court concludes as follows:
A. The Petitioners, by virtue of their being the siblings, married or unmarried or the children of the siblings, are not, ipso facto, disentitled from the benefits of the DVCS Scheme.
B. The receipt of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the Mother, prior to her demise, would not preclude the substituted Petitioners from being entitled to the benefit of the scheme since;
i. The same was in the nature of an interim payment, and
ii. The same was not in terms of a Scheme of the Central Govt. or of the GNCTD.
G. The Mother, during her lifetime, should have been paid, at the very least, the minimum amount of compensation. She was forced to come to this Court for “appropriate compensation”, but before the determination of the petition, unfortunately, passed away. The Petitioners, at the very least, would be entitled to the prescribed minimum under the scheme.
H. This Court directs that a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- be paid immediately to the Petitioners, being the difference between the sum of the prescribed minimum of Rs.3,00,000/- Lakhs and the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- received by way of interim compensation.
I. The Court directs the DSLSA to conduct a fact-finding exercise to evaluate the actual physical or monetary dependence that the substituted Petitioners may have had on the Victim, to determine the loss or injury that they may have suffered.
K. Based on the said determination, the DSLSA may take an appropriate decision for the grant of compensation of such further amount as is permissible under the scheme. This exercise may be carried out by the concerned Respondent authorities within the period as prescribed in the Scheme.”
For sake of clarity, the Bench clarifies in para 61 stating that, “It is made clear that the DSLSA will undertake the exercise only for the purpose of determining further compensation, i.e. in addition to the Two Lakhs already directed to be paid to the Petitioners.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding and directing in para 62 that, “With the aforesaid directions, while the present petition, along with pending application(s), if any, is disposed of, this Court directs that the matter be listed after twelve weeks to inform the Court of the progress in respect of the directions given hereinabove.”
In conclusion, we thus see that Delhi High Court has most commendably stood up for the legal and basic rights of the prisoners in custody and has made it indubitably clear that State cannot shirk from its duty to protect prisoners in custody. It is undoubtedly the bounden duty of the State to abide both in letter and spirit to what the Delhi High Court has held and directed so very commendably, courageously and convincingly in this leading case at the earliest! There can be just no denying or disputing it!
Sanjeev Sirohi