While picking up the gauntlet and not lagging behind in reminding the police officers of the red lines before invoking stringent laws, the Apex Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Sri Gulam Mustafa vs The State of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of 2023 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2480 of 2021 and cited in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 421 that was pronounced as recently as on May 10, 2023 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has minced just no words to hold that, “The officers, who institute an FIR, based on any complaint, are duty bound to be vigilant before invoking any provision of a very stringent statute, like the SC/ST Act, which imposes serious penal consequences on the concerned accused. The officer has to be satisfied that the provisions he seeks to invoke prima facie apply to the case at hand. We clarify that our remarks, in no manner, are to dilute the applicability of special/stringent statutes, but only to remind the police not to mechanically apply the law, dehors reference to the factual position.” The Bench also unequivocally held that, “Where purely civil disputes, more often than not, relating to land and/or money are given the colour of criminality, only for the purposes of exerting extra-judicial pressure on the party concerned, which, we reiterate, is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. (Para 36).” This notable judgment arises out of impugned final judgment and order dated 23-02-2021 in CRLP No. 3788/2019 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Ahsanullah Amanullah for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Dinesh Maheshwari and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Heard learned counsel for the appellant, respondent no.1 and respondent no.2.”
As we see, the Bench then specifies in para 3 that, “The present criminal appeal is directed against the Final Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) rendered by the High Court of Karnataka (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) at Bengaluru, whereby the High Court was pleased to reject Criminal Petition No. 3788 of 2019 preferred by the appellant.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 4 that, “The Appellant is the Managing Director of GM Infinite Dwelling (India) Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as “GMID”). The company is said to be engaged in developing residential properties. The said company and the owners (heirs of one Mr A. Hafeez Khan) of land bearing Survey Number 83 in Jodi Mallasandra Village, District Bengaluru entered into a Joint Development Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “JDA”) on 17.08.2009. In the year 2017, the apartment project, as contemplated under the JDA, was completed and sale deeds were executed in favour of the allottees.”
Further, the Bench then states in para 5 that, “The original owners of the land claimed title on the basis of possessing the sale deed with regard to the said land; order of the Special Deputy Commissioner, Inams Abolition, Bangalore in Case No. 86/1959-60 dated 09.07.1961; Revenue records recording the property mutated in the names of the heirs of Mr. A. Hafeez Khan and given Survey Numbers 83/1 and 83/2 [(old Survey Number 8) new Survey Number 83]. Pursuant to the JDA, the land-owners got the land-use changed from agriculture to non-agriculture and after getting the necessary No-Objection Certificate from various departments involved, obtained the sanctioned map and Building License from the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagar Palike (hereinafter referred to as the “BBMP”), before construction commenced.”
Furthermore, the Bench then discloses in para 6 that, “It transpires that one Venkatesh, son of Late Bylappa, was the owner of old Survey Number 83 and his property had been assigned new Survey Numbers 80/1 and 80/3, and due to such change, with the new survey numbers with regard to the land in question being Survey Number 83, the said Venkatesh claimed title over land under the new Survey Number 83. This resulted in prolonged civil litigation which included an application before the Special Tehsildar; appeal before the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore, North Sub-Division, and; Appeal before the Special Deputy Commissioner – all of which went against Venkatesh.”
What’s more, the Bench then observes in para 7 that, “But that is not all. There were also two suits – one filed by the legitimate landowners, which was a suit for injunction, and one (which we have no hesitation in terming so) a frivolous suit filed by Venkatesh. Since Venkatesh’s suit did not yield any relief, he, along with others, approached the High Court with an appeal, which was also dismissed. In addition to this, Venkatesh also made an application before the Additional Director, Town Planning, BBMP and got the sanctioned plan cancelled. GMID impugned the cancellation before the High Court by way of a writ petition, which was disposed of directing GMID and the owners to approach the BBMP’s Appeal Committee. Upon so doing, BBMP’s Appeal Committee set aside the order of the Commissioner and restored the sanctioned plan.”
In addition, the Bench then proceeds to state in para 8 that, “The construction commenced and after GMID having entered into sale agreement(s) with prospective purchasers of the apartments, Venkatesh initiated criminal proceedings against the appellants and others and through his proxies, one of whom, namely, Parvathy Reddy had even been impleaded in the civil suit filed by Venkatesh. Another civil suit being O.S. No. 8163/2016 has also been filed against the land-owners and the builders by other person(s), which, as on date, is still pending. While these civil litigations were being defended by GMID and the original landlords in various courts, a criminal complaint was lodged by the mother of the plaintiff in O.S. No. 8163/2016, under Sections 120B, 406, 419, 468, 471, 420, 448, 427 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”). The same metamorphosed into First Information Report in Crime No. 317/2017 at Bagalgunte Police Station, Bangalore City (hereinafter referred to as the “FIR”) under Section 3(1)(15) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the “SC/ST Act”) and Sections 427, 420, 419, 406, 471, 468, 448 and 120B of the IPC. The Managing Director of GMID, namely Gulam Mustafa, the appellant before us is arrayed as Accused No. 18 in the FIR.”
