Offence Under SC/ST Act Is Made Out When Offence Is Perpetrated In Public: Allahabad HC

        In a significant development, the Allahabad High Court just recently on February 18, 2020 has pronounced explicitly in a noteworthy judgment titled “K.P.Thakur And Another Vs. State of U.P. And Another” in Application U/S 482 No. – 40418 of 2012 that for constituting an offence under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the alleged offence should have been committed in “public view”. The single-Judge Bench of Allahabad High Court comprising of Justice Ram Krishna Gautam has clarified in no uncertain terms that where a person is allegedly insulted for being a member of the SC/ST community behind closed doors, the SC/ST Act cannot be applied. It is an important observation and a ruling which has to be abided and adhered to unless it is overruled by a larger Bench of the Allahabad High Court or by the Supreme Court!

To start with, the ball is set rolling in para 1 of this notable judgment wherein it is observed that, “The applicants, by means of this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court with prayer to quash the entire proceeding of Complaint Case No. 1577 of 2012, under Sections 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Duddhi, Sonebhadra.”

To put things in perspective, after hearing the learned counsel for the applicants, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2, learned A.G.A. for the State and perusing the record as pointed out in para 2, it is then pointed out in para 3 that, “Learned counsel for applicants argued that a departmental inquiry was pending against Vinod Kumar Tanay, wherein applicant no. 1 K.P. Thakur was Enquiry Officer and applicant no. 2 Binod Kumar was Presenting Officer. This enquiry was being hindered by Vinod Kumar Tanay by any means. He was summoned for recording of evidence in above inquiry, where he came with M.P. Tiwari, another co-worker. It was objected with a direction to M.P. Tiwari not to intervene in the proceeding of enquiry and he was asked to remain outside of the chamber of applicant no. 1, wherein enquiry was being conducted. He made obstruction. The complainant Vinod Kumar Tanay was of habit of creating hindrance in the smooth functioning by making false accusation at different stages because of being member of Scheduled Caste community. In that enquiry too he tried so, for which instant complaint was lodged by applicants to Department’s superiors as well as local authorities. This complaint, with false accusation, was got lodged before court of Judicial Magistrate, Duddhi, Sonebhadra, wherein allegation was levelled with a view to make hindrance in above departmental enquiry, wherein he was examined under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and his two witnesses (co-workers), were examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C., and on the basis of same, learned Magistrate passed impugned summoning order for offences punishable under Sections 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. read with Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act, whereas no assault or abuse in a public view was said to be made by applicants nor it was ever made. The statements, recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. as of complainant was with no mention that this occurrence of alleged assault and abuse was made with intention to abuse or insult on the basis of complainant being member of Scheduled Caste community by present applicants, who were not member of Scheduled Caste community. The place of occurrence has been said to be chamber of applicant no. 1 that too after bolting it from inside i.e. it was not an abuse in the public view. The essential ingredients of offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. In Gorige Pentaiah Versus State of Andhra Pradesh & Others; (2008) 12 Supreme Court Cases 531, Apex Court has propounded at para 6 that a public view is the view, which is of public access. Once it is inside any house, it will not be a public view and in the case of lack of above basic ingredient, the offences of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act is not completed. The same has been propounded by Apex Court while interpreting public view in same case at para 28. In present case, the place of occurrence has been said to be chamber of applicant no. 1 which was said to be bolted from inside. Meaning thereby, that was not a public view at all. The enquiry concluded with dismissal of complainant as well as his witnesses. Applicants being officers of Northern Coalfields Limited being Controller and Head of Department of Mining, where complainant was an employee and they are to take work from him with administrative control and if such type of practice is being permitted then it will be highly impossible for administrative superiors in getting work from administrative inferiors in performance of official duties. The allegations levelled by complainant was false, baseless and under manipulation, for hindering senior officers and influencing enquiry being conducted against him. It was abuse of process of law. Hence, this application with above prayer for setting aside impugned summoning order.”

