Bombay HC Speaks Up For Mother Who Was Dis-housed

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                                It is really a matter of extreme solace that none other than the Bombay High Court which is one of India’s most reputed and also oldest High Courts spoke most vocally in its judgment titled Suryakant Kisan Pawar vs Deputy Collector, Mumbai and others in Writ Petition No. 2141 of 2019 in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction delivered on December 18, 2021 has directed a son who “deprived his mother from leading a normal life” to vacate the house “expeditiously”, noting that the mother had suffered immensely over five years. The single Judge Bench of Justice Girish Kulkarni minced just no words to lament with a heavy heart that it was “astonishing” how the 48-year-old son had invented a novel way of entering the septuagenarian mother’s house. He signed a rent agreement with her, with no intention of honouring the agreement as he didn’t pay a single rupee to her until she did not approach the authorities against him.   

                      To start with, it is first and foremost put forth in para 1 that, “The plight of a benighted widowed mother, a senior citizen, to gain a roof over her head in a tenement of 300 sq. feet owned by her and the hard struggle faced by her from one of her sons, is the subject matter of the present unfortunate proceedings.”

         While elaborating, the Bench then observes in para 2 that, “This is a writ petition arising out of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,2007. An order dated 3 February 2018 passed by the Presiding Officer of the Parents and Senior Citizens Subsistence Tribunal, Mumbai City, is challenged in the present petition, by the petitioner, who is the son of respondent No.2 – Smt. Kusum Kisan Pawar who is a senior citizen (for short ‘the mother’). The mother approached the tribunal as constituted under Section 7 of the the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,2007 (for short ‘the Senior Citizens Act’) invoking its jurisdiction under Sections 4 and 5 read with Section 23 of the Act against the petitioner, inasmuch as, the mother was dis-housed from her only abode being a small tenement admeasuring 300 sq. ft. being No.209 Swapna Safalya Building, Dhan Mill Naka, Prabhadevi, Mumbai-400025 (for short ‘the said tenement’).”

                            To put things in perspective, the Bench then enunciates in para 3 that, “The facts are quite peculiar and to some extent which would shock the conscience of the Court. There was an original tenement which was possessed by the petitioner’s father and respondent no.2’s (the mother’s) husband- Kisan Rangu Pawar. The building in which such tenement existed was taken up for redevelopment and on completion of the redevelopment, Kisan Rangu Pawar would have become entitled to be housed in the redeveloped premises, that is the tenement in question. However, as Kisan expired, the landlord, namely, the Mumbai Municipal Corporation incorporated the mother’s name to be the tenant and permitted allotment of the redeveloped tenement in favour of the mother. The developer accordingly issued an allotment letter of the said tenement in favour of the mother, who was also put in possession of the said 300 sq. ft. tenement. At an old age, the said tenement is the only roof over the mother’s head. It is not in dispute that the mother all along was residing in the said tenement. She has four children, two sons (one of them being the petitioner) and two daughters. It appears that all the children are married.”

                              Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 4 that, “It is matter of common knowledge that the tenement in question is located in a prime locality at Mumbai, namely, at Prabhadevi. This being the position, it appears that the petitioner to the exclusion of other siblings started asserting a right of residence on the said tenement belonging to the mother. The petitioner in such pursuit, along with his family members foisted himself on the mother, who was occupying the said tenement and appears to have entered the tenement on a specious ground that his children are taking education in a nearby school.”

       To be sure, the Bench then pointed out in para 5 that, “It is quite evident from the record that the petitioner at all material times was aware that the tenement exclusively belonged to the mother. The petitioner appeared to be aware that at least during the lifetime of the mother, the petitioner and other siblings would not have any right to seek occupation or possession of the tenement. On this backdrop, the petitioner thought of a novel method to dis-house the mother of the tenement. This, by taking advantage of her old age, her lack of education and that she being not literate and benighted, by entering into a rent agreement with the mother. The rent agreement was part of the record before the Tribunal as is also before this Court. The rent agreement in fact militates against the position taken by the petitioner in purportedly asserting independent rights qua the tenement, which would be discussed little later.”

                             While dwelling on the terms and conditions of the rent agreement, the Bench then hastens to add in para 6 that, “Under the rent agreement, the petitioner agreed to pay the mother a monthly rent of Rs.5000/-, which he never paid. The rent agreement was executed on 18 June 2016 for a period from 1 July 2016 to 31 May 2017, being a period of 11 months. During such period, the petitioner was to pay Rs.5,000/- p.m. as rent to the mother. However, what is significant about the rent agreement is that in the recital clause of the rent agreement, which is also under the petitioner’s signature, he agrees that the tenement is owned by the mother. He further agrees that he is availing the tenement for a period of eleven months, on payment of such rent. He also agrees that he would vacate the tenement after the agreement period is over. The petitioner despite the agreement period having expired continued to enjoy the tenement to the exclusion of the mother, who was required to take shelter along with other extended family members in her village. What is glaring to be noted, is that as far as the petitioner was concerned, the rent agreement was only a piece of paper and was never to be acted upon, either by making payment of rent as agreed and/or vacating the tenement. The petitioner also conveniently choose to forget that in such agreement he had recognized the mother to be the absolute owner of the tenement. It cannot be disputed that the mother had decided to receive income for her survival from the petitioner/her own son, under the rent agreement which was only for a period of 11 months.”

