It is most imperative to note that the Indore Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court while removing all layers of doubts on a particular legal point and while ruling on such a very important particular legal point has in a most learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Yug Dharma Public School vs Employees Provident Fund Organisation in Misc. Petition No. 4278 of 2022 that was finally pronounced on December 1, 2022 has reiterated that applicability of the Limitation Act would be barred in cases governed by a Special Act which provides for the provision of limitation period and its extension. It must be mentioned here that the Single Judge Bench of Hon’ble Shri Justice Subodh Abhyankar added that even if the provisions of the Limitation Act are not specifically excluded, its operation would be barred when the Special Act consists of the provisions for limitation period. No denying it.
At the very outset, this commendable, cogent, composed and convincing judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench of Hon’ble Shri Justice Subodh Abhyankar sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “This petition has been filed by the petitioner – Yug Dharma Public School under Article 226 r/w 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 28.07.2022, passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT), Jabalpur wherein, the petitioner’s appeal filed under Rule 7 of the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 has been rejected solely on the ground of its limitation as according to Rule 7, the limitation of 60 days is provided which can be extended to further 60 days’ period, whereas, the appeal has been preferred after a period of 15 days of the extended period of limitation.”
Needless to say, the Bench then observes in para 6 that, “Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.”
Be it noted, the Bench then notes in para 7 that, “So far as the Rule 7 of the Rules of 1997 is concerned, the same reads as under:-
“7. Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal.— (1) Every appeal filed with the Registrar shall be accompanied by a fee of Rupees five hundred to be remitted in the form of Crossed Demand Draft on a nationalized bank in favour of the Registrar of the Tribunal and payable at the main branch of that Bank at the station where the seat of the said Tribunal situated.
(2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.
Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days.
Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless he has deposited with the Tribunal a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing 75% of the amount due from him as determined under Section 7-A. Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under Section 7-O.” (emphasis supplied).”
It would be worthwhile to note that the Bench then clearly states in para 8 that, “A perusal of the aforesaid Rule clearly reveals that the limitation to file an appeal is 60 days which can be extended for a further period of 60 days subject to sufficient cause being shown.”
What’s more, the Bench then enunciates in para 9 that, “Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is no specific exclusion of Limitation Act, 1963 in the aforesaid provision and thus, the extended period of 60 days can still be extended to condone the delay and the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be maintainable. However, so far as the decision rendered in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise (supra) is concerned, the relevant paras 16, 18 & 32 of the same reads as under:-
16) Reliance was placed to Section 5 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act which read as under:
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. – Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”
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“29. Savings.- (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 and Section 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
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18. Learned Additional Solicitor General relying on the judgment of this Court in Union of India vs. M/s Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470 contended that in the absence of specific exclusion of the Limitation Act in the Central Excise Act, in lieu of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Section 5 of the same is applicable even in the case of reference application to the High Court.
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32) As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35 EE, 35G Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. (emphasis supplied).”
Most significantly, the Bench then minces no words to state unequivocally in para 10 what forms the real cornerstone of this notable judgment stating that, “A perusal of the aforesaid decision relied upon by the counsel for the respondents clearly reveals that when a particular Act itself provides for limitation period and also the extended period of limitation, the provisions of Limitation Act cannot be invoked as the applicability of the Limitation Act is barred by the operation of the special Act. In such circumstances, even if under Rule 7, the provisions of Limitation Act are not specifically excluded, in the light of the extended period of limitation contained in the same, it cannot be said that the Limitation Act would be applicable.”
Furthermore, the Bench then observes in para 11 that, “So far as the decision by the Calcutta High Court in the case of C D Steel Pvt. Ltd. is concerned, that the Act of 1952 is beneficial legislature and should be dealt with leniently , with due respect to the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court, this Court begs to defer with the aforesaid preposition in the light of the decision in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise (supra) and even otherwise, as has been rightly pointed out by the counsel for the respondents that the Act of 1952 is a beneficial legislation not for the employers but, for the employees and in such circumstances also, the aforesaid decision in the case of C D Steel Pvt. Ltd. and others (Supra) cannot be relied upon by this Court.”
Moving on, the Bench then hastens to add in para 12 pointing out that, “The petitioner has also relied upon the decision in the case of Superintending Engineer (Supra) but it is found that in the aforesaid case, the question before the Supreme Court was of the interpretation of Section 48 of Value Added Tax Act, 2005 and on perusal of Section 48 clearly reveals that there is no such extended period of limitation. In view of the same, the decision relied upon by the petitioner is of no avail.”
As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 13 that, “Resultantly, this Court is of the considered opinion that no illegality has been committed by the learned Judge of the Appellate Court in passing the impugned order by dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 14 that, “Resultantly, the petition being devoid of merits, is hereby dismissed.”
In conclusion, we thus see that the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has made it indubitably clear that the applicability of the limitation Act is barred when the Special Act provides for the limitation period along with its extension. Of course, all the courts must definitely always pay heed to what the Court has held in this leading case so very clearly, cogently and convincingly! No denying it!
Sanjeev Sirohi