Most crucially, it is then held in para 9 that, “In present case, the complaint is by an administrative inferior against administrative superior, admittedly, who is conducting a departmental enquiry against him and he had gone there to participate in above proceeding. The Enquiry Officer is to decide as to whether Assisting Officer is to be given to employee, who is delinquent employee in above inquiry or inquiry is to be conducted in camera in Chamber. Any Tom and Harry can never be permitted to come inside, wherein the enquiry is being conducted and to participate in above enquiry, rather if any Assisting Officer is to be taken by delinquent employee; he will have to move an application before Administrative Head or Enquiry Officer for appointing and permitting any Assisting Officer to that delinquent employee and, thereafter, that Assisting Officer may take part in above Administrative Enquiry. In present case, M.P. Tiwari in his statement, recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C., has said that he went at the place of occurrence to say the justice. Neither he was appointed as Assisting Officer nor he was permitted to take part in enquiry, but he went to that place for saying justice. He was so social worker and so a person of securing cause of justice that without following the procedure, he present himself for saying justice, though he was asked to remain out and he remained outside. The door was locked from inside. It was a Chamber of the Enquiry Officer, where Presenting Officer and Enquiry Officer were present and it can never be said to be a public view. Even if, any occurrence took place at that place, it may never be said to be a public view and it has been verified by Apex Court, mentioned as above. Hence, the very ingredient of offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act was missing. The second aspect is that complainant in his statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. has not said that he was insulted because of being a member of Scheduled Caste community by a persons, who were not members of Scheduled Caste community. This ingredient too was missing in the statement of complainant, recorded under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. Other two witnesses, who were examined were co-workers of the same Department and they were admittedly not inside the room, when this occurrence took place and how this occurrence took place, what was precipitation time and what resulted in this occurrence, were not witnessed by those witnesses. Hence, for the same occurrence, these superiors have lodged complaint with local authorities as well as Department Heads and for the same, this complaint was filed there. What was the precipitating point, could not be determined by those witnesses. Moreso, Apex Court in Vaijnath Kondiba Khandke vs State of Maharashtra and Anr. AIR 2018 SC 2659, has propounded that while dealing with a matter, in which complaint or accusation has been lodged by administrative junior or employee against his Head of Office or administrative superior regarding their exploitation or harassment, the Court must take in mind that if such type of occurrence are being actually visualized, then it will be highly impossible for administrative superiors to take work from administrative juniors. There must be administrative authority of administrative superiors, then and then only, they will be in position to take work from junior employees and mere bald allegation of harassment and such type of exploitation are to be strictly analyzed with all care and caution. Hence, in present case, admittedly, applicants were Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer. They were conducting a regular departmental enquiry against complainant. Meaning thereby, charge was framed and the employee complainant was charged employee. Meaning thereby, prima facie, he was delinquent employee, for which charge was framed. Preliminary inquiry stage was passed. Thereafter, departmental enquiry was being conducted and when this enquiry was conducted this fuss was created. Who created this and what was the precipitating point was to be visualized and examined by Magistrate before summoning applicants, but casually impugned order of summoning for offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act was passed. On above facts and circumstances, as apparently offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act was not made out, on the basis of evidence collected in inquiry by Magistrate concerned, hence this application merits to be allowed in part.”

Finally, it is then held in the last para 10 that, “The application is partly allowed. The summoning for offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act is hereby quashed. For rest of the offences, the prayed relief is refused.”

In conclusion, it may well be said that the Allahabad High Court through this latest judgment seeks to send an unmistakable message to one and all that offences under SC/ST Act is made out only when the offence is perpetrated in public. If it happens behind closed doors, then the SC/ST Act cannot be applied! No doubt, it has been very rightly reiterated by the Allahabad High Court in this latest judgment that just mere bald allegation of harassment and such type of exploitation are to be strictly analyzed with all care and caution. No denying it!

