In a significant judgment, we saw how none other than the Himachal Pradesh High Court itself in a most remarkable, robust, rational and recent oral judgment titled Alam Chand vs Chaman Lal and Anr in Cr.MMO No. 1232 of 2022 that was pronounced finally on December 22, 2022 has ruled most markedly that a cheque bounce can be compounded even after conviction. It must be mentioned that the Single Judge Bench of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sandeep Sharma stated that the parties are permitted to get the matter compounded in the light of the compromise arrived at between them. In view of the aforesaid, the Bench allowed the petition and quashed the order passed by the Trial Court.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sandeep Sharma sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 Cr.PC, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner, who stands convicted of his having committed offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in criminal Case No. 197-I/2014/120-III/2014, Chaman Lal v. Alam Chand, for compounding the offence under Section 147 of the Act.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 2 that, “Precisely the facts of the case as emerge from the record are that respondent No.1 instituted proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the court of learned JMFC Chachyot at Gohar District Mandi, H.P. alleging therein that accused with a view to discharge his liability, issued cheque amounting to Rs. 4,00,000/-, but fact remains that aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned, was dishonoured. Since petitioner-accused failed to make the payment good within the time stipulated in the legal notice, respondent/complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings before the competent Court of law under Section 138 of the Act.”
Further, the Bench then goes on to state in para 3 that, “Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment dated 31.1.2017/4.2.2017, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,80,000/- to the respondent/complainant.”
As it turned out, the Bench then discloses in para 4 that, “Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the court below, accused preferred an appeal in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Mandi, District Mandi, HP., which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 28.2.2020. Petitioner accused further laid challenge to the aforesaid judgment dated 28.2.2020 before this Court in Cr.R. No. 183 of 2021, which also came to be dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 15.6.2022, as a consequence of which, judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld.”
As we see, the Bench then points out in para 5 that, “After passing of the judgment dated 15.6.2022 passed by this Court thereby, dismissing the criminal revision petition having been filed by the petitioner-accused, parties have entered into compromise, whereby petitioner-accused has paid the entire amount of compensation to the respondent and in this background, petitioner has approached this court in the instant proceedings filed under Section 482 Cr.PC read with Section 147 of the Act, praying therein for compounding of offence.”
No doubt, the Bench then rightly postulates in para 7 stating that, “Though parties have resolved to settle their dispute amicably inter-se them as is evident from the statement of learned counsel for the respondent, but now question which requires to be decided at the first instance is “whether this court after upholding the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the court below can proceed to review its own judgment dated 15.6.2022, whereby criminal revision petition having been filed by the petitioner accused came to be dismissed or not?”.”
Briefly stated, the Bench then very rightly expounds in para 8 that, “This Court vide judgment passed in Cr.MP No. 1197 of 2017 in Cr. Revision No. 394 of 2015 titled Gulab Singh v. Vidya Sagar Sharma, while relying upon judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court as well as other Constitutional Courts has already held that court, while exercising power under Section 147 of Act can proceed to compound offence even in those cases, where accused stands convicted.”
It is worth noting that the Bench then hastens to add in para 9 noting that, “Reliance is also placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Gujarat High Court, wherein similar application came to be filed for recalling the judgment passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Gujarat High Court, has reiterated that judgment passed by the High Court affirming the judgment of conviction recorded under Section 138 of the Act, can be recalled in view of the specific provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act, which provides for compounding of offence allegedly committed under Section 138 of the Act.
“11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Subramanian Vs. R.Rajathi; (2010)15 Supreme Court Cases 352, also in similar situation ordered for compounding of offence after recording of conviction by the courts below, wherein it has been held as under:-
“6. Thereafter a compromise was entered into and the petitioner claims that he has paid Rs. 4,52,289 to the respondent. In support of this claim, the petitioner has produced an affidavit sworn by him on 1.12.2008. The petitioner has also produced an affidavit sworn by P. Kaliappan, Power of attorney holder of R. Rajathi on 1.12.2008 mentioning that he has received a sum of Rs. 4,52,289 due under the dishonoured cheques in full discharge of the value of cheques and he is not willing to prosecute the petitioner.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner states at the Bar that the petitioner was arrested on 30.7.2008 and has undergone the sentence imposed on him by the trial Court and confirmed by the Sessions Court, the High Court as well as by this Court. The two affidavits sought to be produced by the petitioner as additional documents would indicate that indeed a compromise has taken place between the petitioner and the respondent and the respondent has accepted the compromise offered by the petitioner pursuant to which he has received a sum of Rs.4,52,289. In the affidavit filed by the respondent a prayer is made to permit the petitioner to compound the offence and close the proceedings.
8. Having regard to the salutary provisions of Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court is of the opinion that in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the petitioner should be permitted to compound the offence committed by him under Section 138 of the Code.””
Most significantly, the Bench then minces just no words to state in para 13 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment wherein it is expounded that, “Since in the case at hand, petitioner after being convicted under Section 138 of the Act has compromised the matter with the respondent complainant and in terms thereof has already paid the entire amount of compensation, prayer for compounding the offence can be accepted in terms of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Damodar S. Prabhu V. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663, wherein it has been categorically held that court, while exercising power under Section 147 of the Act, can proceed to compound the offence even after recording of conviction by the courts below. Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Subramanian v. R. Rajathi represented by P.O.A.P. Kaliappan, 2010 (15) SCC 352, has held that in view of the provisions contained under Section 147 of the Act read with Section 320 of Cr.PC, compromise arrived can be accepted even after recording of the judgment of conviction.”
Equally significant is what is then laid down in para 14 wherein it is held that, “Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, parties are permitted to get the matter compounded in the light of the compromise arrived inter se them. Accordingly, judgment of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial court is quashed and set-aside and petitioner is acquitted of the charge framed against him. His bail bonds are discharged. Since petitioner-accused is lodged at Sub Jail Mandi, release warrants be prepared accordingly and sent through Fax/Email to the Superintendent of Sub Jail Mandi, immediately. The petition is disposed of alongwith pending applications, if any.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by clarifying in para 15 that, “The parties are permitted to produce copy of order downloaded from the High Court website before the officer concerned, however, if required, passing of order can be verified from the High Court website or otherwise.”
In a nutshell, we thus see that the Himachal Pradesh High Court has left no stone unturned to make it indubitably clear that cheque bounce can be compounded even after conviction. So it merits no reiteration that all the Judges of Trial Courts and District Courts must pay heed to what the Himachal Pradesh High Court has laid down in this leading case so very clearly, cogently and convincingly! No denying it!
Sanjeev Sirohi