While making a very serious observation, it would be quite significant to note that in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled State vs Yogesh @ Golu & Anr in Crl.Rev.P. 456/2024 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:5252 that was pronounced as recently as on 04.07.2025 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that the State’s delay in filing appeals in cases involving serious offences can cause a setback to the victim’s pursuit of justice. We need to note that the State had moved Delhi High Court by which it sought a condonation of a 325-day delay in filing a revision petition. What also merits noting is that Hon’ble Ms Justice Dr Swarana Kanta Sharma was most emphatic in observing precisely that, “When the State delays in challenging orders which may adversely affect the victim s case, such as an order of discharge, it is not merely a procedural lapse but a setback to the victim’s pursuit of justice. Such delay may, in effect, prejudice the victim’s right to a fair and complete adjudication of the allegations, eroding their faith in the system meant to protect them.” Absolutely right! So it thus certainly merits just no reiteration that all necessary steps must be taken to ensure that such delay does not happen!
CRL.M.A. 10595/2024 (delay of 325 days)
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Dr Swarana Kanta Sharma of Delhi High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The State has, by way of the above-captioned revision petition, assailed the order dated 30.01.2023, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-02, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi [hereafter ‘Sessions Court’], in case arising out of FIR No. 102/2022, registered on 21.02.2022 at Police Station Roop Nagar, Delhi, for offence punishable under Sections 308/341/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereafter ‘IPC’] and Sections 3(1)(r)/3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 [hereafter ‘SC&ST Act’]. By way of the impugned order, the learned Sessions Court discharged the respondents for offence under Section 308 of IPC and framed charges for offence under Section 323/341/506/34 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r)/3(1)(s)/3(2)(va) of SC&ST Act.”
As we see, the Bench then mentions in para 2 that, “However, the present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereafter ‘Cr.P.C.’] has been filed, seeking condonation of delay of 325 days in filing the present revision petition.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 while elaborating on condonation of delay disclosing that, “On the issue of condonation of delay, the learned APP for the State submitted that the present petition could not be filed within the stipulated period as the certified copy of the impugned judgment was obtained on 15.02.2023, and thereafter, the file was sent to the concerned department for its opinion on filing a revision on 27.02.2023. It was submitted that on 21.04.2023, the competent authority took the decision to file the revision petition based on the merits of the case. Subsequently, the file was marked to the present Additional Public Prosecutor for the State on 26.04.2023. However, since certain documents from the trial court record were missing from the file, the original paper-book was requisitioned from the concerned Investigating Officer through the pairvi officer on 04.05.2023, and the same was received on 19.09.2023. Thereafter, some time was taken to get the annexures translated, and the affidavits along with the draft petition were sent to the concerned DCP for signature in October–November 2023, which were eventually received on 02.04.2024.”
Further, the Bench specifies in para 4 stating that, “The learned APP for the State argued that due to the above-mentioned circumstances, administrative formalities, and the movement of the file from one table to another, the prescribed limitation period expired, resulting in a delay in filing the present petition. It was contended that the delay was neither deliberate nor intentional, and thus, deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice. In support of this argument, reliance was placed on the following decisions: (i) Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India: (2023) 10 SCC 531; and (ii) State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao: (2005) 3 SCC 752.”
On the contrary, the Bench points out in para 5 that, “On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents/accused opposed the prayer made in the present application. He argued that there was no plausible or sufficient reason shown by the State for such inordinate delay in preferring the present petition. It is also submitted that the contents of the present application itself reveal the inactiveness on the part of officials concerned, and thus, the delay ought not to be condoned.”
Needless to say, the Bench states in para 6 that, “This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of both the parties, and has perused the material placed on record.”
Simply put, the Bench points out in para 7 mentioning that, “Upon considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and after examining the material on record, this Court finds it necessary to reiterate that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as well as this Court, has consistently held that mere fact of the petitioner being a State is not, by itself, a ground to condone delay. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right, and a day-to-day explanation must be provided where the delay is considerable. Guided by this settled legal position, the delay of 325 days in filing the present petition is sought to be explained by the State on the basis of the following sequence of events:
1. 15.02.2023 – Certified copy of the impugned judgment was obtained.
2. 27.02.2023 – The file was forwarded to the concerned department to seek opinion on filing a revision petition.
3. 21.04.2023 – Decision was taken by the competent authority to file the revision based on the merits of the case.
4. 26.04.2023 – The file was marked to the present Additional Public Prosecutor for necessary drafting.
5. 04.05.2023 – Due to missing documents in the trial court record, the original paper-book was called for from the Investigating Officer through the pairvi officer.