Sanjeev Sirohi

Credibility Of Witness Can Be Established Only After Cross Examination By The Accused: Allahabad HC

                                  It has been very rightly reiterated once again like always in a latest judgment titled Rekha Vs. State of UP and Anr. in Application U/S 482 No. 43580 of 2019 With Manoj Vs. State of UP and Anr. in Application U/S 482 No. 43493 of 2019 reserved on November 28, 2019 and delivered on February 4, 2020 by the Allahabad High Court that the credibility of any witness can be established only after the said witness is put to cross-examination by the accused persons, in connection with the charged offence. Justice Ajit Singh of Allahabad High Court who has authored this notable judgment has very rightly held that the trial court had committed an error in not providing an opportunity to the petitioner-accused to cross examine the prosecution witnesses after the charges framed against them were altered. There can be no denying or disputing it!

                                      To start with, it is first and foremost pointed out in the opening para in para 1 of this noteworthy judgment which states that, “Heard Sri Anoop Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Mohd. Rashid Siddiqui and Abhinav Gaur, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Swetashwa Agarwal, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 and learned A.G.A. for the State.”

                          Unquestionably, the ball is then set rolling in para 2 of this notable judgment which enunciates that, “The present 482 Cr.P.C. Application No. 43580 of 2019 has been filed to quash the orders dated 18.11.2019, 19.11.2019 and 20.11.2019 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Baghpat in S.T. No. 26 of 2017 and S.T. 149 of 2017 (State Vs. Rekha and others), under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307 and 120B IPC, arising out of Case Crime No. 271 of 2016, Police Station Binauli, District Baghpat.”

                          While continuing in the same vein, it is then postulated in para 3 that, “So far as the Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. bearing No. 43493 of 2019 is concerned, has also been filed to quash the order dated 19.11.2019 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, IVth, Baghpat in Session Trial No. 26 of 2017 (State Vs. Satendra and others) arising out of Case Crime No. 271 of 2016, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 120B IPC, Police Station Binauli, District Baghpat.”

                                  Be it noted, it is then disclosed in para 4 that, “Both these applications mentioned above are being decided by a common judgment and order as the controversy involved in these two applications is same and identical.”

                        While elaborating in detail, it is then further disclosed in para 5 that, “The police investigated the matter and submitted the charge sheet against the accused persons, namely, Satendra, Smt. Rekha, Manoj, Nirbhay, Anil, Subodh along with Arjun and the trial commenced. The accused Rekha was charged under Section 120B read with Section 302 IPC and she was further charged under Section 120B read with Section 307 IPC and the accused Manoj was also charged under Section 120B read with Section 302 and 307 IPC and all other accused persons were charged under Sections 302, 147, 148, 149, 307 and 120B IPC and session trial commenced and evidence of prosecution witnesses were recorded. After recording the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, an application was given, copy whereof has been annexed on page 25 onwards under Section 216 Cr.P.C. with the prayer to amend the charges against the accused persons, namely, Rekha and Manoj, charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307 , 120 B IPC. This application was moved on 31.7.2019 and the Court allowed this application vide order dated 18.11.2019, the order has been annexed on page 36 of the paper book and directed that the charge be amended and thereafter the charges against the accused persons, namely, Smt. Rekha and Manoj were amended on 19.11.2019. After the amendment of the charge against the accused Smt. Rekha and Manoj, an application was moved by the prosecution, which is annexed on page 53; which states that the witnesses were present in the Court and they were also ready for cross-examination, but no order was passed by the learned trial Court on the application dated 19.11.2019, moved by the prosecution. Then, again, an application was moved by accused namely Smt. Rekha praying therein that the accused persons may be given an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and the same was rejected. In that application the order was passed on 19.11.2019 by the learned trial Court, which is annexed on page 40 onwards.”

                  Full attention must be paid to what is then observed in para 6 that, “The order passed on the application of the accused persons is annexed to the supplementary affidavit at page 8 dated 20.11.2019, filed in this application. The learned trial Court rejected the application moved by the accused persons for re-cross-examination of the witnesses as fresh and the learned trial Court has opined that if the trial is being proceeded without affording an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses to the accused persons, there will be no adverse effect on the accused persons and thereafter rejected the right of cross-examination of the accused persons.”

                                    Simply put, para 7 then reveals that, “Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that the trial Court by not affording the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses has committed manifest error and has totally bypassed the settled principles of law and by not permitting the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses after amendment of the charge which has been specifically provided by the Sections 216 and 217 CrPC.”

