Online courses on Cyber Psychology & Cyber crimes affecting children and teenagers from 3rd July 2020 by ISAC

Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) is India’s leading cyber security non-profit foundation and a Public-Private-Partner with NCIIPC, Government of India. Information Sharing and Analysis Center was setup in 2011,  is a registered not-for-profit foundation, focused on solving everyday cyber security challenges that impacts individuals and organizations at every stage of their growth using data analytics.
It  creates credible workforce for the Industry by means of unique capacity building programs. Its  mandate includes increasing information sharing among various agencies by creating straight forward platforms. ISAC conducts awareness programmes in Cyber Security specially focusing on the cyber crimes against kids in addition to many training programmes.

The Cyber Crime Intervention Officers’ (CCIO ) course is for parents, teachers, counsellors, lawyers, and LEAs to provide them with essential background on cyber crimes and cyber laws. The course lets one detect early signs of problems in school children and teenagers affected by their online activities and equipments for timely and decisive intervention.

On certification, one may volunteer to be part of the national network for cyber crime prevention, where the profile is shared with Law enforcement agencies and cyber crime cells across India. After the completion of the course, one will receive an ID card as shown above, which can be used while dealing with agencies and victims of cyber crimes.

One can become a part of the established network of existing Intervention Officers from across India, assisting law enforcement agencies in dealing with cyber crimes and their repercussions.

Details of the Online Course : 

Start Date: 3rd July 2020

Course Contents:

  • Children behaving abnormally online – case studies and lessons
  • Negative relationships online – How it impacts family
  • Social Isolation – offline and online issues
  • Low self-esteem and depression – tracking early signs online
  • The tendency for violence from online activities – how to spot the signs and prevent them
  • Internet Gaming Disorder– identifying addiction and other risks
  • Paedophiles online – How to protect children
  • Addiction – various types and what to do about them
  • Tech abuse – how to counsel children and parents
  • Sextortion, Cyber bullying and other online crimes – how to deal with it
  • Virtual girlfriends – how to tell if the children are involved
  • Cyberchondria – Medical self-diagnosis online and its risks
  • The Deep web – What is it
  • Criminal Propaganda – Steps to prevent it
  • Guiding victims affected by cyber crime
  • Tools and techniques to monitor children for online safety effectively
  • Fundamental IT Laws that every teacher and parent must know
  • Counselling victims of cyber crimes
  • Interacting and supporting cops and lawyers with cyber crime cases
  • Steps you can take to enhance cyber security awareness in schools

Further Details on:
Website : https://www.isac.io
One may use https://rzp.io/l/getccio to register and get 10% concession.

The Legal Stance of Online Casinos in India

India is one of the countries with archaic gambling and online gaming laws. Even with the world moving swiftly towards a more flexible viewpoint as regards games of skill, particularly casino games, India’s online gaming law is still very vague. It can even be called non-existent as the current government is not putting any efforts into the gambling laws.

While the confusion as to what type of gambling activity is legal continues in the country, it is quite obvious that Indians are in love with online gaming. According to recent stats published by ICSS (International Centre for Sports Security), the worth of the Indian betting market is over $130 billion. After going through this piece, do not forget to participate in legal online gambling in India at Lucky Dice.

Legality of Online Gambling in India

The outlook of the Indian government as regards online betting and gambling is still a grey area. About four sports were given total betting approval by the government, while the other sports of similar characters as the approved sports were not given any betting approvals. Sports like rummy and Horse racing are regarded as games of skill and are free to wager on but other games like poker and cricket as seen as games of luck and they are viewed differently by the Indian lawmakers.

One major grey area in the gaming laws of India is the Poker. It is very surprising that games like the Texas Hold’em and Teen Patti (flush) is prohibited while Rummy can be wagered on. It is even more surprising that horse racing is allowed to be wagered on due to its classification as a skill game, yet cricket betting is prohibited. Interestingly, both horse racing and cricket share the same skill set.

The days of Matka gaming are long gone in India. What you will find these days are only a few games to wager on. Betting on such games is also found in particular states. Presently lottery, online rummy, online poker, horse racing, and a few gaming platforms are legal in India.

 

The Different State Laws on Gambling in India

If you are a regular online game player in India, you will notice that states in India have their individual gambling laws, even with the existence of centralized Acts. So, why are there different gambling laws in different states in India? The answer to this question is quite straightforward; the constitution of India, particularly in the 7th schedule gives states the power to make regulations and policies as regards betting and gambling in their various states. This means that the 7th schedule gives states the power to legalize online gaming and gambling if they wish to do so.

All the state governments in India can enact gambling laws as well as regulate gaming activities in their individual states according to their discretion. In addition, the Central government is prohibited from intervening in the proceedings of any of the states. With the diversity in the tribes in India and twenty-nine different states, one can only think about how diverse the gambling laws will be. Up till this very moment, only thirteen states have legalized lotteries while the rest have enacted several laws prohibiting gambling. Amongst the states that have legalized gambling are Sikkim and Goa.

 

Casino Gaming In Goa

There have been two significant amendments to the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976. The amendments to the law legalize different gambling games. According to the amendments, slot machines and electronic amusements are allowed in certain locations in the states. The games authorized include offshore gaming and several table games. As of 2011, Goa could boast of numerous offshore casinos and 7 land based casinos.

 

Casino Gaming in Sikkim

Another state that legalized gambling in India is Sikkim. It is in fact the second state to do that. According to the Sikkim Casino Games (Control and Tax Rules) 2002, the government of Sikkim has the power to grant gaming licenses to casino operators and online gaming platforms.

This is the first state to legalize internet gambling in India. Following the 2002 law, Sikkim started handing out licenses to online casino operators whose servers are within the state. The licenses issued by the state of Sikkim include sports betting, lottery and casino gaming. The belief is that when the gaming operators become fully operational in Sikkim, players from other states will be allowed to legally wager there. The laws regulating gambling in Sikkim has made betting giants like Betfair and WilliamHill to watch the Indian betting market with keen interest.