Simply put, the Bench states in para 9 that, “Insofar as the development on the land is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has stated that in 2017, the construction of the apartments was completed, sale deeds executed in favour of the respective allottees, and these allottees are residing in their apartments thereafter.”
Quite revealingly, the Bench then reveals in para 10 that, “The appellant moved a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”) on 28.05.2019 before the High Court for quashing the FIR. The said petition was numbered Criminal Petition No. 3788 of 2019, and the High Court, by order dated 07.08.2019, while issuing notice, granted ad interim direction staying further proceedings in the FIR as far as the appellant was concerned. However, Criminal Petition No. 3788 of 2019 was ultimately dismissed on 23.02.2021, leading to the institution of the instant appeal.”
It cannot be glossed over that the Bench points out in para 24 that, “Having considered the matter, this Court finds that a case for interference is made out. The basic facts to be noticed are: (a) that the land-owners with whom GMID had entered into the JDA, had purchased the land in 1954-1955, and; (b) the occupancy rights were also created in the original land-owners’ favour on 09.07.1961. From then onwards, no dispute was raised by any person before any authority and only after the GMID entered into the JDA with the original land-owners in the year 2009, obtained all clearances from the authorities in their favour, started the construction work and built apartments numbering more than 400, sold them to the buyers/allottees in the year 2017, did the present dispute arise. This itself indicates a lack of bonafide. We have mused as to why the complainant and her family members, if the land was theirs, would sit by and watch on as fence-sitters for a long period of time.”
Quite ostensibly, the Bench remarks in para 25 that, “Moreover, when one civil litigation had attained finality with no relief granted to the relatives of the complainant, another civil suit was filed in the year 2016 and therein as well, when no interim order could be secured by the complainant/her family members, the present complaint has been registered, resulting in the FIR. We are constrained to state that the malafide appears writ large from the aforenoted sequence of events.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 35 that, “We have bestowed anxious consideration to the precedents cited by learned counsel for the respondents and are of the view that the same are inapposite to the factual scenario herein. Suffice it would be to state that while the propositions laid down therein are not disputed, they do not prejudice the version of the present appellant. Tapan Kumar Singh (supra) and Naresh (supra) indicate that the FIR need not be a detailed one, as it is only to initiate the investigative process and the police should ordinarily be allowed to investigate. This is the general rule, but not a fetter on this Court or the High Court in an appropriate case.”
Frankly speaking, the Bench lays bare how a civil case is given a criminal colour by expounding in para 36 that, “What is evincible from the extant case-law is that this Court has been consistent in interfering in such matters where purely civil disputes, more often than not, relating to land and/or money are given the colour of criminality, only for the purposes of exerting extrajudicial pressure on the party concerned, which, we reiterate, is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. In the present case, there is a huge, and quite frankly, unexplained delay of over 60 years in initiating dispute with regard to the ownership of the land in question, and the criminal case has been lodged only after failure to obtain relief in the civil suits, coupled with denial of relief in the interim therein to the respondent no.2/her family members. It is evident that resort was now being had to criminal proceedings which, in the considered opinion of this Court, is with ulterior motives, for oblique reasons and is a clear case of vengeance.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 37 that, “The Court would also note that even if the allegations are taken to be true on their face value, it is not discernible that any offence can be said to have been made out under the SC/ST Act against the appellant. The complaint and FIR are frivolous, vexatious and oppressive.”
Most significantly, the Bench minces just no words to hold in para 38 what constitutes the cornerstone of this learned judgment stating that, “This Court would indicate that the officers, who institute an FIR, based on any complaint, are duty bound to be vigilant before invoking any provision of a very stringent statute, like the SC/ST Act, which imposes serious penal consequences on the concerned accused. The officer has to be satisfied that the provisions he seeks to invoke prima facie apply to the case at hand. We clarify that our remarks, in no manner, are to dilute the applicability of special/stringent statutes, but only to remind the police not to mechanically apply the law, dehors reference to the factual position.”
As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 39 that, “For the reasons aforesaid, the Court finds that the High Court fell in error in not invoking its wholesome power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the FIR. Accordingly, the Impugned Judgment, being untenable in law, is set aside. Consequent thereupon, the FIR, as also any proceedings emanating therefrom, insofar as they relate to the appellant, are quashed and set aside.”
Finally, the Bench concludes by holding in para 40 that, “Accordingly, this appeal stands allowed, without any order towards costs. Pending applications are consigned to records.”
In sum, we thus see that the Apex Court has been most vocal in reminding the police officers to be vigilant before invoking stringent laws like the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. It thus merits no reiteration that the police officers must pay heed to what the Apex Court has directed and act accordingly. No denying it!
Sanjeev Sirohi