                                         Furthermore, it is then added in para 8 that, “He further submitted that initially both the accused persons were charged under Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC and again charged under Section 120B and 302 IPC and they were not charged with the offence under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 IPC. He further submits that initially the charges were confined only to the conspiracy and now by way of amendment  of the charge, substantial change in the charges levelled earlier has been made and a new role has been assigned and attributed to the accused persons by amending charge and the accused persons were not able to defend themselves legally and they have not been provided and afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses in light of amended charges and their legal rights have been curtailed and slashed by the learned trial Judge.”

                              Interestingly enough, it is then conceded in para 9 that, “Sri Swetashwa Agarwal, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has not disputed the fact that the charge was amended and he has accepted that the charges were already amended; and in the proper interest of justice the accused should have been provided the right to cross-examine which has never been catered.”

                               To be sure, para 10 then envisages that, “The provisions of Sections 216 and 217 of Code of Criminal Procedure, which are relevant and necessary for just and proper decision of the controversy, are reproduced below:-

“216. Court may alter charge.

(1) Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced.

(2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and explained to the accused.

(3) If the alteration or addition to a charge is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused in his defence or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court may, in its discretion, after such alteration or addition has been made, proceed with the trial as if the altered or added charge had been the original charge.

(4) If the alteration or addition is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary.

(5) If the offence stated in the altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the altered or added charge is founded.

217. Recall of witnesses when charge altered. Whenever a charge is altered or added to by the Court after the commencement of the trial, the prosecution and the accused shall be allowed-

(a) to recall or re-summon, and examine with reference to such alteration or addition, any witness who may have been examined, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, considers that the prosecutor or the accused, as the case may be, desires to recall or re-examine such witness for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice;

(b) also to call any further witness whom the Court may think to be material. B.- Joinder of charges The bare reading of Section 216 reveals that though it is permissible for any Court to alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced, certain safeguards, looking into the interest of the accused person who is charged with the additional charge or with the alteration of the additional charge, are also provided specifically under sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 216 of the Code. Sub-section (3), in no uncertain term, stipulates that with the alteration or addition to a charge if any prejudice is going to be caused to the accused in his defence or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court has to proceed with the trial as if it altered or added the original charge by terming the additional or alternative charge as original charge. The clear message is that it is to be treated as charge made for the first time and trial has to proceed from that stage. This position becomes further clear from the bare reading of sub-section (4) of Section 216 of the Code which empowers the Court, in such a situation, to either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary. A new trial is insisted if the charge is altogether different and distinct.

Even if the charge may be of same species, the provision for adjourning the trial is made to give sufficient opportunity to the accused to prepare and defend himself. It is, in the same process, Section 217 of the Code provides that whenever a charge is altered or added by the Court after the commencement of the trial, the prosecutor as well as the accused shall be allowed to recall or re-summon or examine any witnesses who have already been examined with reference to such alteration or addition. In such circumstances, the Court is to even allow any further witness which the Court thinks to be material in regard to the altered or additional charge.”

                               What’s more, it is then aptly pointed out in para 11 that, “When this Court applies the aforesaid principles to the facts of this application it emerges out that initially the accused persons were charged for an offence under Section 120B read with Section 302 IPC and later on charges were amended to Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 IPC and initially the accused persons were considering that they had to defend themselves against the charge with which they were charged that is criminal conspiracy, later on they were charged with offence of murder they were charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 IPC now they have to defend themselves under the amended charge and the amended charges are bound to create prejudice to the applicants. In order to take care of the said prejudice, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to recall the witnesses, examine them in the context of the charge under Section 302 IPC and other relevant sections and allow the accused persons to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses in the light of amended charge.”

                                To put things in perspective, it is then laid down in para 12 that, “In the present case, with the framing of alternative charge, testimony of those witnesses recorded prior to that date could even be taken into consideration and this Court is of the opinion that the provisions of Sections 216 and 217 are mandatory in nature as they not only sub-serve the requirements of principles of natural justice but guarantee an important right which is given to the accused persons to defend themselves appropriately by giving them full opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses.”