Democracy cannot function with judicial review not being there, it is an essential component of the constitution: – Shri KK Venugopal, Attorney General for India

Pradosh Shetty

After the grand success of “Dattopant Thengadi Lecture Series”, Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad (ABAP) announced the commencement of its new online lecture series in the name of an eminent jurist and academician, Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon and the opening lecture of the series was delivered by Shri KK Venugopal (Attorney General for India and Senior Advocate) on “Contours of Judicial Review”

The Attorney General for India is known for not mincing words while talking about the judiciary and how it chooses to operate out of its constitutional purview, and contrary to its finding in various precedents. He, therefore, started his observation by noting, “Supreme Court has done a tremendous amount of work. It has practically tried to wipe away tears from the eyes of the poor… At the same time, it has, in many cases, according to me, exercised powers which can never be termed as judicial adjudication or even within the bounds of judicial activism.”

Mr. Venugopal then began tracing the confrontations of the judiciary with the other branches like the executive and the legislature dating back to the 1950s when the said the government chose to strike down land reform laws on a “strict and liberal interpretation of the constitution”.

He referred to how the Golaknath Case acts as a cornerstone for judicial review and noted the observations made in it, that article 368 of the Indian Constitution cannot be used for amending the constitution. So, when the parliament made certain amendments, it looked as if the court had bowed down to the whims of the parliament.

However, in 1973, a 13-judge bench judgment, with 7-6 Majority in Kesavananda Bharati case, declared that the basic structure is immutable and if amendments are made to the constitution which sought to cripple the basic structure, the court would have no choice but to intervene and strike down the said amendment.

He then went on to mention how Alexander Bickel had described the Supreme court of the USA as the least dangerous branch. However, in Ld. Attorney General’s opinion, he would describe the Indian Supreme Court as “the most powerful branch as they can sit in judgments for the other two branches and have the power to strike down their laws and directions.”

Mr. Venugopal mentioned that the source of vast powers of judicial review was Articles 32, 142, and 226 of the Indian Constitution and further reflected upon the present status of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India. He remarked, “Today we find, during the time of COVID-19, the cases that are filed, I mean.. transport all the migrants from one part of the country to another. Unless you have an Aladdin’s lamp and rub it, you cannot suddenly transport. Is it not part of policymaking? … One’s heart is pained at the fate (of the migrants) but the Government is doing whatever is necessary for that purpose.”

He noted that there is a need for the judiciary to exercise restraint, and the concept of constitutional morality which is being used as the new go-to weapon in the armoury of judicial review, should be relooked into. He remarked that Sabarimala case acts as a perfect example where two different judges (J. Chandrachud and J. Indu Malhotra) had concluded with two different views using the same tool of “Constitutional Morality”.

Whilst a question was asked in the context of the trend, whether the idea of Judicial Activism promotes the idea of “Anti-Democracy”. He quipped; “Democracy cannot function with judicial review not being there, it is an essential component of the constitution”.

He went on to add that in separation of powers, which play an important role, none of the branches are more powerful than the other. However, the judiciary is the final interpreter of the constitution and in practice, the power given to them is to test the validity of the law created by the parliament.

Whilst talking about the Judges not being elected persons, he remarked that irrespective of that notion“the quality, integrity, and knowledge should be of the highest quality for the judges at the Supreme Court.”

Mr. Venugopal concluded the lecture noting that “the Bar Council of India should ensure that all law schools in India should be at par with the National Law Schools when it comes to quality and opportunities.”

Mr. Purushaindra Kaurav, the Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh, after the completion of the lecture, tweeted; “Adhivakta Parishad has taken a very useful initiative of online lectures by eminent speakers in the field of law. Today we must hear the highest law officer of the country i.e. Shri K.K Venugopal who is the direct or indirect mentor of many of us like me.”

This demonstrates how Mr. KK. Venugopal has unequivocally touched upon the lives of every lawyer in the country with his nuanced knowledge and contribution to the field of law with his top-notch courtcraft techniques.

This being a lecture series dedicated to Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon, Prof Anirban Mazumder & Prof Shameek Sen of NUJS Kolkata, who had the good fortune of working with Prof. NR Madhava Menon and having been his students, made these thoughtful & heartfelt comments about their mentor during the lecture.

“While Prof. Menon’s most significant contribution has been universally acknowledged to be towards the reformation of legal education and its pedagogy, I will humbly like to flag his most telling contribution to my own life. Having been his student, I have had the privilege of learning my greatest life lesson, “Think like a lawyer, speak like a lawyer”. When the entire world is getting devoured and swayed by the scourge of misinformation and the systematic loss of analytical abilities and critical thinking is conjuring them into believing in the hyper-real and the componential, Prof. Menon’s prophetic words find a constant resonance inside me. As an academic, I definitely try to keep THAT flame of independent thinking alive in me.” – Prof. Shameek Sen, WBNUJS.

“Prof. Menon was an institution in himself, he single-handedly changed the landscape of legal education in India. Whatever little NUJS has achieved, undoubtedly, the credit goes to him” – Prof. Anirban Majumdar, NUJS

The entire lecture can be viewed on YouTube here-

 

Pradosh Shetty is a 5th year Law Student at Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad.

Online Lecture Series : Dattopant Thengadi Lecture Series

In order to utilize this lockdown period and for the benefit of lawyers, our organization is organizing an ‘Online Lecture Series’ in the name of ‘Dattopant Thengadi Lecture Series’ wherein a Senior Advocate, ASG or a Prominent Legal Personality share his views on a given subject/topic.

In this Lecture Series till now we have organized 10 lectures which have been broadcasted live on Social Media Platforms. The timing of live lecture remains by 6.00 PM on daily basis from Monday to Saturday. Presently we are having more than 8,000 subscribers on YouTube.

Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, Mr. Siddharth Luthra, Senior Advocate, Mr. K.V. Vishvanathan, Senior Advocate, Mr. Sajan Poovyya, Senior Advocate, Ms. Pinki Anand, ASG, Mr. R. Venkatramani, Senior Advocated, Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG and Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Senior Adv etc have enlighten the thousands of lawyers with their views on the different topics on the platform of Adhivakta Parishad in this ‘Dattopant Thengadi Lecture Series.

In the furthereance, of present ‘Lecture Series’ today, i.e. on 01.05.2020 Mr. C.S. Vaidhyanathan, Sr. Advocate will be sharing his views @ 6.00 PM on the topic of ‘Dispute Resolution as a Service and the New Normal’, and same will be broadcasted live on YouTube, Facebook and for tomorrow Mr. Harish Salve, Senior Advocate will be sharing his views.

