Court Cannot Impose Condition Of Deposit Of Money While Granting Default/Statutory Bail U/s 167(2) CrPC: SC

                In a recent, remarkable and righteous decision titled Saravanan vs. State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal Nos. 681-682 of 2020 (Arising from S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos. 4386-4387 of 2020) delivered on October 15, 2020, the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Justices Ashok Bhushan, R Subhash Reddy and MR Shah have held in no uncertain terms that while granting default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure condition of deposit of amount cannot be imposed. The only requirement for getting the default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), CrPC is that the accused is in jail for more than 60 or 90 days as the case may be, the investigation is not completed and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail. It thus rightly set aside the condition imposed by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court which while releasing an accused on default bail/statutory bail, imposed a condition to deposit Rs. 8,00,000.

To start with, the ball is set rolling in para 2 of this latest, landmark and laudable judgment after granting leave in para 1 wherein it is observed that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order dated 24.06.2020 in Criminal O.P.(MD) No. 6214 of 2020 and order dated 27.07.2020 in Criminal M.P.(MD) No. 3622 of 2020 passed by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, by which the High Court has released the appellant on default bail/statutory bail, on condition to deposit Rs. 8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs only) to the credit of crime No. 31 of 2019 before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District, the original accused has preferred the present appeals.”

While dwelling on the facts of the case, it is then observed in para 3 that, “That the appellant herein was arrested and remanded to the judicial custody on 31.01.2020 for the offences punishable under Section 420 of the IPC in Crime No. 31 of 2019 on the file of the D.C.B. Police Station, Kanyakumari District. That the appellant herein filed an application before the learned Judicial Magistrate seeking bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C. That the wife of the appellant filed an affidavit before the learned Judicial Magistrate and assured to pay Rs. 7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs only) and the balance amount to be paid on or before 06.04.2020, against the alleged amount of Rs. 15,67,338/- (Rupees Fifteen lakhs Sixty Seven thousand Three hundred thirty eight only). Therefore, by order dated 3.2.2020, the learned Magistrate released the appellant on bail on the conditions stated in the said order. One of the conditions was directing the appellant to deposit Rs. 7,00,000/- in the Court, and the balance amount of Rs. 8,67,338/- was directed to be deposited on or before 06.04.2020.”

While elaborating further, it is then laid down in para 4 that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with condition nos. 2 and 3 of the order passed by the learned Magistrate releasing the appellant on bail, i.e. directing the appellant to deposit Rs. 7,00,000/-, out of the total alleged amount of Rs. 15,67,338/- and the balance to be deposited on or before 6.4.2020, the appellant approached the High Court by way of Criminal OP(MD) No. 6214 of 2020. The High Court dismissed the said application with liberty to the appellant to approach the Magistrate Court for any modification and observed that if any modification is required, the same may be considered by the Magistrate. That thereafter, the appellant filed an application before the learned Sessions Court being Criminal M.P. No. 1695/2020 to release the appellant on default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. It was the case on behalf of the appellant that he was arrested and remanded on 31.02.2020 and he is inside the jail for more than 101 days and the investigation is not completed and the police has not filed the final report within the period provided under Section 167 Cr.P.C. The said application came to be dismissed by the learned Sessions Court on the ground that earlier when the appellant applied for regular bail and which was allowed on condition to deposit Rs. 7,00,000/- in the Court and the same has not been complied with, and despite the liberty reserved by the High Court to approach the Magistrate Court for modification of the conditions, instead of doing so, the appellant has filed an application for default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C., therefore, the learned Sessions Court dismissed the said application.”