                       Most significantly, it is then very rightly underscored in para 13 that, “The credibility of any witness can be established only after the said witness is put to cross-examination by the accused persons in connection with the charged offence. In the instant case, no cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses has taken place insofar as concerned charge under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 IPC and if the accused persons are not provided an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses then the trial will be vitiated.”

                            Equally significant if not more is what is enshrined in para 14 that, “It is principle of natural law that nobody will be condemned unheard and proper and due hearing should be provided to the accused and the cross examination is one of the facet of due hearing which ought to be provided to every accused to defend himself of the charge being levelled against him.”

                                       While citing the relevant case law, it is then stated in para 15 that, “In Bhimanna Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2012) 9 SCC 650, it has been held:-

“19. It is a matter of great regret that the trial court did not proceed with the case in the correct manner. If the trial Court was of the view that there was sufficient evidence on record against Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-3), which would make them liable for conviction and punishment for offences, other than those under Section 447 and 504/34 IPC, the court was certainly not helpless to alter/add the requisite charges, at any stage prior to the conclusion of the trial. Section 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called “Cr.P.C”) empowers the trial Court to alter/add charge(s), at any stage before the conclusion of the trial. However, law requires that, in case such alteration/addition of charges causes any prejudice, in any way to the accused, there must be a fresh trial on the said altered/new charges, and for this purpose, the prosecutor may also be given an opportunity to recall witnesses as required under Section 217 Cr.P.C.”

                                         No less significant is what is then stated in para 16 that, “After considering the rival submissions and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court deems it proper to direct that the learned trial Court will provide an opportunity to the applicants for cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses in the interest of justice and will protect the constitutional rights of due hearing and fair trial of the accused. It is further directed that the learned trial Court will call the prosecution witness day by day and will provide an opportunity to the accused persons to cross-examine the witnesses and it is also being directed that the prosecution witnesses will present as and when required by the trial Court and the accused persons will not take any unnecessary adjournment, if the witnesses are present in the Court. After providing opportunity to the accused persons for cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and after recording the statements of the accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the learned trial Court will pass the judgment.”

                                Before disposing of both the applications, it is then held in para 17 that, “The learned trial Court will not act in haste in deciding this session trial and the trial Court will follow and adhere to the mandatory provisions of law.”

                                         To sum up, the Allahabad High Court in this landmark judgment has very rightly reiterated and reaffirmed that credibility of witnesses can be established only after cross examination by the accused. All the trial Courts must adhere to it and not act in haste in such cases. They must follow and adhere to the mandatory provisions of law as has been mandated by the Allahabad High Court also in this noteworthy case!

Sanjeev Sirohi

Unfortunate That Provisions For Probation Are Not Much Utilized By Courts: Allahabad HC

Allahabad HC : Grants Probation In 28 Years Old Case For Attempt To Homicide

In a latest, landmark and extremely laudable judgment titled Ramdas Harijan & Ors. Vs. State of UP in Criminal Appeal 2012 of 2003 reserved on December 11, 2019 and delivered on January 6, 2020, the Allahabad High Court has very rightly gone the extra mile and asked the courts to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. It very rightly lamented that provisions for probation are not much utilized by the Courts. All the Courts must be careful on this score always!

To start with, Justice Siddharth sets the ball rolling in para 1 of this noteworthy judgment by first and foremost observing that, “Heard Sri Santosh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellants, Sri Gopal Ji Rai, learned counsel for the informant and Sri Gyan Narayan Kanojia, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.”

To put things in perspective, it is then pointed out in para 2 that, “This criminal appeal has been preferred by Ramdas Harijan son of Jagnoo, Sonarase son of Jagnoo, Ramjanam son of Ramdas, Ram Jeet son of Sonarase, Ramesh son of Shyam Lal and Suryabhan son of Banarsi against the judgment and order dated 03.05.2003 passed by Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court No. 3), Ghazipur in Sessions Trial No. 43 of 1994 (State vs. Ramdas Harijan and others) convicting and sentencing the appellants for offence under Section 323/149 IPC for a period of one year rigorous imprisonment, under Section 147 IPC for a period of one year rigorous imprisonment and under Sections 325/149 IPC for a period of five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo four months additional imprisonment and under Section 308/149 IPC for a period of five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo four months additional imprisonment. All the sentences have been directed to run concurrently.”