Chasm with The President Jair Bolsonaro leads to dismissal of Health Minister.

 

Vanshika Jain

At a time when the health care centres are at verge of collapsing in Brazil, the ventilators and beds in the emergency room of Amazona are over 95 percent occupied, the renowned soccer stadium of Rio De Janerio has been converted temporarily into a hospital, the gravediggers of the largest country of South America are working overtime to bury the dead bodies, the corona virus mark has surpassed 30,000 in the country. Amid this Jair Bolsonaro, President of Brazil has frequently downplayed the severity of the global epidemic.

He advised that corona virus is just a “little flu” and the measures taken by the Health Ministry to curb it are unnecessary and economically harmful. Furthermore he said the outbreak is being blown out of proportion, insisting that economy should come into normality.

Yesterday Bolsonaro dismissed Mandetta, the Health minister of Brazil who from being an unsung minister in the cabinet became the most popular minster of Brazil due to the good work which the Health Ministry was doing to contain the pandemic in the country.

It is speculated that this decision came after the health minster criticized the President on a popular news show for refusing to obey the social distancing guidelines laid down by the Health Ministry.

This decision of banning Mandetta did now go well with the Brazilians as they came out of their windows banging pots and pans. Following this many ministers resigned from their post as a sign of protest.

The health ministry’s response in containing the epidemic was rated “good” or “great” by 76 percent of Brazilians, this data was submitted by Pollster Datafolha.

On several occasions Bolsonarao was seen not following the guidelines of World Health Organization and the Health Ministry of his own country. One of the occasions being, last week he visited a hospital with Mandetta, walked into the crowd, took off his mask and extended his hand for a supporter to kiss and autographed jerseys thus openly disobeying the social distancing guidelines

Naom Chomsky, an American linguistic said,” Bolsonarao competes with Trump to be the worst criminal on the planet.”

From the above instances it is clear that the President of Brazil is not acting as a responsible leader. He is not letting the Health Ministry do it’s work by meddling in between thus compromising the life’s of people of it’s nation for which he should be held accountable.

NCLAT exonerated the present Board of 63 moons of all the baseless allegations of oppression and mismanagement.

It is the right time to celebrate the big win for 63 moons as the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, has dismissed the plea of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) to supersede the Board of 63 moons technologies limited (formerly known as FTIL) under Section 397 of the Companies Act, 1956. The present 63 moons Board comprises of 4 former Secretaries IAS (Retd.), 1 former Supreme Court Judge, 1 former Bombay High Court Judge, 1 CA, 1 IIM-A Alumni, 1 noted Economist and 2 former Senior Bankers.

NCLAT has completely exonerated the present Board of 63 moons of all the baseless allegations of oppression and mismanagement.

On this occasion Mr. S. Rajendran, who is MD & CEO of 63 moons stated that “We are extremely happy to note that NCLAT has rejected MCA’s prayer to supersede the Board of 63 moons in connection with the payment default crisis that occurred at one of our subsidiaries, National Spot Exchange Ltd (NSEL) in 2013. The order has also given a clean chit to the current Board of 63 moons of any alleged misconduct or wrongdoing against the interest of its shareholders.”

Mr. Rajendran was shocked and surprised at NCLAT upholding the NCLT Chennai’s order on Section 388B and such sections against some of the past directors of 63 moons who were not even on the Board of NSEL i.e. Mr. Manjay Shah and Mr. Dewang Neralla. And strangely in case of Mr. Jignesh Shah, Section 388B was applied on the basis of material beyond the original petition filed by MCA in 2015. Shockingly, out of the three directors of 63 moons, only Mr. Jignesh Shah was on Board of NSEL and no Section 397 proceedings are initiated against NSEL nor any Section 388B is upheld against any other directors of NSEL including other directors of 63 moons who were also on NSEL Board. This complete contradiction is one of the many unexplained & unsubstantiated inconsistencies in the Order.

The NSEL payment crisis, occurred because of a well-crafted political conspiracy during UPA 2 era. It was due to continued targeting of Mr. Jignesh Shah which started in the earlier UPA Govt. by a powerful minister and his network of loyal bureaucrats, who failed in their duty and misled the Govt. for many such industry negative actions.

At this occasion Mr Rajendran stated that,“The operational part of judgement is being examined and all necessary steps will be taken as per the legal advice. We are very sure that ultimately truth shall prevail & justice will be done.”

 

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986

Before the enactment of this Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, a Muslim woman, who was divorced by or from her husband, was granted a right to livelihood from her quondam husband in the shape of maintenance under the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure until she remarried.
Parliament, with its supposed omniscience in law, may, in its professed omnipotence enact legislations to undo and set at naught the effect of any judicial decision of the Supreme Court or any other Court, however good and conducive to the welfare of the people that decision may be. But to borrow from Shakespeare, while it may be good to have giant’s power, it may not at all be good to use the same as a giant.

It is now well-settled, since the celebrated decision of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis,“ that right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution includes the right to livelihood. Before the enactment of this Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, a Muslim woman, who was divorced by or from her husband, was granted a right to livelihood from her quondam husband in the shape of maintenance under the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure until she remarried.

It is also equally well-settled, since the decisions of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi and in Olga Tellis, that no one, obviously including a Muslim divorced woman, can be deprived of the right to life or livelihood except by the procedure established by law, which must be reasonable, right, just and fair.

Would the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Righs on Divorce) Act of 1986, which apparently seeks to deprive a divorced Muslim woman of such right to maintenance from her former husband, and providing for maintenance to be paid by the former husband only for the period of iddat and thereafter to make her run after her own relatives one after the other and then ultimately to knock at the door of the Wakf Board, at all appear to be reasonable and to be a fair substitute for the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure? To put it in other words, whether deprivation of the Muslim divorced woman of her right to maintenance under the beneficial provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which are otherwise available to all other women in India, has been effected by a reasonable, right, just and a fair piece of law as enacted in the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986?

And if these provisions are much less beneficial than the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then a Muslim divorced woman has obviously been unreasonably discriminated and driven out from the protection of the benign provisions of the general law as enacted in Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which are available to a Hindu, Buddhist, ]ain, Parsee or Christian woman or a woman belonging to any other community.