As a corollary, it is then pointed out in para 5 that, “Feeling aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court and prayed to release the appellant on default bail/statutory bail. It was the case on behalf of the appellant that non-deposit of any amount which was required to be deposited pursuant to the order passed by the learned Magistrate, imposed while releasing the appellant on regular bail under Section 437, Cr.P.C., shall not come in the way of the appellant-accused in getting default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. It was submitted that the default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. is mandatory bail, provided the conditions in Section 167 Cr.P.C. are satisfied, i.e., investigation is not completed and the chargesheet/report is not filed by the investigating agency within the time stipulated under Section 167 Cr.P.C. The High Court, by the impugned judgment and order dated 24.06.2020 accepted the same, however, considering the earlier undertaking given by the wife of the appellant in the Court of the learned Magistrate while considering the regular bail application under Section 437, Cr.P.C., i.e., to deposit Rs. 7,00,000/-, while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail, the High Court has imposed the condition that the appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs. 8,00,000/- before the learned Magistrate. That thereafter, the appellant preferred application being Criminal MP(MD) No. 3622 of 2020 before the High Court to modify condition nos. (b) and (d) in Criminal OP(MD) No. 6214/2020 by which the appellant was directed to deposit Rs. 8,00,000/- before the learned Judicial Magistrate and the appellant was directed to report before the concerned police station daily at 10:00 a.m., until further orders, for interrogation. By the impugned order dated 27.07.2020, the High Court has dismissed the said application for modification observing that earlier wife of the appellant filed affidavit before the learned Magistrate to deposit Rs. 7,00,000/- and the alleged amount is Rs. 32,23,073/-, condition nos. (b) and (d) in order dated 24.06.2020 in Criminal OP(MD) No. 6214/2020 are not required to be modified. Hence, the present appeals.”

On the one hand, to drive home the appellant’s point, it is then revealed in para 6 that, “Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently submitted that condition nos. (b) and (d) imposed by the High Court imposed while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. is contrary to the scheme of Section 167 of Cr.P.C. It is submitted that as observed by this Court in catena of decisions, the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure delineates that provisions of Section 167 Cr.P.C. give due regard to the personal liberty of a person. Without submission of charge sheet within 60 days or 90 days, as may be applicable, an accused cannot be detained by the Police. The provision gives due recognition to the personal liberty. It is submitted that as held by this Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67, where investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, no chargesheet is filed on the 60th or 90th day, accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail, accused becomes entitled to default bail, it cannot be frustrated either by the prosecution or the Court. It is submitted that it is further held that accused need not make out any grounds for grant of default bail but only needs to state that 60/90 days, as the case may be, have expired, chargesheet not filed, he is entitled to bail and willing to furnish the same. It is submitted that therefore condition nos. (b) and (d) imposed by the High Court while releasing the appellant or default bail/statutory bail are against the scheme of Section 167, Cr.P.C.”

On the other hand, it is then revealed in para 7 that, “Mr. Jayanth Muthuraj, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State has tried to support the impugned order(s) passed by the High Court by submitting that as earlier the wife of the appellant filed an affidavit before the learned Magistrate to deposit Rs. 7,00,000/- and the alleged amount was Rs. 15,67,338/-, probably the High Court has imposed condition no. (b) directing the appellant to deposit Rs. 8,00,000/-.”

Most significantly, the Bench then minces no words to state in simple, straight and suave language in para 9 which constitutes the backbone and bedrock of this notable judgment that, “Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and considering the scheme and the object and purpose of default bail/statutory bail, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in imposing condition that the appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs. 8,00,000/- while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail. It appears that the High Court has imposed such a condition taking into consideration the fact that earlier at the time of hearing of the regular bail application, before the learned Magistrate, the wife of the appellant filed an affidavit agreeing to deposit Rs. 7,00,000/-. However, as observed by this Court in catena of decisions and more particularly in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), where the investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day, accused gets an “indefeasible right” to default bail, and the accused becomes entitled to default bail once the accused applies for default bail and furnish bail. Therefore, the only requirement for getting the default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. is that the accused is in jail for more than 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, and within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, the investigation is not completed and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail. No other condition of deposit of the alleged amount involved can be imposed. Imposing such condition while releasing the accused on default bail/statutory bail would frustrate the very object and purpose of default bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. As observed by this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) and in other decisions, the accused is entitled to default bail/statutory bail, subject to the eventuality occurring in Section 167, Cr.P.C., namely, investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail.”