As it turned out, para 3 then brings out that, “During the pendency of this appeal appellant nos. 1 and 2, Ramdas Harijan and Sonarase both sons of Jagnoo, have died and the appeal has been dismissed as abated against them by the order dated 30.5.2019 passed by this court. Now the appeal survives only regarding appellant nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6.”

   Be it noted, para 4 then envisages that, “The prosecution case is that informant, Ram Adhar, son of Pardesi and the accuseds are the residents of village Kudila, Police Station – Bhudkuda, District – Ghazipur. On 26.09.1991 when the informant was making his hut on his abadi land the accuseds Ramdas, Sonarase, Shyam Lal, Ram Janam, Ramjeet and Ramesh, came armed with lathi-danda with common intention and stated that the abadi belongs to them. Suryabhan son of Banarasi came running on the spot and exhorted the accused to beat the informant. On this they started beating the informant with lathi. On his alarm members of his family, namely, Pardesi, Doma Ram, Km. Rita, Km. Sita, Smt. Geeta, Smt. Shyamdei, Smt. Kalawati, Smt. Vidya Devi, Km, Sumitra, daughter of Doma Ram, ran towards the informant and they were also caused injuries by the accuseds. On account of injuries inflicted by the accuseds, mother of informant, Vidya Devi and his grand-mother suffered fractures in hand. Both became unconscious and fell down. Bhuri Ram son of Chauthi, Kashi son of Ramnath, etc., and many persons of the village saw the incident. Informant took his mother in a cot along with other injured to police station. The accuseds set the hut of the informant on fire. The information of the incident was given at the police station Bhudkuda on 26.06.1991 and on its basis FIR was registered at 17:30 hours as Case Crime No. 150 of 1991, under Sections 147, 323, 325, 504, 308 IPC against the accuseds.”

What’s more, it is then stated in para 5 that, “The investigation was entrusted to the S.H.O., Sri J.P. Bharti. The injureds were examined by the doctor and number of injuries were found on the body of the injureds. The Investigating Officer submitted charge sheet against the accuseds. Before framing of charge accused, Shyam Lal, died and charges were framed against the remaining accuseds under Sections 147, 308/149, 325/149, 323/149 and 504 IPC. The accuseds denied the charges and sought trial.”

It would be pertinent to mention here that it is then observed in para 12 that, “After hearing the counsels for the parties this court finds that the offence under Sections 323 and 325 IPC can be compounded by the person to whom the hurt is caused. The offence under Section 308 IPC is not compoundable. In the present case only one of the injured, the informant, has filed his affidavit while the other injureds, namely, Smt. Vidya, Smt. Shyamdei, Smt. Geeta, Doma Ram, Km. Reeta, Km. Sumitra, Km. Sita, Smt. Kalawati and Pardesi, have not filed any affidavit praying that the offences caused against them by the appellants may be compounded. The affidavit of the informant shows that it has been filed only on his behalf and not on behalf of any of the injureds as their pairokar. In view of the above position of the record the compounding of the offences under which the appellants have been convicted cannot be allowed.”

On expected lines, what next follows more significantly is that it is then observed in para 13 that, “However keeping in view the fact that the incident took place about 28 years ago, the parties are neighbours residing in the same village, informant has filed affidavit before this court that their relations have become normal and they are residing peacefully in the village, he does not wants the enmity to be revived, this court feels that the appellants should be given benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 in this appeal while upholding the judgment and order of the trial court.”

Most significantly, it is then observed about Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act which deals with power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct as elaborated upon in para 14 and similarly about Section 360 of Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition as elaborated upon in para 15 in clear and convincing language  by stating unequivocally in para 16 that, “These statutory provisions very emphatically lay down the reformatory and correctional object of sentencing and obligates the trial court as well as appellate courts to give benefit of probation in fit cases as provided under law. Unfortunately, this branch of law has not been much utilized by the courts. It becomes more relevant and important in our system of administration of justice where trial is often concluded after a long time and by the time decision assumes finality, the very purpose of sentencing looses its efficacy as with the passage of time the penological and social priorities change and there remains no need to inflict punishment of imprisonment, particularly when the offence involved is not serious and there is no criminal antecedent of the accused persons. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed.”