Now except for the protection afforded by Art. 25(1) the provisions are patently violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution mandating equality

before and equal protection of laws to all persons otherwise similarly circumstanced, and also violative of Art. 15(1) of the Constitution which forbids any discrimination on the ground of religion, as the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986 would obviously apply to Muslim divorced women only and solely on the ground of their belonging to the Muslim religion. This criticism has been accepted (almost verbatim) by the Supreme Court in Danial Latifi v Union of India.

 

Danial Latifi v Union of India
The constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 was challenged in Danial Latifi.

A Constitutional Bench of five judges speaking through Rajendra Babu, ] noted that the purpose of the Act appears to be to allow the Muslim husband to retain his freedom of avoiding payment of maintenance to his erstwhile wife after divorce and the period of iddat, and thereby to reverse the decision in Shah Bano, but ironically the enactment actually codifies the very rationale contained in Drmial Latzfi.

At the outset the court noted that the Act in terms does not apply to a Muslim woman whose marriage is solemnised either under the Special Marriage Act 1954 or a Muslim woman whose marriage was dissolved either under the Divorce Act 1869 or the Special Marriage Act 1954 nor to the deserted and separated Muslim wives.

It was also made clear that to find out the personal law of Muslims with regard to divorced women’s rights, the starting point should be Shall Bano case and not the original texts or any other material all the more so when varying versions as to the authenticitv of the source are shown to exist.

The court held that if the provisions of the 1986 Act were read as less beneficial than the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then a divorced Muslim woman has obviously been unreasonably discriminated and got out of the protection of the provisions of the general law which are available to Hindu, Buddhist, ]ain, Parsi or Christian women or women belonging to any other community. The provisions would then be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution mandating equality and equal protection of law to all persons otherwise similarly circumstanced and also violative of Art. 15 of the Constitution which prohibits any discrimination on the ground of religion as the Act would obviously apply to Muslim divorced women only and solely on the ground of their belonging to the Muslim religion”.2° To avoid this result the court interpreted the Act by reading its provisions in a manner which would make it compatible with constitutional principles.

Sections 3 and 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 were the principal sections, under attack before the court. Section 3 opens up with a non-obstante clause overriding all other laws and provides that a divorced woman shall be entitled inter ailia to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the period of iddat by her former husband”. Section 4 provides that as long as the divorced woman has not remarried and is unable to maintain herself after the iddat period the Magistrate may order such of her relatives as would be entitled to inherit her property on her death according to Muslim law to pay such reasonable and lair maintenance to her; if they do not have the means then other relatives who do have the means and failing them the State Wakf Board.

The constitutional validity of these two sections was upheld through a process of ingenious interpretation. The court found first that the wordings of s. 3 of the Act indicated that the husband has two separate and distinct obligations:
(1) to make a “reasonable and fair provision” for his divorced wife; and (2) to provide “maintenance” for her?‘ Second it was held that the word “provision” in s. 3(1)(a) of the Act incorporates “mata” as a right of the divorced Muslim woman distinct from and in addition to mahr and maintenance for the iddat period. Third it found that the emphasis of s. 4 is not on the nature or duration of any such “provision” or “maintenance”, but on the time by which an arrangement for payment of provision and maintenance should be concluded, namely, “within the iddat period”.

Fourth, “nowhere has Parliament provided that reasonable and fair provision and maintenance is limited only for the iddat period and not beyond it”.

It would therefore ”extend to the whole life of the divorced wife unless she gets married for a second time”.3 Fifth, the court held “Section 4 of the Act refers only to payment of ‘maintenance’ and does not touch upon the ’provision’ to be made by the husband referred to in s. 3(1)(a) of the Act.”4 Consequently the right to have a fair and reasonable provision in her favour is a right enforceable against the woman’s former husband in addition to what he is obliged to pay as “maintenance” and so “there is no reason why such provision could not take the form of the regular payment of alimony to the divorced woman”. Finally it was held “what could be earlier granted by a Magistrate under 5. 125, CrPC would now be granted under the very Act itself This being the position, the Act cannot be held to be unconstitutional”.

Unfortunately, the court ignored the provisions of Art. 25 and its impact on personal laws for arriving at the same conclusion. It is arguable that the State is limited by Art. 25(2) to enact legislation to amend personal laws only for “social welfare and reform”. Further the legislation so enacted must be in compliance with fundamental rights.

Gajendragadkar, J. in Narasu Appa Mali, had said that the State Legislature can take gradual steps for social welfare and reform but cannot introduce distinctions or classifications which are unreasonable, irrational or oppressive. Since the 1986 Act is certainly neither a measure for “social welfare and reform” under Art. 25(1) nor a measure in compliance with the principle so enunciated, it is unconstitutional.

The decision although it reaffirmed Shah Bano, strangely did not cause any protest and is now the accepted as the authority for the proposition that that the powers and jurisdiction of a Magistrate under the 1986 Act are co-extensive with the those under s. 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure as far as a Muslim divorced woman’s right to
maintenance is concerned.

Even prior to Danial Latifi’s case the Supreme Court had already tempered the impact of s. 4 which provides for the right of a divorced woman to claim maintenance sequentially against various relatives and ultimately against the State Wakf Board, by directing that “she would instead be entitled to plead and prove such relevant facts in one proceeding, as to the inability of her relations aforementioned, maintaining her and directing her claim against the State Wakf Board in
the first instance” .

At present, as a result of the decision in Danial Latifi, according to some High Courts9 the Muslim divorced wife has higher rights than her counter parts in other religions.

Like other divorced wives under Section 125, CrPC, she can get monthly maintenance under s. 3 of the Act provided she is unable to maintain herself. Even when she is able to maintain herself and is even a millionairess, she can get the capitalised payment of amounts under s. 3 of the Act which other divorced wives cannot. Again while the remarriage puts an end to the claim of other divorced wives, the Muslim divorced wife on re-marriage can keep the capitalised amount with herself with no liability to return the same. Thus viewed from any angle, the Muslim divorced wife under her personal

law (i.e. the Act) has larger and superior rights than what her counter parts of other religions have under s. 125 of the Code”.

