While ruling on a most significant legal point pertaining to filing of chargesheet, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba vs The State of West Bengal in Criminal Appeal No.5146 of 2025(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3002/2024) in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction that was pronounced as recently as on December 2, 2025 has discharged an accused in a criminal case involving allegations of voyeurism, wrongful restraint, and criminal intimidation mincing absolutely just no words in holding indubitably that the tendency of filing chargesheets in matters where no “strong suspicion” is made out clogs the judicial system. We need to note here what is really worth paying attention that the Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh and Hon’ble Mr Justice Manmohan after perusing the facts of the case and considering the material on record allowed the appeal that had been filed by Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba set aside the judgment that had been passed by the Calcutta High Court which had upheld the dismissal of his discharge application.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Manmohan for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that, “The present Appeal has been filed challenging the judgment dated 30th January 2024 passed by the Calcutta High Court, whereby the revision petition filed by the Appellant-accused against the order dismissing the discharge application filed by the Appellant in FIR No.50/2020 dated 19th March 2020 lodged with police station Bidhannagar North, was dismissed.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 while elaborating briefly on the facts of the case that, “On 19th March 2020, the complainant-Ms. Mamta Agarwal, an alleged tenant of Mr. Amalendu Biswas, one of the co-owners of the property at CF-231, Sector I, Salt Lake, Kolkata 700064 (“the property”) filed a complaint/FIR under Sections 341, 354C, 506 of Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’). The complainant alleged that on 18th March 2020, when the complainant along with her friend and workmen tried to enter the property, the Appellant-accused intimidated them and restrained them from entering the property. The complainant further alleged that the Appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her pictures and making her videos on his mobile without her consent and by doing so, he intruded upon her privacy and outraged her modesty.”
Briefly stated, the Bench states in para 4 that, “Upon completion of investigation, a chargesheet dated 16th August 2020 was presented against the Appellant-accused for offences punishable under Sections 341, 354C and 506 of IPC. It is stated in the chargesheet that the complainant expressed her unwillingness to make a judicial statement.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 5 that, “Thereafter, the Appellant-accused, who is son of one of the co-owners of the property in question filed an application seeking discharge, which was dismissed by the Trial Court vide order dated 29th August 2023. The revision petition against the order dated 29th August 2023 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide the impugned judgment.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 20 that, “Upon a perusal of the FIR and chargesheet on record, this Court is unable to conclude the same disclose an offence under Section 354C of the IPC since there is no allegation in the FIR and chargesheet that the complainant was watched or captured by the Appellant-accused while she was engaging in a ‘private act’. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment, has concluded with respect to the offence under Section 354C as under:-
“11. Allegation made in the written complaint, in my opinion, did not disclose any offence under Section 354C…
12. From the bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clearly intelligible that the allegation of clicking pictures and making video made in the written complaint cannot be said to be an offence within the meaning of Section 354C of IPC.”
(emphasis supplied).”
As a corollary, the Bench observed in para 21 that, “Consequently, the learned Single Judge in the impugned order itself concluded that the allegations in the FIR and the material on record did not disclose an offence under Section 354C of IPC.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 22 that, “Further, in order to constitute an offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 of IPC, it must be shown that the person charged, threatened another with injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm. Except for the bald allegation that the Appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her photographs, the FIR and chargesheet are completely silent about the manner in which the complainant was threatened with any injury to her person or her property. The words, if any, uttered by the complainant are not mentioned in the FIR. Additionally, as stated above, the complainant or her associates never made a statement to substantiate her allegations. Consequently, in the present case, even if the allegations in the FIR are taken at face value, the ingredients of offence of criminal intimidation are not attracted.”
Do further note, the Bench notes in para 25 that, “In the present case, the perusal of the FIR reveals that the alleged offences were committed when the complainant attempted to enter the property. The right of the complainant to enter the property stems from the virtue of being a purported tenant of Mr. Amalendu Biswas. However, no material has been placed on record along with the chargesheet which indicates that the complainant was a tenant in the property at any point of time. Surprisingly, the complainant has not even given a statement in pursuance to her complaint. On the contrary, the said Amalendu Biswas in his statement has stated that the complainant had come to see the property, meaning thereby that the complainant was not a tenant in the property but only a prospective tenant when the FIR was registered. Therefore, the material on record indicates that on the date of the alleged offence, the complainant had no right to enter the property. In fact, the induction of the complainant as tenant in the property would have been in violation of the injunction passed by the Trial Court.”
Resultantly, the Bench holds in para 26 that, “In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that all that the Appellant-accused did was to enforce what he bonafidely thought was his lawful right over the property in terms of the injunction order passed by the Trial Court. This Court is also of the opinion that the allegations in the FIR and the material on record at best constitute a cause of action for filing a suit for injunction and/or an application seeking modification of the interim order already in subsistence or an application for the relief of ingress and egress in the pending suit.”
Ostensibly, the Bench then directs and holds in para 27 that, “Consequently, this Court is of the view that criminal proceedings against the Appellant-accused for offences punishable under Sections 341, 354C, 506 of IPC cannot be permitted to continue.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 28 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Before parting with this case, this Court would like to emphasise that where there is a pending civil dispute between the parties, the Police and the Criminal Courts must be circumspect in filing a chargesheet and framing charges respectively. In a society governed by rule of law, the decision to file a chargesheet should be based on the Investigating Officer’s determination of whether the evidence collected provides a reasonable prospect of conviction. The Police at the stage of filing of Chargesheet and the Criminal Court at the stage of framing of Charge must act as initial filters ensuring that only cases with a strong suspicion should proceed to the formal trial stage to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system. The tendency of filing chargesheets in matters where no strong suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system. It forces Judges, court staff, and prosecutors to spend time on trials that are likely to result in an acquittal. This diverts limited judicial resources from handling stronger, more serious cases, contributing to massive case backlog. Undoubtedly, there can be no analysis at the charge framing stage as to whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal, but the fundamental principle is that the State should not prosecute citizens without a reasonable prospect of conviction, as it compromises the right to a fair process.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 29 that, “In the present case, the Police and the Trial Court should have been cognizant that as there was a pending civil dispute with regard to the property in question as well as a prior subsisting injunction order and the complainant had refused to make any judicial statement, strong suspicion founded on legally tenable material/evidence was absent.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 30 that, “Keeping in view the aforesaid, the present Appeal is allowed and the impugned Judgment and Order is set aside as well as the Appellant-accused is discharged from G.R. Case No. 223 of 2020 (arising out of Bidhannagar North Police Station FIR No. 50 of 2020).”
Sanjeev Sirohi