1. The suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, relates to two plots of land known in the case as the ‘upper’ and the ‘lower’ plots. These plots were put for sale as being the property of the first defendant and the plaintiffs then brought this suit for a declaration of their title. As regards the lower plot, the Munsif found that from 1897 up to the date of the present suit, brought in 1910, it was under the control of the defendant, and on appeal the District Judge said in 1897, that is, more than twelve years before the institution of this suit, the defendant explicitly objected to the plaintiffs’ application for permission to the Municipal Board and he set up a title of his own and, thereafter, enjoyed possession. I am asked to read this as a finding that the defendant held possession from time to time only. But it appears to me that the District Judge intended to hold that the defendant had continuous possession over the lower plot. Although he may not have been right in his construction of the Munsif’s judgment, I must accept the finding of the District Judge that the first defendant held adverse possession of the lower plot for more than twelve years.
2. With regard to the upper plot, which is house property, the District Judge has decided in favour of the defendant, on the strength of a registered document, more than thirty years old, being a deed of sale of property adjoining the upper land. In that deed, the upper land is described as the property of the defendant’s ancestors. The Munsif held that the sale-deed was inadmissible. But the District Judge admitted it on the strength of the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ningawa v. Bharmappa 23 B. 63. The latest decision on the question is that of Abdullah v. Kunja Behari Lal 14 C.L.J. 467; 16 C.W.N. 252; 12 Ind. Cas. 149 in which it was held that a deed of this kind was admissible as evidence of the title to the adjoining plot referred to therein. It was held that the document was admissible under Section 32 Clause (3). Several cases are cited in support of this view. I am not prepared to differ from this decision and it appears to me that the document may also be admissible under Section 13, if, as is now generally held, the word “right” in Section 13 is not confined to an incorporeal right. The document in question being admissible, it is net for me in second appeal to say that the District Judge ought not to have treated it as sufficient evidence. Further, if it is admitted, it is clearly of much greater value than modern documents which came into existence after the question of title had become a matter of dispute. I am bound to accept the finding of the lower Appellate Court. I dismiss the appeal with costs.