The Act, however, does not in any way affect the rights of the Muslim children to claim maintenance from the father and the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure can obviously be invoked by or on behalf of such children. Section 3(1)(b) of the Act, no doubt, provides that a divorced women shall be entitled to, where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after divorce a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children. But as has been held,“ and rightly too, the right under s. 3(])(b) is a right of the divorced woman hersclfand is incidental to the divorce and the said provisions can in no way affect the operation of the provisions of Chapter IX providing maintenance for minor children.

Minors As Partners of Firm

Indian Partnership Act, 1932 defines persons as a partner who have agreed to share profits of the business carried on by all are any of them acting for all.[1]

A minor is a person who hasn’t yet attainted the age of majority according to the Indian Majority Act, 1875.[2] It is stated that a person who is domiciled in India will attain majority at the age of eighteen in the Indian Majority Act.[3]

The Indian Partnership Act governs the admittance of a minor into the partnership in Section 30. This section deals with the rights and liabilities of a minor who is admitted un the partnership.[4] A deeper reading of the provision, specifically section 30(1) makes it very clear that a minor cannot be admitted in the partnership as a full-fledged partner, but with the consent of the other partners, a minor can be admitted in the partnership to the benefits of the partnership.

It is an established principle that a minor is incompetent to enter in a contract, and therefore, a contract of partnership cannot be entered with a minor.[5] The same was also assented by the apex court of the country in the Dwarkadas Case[6] and the Hardutt Ray Case[7].

Minors Admitted Only For Benefits

The general principle has been laid down by Section 11 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872, where it is discussed that who is competent to a contract and thereby stating that a minor doesn’t have the ability to contract.[8] The same was supported in the Andhra Pradesh High judgement of Addepally Nageshwar Rao[9].

The Indian Partnership Act was drafted by a special committee. Before the enactment of The Indian Partnership Act the provision in partnership was governed by The Indian Contract Act and therefore the special committee thought that there was no requirement to deviate from the principle of incapability of a minor to enter into a contract of partnership as provided by Section 11 of The Indian Contract Act.

Following this the special committee did not allow the minors to become a partner in a partnership, although they allowed a minor to be admitted to the benefits of a partnership with the consent of all the existing partners in the partnership.[10]

The same kind of principle is also pronounced in judicial pronouncements like the S. C. Mandal case.[11] It was observed that under Section 4 of The Indian Partnership Act[12], a firm means a group of people who has entered into a contract of partnership among themselves and reading it with Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act,[13] it can be interpreted that a minor cannot be a part of a partnership contract.

It was held that a minor can only be in the partnership only for the benefits of the partnership. It also stated that there should partnership between two major partners before a minor can be admitted to its benefits.

The high court of Allahabad even declared a partnership deed to be void where the rights and liabilities of a partnership firm was divided between the minor and majors in the partnership.[14] The court held that in the present situation not only the benefits of the partnership but also the liabilities of the partnership are being put on the minor which is contradictory to the Indian Partnership Act[15].

Although the various judgements in the same line was there but still there was a huge confusion regarding the question as to can a minor become a full-fledged partner in the partnership firm as there were some contrary judgement to this effect also.

Finally, the Supreme Court in the landmark judgement of Commissioner of Income Tax vs D. Khaitan and Co.[16] took a legal stand that in a situation where a minor is made a full-fledged partner in the firm in that case the partnership cannot be registered by the Income Tax Department.

In case the partnership has to be registered by the Income Tax Department then a totally new contract has to be formulated where the minor is to be admitted only to the benefits of the firm, and the old contract will be invalid with the new contract coming in force. It was also stated that the new contract has to specifically mention that the minor has been admitted in the partnership only for benefits and no the minor is not liable for any losses.

Even in the judgement of Banka Mal Lajja Ram & Co. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi[17], it was held that even if all the other partners of the partnership consent in making the minor a full-fledged partner still that can be brought into effect.

In the Guwahati High Court judgement of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Kedarmall Keshardeo[18] the court held that a contract deed is valid when a guardian enters into a partnership on behalf of the minor but again no liability should be imposed on the minor, even the income of a minor from the firm should not be considered for the purpose of income tax.

The courts even came to the view that when a guardian is contracting for a minor then the damages must be calculated in the basis of what damage the guardian has suffered and not the minor.[19] It is also established by the courts that if a minor is contracting through a guardian then the benefits that are being conferred that has to be accepted by the guardian[20], but the minor may do away with the agreement id it is not entered for his benefits.[21]

Rights And Liability of A Minor

Section 30(2) of the Indian Partnership Act states that a minor is entitled to share of profits and the property of the firm which may have decided at the time the minor was admitted to the benefits of the partnership.[22] Under this provision, a minor has the right to inspect the accounts of the partnership but to that fact does not have any right to inspect other documents of the partnership.

Even in Section 30(3) of the Indian Partnership Act a minor can only be liable to the extent of his share in the partnership and can’t be liable personally to the partnership for the losses of the firm.[23] Even the same notion was taken in a Calcutta High Court judgement where it was stated that the creditors can only recover the amount from a minor to the extent of his share in the firm, but they can’t sue the minor personally, this benefit is not enjoyed by the major member in the firm.[24]

The Supreme Court went a step ahead when it adjudged that a minor can’t be declared insolvent even if the major partners of the firm are declared insolvent.[25] The apex court also came out with the same view as to when can a minor sue the other full-fledged partner in the partnership.[26]

Section 30(4) of The Indian Partnership Act states that a minor can sue the other partners of the firm for his benefits in the firm but the same right is not available to the full-fledged partners of the firm. The provision also states that in the case the minor severs all ties with the firm then valuation of his share is to be done according to Section 48 of The Indian Partnership Act[27] as far as possible.

Position of Minor Attaining Majority

According to section 30(5) of The Indian Partnership Act, a minor has two option after attaining majority, either he can sever the connection with the firm or become a full-fledged partner in the firm.[28] The minor has to make dis decision within six months of his attaining majority.

The minor has to furnish a public notice specified under Section 72 on The Indian Partnership Act[29] if he chooses to become a full-fledged partner. The minor continues to enjoy the rights as a minor till he makes his final decision as to he will join the partnership as a full-fledged partner or sever the connection from the partnership.