What’s more, the Bench then observes in para 9.1 that, “As observed hereinabove and even from the impugned orders passed by the High Court, it appears that High Court while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail has imposed the condition to deposit Rs. 8,00,000/- taking into consideration that earlier before the learned Magistrate and while considering the regular bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C., the wife of the accused filed an affidavit to deposit Rs. 7,00,000/-. That cannot be a ground to impose the condition to deposit the amount involved, while granting default bail/statutory bail.”

It is worth noting that it is then observed in para 9.2 that, “The circumstances while considering the regular bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C. are different, while considering the application for default bail/statutory bail. Under the circumstances, the condition imposed by the High Court to deposit Rs. 8,00,000/-, while releasing the appellant for default bail/statutory bail. Under the circumstances, the condition imposed by the High Court to deposit Rs. 8,00,000/-, while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside.”

Going ahead, para 10 then makes it clear that, “Now as far as condition no. (d) imposed by the High Court, namely, directing the appellant to report before the concerned police station daily at 10:00 a.m., until further orders, for interrogation is concerned, the same is also unsustainable, as it is too harsh. Instead, condition which can be imposed is directing the appellant to cooperate with the investigating officer in completing the investigation and to remain present before the concerned police station for investigation/interrogation as and when called for, and on breach the investigating officer can approach the concerned court for cancellation of the bail on breach of such condition.”

Finally, what para 11 then underscores is that, “In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeals succeed. Condition No. (b) of order dated 24.06.2020 passed by the High Court in Criminal OP(MD) No. 6214 of 2020, i.e., directing the appellant to deposit Rs. 8,00,000/- to the credit of crime No. 31 of 2019 before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District, while releasing the appellant on default bail, is hereby quashed and set aside. Condition no. (d), namely, directing the appellant to report before the concerned police station at 10:00 a.m. daily, until further orders for interrogation is hereby modified to the extent and it is directed that the appellant shall co-operate with the investigating agency and shall report the concerned police station as and when called for investigation/interrogation and on non-cooperation, the consequences including cancellation of the bail shall follow. Rest of the conditions imposed by the High Court in order dated 24.06.2020 are maintained.”

In essence, the key takeaway from this noteworthy judgment is that while granting default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the condition of deposit of amount cannot be imposed. All the courts while delivering judgments in such similar cases must always take this latest, landmark and extremely laudable judgment into account before pronouncing the final judgment themselves! Para 9 which constitutes the bedrock and backbone of this notable judgment must be always followed in letter and spirit! No denying it!

Sex After Obtaining Consent By False Promise To Marry Is Rape: Supreme Court.

 

It is significant to note that the Supreme Court most recently on April 9, 2019 has very strongly and sternly reiterated in a latest, landmark and laudable judgment titled Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 629 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 618/2019) has reiterated in no uncertain terms that the consent for sexual intercourse obtained by a person by giving false promise of marriage would not excuse him from rape charges. All those men who dare to indulge in sex after giving false promise of marriage must now always bear it in mind that they will not be excused from rape charges as has been held in this most recent case. This commendable and notable ruling is bound to send a large and clear warning to all men that they cannot take women for granted and have sex with them by falsely promising to marry and then later reneging and escaping from all liabilities!

First and foremost, the ball is set rolling in this latest judgment authored by Justice MR Shah for himself and Justice L Nageswara Rao by pointing out in para 1 that, “The application for impleadment of the prosecutrix is allowed, in terms of the prayer made.” It is then mentioned in para 1.1 that, “Leave granted”.

For the uninitiated, para 2 then states that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 10.10.2018 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 1270/2014; by which the High Court has dismissed the said appeal preferred by the appellant herein – the original accused and has confirmed the judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned trial Court convicting the original accused and has confirmed the judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned trial Court convicting the original accused for the offence under Section 376(1) of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for six months, the original accused has preferred the present appeal.”