To substantiate what has been stated in para 16, we then see that relevant case law are quoted as we see for ourselves in para 17 that, “In the case of Subhash Chand and others vs. State of U.P., 2015 Lawsuit (Alld) 1343, this court has emphatically laid down the need to apply the law of probation and give benefit of the beneficial legislation to accused persons in appropriate cases. This court issued following directions to all trial courts and appellate courts:

It appears that the aforesaid beneficial legislation has been lost sight of and even the Judges have practically forgotten this provision of law. Thus, before parting with the case, this Court feels that I will be failing in discharge of my duties, if a word of caution is not written for the trial courts and the appellate courts. The Registrar General of this Court is directed to circulate copy of this Judgment to all the District Judges of U.P., who shall in turn ensure circulation of the copy of this order amongst all the judicial officers working under him and shall ensure strict compliance of this Judgment. The District Judges in the State are also directed to call for reports every months from all the courts, i.e. trial courts and appellate courts dealing with such matters and to state as to in how many cases the benefit of the aforesaid provisions have been granted to the accused. The District Judges are also directed to monitor such cases personally in each monthly meeting. The District Judges concerned shall send monthly statement to the Registrar General as to in how many cases the trial court/appellate court has granted the benefit of the aforesaid beneficial legislation to the accused. A copy of this order be placed before the Registrar General for immediate compliance.””

Moving on, para 18 then states that, “In addition to the above judgment of this Court, this Court finds that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand & others (2004) 7 SCC 659, giving the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to the accuseds has observed as below:

“The learned counsel appearing for the accused submitted that the accident is of the year 1990. The parties are educated and neighbours. The learned counsel, therefore, prayed that benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 may be granted to the accused. The prayer made on behalf of the accused seems to be reasonable. The accident is more than ten years old. The dispute was between the neighbors over a trivial issue of claiming of drainage. The accident took place in a fit of anger. All the parties educated and also distantly related. The accident is not such as to direct the accused to undergo sentence of imprisonment. In our opinion, it is a fit case in which the accused should be released on probation by directing them to execute a bond of one year for good behaviour.”

While continuing in the same vein, it is then further added in para 19 that, “Similarly, in Jagat Pal Singh & others Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 3622, the Hon’ble Apex Court has given the benefit of probation while upholding the conviction of accused persons under Sections 323, 452, 506 IPC and has released the accused persons on executing a bond before the Magistrate for maintaining good behaviour and peace for the period of six months.”

Now coming to the concluding paras, para 20 holds that, “In the light of above discussion, I find no illegality, irregularity or impropriety nor any jurisdictional error in the impugned judgment and order of the court below. The conviction recorded by the court below under Sections 147, 323/149, 325/149, 308/149 IPC is upheld and is not required to be disturbed.” It is then rightly held in para 21 that, “However, instead of sending the appellants to jail, they shall get the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Consequently, the appellants shall file two sureties to the tune of Rs. 25,000/- coupled with personal bonds to the effect that they shall not commit any offence and shall observe good behaviour and shall maintain peace during the period of one year. If there is breach of any of the conditions, they will subject themselves to undergo sentence before the court below. The bonds and sureties aforesaid be filed by the accused persons within two months from the date of the judgment as per law and Rules.” Finally, it is held in para 22 that, “Accordingly, this appeal is partly allowed regarding sentences of the appellants.”

In conclusion, the Allahabad High Court has very rightly underscored that it is unfortunate that provisions for probation are not much utilized by the Courts. It very rightly grants probation in 28 year old case for attempt to homicide. All the courts must pay heed to what the Allahabad High Court has laid down in this latest and laudable judgment wherein it has itself cited many relevant case laws decided by the Allahabad High Court and Supreme Court also! No denying or disputing!

Sanjeev Sirohi