                             Truth be told, the Bench then narrates in para 7 that, “It is the mother’s case that the petitioner did not make payment of the rent which was also a source of her livelihood. She made complaints to different authorities including the police that she has been ousted from her residence as also she was not paid by her son/petitioner.”

As it turned out, the Bench then discloses in para 8 that, “In these circumstances, the mother approached the Senior Citizens Tribunal invoking provisions of the Senior Citizens Act by filing the complaint in question. However, prior thereto, as noted above, she also made complaints to the police against the petitioner. On the mother making such complaints, one day prior to the mother filing her application before the Senior Citizens Tribunal, the petitioner deposited in the mother’s bank account an amount of Rs.30,000/- and thereafter, took a position that he is willing to regularly make monthly payments to the mother.”

                               Briefly stated, the gist of para 9 is that, “The petitioner appeared before the tribunal having received notice of the said proceedings. The reply filed by the petitioner to the mother’s application speaks volumes about the petitioner’s approach and his feelings about his own mother. It is difficult to believe that a son can make reckless allegations against the mother only for paper’s sake and that too, merely with an intention to assert rights on the tenement and opposed to the mother possessing and occupying the same.”

                                 As we see, the Bench then holds in para 16 that, “Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused the record, it appears to be not in dispute that after the death of the petitioner’s father and the husband of respondent no.2 (the mother), the Mumbai Municipal Corporation had recognized the mother as the person lawfully entitled to possess the tenement in question. The mother accordingly was issued an allotment of the tenement by the developers, as noted above. Thus, the petitioner as a son certainly could not have asserted any legal right of occupation or possession of the tenement when such documents showed that the mother was exclusively entitled to the tenement. In these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive that the petitioner could take any steps to oust the mother from the said premises. As asserted by the mother, the petitioner who is 48 years of age although claims to be truck driver, he is in the business of letting out the trucks. He appears to be married and well settled. As also the other son namely Chandrakant, the petitioner’s younger brother is 39 years of age is also staying in independent premises. He is not asserting that the mother should not possess and occupy the tenement so as to oust the mother from the tenement. Two daughters Ranjana and Kalpana who are aged 45 and 42 respectively, are married and they are also not opposed to the mother possessing and occupying the tenement.”

                                  It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then enunciates in para 17 that, “It however appears that the petitioner has not spared any effort and has taken every possible step to retain the possession of the tenement and for that matter, he also tried to enter into such rent agreement, with the mother, however, in doing so he completely overlooked that such a rent agreement was a temporary relief to him, inasmuch as, in the rent agreement in the recital clause, he accepted the mother to be the exclusive owner of the tenement oblivious of the consequence of such recital. The petitioner cannot set up a defence which is contrary to such document, to which he is himself a party.”

                          Quite significantly, the Bench then holds in para 30 that, “In the facts of the present case, the rent agreement is required to be clearly looked at only as an attempt and a struggle on the mother’s part to receive benefits from the tenement, so as to avail such small money from the petitioner for her survival/livelihood. Even to make such payment to the mother, the petitioner defaulted, for no justifiable reason. The petitioner in fact deprived the mother of her right to “live a normal life” apart from the fact that he has failed to maintain and support her livelihood.”

                          As a corollary, the Bench then stipulates in para 32 that, “From the above discussion looked from any angle and with certainty it is evident, that the petitioner has no legal right whatsoever in the tenement in question so as to sustain a claim, that he can dis-house the mother and exclusively enjoy the tenement. The tribunal has recorded findings which are based on record and are in accordance with law. There is no perversity whatsoever in the findings as recorded by the tribunal requiring interference of this Court in its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The petition is wholly misconceived. It is accordingly, dismissed. Rule discharged. No costs.”

                      In addition, the Bench then also stipulates in para 33 that, “As the mother has substantially suffered for a long period, it is imminently in the interest of justice that the petitioner expeditiously vacates the premises. The petitioner is directed to hand over the vacant possession of the premises to the mother within a period of fifteen days from today.”

                               Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 34 that, “At this stage, learned Counsel for the petitioner prays for continuation of the interim relief for a longer period. In the facts of the case, the request is rejected.”

                          All told, it is an extremely commendable, cogent and creditworthy judgment which vocally espouses truth and moral values by refusing to grant relief to son who became mother’s tenant and dis-housed her most shamelessly and most disgracefully without having any regard to the most sacred relations between mother and son! Before concluding we must definitely go through the real gist of para 19 of this extremely commendable judgment that, “The Senior Citizens Act as seen from its preamble is a legislation to provide for more effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized under the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It is also evident from the statement of objects and reasons that the intention behind the Senior Citizens Act is to provide for institutionalization of a suitable mechanism for protection of life and property of older persons.” Of course, the provisions of this laudable Act must be certainly implemented in totality! There can be just no denying or disputing it!  

Sanjeev Sirohi

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