To recapitulate, it is then unfolded in para 3 that, “The prosecution case in brief was that the prosecutrix was the resident of Koni, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur. Prosecutrix was familiar with the accused since 2009 and there was love affair between them. The appellant had even proposed her for marriage and this fact was within the knowledge of their respective family members. At the time of incident, accused was posted as Junior Doctor in the government hospital of Maalkharoda and at that time the prosecutrix was doing her studies of Pharmacy in Bhilai. On 28.4.2013 the accused expressed his desire to the prosecutrix that he wanted to meet her and accordingly on 29.4.2013 at 7.25 a.m. the prosecutrix boarded Durg Danapur Express train and reached Sakti railway station from where the accused took her on a motorcycle to his house situated at Maalkharoda and there she stayed from 2 pm of 29.4.2013 to 3 pm of 30.4.2013 and during this period despite refusal of the prosecutirx the accused established physical relation with her on the pretext of marrying her. On 30.4.2013 the accused asked the prosecutrix to leave by saying that on 1st or 2nd May he will talk to his parents about their marriage and he will soon marry with her. On 30.4.2013 at about 6 in the evening accused Anurag Soni and the prosecutirx reached Bilaspur by train and from where their friend namely Umashankar took them on a motorcycle to the house of Mallika Humne, friend of prosecutrix, where the accused dropped her and went back. Next morning accused dropped the prosecutrix at Railway Station, Bilaspur from where she boarded train for Bhilai (Durg). Accused asked the prosecutrix not to tell about the incident to anyone and as a result of which the prosecutrix did not disclose the incident to anyone, but from 2.5.2013 to 5.5.2013 the prosecutrix had repeatedly asked from the accused about the marriage and when she did not receive any reply from the accused, on 6.5.2013, she informed her family members about the incident and then the family members of the prosecutrix had gone to the house of accused at village Kharod and informed his family members about the incident whereupon the family members of accused had said that now marriage of accused and prosecutrix was the only option available. In the meantime, members of both the families used to visit house of each other, however, after keeping the prosecutrix and her family members in dark for about two months, the accused had refused to marry the prosecutrix and performed marriage with another girl and then on 21.6.2013 the prosecutrix submitted written report (Ex. P-3) in the police station Maalkharoda in respect of rape committed by the accused upon her on the pretext of marriage based on which FIR (Ex. P-4) for the offence under Section 376 of IPC was registered against the accused.”

As anticipated, we then see that para 3.1 brings out the following: “That during the course of investigation, the investigating officer recorded the statement of concerned witnesses including the prosecutrix. The investigating officer collected the medical evidence and other evidence. After completion of the entire investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC.”

Furthermore, it is then pointed out in para 3.2 that, “That the learned magistrate committed the case to the learned Sessions Court which was numbered as Sessions Trial No. 201/2013. That the learned Sessions Court framed the charge against the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. The accused denied the charge so framed and claimed trial, and therefore he came to be tried by the learned Sessions Court for the aforesaid offence.”

To be sure, it is then stated in para 3.3 that, “The prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 13 witnesses including the prosecutrix (PW3) as under:

1.  Pritam Soni                   PW1

2.  Manikchand                  PW2

3.  Prosecutrix                    PW3

4.  Patwari Ghanshyam     PW4

5.  Dr. C.K. Singh                 PW5

6.  Dr. K.L. Oraon                PW6

7.  Amritlal                           PW7

8.  Pankaj Soni                     PW8

9.  Dr. P.C. Jain                               PW9

10. Constable Jawaharlal            PW10

11. Sub-Inspector S.P. Singh       PW11

12. Inspector Sheetal Sidar         PW12

13. Srimati Priyanka Soni             PW13

 

Simply put, it is then observed in para 3.4 that, “After the closing pursis were submitted by the prosecution, three witnesses were examined on behalf of the accused in defence. The statement of appellant-accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein he denied the circumstances appearing against him and pleaded innocence and false implication. As per the accused his marriage was already fixed with one Priyanka Soni and this was in the knowledge of the prosecutrix, even then the prosecutrix and her family members continued to pressurise him to marry the prosecutrix, and then he married with Priyanka Soni on 10.6.2013 in Arya Samaj. Therefore, it was the case on behalf of the accused that a false FIR was lodged against him.”

Needless to say, it is then narrated in para 4 that, “That on appreciation of evidence, the learned Sessions Court observed and held that the prosecutrix gave consent for sexual intercourse on a misrepresentation of fact and the promise by the accused that he would marry the prosecutrix and therefore the said consent cannot be said to be a consent and therefore the accused committed the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. Thereupon, the learned Sessions Court convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment.”