Section 7(a) of The Indian Partnership Act also states that after a minor partner has been admitted in the partnership as a full-fledged partner then he will be liable not only for the future liabilities of the firm but also the past liability from the date of his admission in the partnership.[30]

Section 7(b) states that a the share of the minor after he attains majority will be the same which was given to him when he was a minor as because when a minor chooses to become a full-fledged member of the partnership, there is no break in the partnership and it continues as it is just that the liabilities of being a full-fledged partner are now upon him.

Section 8 of The Indian Partnership Act[31] states that if the minor declines to continue as a full-fledged member of the partnership he will be liable for all the liabilities of the partnership till he furnishes the public notice as per Section 72 of The Indian Partnership Act. After serving the ties with the partnership, the minor may file a suit as to recover the benefits he was entitled to.

Conclusion
From the above discussion, we can say that a partnership firm cannot be formed with a minor as the only other member. The relationship of the partnership arises from a contract. According to Section 11 of The Indian Contract Act[32], a minor is not competent to a contract. Even in the Dwarkadas Khetan case[33] the Supreme Court of the country declares that a minor cannot be a full-fledged partner in the firm. The apex court in Shah Mohandas Case[34] stated that a minor may be admitted in the firm only for its benefits.

End-Notes:

  1. Section 4 of The Indian Partnership Act, 1932
  2. http://admis.hp.nic.in/himpol/Citizen/LawLib/C0141.htm; (last viewed on 22/3/19 at 09:54)
  3. Section 3 of The Indian Majority Act, 1875
  4. Section 30 of The Indian Partnership Act, 1932
  5. Shriram Sardarmal Didwani vs. Gourishankar Alias Rameshwar, AIR 1961 Bom 136
  6. Commissioner of Income Tax vs R. Dwarkadas And Co., [1971] 80 ITR 283 Bom
  7. Hardutt Ray Gajadhar Ram vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1950] 18 ITR 106 (All)
  8. Section 11 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872
  9. Addepally Nageswara Rao vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, [1971] 79 ITR 306 AP
  10. Section 30(1) of The Indian Partnership Act, 1932
  11. Sanyasi Charan Mandal vs. Krishnadhan Banerjee, 1922 (24) BOMLR 700
  12. Supra, Note 1
  13. Supra, Note 8
  14. Hardutt Ray Gajadhar Ram vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1950] 18 ITR 106 (All)
  15. Supra, Note 4
  16. Supra Note 4
  17. Banka Mal Lajja Ran and Co. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, AIR 1953 Punj 270 (DB)
  18. Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Kedarmall Kessardeo, AIR 1968 Gau 68
  19. Khirnji Kuverji vs Lalji Karamasi, AIR 1941 Bom 129
  20. Commissioner of Income Tax Mysore, Bangalore vs Shah Mohandas Sodhuram, AIR 1966 SC 15
  21. Duaram Vir vs Jagan Nath, AIR 1968 Punj 84
  22. Section 30(2) of The Indian Partnership Act, 1932
  23. Section 30(3) of The Indian Partnership Act, 1932
  24. Sanyasi Charan Mandal vs. Asutosh Ghose, AIR 1915 Cal 482
  25. Shivagouda Ravji Patil and Ors. vs. Chandrakant Neelkanth Sedalge and Ors, AIR 1965 SC 212
  26. S. V. Chandra Pandian and Ors. vs S. V. Sivalinga Nadar and Ors., (1993) 1 SCC 589
  27. Mode of settlement of accounts between partners
  28. Section 30(5) of The Indian Partnership Act, 1932
  29. Mode of giving public notice
  30. Section 7(a) of The Indian Partnership Act, 1932
  31. Section 8 of The Indian Partnership Act, 1932
  32. Section 11 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872
  33. Supra Note 4
  34. Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Shah Mohandas Sadhuram, AIR 1966 SC 15

Devastating Effect Of The Domestic Violence Act 2005

Since ages the social status of women has remained pitiful and worrisome. The stance of the society towards feminine gender was not as broad as today. They were the victims of dominance in the hands of their husbands and in-laws, unfortunately the women had no other choice but to accept the enormity as their fate and sanction the ambush done daily on their dignity without any condemnation.

Many tolerated the same as fortune and the rest who came forward to report had to step back due to lack of concrete provisions in law and improper legislation or had to face the gravest aftermaths of their attempt which at times may cost them their life! In order to provide effective protection of rights to women who were victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family, the Protection of Women and Children from Domestic Violence Act 2005[i] enacted as a step towards providing women with tangible legal protection.

The said enactment was in concurrence with the situation and social status of women then, however, the situation at present is not as same as before in fact has reversed, progress of mankind always shows the other side of the coin which is both negative as well as positive. The improved status of women in society and the rising awareness about the rights and privileges available is no doubt a great social change but is accompanied by the excessive bloody wisdom; due to the laws being completely inclined towards women, women find it irresistible to misuse and take the undue advantage of law.

As a result women use the given legal protection as a weapon against men and harass them by taking disadvantage of the prevailing laws. The author in this article has tried to highlight the devastating effect of the misuse of the provions by the women which are enacted for the welfare of women.

The Act at the inception proved to be very fruitful; women audaciously came forward and reported the violence that they suffered. Also, women were made more aware about their rights and the legal remedy that they could avail at the time of adversaries; they also became aware about how they could safeguard themselves as they started acquiring more and more education eventually giving them a better platform for better world exposure.

But as rightly said all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely, the intention of the legislature entered demeaning stage when recently more of false cases were reported. In the recent time women started creating havoc by using the act as a tool or weapon to harass and blackmail men by registering false complaints against husband and his relatives with the alternate motive of extracting money.

Unfortunately the present law being gender specific there is no law to protect men [ii] from such melancholy, being a patriarchal and male dominated society the husband is left with very limited defences, the only remedy a man can avail at such time is either to defend the case and wait till the final judgement comes or file a concrete case against wife and prove her wrong. Mostly, the former remedy is the only one that can be adopted as the later one may get the husband into many complexities.

The primary intention of the legislature behind enacting gender specific law was to empower women and bring them at par with their male counter parts however, the law has not absolutely accomplished the objective of the legislature due to the presence of imperfections in it which in turned has become temptation for women to victimise themselves.