6. 19.09.2023 – The original paper-book was received.
7. October–November 2023 – Time was consumed in translating annexures and completing requisite formalities.
8. 02.04.2024 – The affidavits and petition draft were received back from the concerned DCP with signatures, completing the documentation for filing.”
As things stands, the Bench specifies in para 8 stating that, “The State has therefore attributed the delay primarily to administrative formalities, movement of the file between departments, and time taken for obtaining and compiling relevant documents.”
Do note, the Bench then notes in para 10 that, “While adjudicating this application, this Court also remains cognizant of the fact that the present revision petition assails the order on charge, vide which the respondents herein have been discharged for commission of offence under Section 308 of IPC, and the primary allegations against them were that the respondents herein had physically assaulted the victim with bricks, and had hit the brick on his head and face with the intention of killing him.”
Most significantly, most remarkably and so also most forthrightly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 11 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “In this background, this Court is also conscious of the fact that in cases involving serious offences, the rights of the victim and their family are equally significant and cannot be overlooked. Victims, particularly those belonging to marginalized or economically weaker sections of society, often lack the means or resources to pursue independent legal remedies and instead rely on the State machinery to seek justice on their behalf. When the State delays in challenging orders which may adversely affect the victim’s case, such as an order of discharge, it is not merely a procedural lapse but a setback to the victim’s pursuit of justice. Such delay may, in effect, prejudice the victim’s right to a fair and complete adjudication of the allegations, eroding their faith in the system meant to protect them. Therefore, the Courts must remain sensitive to this dimension while adjudicating applications for condonation of delay in criminal cases involving serious offences.”
Most rationally and as a corollary, the Bench then deems it fit to hold in para 12 that, “In view of the foregoing discussion, and while ensuring a fair balance between the rights of the accused to defend the impugned order and the right of the State to seek judicial scrutiny of a discharge order passed in a case involving the grave offence of murder, this Court deems it appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of the State. The accused shall, at the appropriate stage, have ample opportunity to contest the revision petition on merits. However, considering the explanation offered for the delay of 325 days, the nature of the offence involved, and the larger interest of justice and society in ensuring that allegations of heinous crimes are subjected to proper adjudication, this Court finds sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the present revision petition.”
Resultantly, the Bench directs in para 13 holding aptly that, “In view thereof, the delay of 325 days in filing the present revision petition stands condoned. Accordingly, the present application stands disposed of.”
For sake of clarity, the Bench clarifies in para 14 stating that, “It is however clarified that the observations made in this order shall not be construed as this Court’s opinion on the merits of the case.”
Most concerningly, the Bench then observes in para 15 holding succinctly that, “Before parting, this Court finds it necessary to observe, and caution, that repeated instances of inordinate delays on the part of the State in filing appeals or revision petitions have become a matter of serious concern. While courts may, in appropriate cases, adopt a liberal approach while condoning such delays, this cannot become a shield for systemic apathy or bureaucratic inefficiency. The administration of criminal justice cannot afford to be prejudiced by avoidable procedural lapses or lack of diligence on the part of those entrusted with ensuring timely legal action. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Director of Prosecution, GNCTD, who is directed to examine the circumstances leading to delays in filing of appeals/petitions and take appropriate steps to prevent recurrence of the same in future. The State must ensure that institutional mechanisms are strengthened to track, monitor, and file appeals, revisions, etc. within the prescribed limitation period, and every stakeholder – from the Investigating Officer to the Prosecutor to the administrative departments – discharges their role with a sense of responsibility and within a clearly defined time frame. Only then can the larger objective of ensuring timely justice and maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system be fulfilled.”
Furthermore, the Bench then directs in para 16 holding that, “A copy of this order be forwarded to the Secretary (Law), Department of Law, Justice and Legislative Affairs, GNCTD, by the Registry within two working days.”
What’s more, the Bench then also holds in para 17 directing that, “The State shall form an appropriate policy in this regard, and the same shall be placed before this Court within a period of one month from date of the receipt of this order.”
CRL.REV.P. 456/2024
Still more, the Bench then directs in para 19 holding that, “Let reply be filed by the respondents within four weeks, with advance copy to the other side.”
In addition, the Bench then also holds in para 20 directing that, “List on 28.10.2025 for final disposal.”
Not stopping here, the Bench then further directs in para 21 holding that, “In the meantime, let the Trial Court Record in digitized form be called for, at least two days prior to the next date of hearing.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes aptly by directing in para 22 holding that, “The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.”
Sanjeev Sirohi