Going forward, it is then illustrated in para 5 that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Court, the accused preferred appeal before the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has dismissed the appeal and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Court convicting the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.”

Be it noted, it is then noted in para 6 that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court dismissing the appeal and confirming the conviction and sentence of the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC, the original accused has preferred the present appeal.”

After hearing the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length, it is then observed in para 9 that, “In the present case, the accused has been convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. It is the case on behalf of the appellant-accused that as it is a case of consensual sex, the Courts below have committed an error in convicting the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. Both the Courts below have accepted the case of the prosecution that the consent of the prosecutrix was given on the basis of misconception of fact and, therefore, considering Section 90 of the IPC, such a consent cannot be said to be a consent and, therefore, the accused has committed the rape as defined under Section 375 of the IPC and thereby has committed an offence under Section 376 of the IPC. Therefore, the question which has been posed before this Court is, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the evidence on record, the Courts below have committed any error in holding the accused guilty for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC?”

What’s more, it is then elucidated in detail in para 13 that, “Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the following facts emerging from the evidence on record are required to be considered:

(i)             That the family of the prosecutrix and the accused were known to each other and, therefore, even the prosecutrix and the accused were known to each other.

(ii)          That though the accused was to marry another girl – Priyanka Soni, the accused continued to talk of marriage with the prosecutrix and continued to give the promise that he will marry the prosecutrix.

(iii)       That on 28.04.2013 the appellant expressed his wish telephonically to meet with the prosecutrix and responding to that the prosecutrix went to the place of the accused on 29.04.2013 by train, where the accused received her at the railway station Sakti and took her to his place of residence in Malkharauda.

(iv)       That during her stay at the house of the accused from 2.00 pm on 29.04.2013, they had physical relation thrice;

(v)          That as per the case of the prosecutrix, the prosecutrix initially refused to have physical relation, but then the appellant allured her with a promise to marry and had physical relation with her;

(vi)       That, thereafter the prosecutrix called the accused number of times asking him about the marriage, howeer, the accused did not reply positively;

(vii)    That thereafter the prosecutrix informed about the incident to her family members on 06.05.2013;

(viii) That the family members of the prosecutrix negotiated with the family members of the accused;

(ix)       That on 23.05.2013, the appellant expressed his willingness to marry the prosecutrix and a social function was scheduled on 30.05.2013, which did not take place;

(x)          That, again the family members of both the parties had talks, in which the marriage was negotiated and a social function was scheduled on 10.06.2013, which was again not held and further, the social event was fixed for 20.06.2013;

(xi)       That on 20.06.2013, the appellant telephonically informed the prosecutrix that he has already married;

(xii)    That, Priyanka Soni PW-13, who is the wife of the accused stated that one year prior to the marriage that took place on 10.06.2013, the negotiators were going on; and

(xiii) That the accused married Priyanka Soni on 10.06.2013 in Arya Samaj, even prior to the social function for the marriage of the accused the prosecutrix was scheduled on 10.06.2013 and even thereafter the social event was fixed for 20.06.2013.”

 