The most notable flaw in the act is that it lends itself to such easy misuse that women will find it hard to resist the temptation to teach a lesson to husband and his relatives and will file frivolous and false cases [iii] taking apt advantage of absence of any laws to protect men. The most prominent drawback of the act is that the definition[iv] of  domestic violence  is as stated in the act is very much ambiguous in nature.

The definition of  domestic violence  varies, depending on the context in which it is used. The meaning and interpretation of  violence  may vary from one instance to another. The same may be defined differently in medical, legal, political or social contexts. Though traditionally the definition of domestic violence is associated with physical violence yet the same is defined variedly in different parts of the world. For instance Merriam-Webster dictionary defines domestic violence as  the inflicting of physical injury by one family or household member on another also a repeated habitual pattern of such behaviour [v].

For instance the act includes  insults  and  jibes  under the definition of  verbal and emotional abuse . It might in some cases, be extended to mere domestic quarrels that were not intended to fall under the definition of mental and verbal abuse[vi]. Also, it is pertinent to note that unfortunately according to Domestic Violence Act, 2005 the aggrieved party is always  any women . Man does not come within the ambit of such definition.

Further, the  respondent  under the definition means any  adult male person , which means a complaint cannot be directed against women. However, it is not mandatory that the violence shall always be caused by the man on women.

In the matter of Dr N.G Dastane v/s Mrs S Dastane [vii] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the cruelty is of two types one is mental the other is physical. It might be true that physical is generally being perpetuated by the husband being a strong one but at the same time this can’t be said to be universally true. It is also vice versa in case of mental cruelty to the husband.

The term cruelty thus have a wider connotation and the term can be interpreted contingently as a consideration of those occurring which are yet to occur and which may not even occur. Women to book the husband falsely may interpret the term in the most dangerous way. Thus it is very pertinent to note that though the act has defined the term  domestic violence  albeit in a vague manner yet the concept of cruelty cannot specify for females only.

Another notable flaw is that the Magistrate is empowered to pass protection order[viii] which means that the magistrate can take measures to protect the women from any acts of violence that are even likely to take place in the future. The act further says that the complaint can be filed by any person other than the aggrieved person who has reason to believe that the violence has taken place. The act has certainly given women with too many rights under one roof.

The powers and discretion of the judicial officers too are wider in nature. The foremost action what court takes after receiving complaints of domestic violence is initiating the order of  stop violence order  or  Protection order  against the respondent. The intention of this order is to give a space free from violence to women facing domestic violence. It is in nature meant to be emergency law. If the respondent is disturbing the aggrieved in peaceful living in a shared household, the residence order [ix] which is in it a dangerous immunity conferred upon the women.

The another treacherous provision yet justified by the law is that the interim custody of the child also can be given to the aggrieved which puts the respondent in the fear as the visitation rights can also be denied in the  custody order . [x]

The prominent protection that gives wings to the ill-intentions of women is  monetary protection . Earlier, the genuine reason why women never raised their voice against their sufferings because they were economically dependent on their husband however, the condition is not the same now. Women too are educated and are economically self-reliant and at times are seen having more income than their male counter parts. The one who are indeed economically independent too harass their husbands by asking monetary reliefs by availing the benefit as provided under section 20(1) of the act. The women can avail the monetary relief, when the court is of the opinion to grant compensation to the victim for damages for injuries  compensation order  is issued.

The victim of domestic violence is also protected with monetary relief and the remedy to victim under any other civil or criminal court is not barred. In addition to this and exclusive of other provisions of law the jurisdiction of the magistrate to grant maintenance allowance is governed by section 125 of CrPC impliedly mandatory provision for maintenance and monetary relief was absolutely not required. The women who earn well also are seen taking undue advantage of the same on some or the other pretext.

The provision only tends to create multiplicity of proceedings and consequences which could be grossly unfair to both the parties. However, it is only the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936 which specifically provides the relief of maintenance to both husbands as well as to wives at par [xi].

Domestic violence is extremely complex and to report the same as what is happened is even more complex. The violence takes place within the four walls of the house and no one else can aptly state it other than the one who suffered it specifically in the country like India where there are no specific laws for the protection of men.

There are many laws for the protection of women Dowry Prohibition Act, Section 498A in Indian Penal Code i.e offense of cruelty by husband and relatives of husband, Section 125 in Code of Criminal Procedure Code i.e maintenance for wife protection of women from protection of Domestic Violence, whereas there is no provision like 125A in Criminal Procedure Code or 498 B in Indian Penal Code.

The specific laws are misused by women and are accompanied by the failure in the investigation mechanism. Courts too are not diligent while pronouncing orders and often fail to apply their minds. Nobody addresses the grievances of husbands and his relatives not even the society. The practice says real purpose of the women related specific laws are misused and thereby husband suffer for no fault[xii].

In Vijayalakshmi v. Punjab University[xiii] it was held that as a result of joint operation of Article (15) and (3), the state may discriminate in favour of women against men but it may not discriminate in favour of men against women. Wherein is known that protection against domestic violence is a civil right it cannot be forgotten that its misuse cannot be taken lightly [xiv].

The other view on the other hand argues that social problems if remedied by force may lead to stronger reactions from the respondents, which in the end may be detrimental to the existence of society itself [xv].

It is absolutely true that to keep a check on men some stringent measures are necessary but this needed to be brought about not by adding more and more laws in the statute books with ill-advised measures but through proper enforcement of legal frame-work. Due to few false cases all the genuine cases too loose the gravity of being real and true and at times may be neglected.

The false reports puts the society into a perplexing condition wherein to believe or not to believe becomes the question. There are true cases where women are trapped in atrocious marriage and brutal household environment; they suffer in the hands of their husbands and in-laws.

Even the most educated and dignified people commit the offence of Domestic violence and even the qualified and well behaved women become the victim of Domestic Violence, many women are victims of sexual harassments and marital rapes which may lose spotlight if constantly women would report those crimes which never took place. Thus, in reality it is not only the law but also the inappropriate implementation of law which is responsible for the critical imbalance as what is seen today in the society.

Thus, the Police authorities too should be alert and diligent enough while registering the complaints while taking initial action and while doing further investigation they must once check the veracity of the crime instead of merely following the protocol. The Courts too should bound themselves with a responsibility of delivering decisions which would be based on applicability of their prudent minds and not by any stereotypical mind-set. It is true that the world is changing speedily and so does the social status of women but how many of the women do actually get literate to empower themselves is a biggest question having the most subjective answer.

Today we see women talking about the so called gender equality, we see their aspiration to pursue all what is being pursued by their male counterparts, we see women talking of the independence and freedom, but how many of them do practice it in reality? In a country like India, unlike other religions marriage is sacrament but considering the present situation importance of the institution of marriage is diminishing which consequently is disturbing the culture of family, the one who suffers the most is children in such families.

Conclusion:
The present law needs a rational approach and shall go through a revision. The society changes at particular intervals and that the laws shall commiserate with the change. Bringing into force more and more laws is not the solution but implementing the already existing ones is what is required. Everyone right from the investigating authorities till the courts where justice is sought shall play their role diligently and try to strike a balance in society only then the misuse of law will not take place.

End-Notes

  1. To be referred to as  the Act  throughout the article.
  2. Section 2 (a) of the act provides the definition for aggrieved person which is  aggrieved person  means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent; the definition clearly indicates that the act provides specifically to women.
  3. John Enrich Edward Dalberg Available at http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/814115-absolute-power-corrupts-absolutely
  4. Section 3 of domestic Violence Act defines  Domestic Violence
  5. Available at http://www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/violence.
  6. Gosh & Choudhari, pg 323
  7. AIR 1975 SC 1534
  8. Section 18 of PWDVA 2005
  9. Section 19 of PWDVA 2005which retrains the husband from disposing of property or disturbing the possession of shared household, irrespective of her legal inequitable interest in it.
  10. Section 21 of PWDA 2005, the protection provided in the said section should be given diligently by the judicial authorities. Due to this there are chances of future of child getting affected.
  11. Under Section 24 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 either of the spouses, husband or wife can be granted relief if the court is satisfied that the applicant has no independent income sufficient for his or her support and necessary expenses of the proceedings pending under the Act Under Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 either Parsi wife or husband is entitled to claim expenses where the proceeding is pending under the Act
  12. P.K Das, law relating to cruelty to husband (2008) P.1
  13. AIR 2004 SC 3946
  14. http//:criticalanalysisof domesticviolenceLawinsection
  15. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science(IOSR-JHSS) Volume10, ISSUE 2 (Mar-Apr 2013), PP41-44 e-ISSN:2279-0837, P-ISSN:2279-0845

First Information Report (FIR) : Know more

The first information report means an information recorded by a police officer on duty given either by the aggrieved person or any other person to the commission of an alleged offence. On the basis of first information report, the police commences its investigation. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 defines as to what amounts to first information.

The said section reads as under:-

154. Information in cognizable cases

  1. Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer-in-charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.
  2. A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section
    (i) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.
  3. Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer-
    in-charge of police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned, who if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer-in-charge of the police station in relation to that offence.


The provision in section 154 regarding the reduction of oral statement to writing and obtaining signature of the informant to it, is for the purpose of discouraging irresponsible statement about criminal offences by fixing the informant with the responsibility for the statement he makes.

Refusal by the informant to sign the first information is an offence punishable under section 180 of the Indian Penal Code. The absence of signatures on the first information report by the informant, however, is not necessary to the extent that it will vitiate and nullify such report. The first information is still admissible in evidence.

In order to constitute an FIR in terms of section 154 of the Code. of Criminal Procedure, 1973 two conditions are to be fulfiUed:-
(a) what is conveyed must be an information; and
(b) that information should relate to the commission of a cognizable offence on the face of it.

In other words, FIR is only a complaint to set the affairs of law and order in motion and it is only at the investigation stage that all the details can be gathered. In one of the judgments, the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that the report of the crime which is persuading the police machinery towards starting investigation is FIR, subsequent reports are/were written, they are not hit under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and cannot be treated as such.

Who can File an FIR?

First Information Report (FIR) can be filed by any person. He need not necessarily be the victim or the injured or an eye-witness. First Information Report may be merely hearsay and need not necessarily be given by the person who has first hand knowledge of the facts.

Where to File an FIR?

An FIR can be filed in the police station of the concerned area in whose jurisdiction the offence has occurred. A first are to obtain information about the alleged criminal activity so as to be able to take suitable steps for tracing and bringing to book the guilty person.

Its secondary though equally important object is to obtain early information of an alleged criminal activity and to record the circumstances before the trial, lest such circumstances are forgotten or embellished.

Why FIR should be filed promptly

This is the golden principle of law prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that the First Information Report should always be filed promptly and without wasting any time. Such type of report gains the maximum credibility and is always welcome and appreciated by the courts.

According to Supreme Court the FIR recorded promptly before the time afforded to embellish or do away with the evidence is useful. It eliminates the possible chance of giving rise to suspicion.

Is there time duration fixed for Filing an FIR?

We have already emphasized this fact that as far as possible and practicable, every FIR should invariably be filed promptly, expeditiously and without wasting any time. There may be circumstances where some concession of time must be given in filing the FIR But there must be cogent reasons for reasonable delay in filing the FIR under the compelling circumstances. Judges with lot of wisdom and experience can use their discretion judiciously and in the interest of justice in each and every case. However, no possible duration of time can be fixed for applying the test of reasonableness to the lodging of an FIR as we have already explained. It depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. The delay in lodging the FIR as such is not fatal in law if the prosecution substantiated the factual difficulties encountered by the persons lodging the report.

Following are the reports or statements which do not amount to be an FIR:

  1. A report or a statement recorded after the commencement of the investigation (sections 162 and 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973).
  2. Reports not recorded immediately but after questioning of witnesses.
  3. Reports recorded after several days of developments.
  4. Information not about occurrence of cognizable offence but only cryptic message in the form of an appeal for immediate help.
  5. Complaint to the Magistrate.
  6. Information to beat house.
  7. Information to the Magistrate or police officer on phone.
  8. Information received at police station prior to the lodging of an F.LR.

It was held in Damodar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 4414: 2003 AIR SCW 5050: 2003 (4) RCR (Cri) 355 (SC) that if the information was conveyed to police on telephone and DO entry was made, it will not constitute an FIR even if the information disclosed commission of cognizable offence.