Having said this, the Apex Court then hastened to elegantly add further in para 14 that, “Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, the prosecution has been successful in proving the case that from the very beginning the accused never intended to marry the prosecutrix; he gave false promises/promise to the prosecutrix to marry her and on such false promise he had a physical relation with the prosecutrix; the prosecutrix initially resisted, however, gave the consent relying upon the false promise of the accused that he will marry her and, therefore, her consent can be said to be a consent on misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC and such a consent shall not excuse the accused from the charge of rape and offence under Section 375 of the IPC. Though, in Section 313 statement, the accused came up with a case that the prosecutrix and his family members were in knowledge that his marriage was already fixed with Priyanka Soni, even then, the prosecutrix and her family members continued to pressurise the accused to marry the prosecutrix, it is required to be noted that first of all the same is not proved by the accused. Even otherwise, considering the circumstances and evidence on record, referred to hereinabove, such a story is not believable. The prosecutrix, in the present case, was an educated girl studying in B-Pharmacy. Therefore, it is not believable that despite having knowledge that appellant’s marriage is fixed with another lady – Priyanka Soni, she and her family members would continue to pressurise the accused to marry and the prosecutrix will give the consent for physical relation. In the deposition, the prosecutrix specifically stated that initially she did not give her consent for physical relationship, however, on the appellant’s promise that he would marry her and relying upon such promise, she consented for physical relationship with the appellant-accused. Even considering Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, which has been inserted subsequently, there is a presumption and the court shall presume that she gave the consent for the physical relationship with the accused relying upon the promise by the accused that he will marry her. As observed hereinabove, from the very inception, the promise given by the accused to marry the prosecutrix was a false promise and from the very beginning there was no intention of the accused to marry the prosecutrix as his marriage with Priyanka Soni was already fixed long back and, despite the same, he continued to give promise/false promise and alluded the prosecutrix to give her consent for the physical relationship. Therefore, considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and considering the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, we are of the opinion that both the Courts below have rightly held that the consent given by the prosecutrix was on misconception of fact and, therefore, the same cannot be said to be a consent so as to excuse the accused for the charge of rape as defined under Section 375 of the IPC. Both the Courts below have rightly convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.”

To put it succinctly, it is then held in para 15 that, “Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the accused-appellant that the accused had marriage with Priyanka Soni on 10.06.2013 and even the prosecutrix has also married and, therefore, the accused may not be convicted is concerned, the same cannot be accepted. The prosecution has been successful by leading cogent evidence that from the very inception the accused had no intention to marry the victim and that he had mala fide motives and had made false promise only to satisfy the lust. But for the false promise by the accused to marry the prosecutrix, the prosecutrix would not have given the consent to have the physical relationship. It was a clear case of cheating and deception.”

It is then held in this same para 15 while condemning the most reprehensible and rapidly multiplying rape crime and without mincing any words that, “As observed hereinabove, the consent given by the prosecutrix was on misconception of fact. Such incidents are on increase now-a-days. Such offences are against the society. Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society, an assault on the body, mind and privacy of the victim. As observed by this Court in a catena of decisions, while a murderer destroys the physical frame of the victim, a rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless female. Rape reduces a woman to an animal, as it shakes the very core of her life. By no means can a rape victim be called an accomplice. Rape leaves a permanent scar on the life of the victim. Rape is a crime against the entire society and violates the human rights of the victim. Being the most hated crime, the rape tantamount to a serious blow to the supreme honour of a woman, and offends both her esteem and dignity. Therefore, merely because the accused had married with another lady and/or even the prosecutrix has subsequently married, is no ground not to convict the appellant-accused for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. The appellant-accused must face the consequences of the crime committed by him.”

Lastly, it is then held in para 16 that, “In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that both the Courts below have rightly convicted the appellant-accused under Section 376 of the IPC. We also maintain the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 376 of the IPC. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case and the request made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused, the sentence of 10 years’ RI awarded by the courts below is hereby reduced to seven years RI, the minimum which was prescribed at the relevant time of commission of offence under Section 376 of the IPC. Consequently, the present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid modification in the sentence only.”

What should I say of these two Judges – Justice L Nageswara Rao and Justice MR Shah? What should I say about this extremely landmark and laudable judgment delivered by them? I am too small a fry to comment on them. But one thing is for sure: They have left no doubt in sending a loud and clear message to all men that if you dare to indulge in sex with any women by showing a carrot in the form of a false promise to marry, you too then shall be held liable in the same manner just like any other rapist who forcibly rapes woman as you have obtained her consent falsely for which you certainly must face the consequences! They certainly do deserve all the laurels and lavish praise for not hesitating in calling a spade a spade! This will certainly now deter all men from ever indulging in sex with a women after giving false promise of marrying her! Each and every Judge not just in India but all over the world must always adhere and abide by what has been laid down by these two learned Judges in this latest, landmark and laudable judgment so that no men ever thinks that he can get away most easily even after openly cheating a women by first promising to marry her and then having sex with her and still worse then dumping her shamelessly like a commodity from his own life without incurring any kind of liability whatsoever!

 

Sanjeev Sirohi,